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Thesis Abstract 
 
The minimalist state of the national treatment provision in the investment treaties has 
provided limited guidance for the tribunals for interpretation. As a result, there were 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of national treatment, in particular the question 
of likeness. This thesis aims to develop the doctrinal understanding of the 
determination of appropriate comparator guided by the underlying philosophies, 
historical evolution and relevant investment decisions. The methods applied in this 
thesis are doctrinal and comparative studies of international investment law and the 
compared jurisprudences. A major part of this thesis is dedicated to examine the 
comparison and relevance of the GATT/WTO, EU and international human rights 
law in the interpretation of discrimination based on nationality. The interpretative 
methods applied by the respective jurisprudences in determining likeness and related 
questions of legitimate regulatory measures are examined to see whether there are 
lessons that could be learnt in the interpretation of national treatment in investment 
law. The finding of this thesis confirms that there is potentially a range of insightful 
guidance from the jurisprudences under comparison which could provide a 
structured understanding of national treatment in international investment law. The 
observations put forth highlight the underlying philosophies and values of the 
national treatment principle in protecting the investors and addressing the host states‘ 
regulatory needs.   It reflects the contemporaneous development in international 
investment law and provides a positive response to public administrative principles 
benefitted by way of international comparative administration law. 
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Chapter 1 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
National treatment in international investment law is a doctrine aimed to prohibit 
host states from introducing discriminatory measures that favour domestic than 
foreign investors or investments, in like circumstances. It is a common provision 
found in almost all bilateral investment treaties and other international investment 
agreements.
1
 The inclusion of this provision in international investment agreements 
and treaties provides an assurance to foreign investors that their investments will 
operate at least at a level playing field and at the course of ordinary business 
circumstances or risks.
2
 It promotes the establishment of neutral investment 
environment and reduces discrimination, which would otherwise be a certain risk to 
foreign investors.
3
 
                                                 
1 Examples of investment treaties containing national treatment provision are UK-Argentina BIT , 
Egypt-Germany BIT (2005) , Korea- Malaysia BIT (1988) and Finland-Brazil BIT (1995) all text are 
available at <http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779> , accessed on 28 July 
2014. National treatment provisions are also inserted in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the 
United States,  signed 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 [entered into force 1 January 1994], < 
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=FullView&mid=1588&language=en-
US>, accessed on 26 September 2013; and The Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1, Official Journal of 
the European Communities, L69/26, March 1998, < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:069:0026:0090:EN:PDF>, accessed on 29 
July 2013. 
2 Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (OUP 
USA 2010) 342. 
3 Thomas W Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good 
Governance and Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (2004). Lord Mustill International 
Arbitration Conference. St. John's College. 
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The exposure of foreign investments to discrimination is a concern attributable to the 
host states‘ tendency in protecting its domestic investors against threats of 
competition in the open market.
4
 Host states often find it hard to reconcile the 
limited regulatory function and the increasing internal pressure to safeguard national 
investors and strategic industries in facing competition with the foreign investors. A 
treatment which is favourable to national investors would probably be discriminatory 
to foreign investors. Such favourable treatments are commonly given through the 
change of fiscal regulations in the form of exemption of permits, rebates on taxes or 
less procedural requirements arising from the new regulations introduced by the host 
states, executed by governmental bodies or agencies in performing their regulatory 
functions.
 5
 
 
The states and their increasing regulatory function are termed as regulatory states. In 
the setting of a ‗regulatory state‘, the state‘s role is shifted from controlling directly 
businesses or assets as a public entity ownership to a regulatory or supervisory role 
of the private owners of business.
6
 It is by this function, and in the light of upholding 
the sovereignty to determine the state‘s own economic and social system that host 
states tend to impose rules and regulations to manage the important sectors in the 
state.  
 
                                                 
4 Governments seek through their regulations and administrative actions to assist their nationals and 
companies. See Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2010) 
245. 
5 The change of fiscal regulations and economic environment may adversely affect foreign investors. 
See Abba Kolo and Thomas W Walde, ‗Coverage of Taxation Under Modern Investment Treaties‘ in 
Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 306. 
6 Giandomenico Majone, ‗From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of 
Changes in the Mode of Governance‘ (1997) 17 Journal of Public Policy 139. 
 3 
 
It is reported in the World Development Report 2005 that the regulations and taxes 
imposed by the host states tend to discriminate foreign investors, particularly by the 
developing countries.
7
 The World Bank has also highlighted the potentials of how 
public ownership could weaken the investment climate, one of which is by setting up 
monopolies and denying opportunities to other firms. It claims that public enterprises 
often enjoy a range of exemptions either by law or by practice from taxes or 
regulations that can distort competition.
8
    
 
The need to protect domestic investments became imminent due to huge inflow of 
foreign direct investments by privatisation encouraged by bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and regional and free trade treaties with investment chapters among 
states.
9
 According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
                                                 
7 World Development Report 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (The World Bank and 
Oxford University Press 2005) 96. See especially Figure 5.1: Low-income Countries Tend to 
Regulate More. Claims of discrimination also occur between OECD Member States and nationals of 
other OECD Member State, for instance those under NAFTA. See Andrew Newcombe and Lluís 
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 53. 
8 World Development Report 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (n 7) 97. 
9 Privatisation has taken over public monopolies and caused the flow of foreign investment into the 
internal market in domains such as telecommunication, energy, water and transportation. Foreign 
direct investment inflow has reached a record in 2007, surpassing its previous peak in 2001 with 
inflows of $1833 billion. Although the trend declined in 2008 due to the global and economic 
financial crisis, there was a modest recovery in early 2010. See United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (Geneva), World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations, and the 
Infrastructure Challenge (United Nations 2008) 3.; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy (United Nations 
2010) 2. For a recent  update of the global foreign direct investment inflow, refer ‗World Investment 
Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development‘ (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2013) 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf>, 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf>, accessed on 26 September 2013. 
Privatisation has also contributed to the transformation of the international economy. See David J 
Donaldson, Privatization: Principles and Practice (World Bank Publications 1995) 9. As far as 
investment agreements involving more than two countries, the examples are North American Free 
Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the 
Government of the United States (NAFTA),  signed 17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 
1994], < https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=FullView&mid=1588&language=en-US>, accessed on 26 
September 2013, The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),[1998] OJ L69/26, < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:069:0026:0090:EN:PDF>, accessed on 29 
July 2013. 
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(UNCTAD), there were 2608 BITs, 2730 double taxation treaties (DTTs) and 254 
free trade agreement (FTA) by the end of 2008.
10
 As these treaties guarantee 
extensive rights to the foreign investors against, inter alia expropriation, 
discrimination and unfair acts by the host states, they cast a huge responsibility on 
the host states to meet the obligations. This does not only mean that host states must 
ensure compliance of all domestic law before ratification of the treaties, but to 
maintain and work within the commitments which may involve future restrictions in 
introducing new measures into the domestic law.
11
 
 
Due to the fragility of foreign investments against unpredictable regulatory changes 
which are potentially discriminatory, discrimination has become a more fearsome 
risk than other interferences, including formal expropriation.
12
 The national 
treatment protection is an international discipline that counteracts innate tendencies 
of host states towards protectionism.
13
  
 
 
                                                 
10 UNCTAD also reported the increase of double taxation treaties and other international agreements 
with investment provisions. Refer UNCTAD, ‗Recent Developments in International Investment 
Agreements (2008–June 2009)‘ (2009) xvii, 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf.>,  accessed on 28 January 2014. 
11  More than four fifths (81.5%) of the 1,891 BITs that had entered into force until the end of 2005 
became effective within the first three years after signature. This indicates the complicated process of 
national ratification required. Refer UNCTAD, ‗The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs)‘ (2006), <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf>, accessed on 28 January 
2014. 
12 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). Expropriation becomes an unpopular resort by 
states not only because of the uproar in such takings by capital exporters and the increase of 
investment cases at the tribunals but also because the important sectors have practically been taken 
over by states by 1970s. See also Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2), Michael S Minor, 
‗The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy, 1980-1992‘ (1994) 25 Journal of 
International Business Studies 177. 
13 Karl P Sauvant, ‗FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise‘ [2009] The World Bank., 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-5052> accessed on 14 
October 2013. 
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2.0 Statement of Problem 
 
Clauses on national treatment in international investment law instruments are almost 
identical, save for some wordings.  Despite the similar nature of the national 
treatment provisions, there are inconsistencies in interpretation in the investment 
awards.
14
 Among the most incoherent matters in national treatment are the 
identification of the relevant comparator -commonly phrased as ‗in like 
circumstances‘ or ‗in like situations‘ in national treatment provisions, the 
determination of legitimate regulatory measure and the comparative methodology in 
the interpretation of the national treatment provision.  
 
2.1 Interpretation of Likeness in Investment Arbitration Cases 
 
In determining the appropriate comparator, the tribunals took very divergent 
approaches from one case to another. The tribunal in the case of Marvin Feldman v 
Mexico limited likeness to only trading companies, excluding exporting companies 
even though they are similarly in the tobacco business.
15
 The narrow approach taken 
was justified by the tribunal by holding that treating producers and resellers 
differently would promote inter alia; better control over tax revenue, discourage 
smuggling and prohibit grey market sales business.
16
 
 
                                                 
14 Rudolf Dolzer observed that it is misleading to assume that the homogeneity of the clauses make it 
easy for the standard to be applied. See Rudolf Dolzer, ‗National Treatment: New Developments‘ 
(Syposium Co-organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD 2005) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/36055356.pdf>, accessed on 12 
September 2013. 
15 Marvin Feldman v Mexico ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002 (hereinafter 
‗Feldman v Mexico’). 
16 Ibid., para 172. 
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In contrast to Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal in Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador adopted a broad interpretation to 
include all companies engaged in exports regardless of the sector they are in, as valid 
comparators to the claimant. Comparing the situation with ‗like product‘ under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT/WTO),
17
 the tribunal claimed that 
the case in question is broader, that no exporter is ought to be put in a 
disadvantageous position as compared to other exporters.
18
 Thus, the tribunal 
concluded that the appropriate comparator could not be limited exclusively to the 
sector in which that particular activity is taken. 
 
From the two cases, it can be observed that while the interpretation of likeness is 
very narrow in Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal captured the whole group of exporters 
ranging from flower exporters to oil exporters in the case of OEPC v Ecuador. In 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, in like circumstances was 
construed to be comparators who are in the ‗most‘ like circumstances, not the ‗less‘ 
like circumstances, particularly in the case where there is an identical comparator but 
for nationality which was not discriminated.
19
  Having identical comparators 
producing methanol, the claimant was thus not considered as in like circumstances 
with other US domestic comparators producing oxygenates used in manufacturing 
reformulated gasoline that also compete for the same customers.  
 
 
                                                 
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed 1947, entered into force 1 January 1948, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf>, accessed on 5 October 2013. 
18 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador UNCITRAL, LCIA 
Case No UN3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004, para 176 (hereinafter ‘OEPC v Ecuador). 
19 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of the 
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, Part IV Chapter B p.8, para 17 (hereinafter 
‗Methanex v USA’). 
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In the case of Pope & Talbot Inc. v The Government of Canada, in like 
circumstances was discussed in view of the location of comparators among softwood 
lumber exporters.
 20
 In that case, the producers in the non-covered provinces were 
considered as not in like circumstances with those in the covered provinces. In 
United Parcel Service of America v Government of Canada, the operation courier 
and postal services was considered to be not in like circumstances due to the 
difference in the delivery mechanism, where one was able to deliver to ‗large retail 
customer‘ and ‗customers in shopping malls‘ while the other one was a ‗home 
delivery service‘. 21   
 
It is therefore observed that the interpretation of in like circumstances is construed 
differently and inconsistently by the tribunals which provides no predictability in the 
extent of the national treatment application.  
 
2.2 The Need for a Set of Criteria for Likeness 
 
The determination of likeness or appropriate comparator constitutes an integral test 
in invoking the national treatment protection.
22
 Non-discrimination principle such as 
national treatment only prohibits between covered investment and certain selected 
                                                 
20 Pope & Talbot Inc. v The Government of Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Merits of 
Phase 2, 10 April 2001, paras 75, 88 (hereinafter ‗Pope &Talbot Inc. v Canada’). 
21 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Merits, 24 
May 2007 (hereinafter ‘UPS v Canada’). 
22 The two elements of national treatment analysis in Andrew Newcombe are (i) identifying the 
relevant comparator and (ii) comparing the treatment received by the foreign and local investor to 
determine whether there has been less favourable treatment. See Newcombe and Paradell, Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 159. The importance of likeness and 
the difficulty of assessing it is a real issue in determining what constitute less favourable treatment to 
foreign investors. See AF. Maniruzzaman, ‗Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-
Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investments: An Overview‘ (1998) 8 Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy. 
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investments, termed ‗comparator‘.23 It has a direct causal relationship to the 
application of national treatment depending on the approach adopted. If a broad 
approach is applied, many investments would probably be regarded as like and thus 
makes the protection wider. On the contrary, if a narrow approach is applied, the 
scope will hence be smaller. 
 
Having such an importance in national treatment, likeness has however not been 
developed in a manner which could cast light in the determination of guiding 
principles for comparison. It is observed that this absence is at least because of two 
reasons. Firstly, it is perceived as impossible to have one guide that applies to all 
investments, and secondly, that the matter should be left to be resolved by the 
arbitrators on a case by case basis.  
 
The tribunals have suggested that the interpretation of likeness is context dependant, 
thus impossible to have a standard guide across all types of investments.
24
 In S.D. 
Myers Inc. v Canada, the tribunal held that in like circumstances invites a very wide 
interpretation and depends highly to the context of a particular dispute.
25
 Although 
factual circumstances are important in construing likeness, this thesis asserts that the 
criteria for likeness in investments are nevertheless possible. It is possible to 
characterise the vast diversity of investment, not necessarily solely by looking at the 
economic sector but by other relevant criteria congruent to investments.
 26
 
                                                 
23 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 338.  
24 Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada, (n 20), para 75; S.D. Myers Inc. v Government of Canada 
UNCITRAL/ NAFTA, Partial Award, 13 November 2000 (hereinafter SD Myers Inc. v Canada), para 
244. 
25 S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 244. 
26 Investments in the same economic sector is potentially a criteria of likeness. Likeness was 
construed in view of economic sector in some cases, see S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24) paras 243-
251.  Other relevant criteria to likeness in the investment context could be for instance, competition.  
Andrew Newcombe commented about the existence of a competitive relationship, which may 
 9 
 
 
The existence of criteria for interpretation can be taken as example from other areas 
of international investment law like expropriation, or from other jurisprudences 
having similar protections.
27
 International trade law acknowledges the complexity of 
determining the appropriate comparator. Gaeten Verhoosel described it as ‗one of the 
thorniest issues WTO panels has had to deal with in the past‘. 28 Through the 
evolution of decided cases and lengthy scholarly discussions in GATT/WTO, the 
jurisprudence has developed certain characteristics or factors to determine 
appropriate comparator, namely the products‘ end-users in a given market, 
consumers‘ tastes and habits, the products‘ property, nature and quality, the 
products‘ tariff classification and the aim and effect test.29 Similarity in approach is 
also observed in the EU law. The ECJ, in determining similar products for the 
purpose of Art 110 (1) TFEU (ex Article 90(1) EC) referred to whether the products 
were placed in the same classification, at the same stage of production or marketing, 
similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the viewpoint of consumers.
30
 
The competitive and substitutability factors are also examined in both 
jurisprudences.   
                                                                                                                                          
sometimes overlap or distinct from economic sector. See Andrew Newcombe (n 7)164. The 
competition criterion along with other criteria will be developed in this thesis in Ch.3 and 6. 
27 Criteria for expropriation are: (i) it must be for a public purpose (ii) it should be non-discriminatory 
(iii) it is taken in accordance with the applicable laws and due process (iv) full compensation is made. 
See Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (First Edition, 
Hart 2008) 74. See also Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law (OUP Oxford 2008) 91. and ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC &ADMC Management Limited  v 
The Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October 2006, paras 429-433. 
28 Gaetan Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement: Adjudicating the Boundaries 
of Regulatory Autonomy (Hart Publishing 2002) 23.  
29 In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, it was mentioned that no one approach will be appropriate 
for all cases. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8R, adopted 1 
November 1996, page 21. Among the writers in the field are Robert Hudec, Gaeten Verhoosel, Rex 
Zedalis, Won Mog Choi , Federico Ortino, Nicholas Di Mascio, Joost Pauwelyn and Jurgen Kurtz. 
The scholarly articles will be referred to especially in the literature review in this chapter and the 
discussion on relevance of likeness in GATT/WTO in Ch.3. 
30 Case 27/67, Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH v Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse [1968] ECR 
223, para 232,  Case 45/75, Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Großhandels GmbH v Hauptzollamt 
Landau/Pfalz [1976] ECR 181, para 12. 
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The international investment jurisprudence on the other hand has no firm criteria that 
could classify investments for the purpose. Research must be conducted to provide a 
comprehensive observation as to what kind of circumstances which are considered 
alike in the investment environment.
31
 The need of a set of criteria must not wait for 
the trend of arbitration awards which may take years and a long stretch of cases. 
Gabrielle Kaufman Kohler commented on the risk of waiting. The risk is that 
consistency will not emerge, as certain fundamental disagreements will remain.
32
 
With the current handful of inconsistent national treatment cases, it is hard to 
imagine elevating national treatment from ‗an empty shell‘ standard to a systematic 
and consistent jurisprudence (jurisprudence constante), if the trend continues.
 33
   
 
2.3 Legitimate Regulatory Measure 
 
Along with the interpretation of ‗in like circumstances‘, the determination of 
legitimate policy objectives is also a potential area of incoherence. The question of 
legitimacy of government regulatory measure is closely inter-related to likeness. 
Tribunals will often not find a breach of national treatment if there is a justified 
policy reason for less favourable treatment. In other words, investments are 
considered ‗in like circumstances‘ if there is no justified policy reason to treat them 
                                                 
31 It is not only about how to define likeness. The observation must be wide enough to encompass like 
circumstances. See S.D. Myers , Inc. v Canada ( n 24) 250. 
32 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and International Arbitration Institute, ‗Is the Search of Consistency a 
Myth?‘ in Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds), Precedent in International Arbitration (Juris 
Publishing, Inc 2008). 
33 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 
148. 
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differently. As such, the determination of legitimate regulatory measure affects the 
interpretation of likeness. 
 
The area of legitimate regulatory measure in the context of national treatment is still 
underdeveloped in international investment law. Unlike the expressed provision in 
the chapeau of Article XX GATT 1994 which exempts certain government 
discriminatory measures provided that they are not arbitrary or unjustifiable, the 
investment treaties generally do not provide such details.
34
  The EU law also has its 
own experience in deciding legitimate regulatory measures. The most notable 
decision made in this matter was in the Cassis de Dijon case which stated,  
 
‗Obstacles to movement within the community resulting from disparities 
between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in 
question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised as 
being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in 
particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public 
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the 
consumer‘. 35 
 
                                                 
34 A notable exception is NAFTA in Article 1114 and  Article 714. Other investment treaties which 
contain this exception are explained in Ch.3. See also Halil Hasic, ‗Article 1110 of NAFTA: 
Investment Barriers to ―Upward Harmonization‖ of Environmental Standards‘  12 (Southwestern 
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas) 138. 
35 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon)[1979] ECR 649. Other important cases in the EU law on the matter are Dassonville – See Case 
8/74, Procureur de Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 and  Keck – See Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-
268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
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The principle in the Cassis de Dijon case is applied throughout the EU 
jurisprudence, including in the area of free movement of capital and freedom of 
establishment as will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
   
The past international investment cases, such as Feldman v Mexico suggested that 
the policy reasons laid by the host states which discriminate between investors must 
be reasonable.
36
  Although generally the tribunals construe the reasonableness of the 
regulatory measures challenged, the observations made were on environmental or 
health issues rather than intrinsic features and problems related to investment.  Apart 
from issues of environment and health, a research is needed to explore these areas 
which may include reasonable favourable treatment towards strategic investments, 
indigenous and infant industries,
37
 contribution of the investment towards national 
security, impact of regulatory measure on rate of returns as unnecessary investment 
risk and deprivation of investment opportunity.
38
 
 
By having a guideline of legitimate areas of governmental regulation that 
incorporates environmental, health, national security and issues related to 
investments, it will help to develop international investment law as an integrated 
regime, in line with other international and national concerns and with a practical 
international investment identity.
 39
 
                                                 
36 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15),  para 170. 
37 Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (1st Edition, OUP Oxford 2008) 23. 
38 These concerns will find its place  in the concepts suggested by this thesis such as   deference and 
proportionality in Ch.4-6 of this thesis. 
39 A regime that takes into account of possible areas that is ―reasonable‖ and ―legitimate‖ for 
interpretation of ―likeness‖ as guidance for investments. For ‗integrated regime‘ see also Thomas 
Waelde and Abba Kolo, ‗Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ―Regulatory Taking‖ 
in International Law‘ (2001) 50 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 811, 813.  
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2.4 Incoherence in Reference to Other Jurisprudences 
 
The reference of past arbitration tribunals to other jurisprudences, in particular 
GATT/WTO has also contributed to incoherence. The incoherence arises out of the 
comparison to the likeness criteria in GATT/WTO as a methodology for 
interpretation and application.
40
 In other words, while some tribunals referred to 
GATT/WTO, some others were reluctant to do so. Even where reference was made, 
interpretations tend to differ.
41
 The relevance of likeness test in GATT/WTO to 
likeness in international investment law must be addressed before further 
comparisons or transposition takes place.  
 
In S.D Myers, Inc. v Canada for instance, reference was made to GATT/WTO, 
where the determination of likeness would consider the overall GATT/WTO 
framework, including the general exceptions in Article XX. It suggested that 
likewise, national treatment under NAFTA should consider the objects and 
principles under the various provisions of NAFTA as well as the North American 
Agreement on the Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).
42
 The tribunal also agreed 
to resort to the OECD Declaration on International and Multinational Enterprises on 
the expression of ‗in like situations‘.43 In the case of Pope & Talbot, reference was 
also made to the GATT/WTO jurisprudence in discussing the general heading of 
NAFTA 1102.
44
    
                                                 
40 Jurgen Kurtz, ‗The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and Its 
Discontents‘ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 749. 
41 Ibid. 
42 S.D Myers Inc v Canada, (n 24), para 246. 
43 Ibid, para 248. 
44 The tribunal referred to the  WTO jurisprudence, i.e the cases of Bananas and Asbestos. See Pope 
& Talbot v Canada, (n 20) paras 50 and 58; Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Regime 
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, 
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On the other hand, the non-reference of GATT/WTO jurisprudence for the criteria of 
likeness was apparent in the case of OEPC v Ecuador. The tribunal  highlighted the 
differences of ‗in like situation‘ in investment treaties and ‗in like products‘ in 
GATT/WTO.
45
  Methanex v USA  also rejected the direct use of trade law  likeness  
test insisting that NAFTA Chapter 11 was intended for a different regime for 
investment than trade.
46
  NAFTA as a treaty should be interpreted in accordance with 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and thus should 
not rely on trade criteria. Accordingly the tribunal said,    
 
‗It may also be assumed that if the drafters of NAFTA had wanted to 
incorporate trade criteria in its investment chapter by engrafting a GATT-
type formula, they could have produced a version of Article 1102 stating 
―Each Party shall accord to investors [or investments] of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than it accords its own investors, in like 
circumstances with respect to any like, directly competitive or substitutable 
goods‖. It is clear from this constructive exercise how incongruous, indeed 
odd, would be the juxtaposition in a single provision dealing with investment 
of ―like circumstances‖ and ―any like, directly competitive or substitutable 
goods‘.47   
 
If the GATT/WTO jurisprudence was adopted in the case of Methanex v USA, the 
result would be different. An identical comparator who is not a direct competitor to 
                                                                                                                                          
DSR 1997:II, 59; Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR2001:V II, 3243. 
45 OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18), para 176. 
46 Methanex v USA, (n19), para 33. 
47 Ibid., para 34. 
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the claimant will not be in like circumstances as compared to the ‗less‘ like but direct 
competitor.
 48
  
 
2.5 Contribution of this Research 
 
The contribution of this research is to develop a doctrinal understanding of 
appropriate comparators in national treatment based on the underlying philosophies 
of international investment law and relevant criteria learnt from the GATT/WTO, 
EU and international human rights law. At the end of this research, it provides the 
criteria for the interpretation of likeness and legitimate regulatory measures in 
national treatment cases under investment treaties.  
 
3.0 Objectives of Research  
 
This research undertakes the following objectives:  
 
i- To analyse the emerging principles in the interpretation of national treatment in 
international investment arbitration cases. 
 
ii- To analyse the relevance of the GATT/WTO, EU and the international human 
rights jurisprudence in the interpretation of national treatment in international 
investment law. 
 
                                                 
48 Methanex insisted that the GATT/WTO should be referred to. Ibid.,  para 23. 
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iii- To develop the standards in the interpretation of national treatment in 
international investment arbitration cases supported with the relevant 
GATT/WTO, EU the international human rights jurisprudence. 
 
4.0 Research Questions 
 
This research seeks to address the following research questions:  
 
i- What are the emerging principles in the interpretation of national treatment in 
international investment arbitration cases? 
 
 With whom should a claimant be compared? 
 
 What legitimate regulatory interest that may justify differences in treatment 
between foreign and domestic investor? 
 
 How do the emerging principles correspond with the objectives of national 
treatment? 
 
ii- How relevant are the GATT/WTO, EU and the international human rights 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of national treatment in international 
investment law? 
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5.0 Analytical Framework 
 
This research will be guided from the viewpoint of investment security and 
reasonableness. These angles will provide a balanced interpretation of national 
treatment from the perspectives of both the host states and the investors, within the 
spirit of BITs, investment protections and sovereignty.
49
  
 
5.1 Investment Security 
 
Kenneth J. Vendevelde states that most BITs promote principally investment 
security.
50  
This is related to the main rationale of concluding BITs, that is to protect 
covered investments from political risks. Marino Baldi described this as, 
 
‗…to prevent countries not having sufficient tradition of applying concepts 
such as ‗the rule of law‘ and ‗due process of law‘ from taking discriminatory 
or arbitrary measures vis-à-vis foreigners and their property…The overall 
purpose of BITs-which are bilateral treaties- has never been and cannot be 
anything other than to provide a framework for protection against so-called 
political risks, namely measures that are considered to be incompatible with 
concepts such as ‗rule of law‘ and ‗due process of law‘.‘51 
                                                 
49 The aim of BITs is to promote and protect foreign investments.  See Patrick Julliard, 'Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the Context of Investment Law', (Investment Compact Regional Roundtable on 
Bilateral Investment Treaties for the Protection and Promotion of Foreign Investment in South 
Europe, 2001). See also Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?‘ (2008) 102 The American 
Journal of International Law 48.  
50 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n  2) 108. 
51 Marino Baldi, ‗Less May Be More: The Need for Moderation in International Investment Law‘, 
Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 444. 
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The guarantee towards favourable investment climate by promoting and protecting 
foreign investments is manifested in most BITs.
52
 The national treatment provision is 
an important tool to encourage foreign investments bringing capital to the host 
countries. This explains the incorporation of non-discrimination principle that 
protects foreign properties in many agreements and initiatives such as the Hansaetic 
League,
53
 1929 Draft Convention,
54
 the International Chamber of Commerce‘s 
International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investment, the Abs-Shawcross 
Draft Convention 1959,
55
  the Harvard Draft 1961,
56
 the Draft OECD Convention 
1967
57 
and the 1976 OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises.
58
 
 
 
The security intended for investments is not only confined to physical security but 
also to functional security. Foreign investments, having sunk its capital in a foreign 
country is fragile and vulnerable to changes in the latter‘s governmental 
                                                 
52 Promotion and protection of investments are normally written in the preambles. See for instance 
Egypt-Germany BIT (2005), <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_egypt.pdf.> 
accessed 9 September 2013. See also UK-Argentina BIT (1991), 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_argentina.pdf>,  accessed on 28 January 2014. 
53 Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World: From Paleolithic 
Times to the Present (4th edn, OUP USA 2002). 
54 The Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners 1929, Proceedings in League of Nations 
Document C.97. M.23.1930; John Ward Cutler, ‗The Treatment of Foreigners: In Relation to the 
Draft Convention and Conference of 1929‘ (1933) 27 The American Journal of International Law 
225. 
55 1959 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention), International 
Investments: A Compendium, 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium/en/137%20volume%205.pdf>, accessed on 1 
October 2013; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‗Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention to Protect Private 
Foreign Investment: Comments on the Round Table, The‘ (1961) 10 Journal of Public Law 100; 
‗Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment--Introduction, The‘ (1960) 9 Journal of 
Public Law 115; ‗The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment - A Round Table‘ 
(2005) 2 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=458>, accessed on 1 October 2013. 
56 The 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 
57 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 1967, (1968) 7 ILM 117. 
58  OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, signed 21 June 
1976, <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/50024800.pdf> , accessed on 3 October 2013. 
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regulations.
59
 The imminence of the situation is perhaps best termed as ‗obsolescing 
bargains‘ by late Professor Raymond Vernon which was quoted in many writings to 
explain the weak position of foreign investors in the circumstances which force them 
to accept any unilateral terms imposed by the host state. 
60
  The vulnerability or 
exposure of risks can be from all angles of the investment, from production to labour 
and marketing.  The exposure of risk and host states‘ creativity in regulating is also 
mentioned in literatures
61
 including introducing regulatory measures which are 
inherently discriminatory, 
62
  based on religion, language or geographical 
differences.
63
  In Mondev International Ltd v. United State of America, the tribunal 
referred to the Neer award and commented that the international protection of 
foreign investment must not be confined to physical security which may be the 
appropriate approach in 1920s. The tribunal acknowledged that there is development 
by the occurrence of time. In Mondev: 
 
‗Secondly, Neer and like arbitral awards were decided in the 1920s, when the 
status of the individual in international law, and the international protection 
of foreign investments, were far less developed than they have since come to 
be.  In particular, both the substantive and procedural rights of the individual 
in international law have undergone considerable development.  In the light 
of these developments it is unconvincing to confine the meaning of ―fair and 
                                                 
59 One of the main risks for foreign investors is the change of rules by host states. See Jeswald 
Salacuse, ‗The Emerging Global Regime for Investment‘ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law 427. 
60 Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (n 4) 92; Peter D. Cameron, International Energy 
Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability (Oxford University Press 2010) 4. 
61 See Anne van Aaken, ‗Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection‘ (2008) 9 
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 1. 
62 New forms of ‗taking‘ are now being operated by ‗regulation‘. See Waelde and Kolo, 
‗Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ―Regulatory Taking‖ in International Law‘ (n 
39) 813. 
63 Federico Ortino, ‗From ―Non-Discrimination‖ to ―Reasonableness‖: A Paradigm Shift in 
International Economic Law?‘ (2005). (Jean Monnet Seminar, New York University School of Law) 
12. 
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equitable treatment‖ and ―full protection and security‖ of foreign investments 
to what those terms – had they been current at the time – might have meant in 
the 1920s when applied to the physical security of an alien.  To the modern 
eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the 
egregious.  In particular, a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and 
inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.‘64 
 
Investment security requires host state to allow foreign investors fair competition in 
the market; ensuring level playing field. Distortion of the market would amount to 
changes contrary to the investors‘ legitimate expectation. The national treatment 
provision is expected to serve as an effective mechanism to hinder host states from 
introducing protectionist measures and discriminatory treatments.  
 
In construing the needs of investments, it should be assumed that all investments 
require a neutral, if not friendly investment atmosphere. Investments should be able 
to operate in the ordinary cause of business without procedural complications which 
may cost time and expenses. Loss of time and expenses would eventually lead to loss 
of competitiveness and returns. Foreign investments therefore also strive to compete 
for the soft or smooth procedures or laws to ensure that the ‗establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments‘ would be the same as provided for to the domestic 
investors. 
 
                                                 
64 Mondev International Ltd v. United State of America (2002) ARB (AF)/99/2 para 116. See also 
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A and Vivendi Universal S.A v Argentine Republic, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 20 August 2007, para 7.4.7, page 202 and CME Czech Republic B.V (The 
Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL, 14 March 2003, para 499. 
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Not only do the foreign investors need investment security, the host states also need 
the same. Foreign investments bring various advantages to the host states, among 
which are the creation of new jobs, development of natural resources, transfer of 
skill and technology, improved linkages with the world markets and improvement of 
balance of payments.
 65
 It is also in the interest of the host states to maintain the 
investors in the state as a sign of stability and honouring the commitments in the 
investment agreements which would further attract more investors. 
 
5.3 Reasonableness 
 
In determining appropriate comparators, two investors/ investments can be 
considered unlike if there is justification or reasonableness for the discriminatory 
measure. The criteria for the appropriate comparator therefore must be based on this 
ground. Looking at national treatment from the viewpoint of reasonableness provides 
a balanced approach as it gives room to the host state to exercise its sovereignty to 
introduce regulatory measures as long as they are legitimate.  
 
Within international investment law, Kenneth J. Vandevelde puts reasonableness as 
one of the core principles of the BITs.
66
 The investment tribunals have resorted to 
                                                 
65 The need for investment has encouraged countries to sign BITs. See  Zachary Elkins, Andrew T 
Guzman and Beth A Simmons, ‗Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960-2000‘ [2006] International Organization 811. and Andrew T Guzman, ‗Why LDCs 
Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties‘ (1998) 38 
Virginia Journal of International Law 639. 
66 Other core principles are access, security, non-discrimination, transparency and due process. See 
Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 2.  In relation to this, Marino Baldi emphasised that 
the aim of investment treaties is to protect investments. He  disagreed with attempts to stretch the use 
of BITs for the furtherance of other purposes, such as claims for large amounts of compensation for 
damages caused by measures of general application dealing with public health or environment. His 
article is in line with the rationale of forwarding  the principle  of ‗reasonableness‘ as the second tier 
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general public international law principles to interpret the broad provisions of the 
BITs, which may enhance the protection on foreign investors.
67
 Reasonableness is 
among other general principles referred to (such as proportionality, transparency and 
due process), but it is more common in fair and equitable treatment.
68
 The quest 
towards reasonable results of investment decisions is in line with Article 32(b) of the 
VCLT. The tribunals could set aside interpretations which would lead to ‗a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. It also brings the interpretation closer to 
the context, promotes teleological construction of the subject matter of dispute and 
lead towards a more ‗legislator-oriented‘ decisions.69 
 
The move towards reasonableness is also forwarded by Professor Andreas F. 
Lowenfield highlighting that there is a trend in favour of the reasonableness principle 
across numerous international litigations.
70
 In national treatment, the principle of 
reasonableness is applied but with less emphasis which perhaps spurred Federico 
Ortino‘s work urging to move towards reasonableness. This work provides insight to 
view reasonableness from the investors‘ point of view, by applying the 
reasonableness related tests of necessity, proportionality, transparency and 
participation.
71
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
of the analytical framework of this thesis, in order to achieve a balanced interpretation. See Baldi, 
‗Less May be More: the Need for Moderation in International Investment Law‘ (n 51). 
67 Jurgen Bering and others, ‗General Public International Law and International Investment Law: A 
Research Sketch on Selected Issues‘ (The International Law Assoc. German Branch Sub-Committee 
on Investment Law) 23 < http://telc.jura.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/BeitraegeTWR/Heft%20105.pdf >, accessed on 28 January 2014. 
68 Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada, (n 20), para 123. 
69 Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‗The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis‘ (2008) 
19 European Journal of International Law 301. 
70 Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‗Investment Agreements and International Law‘ (2003) 42 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 123, 231.  
71 Ortino, ‗From ―Non-Discrimination‖ to ―Reasonableness‖: A Paradigm Shift in International 
Economic Law?‘ (n 63).   
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This research will portray how reasonableness interacts with investment security and 
what effect they will bring to the determination of appropriate comparator. Although 
investors dislike abrupt changes, or changes at all affecting their investments, host 
states nevertheless have certain discretion to change policies. Here, the principle of 
reasonableness comes into play. In light of reasonableness of government regulatory 
measures, this analysis will also examine whether competition benefited from 
liberalisation should be given an exclusive or a non-exclusive approach in 
considering comparability between the investors and domestic investors.  
 
6.0Significance of Research 
6.1 Coherence in National Treatment  
 
This research addresses and provides suggestions towards coherence in the level of 
protection that investors could rely on under the national treatment principle. Even 
though the arbitrators are not bound by the doctrine of judicial precedence, it is 
necessary to increase predictability,
72
 maintain and enhance credibility of this area of 
law.
73
 Salacuse has highlighted that the 3000 international investment treaties 
concluded has already constituted an emerging global regime for investment. 
74
 As a 
regime, coherence is no longer an option, but necessary to allow it to evolve as a 
credible jurisprudence. In this matter, Reinisch mentioned,   
                                                 
72 Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‗Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante‘ [2008] 
UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper, also in Colin B Picker, Isabella D Bunn and Douglas W 
Arner (eds), International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart Publishing, 
2008) 266. 
73 See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‗Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 
Freshfield Lecture. See also Jeffery P. Commission, ‗Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence‘ (2007) 24(2) (Journal of International Arbitration) 
129-158.  
74 Salacuse, ‗The Emerging Global Regime for Investment‘ (n 59). 
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‗It is immediately apparent that this kind of lack of coherence may seriously 
diminish the appeal of investment arbitration because it will decrease the 
confidence of potential claimants, as well as respondents, in a predictable 
form of dispute settlement.‘75 
 
Andrea K Bjorklund has also foreseen the practical problems if the decisions are not 
consistent- among which is - with the increase number of conflicting cases, it will 
soon be difficult for arbitrators themselves to canvass all relevant prior cases.
76
 
Conflicting decisions in arbitration awards constitute a cause of incoherence and 
inconsistency in international investment law.
77
 
 
Having identified the issue of likeness which constitutes the biggest inconsistency in 
national treatment, it is necessary to maximise its potential towards predictability by 
filling in the gap in creating guidelines on the interpretation of likeness and 
legitimate regulatory measures based on previous investment cases and expanding 
references to other relevant jurisprudence of earlier experience. 
78
 It is pertinent to 
this thesis that the coherence sought is not ‗consistency for consistency‘s sake‘ but 
an effort towards predictability of quality interpretations that take into account the 
                                                 
75 August Reinisch, ‗The Challenge of Fostering Greater Coherence in International Investment Law‘ 
in Roberto Echandi (ed), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 236. 
76 Bjorklund, ‗Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante‘ (n 72). 
77 This is in addition to the fragmented legal foundation in the large number of BITs and the 
increasing regional and multilateral treaties. See Christoph Schreuer, ‗Coherence and Consistency in 
International Investment Law‘ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects in International 
Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2013) 391, 398. 
78 Andrea K Bjorklund claims that to achieve persuasion, precedent and jurisprudence constante, it is 
necessary to examine how to treat the decisions to maximize their potential for creating predictability 
and widely accepted principles of investment law. See Bjorklund, ‗Investment Treaty Arbitral 
Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante‘ (n 72) 270. 
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context and underlying philosophies of national treatment and investment treaties.
79
 
It works for coherence within the current setting of investment treaties by way of 
interpretation.
80
 
 
Should there be coherence in the understanding of national treatment provisions, it 
will help both the host states and the investors to minimise disputes which are both 
expensive and time consuming.
81
 Certainty in law thus brings respect towards 
international investment law, in line with the spirit of pacta sunt servanda where 
treaties are based on. 
 
6.2 Better Investment Climate 
 
This research responds to the concerns faced by investors against discrimination and 
unfair level playing field.
82
 Discrimination in the form of national treatment has 
increasingly becomes a barrier replacing expropriation. This is due to the shift 
towards regulatory state where the investors‘ position becomes more exposed to 
                                                 
79 Michael Ewing-Chow has raised this provocative idea of consistency. This is a useful observation 
which should encourage caution in the direction of consistency that is often promoted in international 
investment law. See World Trade Forum and Michael Ewing-Chow, ‗Coherence, Convergence and 
Consistency in International Investment Law‘ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects 
in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
232. 
80 Rudolf Dolzer highlighted three lines of argument in relation to consistency in international 
investment arbitration, i.e embracing the status quo, a call for serious overhaul and improving the 
current regime. This thesis works in line with the third argument. See Rudolf Dolzer, ‗Perspectives for 
Investment Arbitration: Consistency as a Policy Goal?‘ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), 
Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 409. 
81 The ICSID Caseload Statistics. Issue 2010-1. Chart 1: Total Number of ICSID Cases Registered by 
Year. 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocu
ment&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English >7, accessed on 28 January 2014. 
82 Marcin Sobczyk, ‗Foreign Investors Allege Discrimination in Hungary‘ The Wall Street Journal 
(January 3, 2011) <http://blogs.wsj.com/new-europe/2011/01/03/foreign-investors-allege-
discrimination-in-hungary/ > accessed on 28 January 2014. 
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discriminatory measures by way of regulatory conducts and administrative 
practice.
83
 As domestic politics are unpredictable, there appears to be a need of 
external disciplines in order to create good governance and investment climate.  
 
The outcome of this situation is not difficult to see as although investment cases on 
national treatment grew only in the 2000s, it has become an area of speculation 
among the investment players, be it the investors, the host states and even the legal 
academia. The incoherence of the interpretation of national treatment principle had 
caused parties to be at a limbo, as there is no predictable set of legal explanations 
that they could rely on not only when disputes are already filed in an arbitration 
tribunal, but during the day to day business. Host states may end up facing million 
dollars‘ worth of suit under national treatment because of mistakes in actions or 
regulations.  
 
A good investment climate means consistent and predictable investment regulations. 
It is impossible for states and investors to contemplate matters within their rights if 
there is no guide in the interpretation of national treatment. As a comparison, 
expropriation has its own standards developed in some BITs, cases and literatures 
which make it more certain.
84
 As a result of inconsistencies, foreign investors have 
the tendency to abandon even the most profitable investment opportunity if they 
think that the investment climate is threatening.
85
 
 
                                                 
83 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
84 Waelde and Kolo, ‗Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ―Regulatory Taking‖ in 
International Law‘ (n 39) 826–827. See also 2004 US Model BIT, Article 6 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf >, accessed on 28 January 2014. 
85 Ibrahim F. Shihata, ‗Encouraging International Corporate Investment: The Role of The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency‘ (1998) 23 Columbia Journal of World Business 11. 
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7.0 Research Methodology 
This research is a qualitative study, applying the doctrinal legal research and 
comparative research approach. It involves textual studies of national treatment 
provisions from the relevant BITs and other international investment agreements, 
arbitration awards and scholarly interpretations in the legal academia. The similar 
contents of national treatment provisions in BITs provide a considerable source of 
reference within international investment law. Such, in a wider context, has even 
been regarded as the emergence of a new ‗customary international law‘ by Andreas 
F. Lowenfield
 and as a ‗regime‘ by Jeswald Salacuse, suitable for doctrinal 
analysis.
86
  Doctrinal analysis is deployed to examine the content of the legal 
contents and opinions and to analyse the reasoning.
87
 Accompanied with the 
doctrinal analysis, this research will also apply the comparative approach which is 
another common method in legal studies. The basic methodological principle in the 
recent legal comparative analysis is the ‗principle of functionality‘ which allows 
jurisprudences to benefit from each other the tools of interpretation in comparable 
areas of research.
88
 Below are the explanations of the methodology used in the 
context of this research:  
7.1 Doctrinal  and Comparative Legal Research  
 
The doctrines which are the subjects of research are primarily the national treatment 
provisions and the non-discrimination principles in the international investment law, 
                                                 
86 Lowenfeld, ‗Investment Agreements and International Law‘ (n 70); Salacuse, ‗The Emerging 
Global Regime for Investment‘ (n 59). 
87 Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, 'What is Legal Doctrine' (2006) Northwestern University 
Law Review. 
88 Ralf Michaels, ‗The Functional Method of Comparative Law‘ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP Oxford 2008); Christopher A 
Whytock, ‗Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law‘ (2009) 6 Brigham 
Young University Law Review. 
 28 
 
the GATT/ WTO, the EU and the international human rights law.  This research 
studies the common elements in the jurisprudences in relation to national treatment 
and the non-discrimination principle in the investment context. It analyses whether 
there are lessons from GATT/ WTO, the EU and the international human rights 
jurisprudences that could be learned by international investment law. It builds the 
criteria for likeness and legitimate regulatory measures in the perspective of national 
treatment in line with the doctrinal and comparative legal research it conducts. The 
scope of doctrinal and comparative legal research in the jurisprudences is as the 
following: 
 
7.1.1 National Treatment in GATT/WTO 
 
Under the WTO law, the main area of doctrinal analysis and comparison is Article 
III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT/WTO 
provides for national treatment obligations on internal taxes, charges and regulatory 
measures affecting the sale of products.
89
 The GATT/WTO panels have confronted 
the issue of like products in their cases.  The criteria that are applied to establish 
likeness  are the competitiveness test based on the products‘ end-users in a given 
market, consumers‘ tastes and habits, the products‘ property, nature and quality, the 
products‘ tariff classification and the aim and effect test. This research examines 
how the panels construe the criteria in the cases and how it may be relevant to 
international investment cases.  
 
                                                 
89 Article III:2-4 GATT 1947. 
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7.1.2 Non-Discrimination Based on Nationality in EU Law 
 
The two important areas of the EU law which are the subject of comparison are free 
movement of capital 63(1) TFEU (ex Article 56 TEC) and freedom of establishment 
Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 TEC). Freedom of investment, although not 
explicitly referred by the term, is covered in the two freedoms mentioned.
 90
 By 
virtue of these freedoms, non-nationals from a member state are allowed to establish 
their investments and freely move their capitals without discrimination and 
restriction.
91
 
 
Discrimination on the basis of nationality may occur in investments by way of direct 
taxation (income and incorporate taxes).
92
 The member states still preserve their 
sovereign power to subject investments to certain requirements or regulations. This 
national control however must respect the fundamental freedoms provided for in the 
EU law. Case laws have been brought by the EU to challenge member states‘ 
discriminatory regulations.
93
 This comparative method will analyse the issue of 
likeness in investments, unreasonable and reasonable regulatory measures in the EU 
jurisprudence. 
                                                 
90 Freedom of investment is often subjected to many definitions. Common concepts of freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital are reverted to when dealing with investment. For further 
discussion, see P Juillard, ‗Freedom of Establishment, Freedom of Capital Movements, and Freedom 
of Investment‘ (2000) 15 ICSID Review 322. 
91 In the interpretation of these freedoms, along with other freedoms in the EU law, the principle of 
equal treatment is applied as a common thread. See Michel Aujean, ‗The Future of Non-
Discrimination – Direct Taxation in Community Law‘ in Reuven Avi-Yonah, James Hines and 
Michael Lang (eds), Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and 
the US Supreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence (Kluwer Law International 2007) 322.  
92 As compared to indirect taxation which is harmonised in almost every issue, there are a few areas 
which are harmonised in direct taxation, such as Merger Directive 90/434/EEC, the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive 90/435/EEC and the Arbitration Convention 90/436/EEC. 
93 See Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt,2002 E.C.R I-11779, Case C-
168/01 Bosal Holding BV V. Staatssecretaris Van Financien, 2003 E.C.R I-9409. 
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7.1.3 Non-Discrimination Principle in the International Human Rights Law 
 
The main examination involved in this thesis is the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) in particular, Article 1 Protocol 1 (A1P1) on the right to property 
taken together with Article 14 which prohibits discrimination. The effect of these 
provisions is that they provide a similar form of protection as the national treatment 
provision. Investors and businesses have increasingly resorted to these provisions 
against discriminatory measures by the member states.
94
 Cases brought under these 
provisions have decided on comparability issues and legitimate regulatory measures. 
Scholarly articles have also highlighted the importance of the issue of determining 
comparators in discrimination cases which are a fertile area of research for this 
thesis.
95
 
7.1.4  Relevance of Comparison with GATT/WTO, EU and International Human 
Rights 
 
The study of the GATT/ WTO, the EU, the international human rights jurisprudence 
and the various investment treaties (NAFTA, Energy Charter Treaty, BITs) is 
undertaken based on the possible common economic philosophy of liberalisation, 
protection of property rights and non-discrimination.
96
 
 
It analyses the application of the non-discrimination principle and its role in the 
bigger objectives of the treaties including economic integration and creating a level 
                                                 
94 Further explanation on reference to the international human rights law is dealt in Ch. 5. 
95 Aileen McColgan, ‗Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, Equal Treatment and the 
Role of Comparisons‘ (2006) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 650; Issac Joory, ‗Arguments 
Against the Politicized Role of Comparators in Article 14 Discrimination Cases‘ (2009) 5 Cambridge 
Student Law Review 40. 
96 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3).   
 31 
 
playing field in a competitive market economy. This is achieved by studying the 
philosophies of these jurisprudences in their evolution which involves the political 
economy and the circumstances of the post-World War II development in trade and 
investments. Compatibility will be determined based on the commonalities reached 
among the jurisprudence as compared to international investment law.  
 
Reference to the GATT/WTO, the EU and the international human rights 
jurisprudence is conducted on the basis that they may assist in the interpretations of 
the non-discrimination principle. All three jurisprudences ask the same questions in 
construing discrimination cases (i.e the determination of comparators and objectivity 
of justifications) and involve cases against state measures. They have relatively 
earlier experience and an extensive number of case laws. These jurisprudences 
contain protections on foreign investors or traders against regulations which 
discriminates domestic players. There is therefore a basis to systematically study and 
seek the commonalities that may benefit international investment law.   
 
It is observed that the reference to the EU law is less undertaken. Similarly, the 
international human rights law is not found discussed in the context of national 
treatment in investment cases.
97
 The comparison so far has only actively been with 
GATT/WTO.
98
  
 
                                                 
97 In terms academic discussion, there is an attempt of this nature by Freya Baetens, ‗Discrimination 
on the Basis of Nationality: Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment Law‘ in Stephen 
W.Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 
2010). 
98 See generally Methanex v USA, (n 19), SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24) and Corn Products 
International, Inc v The United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/04/01, Decision on 
Responsibility, 15 January 2008 (hereinafter ‗CPI, Inc. Mexico‘). 
 32 
 
This research also serves to respond to the cries towards convergence in international 
economic law, to point a few - as a notion of a possible emergence of common law 
in international economic law,
99
 comparative method as an indispensable tool for the 
construction of the ‗science‘ of international economic law 100 and as a period of 
convergence in international economic law
101
-  to the extent of analysing the possible 
areas that jurisprudences may benefit from each other.  Although there are different 
textual wordings in the jurisprudences, the economic logic is similar.
 102
 The three 
jurisprudences contribute to liberalisation of trade and investment, state-to state 
exchanges of market access and trade and investment opportunities.
103
   
 
This research revolves around the common minimum standard of non-discrimination 
principle, which exists in all the three jurisprudences. The standard on non-
discrimination principle will help to answer the research question by identifying the 
emerging principles in likeness in discrimination tests, the purpose and intention of 
national treatment and justifications of discriminatory treatments. Interaction 
therefore is plausible due to the common language and the same industrial players 
(especially in trade and investments) – the lawyers, arbitration panels and drafting 
committee and the same general aim of the national treatment protection. 
 
                                                 
99 JHH Weiler, ‗Cain and Abel- Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law‘ in  The EU, 
the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (OUP, Oxford 2000) 1. 
100 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis 
of EC and WTO Law (Hart Publishing, North America 2004) 5. 
101 Todd Weiler, ‗Saving Oscar Chin: Non-Discrimination in International Investment Law‘, 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties 
and Customary International Law ( Cameron May, London 2005) 559. 
102 Jurgen Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International 
Investment Law and the WTO‘ in  Stephen W. Schill (ed) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP, UK 2010) 243. 
103 In the context of international trade law and international investment law, see DiMascio and 
Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties‘ (n 49).  
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This study is of importance to the whole development of international investment 
law, not confining itself to ICSID or NAFTA disputes. The fora of arbitration, being 
left at the liberty of the disputing parties, may lead them to resort to non-institutional 
tribunals (adhoc tribunals), or being guided only by UNCITRAL rules, which opens 
the application of other related jurisprudences outside international investment law. 
Thus, interaction with other jurisprudences is necessary to understand the 
commonality and the differences which may be applicable at hand.  
 
7.2 Sources of Research 
 
This research refers mostly bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, relevant 
international conventions, textbooks, case reports and journal articles in the form of 
printed, visual, digital and any other retrievable format. It also includes the 
utilisation of online databases, among others Transnational Dispute Management 
(TDM), LexisNexis, HeinOnline and Westlaw International, Kluwer Arbitration, 
Investor-State Law Guide, ICSID, UNCTAD, Eur-Lex Access to European Union 
Law, HUDOC European Court of Human Rights and WTO websites and databases. 
In carrying out this method of research, focus is given to published academic 
discussions on the subject matter to preserve the objectivity and reliability of this 
research.  
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8.0 Thesis Structure 
 
This research consists of six chapters. The first chapter outlines the foundation of the 
thesis, which includes the problem statement, research question, object, 
methodology, literature review, analytical framework and significance of the 
research.  
 
The second chapter underlines the doctrinal evolution of the national treatment 
principle in the history. It also explains the scope of national treatment in different 
investment treaties and put the application of national treatment in treaty practice 
into perspective. It elaborates the interpretative problems of national treatment which 
are the focus of this thesis, i.e how the tribunals have interpreted likeness and 
determine legitimate regulatory measures. It triggers the relevant questions and 
provides the general status quo of the jurisprudence for the comparative exercise in 
the subsequent chapters that follow. 
 
The third chapter discusses the most controversial question of relevance of other 
jurisprudence in national treatment as presented in investment arbitrations. The 
GATT/WTO has always been the shadow jurisprudence behind an international 
investment law national treatment interpretation. The relevance or plausibility of 
referring to it is however debatable. Yet, there are potential interpretative 
mechanisms that may be helpful to investment law considering the similar question 
posed in both jurisprudences. This chapter thus firstly explores the plausibility of 
reference and proceeds to find the lessons that could be learnt from this 
jurisprudence. 
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The fourth chapter is an attempt to seek the relevance of the European Union law to 
investment treaties specifically from the viewpoint of two freedoms i.e freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital. This chapter examines the philosophy 
of the EU law and the analogous effect of national treatment in the two freedoms. It 
proceeds with the analysis of likeness and observations on the similarity and 
difference of level of integration and their relevance to the determination of 
legitimate regulatory measures.  
 
The fifth chapter focusses on the relevance of international human rights law. It 
highlights the similarity in the non-discrimination principle as protection of 
investors‘/investments‘ property. It examines the ECHR approach in determining 
discrimination cases including the methodology of assessment of likeness and the 
application of relevant administrative principles.   
 
The final chapter is a thorough synthesis on the lessons taken from the 
jurisprudences under comparison. It incorporates these lessons into the investment 
context by analysing and revisiting investment cases. It suggests the extent of 
suitability and develops the criteria of likeness to be applied in the investment 
disputes. It also attempts to relate the thesis with the analytical framework and the 
significance of the research as proposed in this chapter.   
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9.0 Literature Review 
 
Literatures on the determination of likeness in international investment law are 
generally not found as standing on their own. It is mostly discussed under the 
headings of national treatment or non-discrimination as part of examining the 
required thresholds of national treatment. Among the prominent investment law 
writers whom have elaborated to a certain extent on likeness in national treatment 
chapters are Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Newcombe, Vandevelde,, Baeten 
and Bjorklund.A.K..104 Earlier works by prominent scholars can be found written for 
seminars in response to earlier NAFTA disputes, among which are by Walde,
105
 
Dolzer
106
 and Rojas F.G.
107
 
 
This current research was triggered by the observation made in Dolzer that the case 
laws of national treatment failed to address the inconsistency in the definition of 
‗business‘ and ‗sector‘ for the purpose of comparison in national treatment, hence 
resulted to the inconsistency in the interpretation of likeness.
108
 Newcombe also 
highlighted the complexity of equating circumstances with operating in the same 
sector of the economy. The same was observed by Vandevelde claiming that some 
                                                 
104 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 27); Newcombe and Paradell, 
Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7); Vandevelde, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (n 2); Andrea K Bjorklund, ‗National Treatment‘ in August Reinisch (ed), 
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press 2008). August Reinisch, Standards of 
Investment Protection (OUP, UK 2008); Freya Baetens, ‗Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: 
Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment Law‘ (n 97). 
105 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3).  
106 Part of this paper appeared in his later book ‗ Principles of International Investment Law‘. See 
Rudolf Dolzer,  ‗National Treatment: New Developments‘ (Symposium Co-Organised by ICSID, 
OECD and UNCTAD - Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common 
Agenda. OECD Headquarters Paris). 
107 Fernando Gonzales Rojas, ‗The Notion of Discrimination in Article 1102 of NAFTA‘ [2005] Jean 
Monnet Seminar: Advanced Research in the Law and Policy of the EU, NAFTA and WTO, New 
York University School of Law. 
108 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (n 27). 
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investments may not be identical but operate overlapping tasks. He examined ‗in like 
circumstances‘ in the view that investments must be in the same economic sector.109  
In  an article by Todd Weiler, it highlighted the case of Loewen Group, Inc. and 
Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America  as departing from the earlier 
approach in Pope & Talbot v Canada, Feldman v Mexico and SD Myers v Canada, 
as adopting ―likeness simpliciter‖ that investments should be in the same sector.110 
Bishop R.D et al in their commentaries, pointed at the possibility that agreements 
can be reached on what is ―like‖ circumstances, but agreed that such is not an easy 
practice referring to the experience of the GATT/WTO.
111
  Subedi stated that what 
are and are not like circumstances is often a matter of controversy.
112
 Extensive 
discussions were however not made on the matter in any of the writings. 
 
It is observed that the literatures, like the panels in arbitrations, prefer to leave the 
matter of likeness to be determined on a case by case basis. Vandevelde went further 
to conclude that a national treatment claim should be found violated if there was a 
discriminatory motive and if there was no legitimate host-state regulatory interest, 
even in the absence of a plausible comparator.
113
 This approach seems to suggest that 
the determination of appropriate comparator finds less importance in the invocation 
of a national treatment violation. This research disagrees on such approach as the 
insertion of ‗in like circumstances‘ or ‗situation‘ is not without purpose, and should 
                                                 
109 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 385.  
110 Todd Weiler, ‗Saving Oscar Chin: Non-Discrimination in International Investment Law‘ in Todd 
Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, 
Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005) 569. ; Loewen Group, Inc. 
and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 26 June 2003 
(hereinafter ‗Loewen Case‘); Pope & Talbot v Canada, (n20), Feldman v Mexico, (n15) and SD 
Myers v Canada, (n 24). 
111 R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford and W. Micheal Reisman , Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law International, Netherland 2005) 1154. 
112 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 27) 101.  
113 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 385. 
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be used as the test to invoke difference of treatment between the local and foreign 
investors before moving on or simultaneously with the reasonableness of the 
measure. Even in the absence of the phrase ‗in like circumstances‘ in the treaty, it is 
common sense to determine a discrimination claim to compare between like and 
like.
114
 This also creates a line between a claim under national treatment and a claim 
under the fair and equitable treatment provision. The view of Newcombe perhaps is a 
better approach as compared to Vandevelde which chose to shift to find the 
legitimacy or reasonableness of the discriminatory measure taken by the host state. 
Newcombe claimed that the like circumstances analysis cannot be divorced from the 
reasons for the treatment in question.  In the context of NAFTA, Rojas has made an 
observation on how the tribunals have resorted to the assessment of likeness in order 
to avoid the question of intent. On the flipside of this observation, this thesis aims to 
pull tribunals from such avoidance and attempt to cast the role of intent or 
protectionist intent to the assessment of like circumstances.
115 
 
 
National treatment has invited comparative studies with the WTO either by scholars 
of international trade or international investment. Such studies have been sparked by 
the reference of international investment arbitrations to the WTO jurisprudence. The 
study of national treatment in investment treaties and its connectivity to 
protectionism is a major concern in articles by Kurtz.
116
 He contended that the 
correct approach of interpreting national treatment in investment treaties is to put 
that obligation as a constraint against protectionism. This suggestion seemed to stem 
                                                 
114 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 
161. 
115 Rojas, ‗The Notion of Discrimination in Article 1102 of NAFTA‘ (n 107). 
116 Jurgen Kurtz,  'National Treatment, Foreign Investment and Regulatory Autonomy: The Search for 
Protectionism or Something More?' P. Kahn, T. Walde (ed), New Aspects of International Investment 
Law (2007) 311-351. 
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out of the debate that the interpretation of national treatment in investment treaties 
should not rely on GATT/WTO mainly based on several stark contextual differences 
between the two jurisprudence, namely the absence of GATT III:1, the GATT 
Article XX equivalent, and the right of private investors in bringing direct arbitral 
proceedings in most investment treaties. The article suggested that the protectionist 
approach will further raise an interpretative task to determine what will constitute 
protectionism, which will hence be undertaken by this research in relation to 
competition and discrimination. 
 
In another article by Kurtz,
117
 a firmer argument was brought forward claiming that 
the misuse of WTO law contributed to the inconsistency in the international 
investment law jurisprudence. Kurtz recognised that there is a problem in the 
transposition of WTO law wrongly in international investment disputes, OEPC v 
Ecuador being the most criticised in the article. A departure from this literature is 
perhaps to analyse the jurisprudences, should there be possible ways to correctly 
transpose the WTO law in areas of similarities into international investment disputes. 
Kurtz‘s later article reinforced his earlier stand on the transposition of WTO law in 
international investment arbitrations.
 118 
This thesis expands the discussions put forth 
in Kurtz‘s articles in the GATT/WTO context and extends the comparative study on 
likeness with the EU and international human rights jurisprudence.  
 
Walde observed that despite some differences, there is an increasing proximity and 
reason for partial convergence between the WTO and international investment 
                                                 
117 Kurtz, ‗The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration‘ (n 40).  
118 Jurgen Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International 
Investment Law and the WTO‘ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 243. 
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treaties. His article was projected on the claim that national treatment is a capable 
mechanism of an external discipline to promote good governance of the global 
economy.
119
 The article triggers this current research in the sense that there is a 
ground of comparative study between national treatment in investment treaties, the 
WTO and the EU. DiMascio and Pauwelyn also outlined the common roots of WTO 
and investment law and the possible interaction between them.
120
 
 
Gaeten. V. observed that the application of WTO principles as an interpretative tool 
is possible in disputes relating to BITs. He mentioned that the relevant provisions of 
the WTO are likely to pave way for international law standards of treatment to be 
applied in investment cases. In the alternative, even if the WTO law could not be 
construed as applicable to the investment disputes, it may still contribute as an 
‗interpretative context‘, pursuant to Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.
121
 Scholarly articles on GATT/WTO are also referred to in 
conducting this research. Among them are those by Horn and Mavroidis,
122
 
Hudec
123
and Mark Liang.
124 
  
 
 
                                                 
119 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
120 DiMascio and Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties‘ (n 49). 
121 Gaetan Verhoosel, ‗The Use of Investor–State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to 
Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law‘ (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law 493. 
122 Henrik Horn and Petros C.Mavroidis, ‗Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of 
National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination‘ (2004) 15 39. 
123 Robert E. Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ―Aim and 
Effects‖ Test‘ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 623; Robert E. Hudec, ‗―Like Product‖: The 
Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III‘ in Thomas Cottier and Petros Constantinos 
Mavroidis (eds), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-discrimination in World Trade Law: 
Past, Present, and Future (University of Michigan Press 2000). 
124 Mark Liang, ‗Green Taxes and the WTO: Creating Certainty for the Future‘ (2009) 10 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 359. 
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Direct studies comparing international investment law, GATT/WTO and the EU 
jurisprudence are rare in the context of the interpretation of likeness in national 
treatment. Studies however can be found comparing international investment law 
and WTO as a pair (as noted a few in the above literatures) or WTO and the EU as 
another pair.
125
 An example is the comprehensive comparative study by Ortino, 
which compares the WTO and the EU in the view of non-discrimination.
126
  
 
In the reading from the EU perspective, Steffen Hindelang has made a connection 
between free movement of capital and freedom of establishment in the EU law with 
national treatment in international economic law. Both Articles 49 (ex Article 43 
EC) and Art 56 EC (now A63 TFEU) include a prohibition of discrimination. In both 
cases, if cross-border and domestic situations are compared, they correspond to the 
international economic law principle of national treatment.
127
 Another important 
scholarship in the field is Tom O‘Shea who has contributed significantly in tax areas 
involving freedom of establishment and free movement of capital.
128
 His writings 
have casted insights to the comparative exercise in this thesis. 
 
Juillard, P had attempted to discuss the relationship between the freedoms; freedom 
of establishment, freedom of movement and freedom of investment. He contended 
                                                 
125 G De B rca and Joanne Scott, The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Pub. 
2001). 
126 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis 
of EC and WTO Law (Hart Publishing 2004). 
127 Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of 
Protection in EU Law (OUP Oxford 2009) 129–135. 
128 Tom O‘Shea, ‗Freedom of Establishment Tax Jurisprudence: Avoir Fiscal Re-visited‘ (2008) 6 
Tax Review, <http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/staff/oshea/52178.pdf>, accessed on 14 October 
2013; Tom O‘Shea, ‗Taxation of Non-Residents‘ [2009] The Tax Journal 
<http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/staff/oshea/52213.pdf> accessed 28 January 2014; Tom O‘Shea, 
‗Truck Center: A Lesson in Source Vs. Residence Obligations in the EU‘ (2009) 53 Tax Notes 
International 593. 
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that due to the multiplicity of definitions of the term investment, the term freedom of 
investment has not gained significant acceptance.
129
  
 
Aujean, M. observed that challenges of direct taxations will continue and that it is 
likely that it will induce collective action by the member states to ensure coherence 
at the community level.
130
 This article also shed some light on a number of 
justifications for discriminatory measures by member states from decided cases.  
 
As far as the principle of reasonableness is concerned, Ortino has explored the 
relationship between reasonableness and national treatment comparing WTO and 
NAFTA.
 131
 In so doing, the EU law is also touched. The literature has well 
established the basic features of the reasonableness principle namely suitability, 
necessity, proportionality, transparency and participation. He suggested that a shift 
should take place in the sense that the NT principle is employed not only as a 
prohibition of de jure discrimination, but as a tool to review origin-neutral regulation 
with de facto discriminatory or protectionist features. This literature will provide a 
great reference for this research, but this research will look at it in the view of 
investment. In Ortino, the comparison is confined to product-related contents, 
(GATT, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the EU law relating to goods), but 
this research will add feature on the comparison with EU freedom of establishment 
and free movement of capital.  
 
                                                 
129 Juillard, ‗Freedom of Establishment, Freedom of Capital Movements, and Freedom of Investment‘ 
(n 90). 
130 Aujean, ‗The Future of Non-Discrimination – Direct Taxation in Community Law‘ (n 91). 
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The discussion on likeness in the international human rights law revolves the human 
rights context. However, useful observations made by the scholars in the field are 
helpful in identifying and understanding the practice of the courts in the 
interpretation and the challenges arising thereof. Among literatures referred to are 
McColgan,
132
 Joory
133
 and Gerards.
134
 
 
All of the studies above provide an overview of the existing work relating to this 
research. This research will fit in and contribute in the scholarship of international 
investment law with its comprehensive study on the interpretation of likeness and 
comparative insights from international trade law, the EU and the international 
human rights law. 
 
 
  
                                                 
132 McColgan, ‗Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, Equal Treatment and the Role of 
Comparisons‘ (n 95). 
133 Joory, ‗Arguments against the Politicized Role of Comparators in Article 14 Discrimination Cases‘ 
(n 95). 
134 Janneke H Gerards, ‗The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights‘ [2013] Human Rights Law Review 
<http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/13/hrlr.ngs044>, accessed on  20 February 2013. 
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Chapter 2 
THE DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter will firstly examine the historical origin of national treatment and the 
development of the doctrine in previous practices. The historical assessment is 
informative in order to understand the character and importance of the national 
treatment provision as a fundamental norm in international investment law.
135
 It will 
show how this principle has evolved intensely in recent decades in almost all 
transnational or international economic agreements as one of the primary protection 
accorded to foreign investors. In today‗s context, this principle is fortified by the 
means of enforcement via investor-state arbitration. This makes it even vital to 
define its exact scope, application or coverage. This chapter thus identifies the 
variations of the national treatment provision as in the modern treaty application in 
the context of investment treaties.  
 
The contextual assessment of the national treatment provision is examined from the 
investment disputes. It is found that the investment disputes have not adequately 
reflected or developed the context of the provision to the cases. In responding to this, 
this chapter importantly analyses these contents by two methods, firstly by looking at 
                                                 
135 In a similar vein, Todd Weiler highlights that ‗historical analysis is everywhere and always part of 
international investment law interpretation‘. See Todd Weiler, The Interpretation of International 
Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination, and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical 
Context (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 1, 17. 
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the objects and purpose of investment treaties; and secondly by the connection of the 
national treatment protection to the political economy both at the time of the 
promulgation of investment treaties and the current time taking into consideration 
the modern nature of investments. It builds a preliminary overview of the context of 
national treatment that will be further discussed in depth in Chapter Six with an 
analysis on the application onto investment disputes.  
 
The next task of this chapter is to evaluate how the tribunals have construed national 
treatment cases in addressing the question of likeness and legitimate regulatory 
measures. This chapter will reveal the inconsistencies of the investment decisions in 
these matters. This thesis generally asserts the importance of coherence with a view 
that investment tribunal decisions should show some clarity and certainty in the law. 
This casts implication on the international investment legal order which could 
otherwise undermine key participants‘ confidence. 136 Furthermore, with the 
availability of awards in public, later cases in practice resort to earlier awards.
137
 It is 
therefore essential that awards must be sound in its reasoning.  
 
The discussion of likeness and legitimate regulatory measures in this chapter 
provides an important foundation for the subsequent comparisons in Chapters Three, 
Four and Five in the context of GATT/WTO, EU law and International human 
rights. It also casts an essential basis for the synthesis in Chapter Six for this thesis to 
                                                 
136 Thomas W Walde, ‗Confidential Awards as Precedent in Arbitrations. Dynamics and Implication 
of Award Publication‘ in Yas Banifatemi (ed), Precedent in International Arbitration (Juris 
Publishing Inc. 2008) ; Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good 
Governance and Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
137 Bjorklund, ‗Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante‘ (n72); Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, ‗Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?‘ (2007) 23 Arbitration 
International, LCIA; Kaufmann-Kohler and International Arbitration Institute, ‗Is the Search of 
Consistency a Myth?‘ (n 73); Jeffery P. Commission, ‗Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence‘ (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration 129–
158. 
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present its final suggestion on the criteria and flow of an analysis of likeness in 
national treatment.  
 
National Treatment Obligation – The Origin 
 
Generally, there was no obligation to treat aliens favourably or in the same position 
as the locals in customary international law. Such positions were only accorded to in 
the existence of a particular arrangement or treaty. The Greek for instance, during 
the time of antiquities or ancient sovereigns have recorded to have given similar 
treatment to aliens as the locals based on some treaties and the general religious duty 
of hospitality.
138
 The Islamic historical practice has also portrayed a relatively 
favourable economic environment for foreigners in the form of freedom of 
commerce.
139
   
 
The modern traces of diplomatic relation among states to protect foreign subjects can 
however be said to formally begin from the medieval commerce, in particular the 
formation of the Hansaetic League (1259-1450).
140
 The age of colonisation has 
shown a different landscape in the international economic law. Most of the 
                                                 
138 Amos S Hershey, ‗History of International Relations During Antiquity and the Middle Ages‘ 
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Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and Intruding into Domestic 
Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). The interaction between the Italian city states and the Ottoman Empire has 
adopted the treatment non-less favorable in their diplomatic commercial practice. See Weiler, The 
Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination, and Minimum Standards of 
Treatment in Historical Context (n 135) 336. 
140 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‗The Province and Standards of International Economic Law‘ [1948] 
International Law Quarterly 402. Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, The Changing Structure of 
International Economic Laws: A Contribution of Legal History, of Comparative Law and of General 
Legal Theory to the Debate on a New International Economic Order (BRILL 1981) 19. Many 
reference on this matter is referred to Erler‘s writing, available in German language, see Georg Erler, 
Grundprobleme des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts. - Göttingen: O. Schwartz 1956. (Otto 
Schwartz 1956). See also Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
Standards of Treatment (n 7) 152. 
 47 
 
developing countries were colonised and the foreign investors were mainly the 
colonists. Thus the treaties were not made with the colonies, possessions or 
protectorates but mainly between the greater powers.
141
 An example of a treaty that 
contained a national treatment provision from this era was the treaty between Great 
Britain and Portugal, signed at London on the 29th January 1642. The provision 
mentioned,  
 
‗And that the subjects of each of the most renowned Kings before named, in 
the Dominions and Territories of the other, shall not be worse dealt withal 
than the natural subjects, in their sales and contracts for their merchandizes, 
as well for price as otherwise; but that the condition of foreigners and natural 
subjects shall be equal and alike as aforesaid, according to the practice of 
ancient Treaties made between the most renowned Kings of Great Britain and 
Castile.‘142 
 
This treaty also affirms the earlier practice of the national treatment protection 
between the Kings of Great Britain and Castile. The industrial revolution has later 
contributed to even more forms of international trade. With the introduction of new 
technologies and the end of the Napoleonic wars,
143
 the world entered into a process 
                                                 
141 It was customary that treaties bind the colonies. See Thomas Edward Scrutton and William 
Bowstead, ‗14 The Commercial Laws of the World Comprising the Bills of Exchange Bankruptcy 
and Maritime Laws of All Nations‘ [1911-1914] Commercial Treaties and Conventions 780.  
142 See 2 Hertslet's Commercial Treaties: A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and 
Reciprocal Regulations, at Present Subsisting between Great Britain and Foreign Powers 1(1840) 
Portugal. 
143 This era introduced new technologies such as the spinning jenny, the use of steel that replaced iron 
ore, new means of transportation such as the steam engines and communications such as radios. See J 
Salwyn Schapiro, ‗Industrial Revolution‘ (1934) 1 Modern and Contemporary European History 
(1815-1936) 30. 
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of globalisation.
144
 At this stage, more commercial treaties were entered into to 
encourage international cooperation. Among which were flourishing were the 
friendship, commerce and navigation treaties (FCN) which were general treaties 
containing parts of protection of foreign properties.
145
 The FCNs were bilateral 
treaties entered into between states which were generally for the purpose of 
international cooperation, often containing familiar terms.
146
 The Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the 
Italian Republic for instance provided national treatment in the wordings below, 
 
‗The nationals of either High Contracting Party shall, within the territories of 
the other High Contracting Party, be permitted, without interference, to 
exercise, in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations, the 
following rights and privileges upon terms no less favorable than those now 
or hereafter accorded to nationals of such other High Contracting Party…‘147 
 
The US-Japan FCN which was entered into after World War II included a clearer 
national treatment provision, 
 
                                                 
144 Vandevelde characterised the era between 1820-1914 as the emergence of global economy which 
marked an active amount of world trade before the advent of World War 1. See Vandevelde, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (n 2) 20. 
145 The first US FCN was entered into in 1778 with France right after its independence.   
146 It must be noted that there are some variation in the main motivation of some treaties, whether 
more towards friendship or diplomatic ties or commerce, the latter is especially seen in post World 
War II FCNs.  See further discussion in Wayne Sachs, ‗The New U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties‘ 
(1984) 2 Berkeley Journal of International Law 192. 
147 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and the 
Italian Republic, signed at Rome , 2 February 1948, Article 1(2). This treaty was applied in the case 
of ELSI. The applicant  brought Article 1 of the Supplementary Agreement of the FCN Treaty which 
prohibited ‗arbitrary and discriminatory‘ measures but was dismissed by the Chamber. See 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) case (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment of 20 July 1989. 
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‗Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment 
with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and 
other business activities within the territories of the other Party, whether 
directly or by agent or through the medium of any form of lawful juridical 
entity. Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted within 
such territories: (a) to establish and maintain branches, agencies, offices, 
factories and other establishments appropriate to the conduct of their 
business; (b) to organize companies under the general company laws of such 
other Party, and to acquire majority interests in companies of such other 
Party; and (c) to control and manage enterprises which they have established 
or acquired. Moreover, enterprises which they control, whether in the form of 
individual proprietorships, companies or otherwise, shall, in all that relates to 
the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded like enterprises controlled by nationals and companies of 
such other Party.‘148 
 
The dimension of such provision in the treaties was to ensure protection of the state 
party‘s citizen in a foreign land for both his person and property. The US-Japan FCN 
also demonstrates the inclusion of right of establishment, management and control of 
investment at a level playing field with the locals which are made possible by the 
national treatment principle.
149
 Thus it can be understood that the principle of 
                                                 
148 The post world war II FCNs were modified to be more investment related including the national 
treatment. See Herman Jr Walker, ‗Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign 
Investment: Present United States Practice‘ (1956) 5 American Journal of Comparative Law 229.; 
Sachs, ‗The New U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties‘ (n 156). 
149 Treaty and Protocol between the United States of America and Japan (US-Japan Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation), signed on 2 April 1953, entered into force on 30 October 1953, < 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/japan-korea/market-opening/US-
Japan%20Treaty%20on%20Friendship%20Commerce%20and%20Navigation%201953-04-02.pdf>, 
accessed on 10 September 2013. 
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national treatment primarily seeks to provide protection of investment while its 
furtherance makes liberalisation of trade and investment possible.  
 
It has become somewhat settled during the FCN practice that the investors do not 
only enjoy level treatment with the locals, they also enjoy a minimum degree of 
protection under international law if the state protection fall below the line.
150
 A 
heated discussion arose between developed and developing countries over the 
minimum international standards in which foreign investors are entitled. The 
developed countries promoted the doctrine of state responsibility for injuries to 
aliens and their properties that states should adopt the minimum standards of 
international law which allows foreign investors to be treated better than the 
treatment accorded to the nationals if the treatment is below the standard. On the 
other hand, the developing countries, in particular from Latin America defended 
under the principle of territorial sovereignty that limits the foreign investors to be 
treated similar to the nationals regardless the international minimum standards.
151
 
This was later known as the Calvo Doctrine.
152
 
 
In the exchange of correspondence between Cordel Hull, the US Secretary of State 
and Eduardo Hay, the Mexican Foreign Minister on the expropriation of American 
landholders in the Mexican agrarian reform, Mexico suggested firmly that the 
                                                 
150  Walker, ‗Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United 
States Practice‘ (n 148). 
151 ‗International Investment Agreements: Key Issues‘ (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2004) Volume 1 163; ‗National Treatment‘ (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, UN 1999) 6. 
152 This idea was developed from the idea put forth by Dr. Carlos Calvo in his two volume writings. 
See Carlos Calvo, Derecho Internacional Teórico y Práctico de Europa y América (D‘Amyot 1868). 
See also the discussion in Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, 
Discrimination, and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (n 135) 417. 
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standard must be domestic and that foreign investors must not expect better 
treatment to be given than what is accorded to the locals. In the correspondence: 
 
‗Nationals and foreigners who are under the same protection of the national 
legislation and authorities the foreigners cannot claim rights different from or 
more extensive than nationals. The demand for unequal treatment is 
implicitly included in your Government's note for while it is true that it does 
not so state clearly, it does require the payment to its nationals, independently 
of what Mexico may decide to do with regard to her citizens, and as your 
Government is not unaware that our Government finds itself unable 
immediately to pay the indemnity to all affected by the agrarian reform, by 
insisting on payment to American landholders, it demands, in reality, a 
special privileged treatment which no one is receiving in Mexico.‘153 
 
The reluctance of adhering to the foreign investors‘ demands was a signal from 
newly independent states that their sovereignty must be respected and 
acknowledged. It was also to defend the states from forced compensation schemes 
and arbitration agreements set by capital exporting countries.
154
  The impact of non-
payment of compensation was very acute during the period due to the capital 
exporting countries‘ possible resort to gunboat diplomacy and military self-help155 or 
diplomatic espousal. This would result to economic and political pressure.
156
  
                                                 
153 Official Document (1938) 32 AJIL Sup 189. 
154 The injured investor states responded to the inability of weaker countries in paying debts by 
gunboat diplomacy, which is an abuse of the diplomatic protection process. See  Santiago Montt, 
State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the 
BIT Generation (Hart 2009). 
155 Luis Maria Drago, an Argentine Foreign Minister stated a firm objection on the use of force for the 
collection of debt, which later came to be known as the Drago doctrine. See James T Gathii, ‗War‘s 
Legacy in International Investment Law‘ (2009) 11 International Community Law Review 353. See 
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What followed was the number of failures to come up with multilateral investment 
treaties due to the sensitivity and difficulty of the subject.
157
 The unpredictable 
investment climate, the lack of consensus on customary international law and the 
inability of states to agree on an accepted international set of protections for 
investors on a multilateral basis have caused some states to conclude investment 
treaties on a bilateral basis. Such effort was a more expedite alternative which would 
provide effective protection to foreign investors and enhance the flow of foreign 
investment into host states and to benefit from its capital, local employment, skills 
and technology in the economic development.
158
 The facet of today‘s standard of 
treatment is no longer chasing for the international minimum standard but more 
towards wanting the same favourable treatment as given to the local considering the 
various incentives and advantages provided by the host state. 
159
 
 
The first bilateral investment agreement was between Germany-Pakistan in 1959.
160
 
It was later accumulated up to 2,670 BITs and more than 270 other IIAs at the end of 
2008.
161
 Among the leading countries with the most investment treaties are 
                                                                                                                                          
also Jos  E Alvarez, ‗The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime‘ (2005) 99 Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 94.  
156 Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in the BIT Generation (n 154) 32.  
157 The multilateral attempts will be explained further in 3.2 ‗The Political Economy and Nature of 
Investment ‗ below.  
158 The investment regime was described as an act of hegemonic stability and a cooperative 
arrangement that would help states to advance their interests. See Salacuse, ‗The Emerging Global 
Regime for Investment‘ (n 59); Guzman, ‗Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them‘ (n 65) 
159 See Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
160 Germany-Pakistan BIT, signed 25 November 1959, < 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/investment_pakistan_germany.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2013. 
161 See ‗The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries‘, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development. 
2009, <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf>, accessed on 28 January 2014. Most of 
these agreements contain the national treatment provision. 
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Germany, China, UK, Switzerland and Egypt. 
162
 This rapid development was a 
respond towards both the sponsoring capital exporting countries and the need of the 
developing countries to build their economies, in most cases, after decolonisation. 
Capital was needed to build infrastructures and this could be achieved by allowing 
foreign inflow of capital. In order to create a favourable investment climate, the 
more familiar Friendship Commerce and Navigation (FCN) templates in the 
international trade and economic fraternity became handy, and were hence replicated 
in the new form of investment treaties.
163
 These investment treaties include key 
protective features – expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (FET), full 
protection and security (FPS), free transfer of fund and most favoured nation (MFN) 
and national treatment principle. 
 
It is pertinent to mention that some earlier investment treaties did exclude national 
treatment. A study has shown that of the investment treaties signed before 1990, 
nearly fifty per cent of them did not include national treatment clauses, especially 
from the Asian region.
164
 The abstention from including national treatment was also 
due to the reservation of some states so as to the effects of national treatment. 
Among the western countries which did not insert the national treatment provisions 
are Sweden and Norway.
165
 Following the other investment treaties, the modern 
Chinese investment treaties have also later begun to include national treatment 
                                                 
162 Meredith Broadbent and Robbins Pancake, ‗Reinvigorating the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Program‘ [2012] Center For Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) 4. 
163 The modern BITs have incorporated many features contained in earlier commercial treaties such as 
the Friendship, Commerce and Navigations (FCN) treaties concluded by the United States. BITs are 
successors of the FCN programme. See Department of State. (Washington) Warren Christopher. 
Letter of Submittal. USA-Uzbekistan BIT 1996.< 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_uzbekistan.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2013. 
164 Peter Chowla, ‗Comparing Naughty BITs: Assessing the Development Impact of Variation in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties‘ [2005] London School of Economics and Political Science 
<www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP67.pdf>, accessed on 14 October 2013. 
165 ‗International Investment Agreements: Key Issues‘ (n 151) 87. 
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provisions.  A few examples are the Chinese- Netherlands bilateral investment treaty 
in Article 3 (3) and the 2008 Free Trade Agreement between Chinese - New- 
Zealand.
166
  
 
Today, the national treatment obligation is one of the most pivotal obligations in any 
international investment agreement. 
167
 It is a treaty based obligation, without which 
renders host states no obligation to provide foreign investors and nationals similar 
treatment.
168
 Its insertion, accompanied with the dispute resolution clause allows 
foreign investors to bring direct claims to international arbitration on the ground of 
discriminatory treatment based on nationality. This position did not exist under 
customary international law.
169
 Although earlier treaties have embodied the national 
treatment provision, they were applied widely in trade and commerce. Later, the 
national treatment principle became a common criterion of trade and investment 
                                                 
166 China-Netherlands BIT, signed 26 November 2001, entry into force 1 August 2004. < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_netherlands.pdf>, accessed 23 July 2013; The 2008 
Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and China (NZ-China FTA), signed 7 April 2008, entry 
into force 1 October 2008, < http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-
agreement/index.php>, accessed 20 July 2013. See also the development of Chinese investment 
treaties in Norah Gallagher, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2009); Axel Berger, ‗China‘s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Substance, Rational 
and Implications for International Investment Law Making‘, The Politics of International  Economic 
Law: The Next Four Years (2008)., < http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/berger.pdf>, 
accessed on 26 July 2013. 
167 See for instance USA-Mongolia BIT, signed 6 October 1994, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_mongolia.pdf>, accessed 4 October 2013; Canada-
Argentina BIT, signed 5 November 1991, brought into force 29 April 1993, 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argen_canada.pdf>, accessed on 20 August 2013, also 
available at < http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-
apie/>, accessed on 10 September 2013.  Australia-Argentina BIT, signed on 23 August 1995, entry 
into force 11 January 1997, <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_australia.pdf>, 
accessed on 20 August 2013. 
168 In the absence of contrary rule of international law binding on the States parties, whether of 
conventional or customary origin, a State may differentiate in its treatment of nationals and aliens. 
See Methanex v USA Part IV - Chapter C - Page 12, para 25. Similarly, in the case of Genin v Estonia, 
the tribunal confirmed that ‗Customary international law does not, however, require that a state treat 
all aliens (and alien property) equally, or that it treats aliens as favourably as nationals.‘ See Genin, 
Eastern Credit Ltd. Inc. and AS Baltoil v Republic of Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, para 368. 
169 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 9. 
Under customary international law, a claim can only be made by diplomatic protection which 
discretion rests upon the home state.  
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treaties in modern international economic law.
170
 In the investment context, the 
national treatment principle is developed by its adoption in international investment 
treaties and its interpretation in investment arbitration awards. 
 
2.0 National Treatment Provisions: Scope and Treaty Practices 
 
The ordinary phrasing of the national treatment provision across BITs generally 
comprises of an obligation that the contracting parties must accord treatment ‗no less 
favourable‘ to the investors or investments of the other contracting party than that 
they accord to their nationals ‗in like circumstances‘. Article 3 of the US-Rwanda 
BIT 2008 provides national treatment in the following wordings; 
 
‗1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 
 
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favorable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of its 
own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
                                                 
170 Thomas W Walde, ‗In the Arbitration Under Article 26 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Nykomb V. 
The Republic of Latvia-Legal Opinion‘ (2005) 2 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM)., para 
102.See also Todd Weiler, ‗Prohibitions Against Discrimination in NAFTA Chapter 11‘ in Todd 
Weiler (ed), NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects 
(Transnational Publishers 2004) 28. 
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management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.‘171 
 
The inclusion of less favourable treatment is an advantageous standard of treatment 
from the investors‘ viewpoint. This reflects the debate in the past as to what level the 
treatment should be given. In the past, the national treatment principle was used to 
limit foreign investors from enjoying more treatment than the locals by the 
invocation of international minimum standard of treatment. Today, in the era where 
states are giving incentives to the locals, the national treatment provision is used by 
the foreign investors to obtain these advantages.
172
  
 
National treatment covers both de jure and de facto discrimination.
173
 In determining 
less favourable treatment, the tribunal would look at the factual impact of the 
discriminatory measure. There is no requirement of weighing the proportionate or 
disproportionate advantages as to its quantifications, but it may be indicative as a 
matter of ‗identification‘ of a particular nationality being discriminated.174 In the 
context of investment treaties, what matters is under the investor‘s exercise of its 
                                                 
171 US-Rwanda BIT, signed 19 February 2008, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Rwanda.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2013. 
172 Walde regarded today‘s conception of national treatment as a ‗minimum standard‘ as opposed to 
the Calvo‘s ‗maximum‘ or ‗absolute ceiling‘. He also referred to it as treatment being ‗pulled up‘ in 
the former and ‗pulling down‘ in the latter. See Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National 
Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
173 ADF Group Inc v United States of America ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/1, 9 January 2003, 18 
ICSID Rev-FILJ 195 (2003), para 157; El Paso Energy International Co v Argentine Republic ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/14, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para 309. See also ‗Non-
Discriminatory Barriers to Establishment‘ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 1996) Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
DAFFE/MAI(96)28 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9628e.pdf>. < 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9628e.pdf>, accessed on 26 July 2013.  
174 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, (n 20), para 55. 
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own right, whether there was less favourable treatment as compared to other 
investors in like circumstances.
175
 
 
Some provisions are combined with the most favoured nation principle as in the US- 
Czech Republic 1992 BIT,  
 
‗Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated 
therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investment or  associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of 
nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the most favorable, 
subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling 
within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty.‘176  
 
There are investment treaties which do not contain the comparison between like 
circumstanced or situated investments. The UNCTAD inferred this absence to a 
much wider scope of comparison.
177
 This was raised in the MAI negotiations over 
the national treatment provision. Some delegates asserted that its inclusion is 
unnecessary and should be implicitly required.
178
 
 
 
                                                 
175 The right of national treatment is dependent on the claimant‘s own facts and own deprivation of 
investment. See Canada‘s argument on disproportionate disadvantage and the tribunal‘s response in 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, (n 20), para 44-56.  
176 US-Czech Republic BIT, signed October 22, 1991, entered into force 19 December 1992, <  
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_us.pdf>, accessed 20 July 2013. 
177 ‗National Treatment‘ (n 151) 34. 
178 ‗National Treatment, Non-Discrimination/MFN and Transparency‘ (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 1996) Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) D AFFE/MAI/DG2(95)1/REV2 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/dg2/dg2951r2e.pdf>. < 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/dg2/dg2951r2e.pdf>, accessed on 26 July 2013. 
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The national treatment provisions in international investment law generally contain a 
high degree of homogeneity even though the BITs were separately concluded. All 
national treatment provisions prohibit different treatments of foreign investments/ 
investors as compared to those given to the locals. Some noticeable differences 
however are the usage of the term ‗situations‘ rather than ‗circumstances,179 ‗similar‘ 
rather than ‗like‘ or ‗same‘, ‗as favourable as‘  or ‗no less favourable‘  treatment or 
whether they are inserted as stand-alone or combined with other general standards of 
treatment.
180
   
 
The national treatment provision are sometimes not termed in the familiar language 
as in the US-Rwanda BIT and US-Czech Republic BIT above which contain less 
favourable treatment and like circumstances or like situations. They sometimes 
appear in a more general prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory measures. The 
FCNs generally contain these clauses. The interpretation of such clauses have been 
similar to an assessment of a claim under national treatment as it involves the same 
questions, i.e whether there was less favourable treatment, proper comparator and 
reasonableness of the measure.
181
 An example of a bilateral investment treaty which 
contains a prohibition of this kind is the U.S-Ecuador BIT 1993.
182
  
 
The national treatment provision contained in Article 1102 in NAFTA is the most 
invoked provision in investment cases, among others were Pope &Talbot Inc v 
Canada, SD Myers Inc. v Canada, CPI v Mexico, Cargill, Inc v Mexico and 
                                                 
179 See, e.g Article 1102, NAFTA. In some other BITs, predominantly US BITs, the term used is ‗in 
like situations‘. See e.g, US-Bolivia BIT 1998, 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43541.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2013 
180 ‗National Treatment‘ (n 151). 
181 See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy),(n147). 
182 Art II (3)(b), invoked in OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18),  para 157. 
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Methanex v USA. Examples of other cases outside NAFTA were OEPC v Ecuador 
under the US-Ecuador BIT, Champion Trading Co. v Egypt under the US-Egypt BIT 
and Noble Ventures v Romania under ECT.
183
 
 
The scope of the national treatment provision depends on the extent given in the 
treaties. Some treaties provide coverage for pre-establishment while others limit it to 
established investments. Most investment treaties provide the protection to 
established investments only. The Energy Charter Treaty for instance in Article 10 
(7) provides: 
 
‗Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of Investors 
of other Contracting Parties, and their related activities including 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, treatment no less 
favourable than that which it accords to Investments of its own Investors or 
of the Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third state and their 
related activities including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal, whichever is the most favourable.
184
  
 
On the other hand, the 2004 Canadian Foreign Investment Protection Agreements 
(known as the Canadian FIPAs) in its article 4 stipulates a broad coverage of 
investment activities including pre-establishment; 
                                                 
183 See Pope &Talbot Inc v Canada (n 20); S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada,(n24), CPI, Inc v Mexico, (n 
98),  Cargill, Incorporated v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2,Award,18 
September 2009;  Methanexv USA, (n19); OEPC v Ecuador, (n18);  Champion Trading Company and 
Others v Arab Republic of Egypt , ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9,27 October 2006  and Noble Ventures 
Inc. v. Romania ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, October 12, 2005. 
184 The Energy Charter in Part III provides for investment promotion and protection. See The Energy 
Charter Treaty and Related Documents. 
<http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf>, accessed on 16 July 2013. 
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‗1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.  
2.  Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less 
favourable than  
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.‘  
 
This resembles the NAFTA and the 2004 US Model treaties that include pre-
establishment protection of foreign investors.
185
 Similarly, pre-establishment clause 
is included in Article 10.3, Chapter 10 of CAFTA.
186
 The recent Japanese BITs are 
also of this feature.
187
 In the selection of words to describe investment activities in a 
national treatment provision, the OECD Commentary Draft of the MAI has made a 
helpful remark.  The Group agreed that all diversification activities are covered by 
the references to ―establishment, acquisition and expansion‖. The commentary 
further stated: 
                                                 
185 See for instance US-Uruguay BIT 2005, Article 3 under the 2004 US Model treaties template, 
signed November 2005, < http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf>, accessed on 
4 October 2013. 
186 Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) comprises of the Government of the Republic of 
Costa Rica, the Government of the Dominican Republic, the Government of the Republic of El 
Salvador, the Government of the Republic of Guatemala, the Government of the Republic of 
Honduras, the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua, and the Government of the United States of 
America < http://www.caftalaw.net/cafta-text>, accessed on 20 July 2013. 
187 See for instance Korea-Japan BIT 2002, signed 22 March 2002, entry into force 1 January 2003, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_japan.pdf>, accessed on 20 August 2013,  and 
Japan-Lao Peoples‘ Democratic Republic BIT 2008, signed 16 January  2008, 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Japan_Laos.pdf>, accessed on 20 August 2013. Peter 
Chowla, ‗Comparing Naughty BITs: Assessing the Development Impact of Variation in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties‘ (n 164) 18. 
 61 
 
 
‗Several Delegations believed that the list ―establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or 
other disposition of investments‖ should be considered a comprehensive one 
whose terms were intended to cover all activities of investors and their 
investments for both the pre- and post-establishment phases. In their view, 
this was the preferable approach.‘188 
 
There are treaties that have national treatment negative list of exceptions. These lists 
are normally representing strategic industries that the states want to be excluded 
from the liberalisation process.
189
 In the USA-Mongolia BIT for instance, the US 
government specified a list of sectors and matters which are excluded from national 
treatment inter alia air transportation, ocean and coastal shipping, banking, energy 
and power production and communication services. Mongolia‘s exceptions were 
land ownership and banking.
190
  The US exceptions in the US-Bolivia BIT from 
national treatment obligation are:  
 
‗Atomic energy; customhouse brokers; licenses for broadcast, common 
carrier, or aeronautical radio stations; COMSAT; subsidies or grants, 
including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance; State and 
local measures exempt from Article 1102 of the North American Free Trade 
                                                 
188 OECD, ‗The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Commentary to the Consolidated Text‘ 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 22 April 1998) Negotiating Group on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 9, < 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2013. 
189 Such as infant industries that may not be able to compete with foreign investors, natural resources 
or essential public utilities. See ‗International Investment Agreements: Key Issues‘ (n 151) 109 < 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit200410_en.pdf>, accessed on 16 July 2013. 
190 US-Mongolia BIT, signed 6 October 1994, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_mongolia.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2013. 
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Agreement pursuant to Article 1108 thereof; and landing of submarine 
cables.‘191 
 
The OECD has organised a programme for South Eastern Europe (SEE) countries 
which analyses the exceptions in the field of authorization, licensing and screening 
procedures in various sectors of the SEE.
192
 The prevalent exceptions are in foreign 
real estate ownership, while sector wise are in the areas of insurance, maritime 
transport and fishing. The OECD also provides updates of exceptions from national 
treatment by OECD countries and eight non-member economies. The recent 2013 
report listed the exceptions as a measure to provide transparency among the states.
193
 
 
In connection to this, it is hard to say that investment treaties are going towards full 
liberalisation. As compared to MAI, the BITs are focused on the protection of 
investments. The MAI involved OECD countries which were ready to embark on ‗a 
broad multilateral framework for international investment with high standards for the 
liberalisation of investment regimes and investment protection and with effective 
dispute settlement procedures‘. As explained earlier, the scope in the application of 
national treatment differs. Even in treaties that grant pre-establishment, they have 
negative list of exceptions. The treaties such as the Canadian FIPA, NAFTA and US 
treaties allow exception annex to national treatment. The Canadian FIPA for instance 
in Article 9 has excluded government of state enterprise procurement, subsidies or 
                                                 
191 US-Bolivia BIT 1998, (n179). 
192 National Treatment of International Investment in South East European Countries- OECD 2003, 
p13, < http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/20637291.pdf>, accessed 15 
October 2013. 
193 National Treatment for Foreign Controlled Enterprises: Including Adhering Countries Exceptions 
to National Treatment. 2013 < http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/national-treatment-
instrument-english.pdf>, accessed on 28 January 2014. 
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grants including government supported loans, guarantees and insurance. A similar trait 
can be found in the US 2004 Model BIT in Article 14. 
 
These are the exact reasons why some investment treaties are called as adopting 
‗selective liberalisation‘.194 It is submitted that liberalisation in the contexts of 
international investment agreement differ to that of GATT/WTO, as it provides 
liberalisation within the area permitted. It has a limited connotation depending on the 
scope of the treaties and should not be overemphasised in the interpretation of 
national treatment. 
 
The issue of BITs as promoting ‗protection‘ or ‗liberalisation‘ is related to the treaty 
designs of recent investment treaties (especially the FTAs incorporating investment 
chapters). Marino Baldi described that investment protection rules have clear 
characteristics of property law while investment liberalisation rules have a trade-
policy character.
195
 This constitutes a theoretical difficulty that will be faced by these 
new generations of investment treaties which would probably cast a more 
challenging balancing of sovereign and foreign  investors‘ interest. 
 
3.0 The Contextual Analysis 
 
The minimalist approach in the drafting of the national treatment provisions has left 
the tribunals a huge task to determine its interpretation. The tribunals have to fulfil 
the legal requirements of ‗less favourable treatment‘ and ‗in like circumstances or 
                                                 
194 ‗Admission and Establishment‘ (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN 
2002) 39. 
195 Baldi, ‗Less May be More: the Need for Moderation in International Investment Law‘ (n 51) 448. 
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situations‘, in the right contextual framework. The context should be instructive on 
the tribunals as to the purpose of national treatment in the context of international 
investment law. This would in turn guide the balance between the investors‘ 
protection and the host states‘ regulatory space. It is observed that the contextual 
aspect of the national treatment interpretation is an underdeveloped area in 
investment tribunal decisions.  
 
This is a challenging matter as there is limited, if any, legal textual documentations 
or the preparatory work (travaux) that could explain the context of national treatment 
in investment treaties.
 196
 This adds the pressure that has already surrounded 
investment tribunals that investment law is different to trade, causing the tribunals to 
exercise caution to refer to the latter. While the differences in wordings do not 
linguistically and substantially differentiate the essence of the protection from one 
BIT to another, the interpretation of the terms in the context of national treatment 
however proves to be interestingly challenging and diverged. In any exercise of 
comparison, the comparator must be of a common denominator.  Past arbitrations 
have suggested at times that the common denominators should be ‗common 
competitive investments‘ or of ‗common economic sector‘.197 At some other 
instances, the comparators are considered common if they share ‗common economic 
activity‘ regardless of the economic sector.198 In many cases, the appropriate 
                                                 
196 The preparatory works of investment treaties are often unavailable.  A notable exception is 
NAFTA. See NAFTA negotiating texts available at < http://www.naftalaw.org/commission.htm>, 
accessed on 17 October 2013. See also Meg Kinnear, Andrea Bjorklund and John FG Hannaford, 
Investment Disputes Under NAFTA: An Annotated Guide To NAFTA Chapter 11 (Kluwer Law 
International 2006).  In cases where they are available, they are rarely used for the interpretation of 
substantive provisions. Fauchald, ‗The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical 
Analysis‘ (n69).;‗The Usefulness of Travaux in Investment Treaty Interpretation‘ (2005) 2 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=442> accessed 28 July 2013. 
197 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, (n 20), para 78. 
198 OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18), para 168. 
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comparator test is regarded by whether they were ‗common from the viewpoint of 
the regulatory measure challenged‘, which is a very broad approach. 
 
The approaches provided by past arbitrations are nevertheless valuable in identifying 
some areas of comparison, but the decisions collectively lacked the contextual 
flavour and doctrinal clarity, which may not necessarily bring to a different 
conclusion in the award, but to a sound judgment which greatly contributes to the 
coherence of the jurisprudence. The most important foundation for a sound regime is 
therefore the establishment of a clear contextual layout of its doctrines. The quest for 
a contextual understanding of national treatment must begin with the objects and 
purpose of its introduction, the scope of national treatment, the investment climate 
which it is expected to serve and the crux of its discriminatory characteristic which 
distinguishes it from other discriminations. 
 
There are at least two methodologies that could indicate the understanding of the 
context of national treatment in investment treaties. Firstly, by looking at the 
objectives and purposes of the treaties as commonly found in the preambles and 
secondly the political economy of both times- the time of the promulgations of 
investment treaties and the historical evolution of previous attempts of a network of 
investment protection regime; and the current political economy of world 
investment.
199
  
                                                 
199 A third methodology, that is by comparing the context of the non-discrimination principle based on 
nationality in the GATT/WTO, EU and IHR jurisprudence will be introduced and elaborated in Ch. 6 
of this thesis. This would be in consistent with Articles 31-32 of the VCLT which requires the search 
of the context of the provision. See Methanex v USA, Final Award  Part IV Chapter B para 29, p14. 
See also International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States (hereinafter, 
‘Thunderbird Case’) UNCITRAL, Award, 26 January 2006, para 175. ‗The interpretation of 
treatment standards in investment treaties must begin, like any other process of treaty interpretation 
with the approach indicated by  Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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3.1 The Objects and Purpose of National Treatment 
 
In every attempt to interpret national treatment, one must not lose sight of the object 
and context of its existence in international investment law.
200
 It is the first step 
towards a contextual interpretation of national treatment, but this link needs to be 
articulated.
201
 A notable attempt however that searched the overall context is the case 
of Pope & Talbot v Canada in defining like circumstances. The tribunal agreed that 
the legal context of Article 1102 as proposed by the claimant includes the trade and 
investment-liberalising objectives of the NAFTA.
202
 By comparing investments in 
the same business or economic sector, the tribunal believed that it would reflect the 
legal context of Article 1102.
203
 
 
In the case of SD Myers Inc. v Canada, the tribunal examined the preambles of 
NAFTA, NAAEC and other international commitments to look at a wider context of 
which NAFTA Chapter 11 and national treatment comes in place. The tribunal also 
took into account the various provisions of NAFTA and NAAEC which includes 
states‘ rights to establish high levels of environmental protection, avoidance of 
distortions in trade and mutually supportive environmental protection and economic 
development. As the case was involving environmental regulatory measure, the 
tribunal tried to determine both environmental concern and the need to avoid trade 
distortions that are not justified by environment concerns.
204
   
                                                                                                                                          
1969‘. See Campbell McLaghlan, Laurence Shore and Mathew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (New York: OUP, 2007) 221. 
200 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3) 24. 
201 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 
152. 
202 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, (n 20), para 77. 
203 Ibid,  para 78. 
204 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 62. 
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The approach taken in SD Myers Inc. v Canada was however more towards 
searching the relevance of environmental protection with the national treatment 
obligation in NAFTA. While such approach is essential in determining the scope of 
the NAFTA national treatment provision,
205
 it was not comprehensive. The tribunal 
should have deliberated further on the objective of national treatment in the context 
of promoting and protecting the security of investments as the first step, and then its 
interplay with the state‘s commitment in the environmental treaties in question.  
 
The attempt to appreciate the objectives and purpose of national treatment such as in 
Pope & Talbot v Canada and SD Myers Inc. v Canada in the search of its contextual 
interpretation is not often found in arbitral decisions. Tribunals tend to pave away 
with single issues while interpreting national treatment, with which they conclude. In 
the separate statement of UPS v Canada,
206
 the tribunal focused on the differences of 
the investors in detail rather than deliberating on the apparent competitive 
relationship and the importance of investment protection which could have led to a 
contextual interpretation of national treatment. 
 
The preambles of investment treaties are normally broadly drafted. Most of the 
bilateral investment treaties are entitled ‗promotion and protection of investments‘. 
The Germany-Bangladesh BIT for instance further provides the aim to ‗create 
favourable conditions for investments by nationals and companies of either states‘ 
and that the promotion and reciprocal protection of such investments ‗are apt to 
                                                 
205 As international investment emerge in the middle of other branches of international law, awareness 
of such wider international concerns is essential in determining the scope and application of national 
treatment.  
206 See UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, 24 May 2007, paras 14-17. 
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stimulate private business initiative and to increase the prosperity of both nations‘.207 
The NAFTA in Article 102 states in relation to investments that it aims to ‗increase 
substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties‘. The Energy 
Charter Treaty states ‗to catalyse economic growth by means of measures to 
liberalize investment and trade in energy‘.208 These preambles can generally 
conclude that investment treaties are aimed to facilitate the maintenance and 
protection of investments and the promotion thereof against possible domestic legal 
uncertainties. It aims at providing a level playing field and favourable investment 
climates by way of the substantive provisions, in particular on expropriation, 
national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
These protections are further guaranteed by the investor-state dispute resolution 
mechanism which enables the foreign investor a direct recourse in an independent 
tribunal.  
 
Earlier attempts to create multilateral investment treaties also did not provide a clear 
guidance in the essence of national treatment. The Abs-Shawcross draft was among 
the earliest to address a multilateral approach of foreign investors protection.
209
 The 
Abs-Shawcross draft provided a general protection of foreign investments against 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures.
210
 Similarly, the Harvard draft and the 
                                                 
207Germany-Bangladesh BIT, 6 May 1981, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_bangladesh.pdf>, accessed on 29 July 2013. 
Similarly, favourable conditions is also found in the Denmark-Malaysia BIT (1992), < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/denmark_malaysia.pdf>, accessed on 20 August 2013. 
208 Preamble, The Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
L69/26, March 1998, < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:069:0026:0090:EN:PDF>, accessed on 29 
July 2013. 
209 Seidl-Hohenveldern, ‗Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment‘ (n 
55). See also Michael Brandon, ‗Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment Climate‘ 
(1960) 9 Journal of Public Law 125. 
210 1959 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention), (n 55). 
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OECD draft which came later provide similar protection but did not have expressed 
reference to the national treatment clause.
211
 
 
The OECD 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises (the OECD Declaration) for instance provides a guideline accompanying 
its national treatment provision.
212
 Enterprises within the OECD states must maintain 
the environment, public health, safety and labour rights.  NAFTA also recognises 
that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or 
environmental measures.
213
 The defined area of application in some investment 
treaties has shed light to investment arbitrations in delivering decisions. They also 
indirectly form the exceptions similar to, although not as extensive as the general 
exceptions in Article XX in the GATT jurisprudence.  
 
One would realise that the national treatment protection has an immense role in 
achieving the objects and purpose of investment treaties. It battles innate domestic 
regulations that discriminate foreign investors even on a de facto basis. It is a form of 
an external discipline that alerts discriminatory effects of nationally neutral measure 
imposed by host states under various reasons such as the environment or public 
health.
214
 Many of the cases brought under national treatment are of this nature, for 
instance the export ban on polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs) in SD Myers Inc v 
Canada and the ban on MTBE in the case of Methanex v USA. These are delicate 
                                                 
211 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Alien (1961 
Harvard Draft); 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, )1968) 7 ILM 
117 (OECD Draft), (n 57). 
212 Article II.1, OECD 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, (n 
58). 
213 NAFTA, Article 1114. 
214 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
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matters that tribunals have to construe in demarcating legitimate and reasonable 
measures against discriminatory effects on foreign investors. The national treatment 
principle should ideally be able to prohibit such de facto discriminations (apart from 
de jure) as per committed by the signing parties of investment treaties 
acknowledging national treatment as a treaty based obligation. Without the 
incorporation of the national treatment provision, the states are certainly disbarred 
from discriminating foreign investors in favour of the locals.
215
 It must be seen as to 
discipline governments in regulating in a manner that suits the rule of law which is a 
necessary ingredient for a workable global economy.  
 
The essence of international investment agreement containing the national treatment 
principle must constantly be emphasised in arbitral decisions. The national treatment 
principle in today‘s treaties is a product of mutual understanding by the contracting 
parties. States entering BITs agree that they will not treat the investors of the other 
party less favourably than what it accords to its own investors. This commitment is 
so vital that states are ready to relinquish certain sovereign privilege that would have 
enabled them to introduce regulatory measures which grant protectionism to its 
investors in the local industry.
216
 
 
This compromise is a result of recognising the bigger benefit of foreign direct 
investment, including job opportunities, transfer of skills and technology and 
development of infrastructures. States also benefit from the flow of capital by its 
                                                 
215 It is stated in Methanex v USA that ‗ In the absence of a contrary rule of international law binding 
on the State parties, whether of conventional or customary origin, a State may differentiate in its 
treatment of nationals and aliens. See Methanex v USA, (n 19), Part IV- Chapter C,  paras 14-15. See 
also national treatment as a treaty-based obligation in Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 149. 
216 Despite this disadvantage, states still enter into investment agreements. See Guzman, ‗Why LDCs 
Sign Treaties That Hurt Them‘ (n 65). 
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investors. The bigger benefit of foreign direct investment is believed to be achieved 
if foreign investment is promoted and protected. Thus most of the BITs emphasise 
the aim to promote, variedly in terms such as ‗promotion of investment relations‘,217 
‗promotion and protection of investments of investors‘218 and ‗to create favourable 
conditions for investments‘.219 The preamble of NAFTA also explicitly asserts that 
the Parties will ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning 
and investment which is essential to protect investments from unpredictable changes 
in the domestic regulations.  
 
The national treatment provision is the cornerstone in almost all investment treaties 
because of its potential to promote investment protection and security, especially of 
its functional survival in an alien land. An investment which is deprived functionally 
by way of discriminatory regulatory measure may be fatal to its survival or 
existence. Among the consequences includes loss of sales and profits, loss of 
investments or joint venture,
220
 destruction or cutting access of market
221
 and 
massive increase of operational cost.
222
  
 
An observation of the objects and purpose of the national treatment provision must 
include nationality as its main essence of protection. It differentiates from ordinary 
discrimination where nationality is not a factor. The claimant needs to show that 
                                                 
217 See, e.g  Australia-Argentina BIT 1995 (n 167).  
218 See, e.g  Canada-Argentina BIT 1991, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argen_canada.pdf>, accessed on 20 August  2013. 
219 See, e.g China-Belgium BIT 1984, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_belg_lux.pdf, 
accessed on 20 August  2013. 
220 SDMI claimed that among the result of Canada‘s breach of obligation under NAFTA is the loss of 
its investment in its joint venture with Myers Canada. See SD Myers Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para144. 
221 The CPI claimed  that the Mexican government destroyed the soft drinks market for HFCS to the 
benefit of the Mexican sugar industry. CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 83. 
222 The impact of not allowing fabricating steel in Canada  has caused increase of cost due to the 
hiring of five U.S fabricators, testing, equipment rental, transport, demurrage and additional time in 
project management. See ADF Group Inc v USA (n 173), para 55. 
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there is direct or indirect actual discrimination which affect foreign investors only. In 
the determination of in like circumstances, the nationality test is crucial. The foreign 
investor or foreign owned investment should be compared to a domestic owned 
investment that is like in all relevant respects, but for nationality of ownership.
223
 In 
Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal mentioned: 
 
―In this instance, the evidence on record demonstrates that there is only one 
U.S Citizen/ investor, the Claimant, that alleges a violation of national 
treatment under NAFTA Article 1102, and at least one domestic investor 
who has been treated favourably. For practical as well as legal reasons, the 
Tribunal is prepared to assume that the differential treatment is a result of the 
Claimant‘s nationality, at least in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary‖.224  
 
Tribunals must determine whether the measures explicitly discriminate or adversely 
impact foreign investors.
225
 Discriminatory motive does not necessarily emerge in 
the measure but can be examined from the impact of the measure. It thus involves de 
jure and de facto examination in national treatment cases. In the case of SD Myers 
Inc. v Canada, the ban of disposing PCBs originating from Canada to United States 
by de facto nationally discriminated Canadian investors. In the case of Feldman v 
Mexico the tribunal concluded that Mexico has violated national treatment provision 
on the basis of nationality by denying tax rebates for cigarettes sold for export to a 
US company.
226
 The decision of OEPC v Ecuador case on the other hand was not 
                                                 
223 Methanex v USA , (n 19), para14. 
224 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 181. 
225 Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 377.  
226Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 182. 
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examined based on nationality but the different treatment across sectors as no 
exporter can be discriminated against other exporters.
227
   
 
3.2 The Political Economy & Nature of Investments 
 
One would have to trace the underlying philosophy of the investment treaties in the 
history of its evolution.   The crucial turning point in the history of investment 
regime was the global collapse of the economy between 1914-1944.
228
 The 
international investment regime suffered during this period as foreign properties 
were seized and nationalised.
229
  According to Verloren Van Themaat, the period 
between the two world wars is significant to the evolution of international economic 
law because it was in this period that many of the principles of treaty law that have 
evolved during the preceding seven centuries has disappeared.
230
 Post war U.S FCNs 
responded to the calamity of the war on foreign investments by including detailed 
rules on expropriation and the principle of non-discrimination.
231
 It is important to 
understand what led to the promulgation of the national treatment provision during 
this time. 
Direct mention on the matter is scarce. However, indication can be made from 
observations and pieces of information from separate events and evolution. At this 
particular point, the idea of economic liberalism emerged and dominated the earlier 
                                                 
227 OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18), para 176. See also Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 152. 
228 Schwarzenberger, ‗The Province and Standards of International Economic Law‘ (n 140). 
229 Vandevelde highlighted how the principles of non-discrimination, the principle of access and 
security which were once enjoyed before the World War 1 were ignored. Countries seized enemy 
properties. As far as nationalization is concerned, the series of expropriations of foreign investment by 
the Soviet government in the 1920s was a striking example. See Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (n 2) 31–35.  
230 Themaat, The Changing Structure of International Economic Laws (n 140) 21. 
231 For instance, US-Netherlands FCN, signed 27 March 1956, entered into force 5 December 1957, < 
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/key-topics/treaties/search-the-treaty-database/1956/3/008392.html>, 
accessed on 3 October 2013 and US-Japan FCN (n 149). 
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theory of mercantilism which discouraged exports.
232
 Under this theory, state 
intervention would be a barrier of economic efficiency. Liberalism was supported by 
the classical economists including David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill who were 
inspired by earlier works of Adam Smith.
233
 This evolution was coupled with the 
prevalence of the laissez faire principle which maintained liberty to trades and 
individuals in the economic activity from the interference of the state.
234
 
 
Vendevelde tried to match the development of investment treaties with the relevant 
economic theory.
235
 The investment treaties are clearly inclined towards liberalism 
as opposed to Marxist economics. However, upon observation and recognition of 
states‘ interest, Vandevelde concluded that liberalism in this context is limited as it 
gives the opportunity to host states to pursue their economic nationalist policies.
236
 
This is indeed a plausible observation. The investment tribunals have taken into 
account states‘ justification to legitimise certain regulatory measures when it is 
necessary for the general interest of the public. This maintains the public feature of 
investor-state arbitration. Liberalism is confined to the areas specified in the treaties, 
such as pre-establishment or established investments and the various exceptions in 
the national treatment provision. The focus of investment treaties is rather to provide 
investment security or protection in the covered area. This includes the principle of 
non-discrimination manifested in the national treatment provision. 
 
                                                 
232 Many writings on the history of international economic law highlight this change of economic 
theory. See Schwarzenberger, ‗The Province and Standards of International Economic Law‘ (n 140). 
233 Schapiro, ‗Industrial Revolution‘ (n  142) 42. 
234 Ibid 43. 
235 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‗Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, The‘ (1998) 92 
American Journal of International Law 621. 
236 Ibid. 
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As noted earlier, the search of the political economy is not confined to the time of 
promulgation or the historical evolution of the investment regime. It must also reflect 
the contemporary issues from the role of regulatory states and states‘ law making 
capacity, protectionism, democracy, state necessity, public interest, environment and 
social values to complex investment nature and political risks.
237
  It is the 
observation of this thesis that today‘s political economy can be looked at from two 
angles, i.e the creative modern legislations that could potentially hide protectionist 
agenda; and the multifaceted domestic economic, social and environmental impacts 
that need investment regulations. 
 
First is from the viewpoint of the protection needed by modern investments against 
creative legislation that could potentially hide protectionist agenda. States are able to 
introduce face-neutral-measures that result to discriminatory impact on foreign 
investors. This form of intervention was not obvious in the past where expropriations 
were more rampant. It has today become a major concern of investments.
238
 This 
change in the economic indirect intervention is a real challenge in investment 
arbitration as it is often a difficult task to identify real government intentions behind 
measures. Investments involve a long span of time in the host states. In certain 
sectors such as natural resources or infrastructure, the duration would take until the 
                                                 
237 Walde made a remark on this, 
‗The contemporary situation is one of an acceleration of the globalisation process, of 
regional and multilateral economic integration, of privatisation, liberalisation and 
deregulation, of an international environmental and social values export.  Issues of non-
discriminatory open access and  the tension with domestic protectionism, also with 
environmental and social values (human rights)  - in investment similar to the situation in 
international trade - are the key issues of the agenda of the year 2000.‘ 
See Thomas W Walde, ‗Changing Directions for International Investment Law in the Global 
Economy An Overview of Selected Issues‘ 4-2 CEPMLP Website 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol4/article4-2.html>., < 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol4/article4-2.html> , accessed on 29 July 2013. 
238 World Development Report 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (n  7). 
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project ends or until financial returns are obtained.
 239
 Such span of time also means 
that it is exposed more to risks, both economic or political, especially the latter, 
arising from the change of host states regulations. While economic changes could at 
times be forecasted
240
 and accepted as ordinary business risks to the investors, 
changes in regulation are normally abrupt and cause devastating impacts on the 
survival of the investment. The investors fear of the decreasing value of the 
investments because of host states‘ actions or regulation.241 Nationals are more 
inclined to receive better treatment from their government as compared to foreign 
investors simply because the government has the power to regulate and domestic 
interests to protect. Changes in regulation may be affecting any stage of the 
investment, in the form of increase in taxes, restrictions on the transfer of funds and 
introductions of conditions or procedural requirements. They may be under the name 
of environmental regulation, health or public security. The fragility of investments, 
its financial viability
242
  and level playing field are unique natures and needs of 
investments that the tribunals need to capture when discussing on the impact of 
government regulatory measures.  
 
Secondly, it is from the angle of host states‘ interest and the increasing awareness of 
the effects of liberalism to the domestic economy. At the early stage of the 
promulgation of investment treaty, it may not be as obvious, as at that time, the 
states (especially the developing states) more than ever needed foreign investment to 
                                                 
239 An aspect that must be understood is the importance of the financial viability of investments. 
Foreign investors constantly ensure that their investments are financially viable to survive the long 
term operation in the host state. This is in fact assumed to be the first consideration taken by foreign 
investors before a decision to invest abroad is made. See Imad A Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: 
Theory, Evidence and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 102. 
240 e.g loss in demands, increase in competition or changes in exchange rates. 
241 See GAMI Investments, Inc v The Government of the United Mexican States, Final Award 15 
November 2004, para 28. 
242 As compared to international trade, the exporters still have the option to cease exporting if the 
situation in the host importing country is unfavourable to the product. 
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build infrastructures and economy. Thirty years later, the effects of such 
liberalisation is felt, domestic investments especially from the emerging economies 
are becoming capable but still could not stand the rigorous competition of FDI 
inflow.
243
 Studies have shown that there are signs towards protectionism.
244
 
Observers have related this to the re-evaluation of the FDI framework and the 
insertion of exceptions, the global financial crisis and recession.
245
 Another 
interesting recent development that one could relate is the mobilisation of new 
immigrants which are pushed out of their countries because of economic pressures 
that hit several European countries.
246
 These European immigrants, for instance 
those from Spain and Portugal are settling in volumes in developing countries or 
former colonies such as Uruguay and Mozambique. Many have enough capital to set 
up small investments and are expected to compete the same investment incentives 
under relevant investment treaties. On a bigger level, the increasing numbers of 
multinational companies which run big scale investments are effectively causing 
concerns to states (even developed ones) of the threat they may impose to local 
industries.
247
 There are also real social and environmental issues that the host states 
                                                 
243 Leon Trakman, ‗Foreign Direct Investment: Hazard or Opportunity?‘ [2010] University of New 
South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2010 <http://law.bepress.com/unswwps-flrps10/art32>, 
accessed on 28 January 2014. 
244 Sauvant, ‗FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise‘ (n 13); Karl P Sauvant, ‗Driving and Countervailing 
Forces: A Rebalancing of National FDI Policies‘ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy 2008-2009. (Oxford Univ Pr 2009). See also in the context of trade 
Matthieu Bussière and others, ‗Protectionist Responses to the Crisis: Global Trends and Implications‘ 
(2011) 34 The World Economy 826. 
245 Sauvant, ‗FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise‘ (n 13). 
246 Robyn Curnow, ‗Portuguese Head to Mozambique to Escape Eurozone Crisis‘ (CNN, 15 August 
2012) <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/15/business/mozambique-portugal-economy/index.html> 
accessed 21 August 2013; ‗Argentina, Uruguay Among Region‘s Most Wanted For Immigration‘ 
(InvestBA.com, 18 March 2013) <http://investba.com/2013/03/immigration-to-argentina-and-
uruguay/> accessed 21 August 2013. 
247 An example is the ‗Buy American‘ requirement on foreign investors in the USA. This was 
challenged in ADF Inc. v USA. See attempt to end it via the Trans Pacific Partnership in  John Ivison, 
‗John Ivison: Trans-Pacific Talks Provide Opportunity to Put an End to Buy American Protectionism‘ 
(National Post, 3 March 2013) <http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/03/03/john-ivison-trans-
pacific-partnership-talks-provide-opportunity-to-put-an-end-to-buy-american-protectionism/> 
accessed 21 August 2013. See also J.D Foster, ‗United States International Tax Policy: Tax Neutrality 
or Investment Protectionism?‘ (Tax Foundation, 10 November 1994),< 
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have to deal with the influx of foreign investments.
248
 It is because of this realisation, 
that the interpretation of national treatment should accommodate real issues and find 
the right balance by utilising public administration law tools for more acceptable 
decisions.
249
  
 
4.0 Likeness Test: The Real Battle in National Treatment 
Like circumstances is integral in the interpretation of national treatment.  It is 
mandated in many investment treaties. The NAFTA Article 1102 for instance 
literally inserts ‗like circumstances‘ in its national treatment provision.  
 
‗Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.‘ 
 
Even in cases without specifying in like circumstances, it is observed that the 
assessment should nevertheless be constructed. In the case of Nykomb v Latvia, the 
tribunal asserted that the general test in a discrimination assessment is to examine 
                                                                                                                                          
http://taxfoundation.org/article/united-states-international-tax-policy-tax-neutrality-or-investment-
protectionism>,  accessed 21 August 2013.  
248 One example is the question of food security. This is due to masses of land which are under the 
private ownership of foreign investors for projects like biofuel, irrigation and livestock. There are 
issues of limited local access to land, food and water and distribution of food to home and host-
countries. See Lorenzo Cotula, ‗Land Grab or Development Opportunity? International Farmland 
Deals in Africa‘ in Karl P Sauvant and others (eds), FDI Perspectives: Issues in International 
Investment (2011). 
249 The international investment law literatures are currently heading towards this awareness in search 
for a more sustainable investment regime. See for instance Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, 
‗Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the 
Emerging Global Administrative Law‘ (Social Science Research Network 2009) SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 1466980 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1466980> accessed 29 April 2013; Stephan W 
Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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like with like.
250
 This case invoked Article 10 of the ECT which does not contain 
expressed comparator requirement. Similarly, in the case of Saluka Investments BV v 
Czech Republic which conducted an examination of discrimination under the fair and 
equitable treatment claim, the tribunal examined the comparable position of the big 
four banks regarding the bad debt problem – akin to an ‗in like circumstances‘ 
assessment.
251
 The OECD commentary on the Draft Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) maintained that the national treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment by themselves are comparative terms.
252
 
 
As most national treatment provisions are without detailed elaboration,
253
 the debate 
remains on the degree of the protection, or the extent in which the host states are 
obliged to protect foreign investors or investments. The arbitrations, seen 
collectively, agree that the interpretation depends on the examination of the context 
of specific circumstances of each case.
254
 This general observation nevertheless 
loosely allows independent interpretation and opens a wide door to inconsistency. 
The inconsistency is largely due to the interpretation of likeness.
255
  
 
The difficulty is to determine likeness in the investment setting where there is nearly 
no physical attributes that can be compared. The comparison is thus upon other 
contingent attributes of the investment, commonly from the sector of the investments 
                                                 
250 Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v The Republic of Latvia, Energy Charter 
Treaty,Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 16 December 2003 , page 34. 
251 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award, 17 March 2006 
, para 314- 323. 
252 This discussion took place in deciding whether ‗in like circumstances‘ should be included in the 
MAI draft. See  OECD, ‗The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Commentary to the Consolidated 
Text‘ (n 188) 11. 
253 National treatment is an ambiguous relative right. See Jose E. Alvarez, 'The Emerging Foreign 
Direct Investment Regime' (2005) ASIL Proceedings, (n 155) 95. 
254 S.D Myers Inc v Canada, (n 24), para 249. 
255 See the broadness of interpretation in OEPC v Ecuador (n 18) as opposed to narrow interpretations 
in Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), Methanex v USA (n 19). 
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and their investment activities. Tribunals have not simplified the criteria or 
characteristics of likeness for investments. There are however traces or criteria - 
some commonly invoked by the tribunals and some isolated approaches- that are 
able to provide a view of the development of this area of jurisprudence. This part 
attempts to structure these findings and suggest some linkages and observations.  
 
The most prevalent approach in investment tribunals is to determine the economic 
sector of the comparators.
256
 In Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada, the tribunal asserted 
that as a first step to this analysis, comparison must be made among investments in 
the same business or economic sector.
257
  The tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v 
Canada referred to the OECD analysis on national treatment that as regards to ‗in 
like situations‘, the comparison is valid only if it is made between firms operating in 
the same sector. The tribunal also took note that the economic sector should not be 
the only determinative factor, but must take into account the general considerations 
such as the policy objectives of the member countries.
258
 Similarly, in the case of SD 
Myers, the tribunal referred to the OECD practice.
259
 In SD Myers, the tribunal in 
comparing between the PCB operators held, 
 
The concept of ―like circumstances‖ invites an examination of whether a 
non-national investor complaining of less favourable treatment is in the same 
―sector‖ as the national investor.  The Tribunal takes the view that the word 
                                                 
256 See Methanex v USA (n 19), Pope & Talbot Inc. v Canada (n 20), para 78. 
257 Pope & Talbot Inc. Canada (n 20),para 78. This approach was also adopted in Parkerings v 
Lithuania in determining likeness in most favoured nation claim. See Parkerings- Compagniet  AS v 
Republic of Lithuania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8), para 371. 
258 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, (n 20), para 78. 
259 SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 248. 
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―sector‖ has a wide connotation that includes the concepts of ―economic 
sector‖ and ―business sector‖.   
  
However, within the criteria of economic sector, the tribunals have differed as to the 
narrowness or broadness of the economic activities. In the case of Feldman v 
Mexico, the tribunal has adopted a much narrower application of economic sector, in 
that it was limited to the reselling and exporting of investments in the cigarette 
industry.
260
 Similarly, in the case of Methanex v USA and UPS v Canada, the 
tribunals held that methanol and ethanol investment were not in like circumstances 
despite both being in the oxygenate market and investments in the postal industry 
differently. Thus it could be discerned that being in the same economic sector is not 
the sole and determinative factor of likeness. The tribunals have to take into 
consideration the policy objectives of the measure that could flip likeness otherwise. 
 
There is no fixed definition of economic sectors which could be imposed in the 
determination of likeness. A general division of the industrial sector can be seen in 
statistics done at the international level on foreign direct investment for instance by 
UNCTAD or OECD.
 261
 Some examples of sectors are agriculture and fishing, 
mining and quarrying, food products, metal and mechanical products, construction, 
trade and repairs, finance and transport and communications.
262
 These divisions are 
                                                 
260 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 171. 
261 Direct Investment by Industrial Sector, International Direct Investment Database, OECD, < 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=FDI_FLOW_INDUSTRY >, accessed on 28 January 
2014. Foreign direct investment in the financial sector - Experiences in Asia, Central and Eastern 
Europe and Latin America CGFS Publications No 25. June 2005. < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs25.htm>, accessed on 28 January 2014. 
262 For example, see ‗Morocco Table 5. FDI Flows in the Host Economy, by Industry, 1996-2006 
(millions of dirhams)‘ World Investment Directory. Volume X Africa. 2008  page 447, 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20075_en.pdf.>, accessed on 28 January 2014. 
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general and may only be helpful for the first string filter in the search of likeness.
263
 
The examination must proceed further because investment activities tend to 
specialise.  In the wood industry alone, there could be a range of specialisation, such 
as wood lumbering, moulding, flooring and coating.  Investment activities vary 
depending on factors including the potential profit they can accumulate, skill, 
demand and resources. In SD Myers, the tribunal viewed that ‗sector‘ is a wide 
connotation that includes the concept of economic sector and business sector.  The 
tribunal however did not provide the details of the two concepts, but concluded that 
SDMI and Myers Canada were in like circumstances with the Canadian operators 
from the business perspective, because of the same group of customers.
264
 
 
As if the possibility of broad range of activities within an economic sector is not 
enough, the tribunal in the case of OEPC v Ecuador has even widen the application 
of likeness. Such approach, if taken for the purpose of national treatment will not 
only hold unnecessary barrier to the host states‘ power to legislate but also open a 
floodgate of discrimination claims. This explains the controversy on the OEPC v 
Ecuador award where companies engaged in exports were considered alike even if 
encompassing different sectors, including export of petroleum, flowers and seafood 
                                                 
263 As there could be a variety of measure of how embracing an economic sector can be, it is best to 
examine the most obvious, reasonable, practical and recognised specialisation in the area which 
consist of a handful of players. For instance, it is unlikely to conclude that mining activity and fishing 
activity should be in the same sector because both involve extraction and production of raw materials. 
It is also inappropriate to assume a retailing business and a barber shop as alike due to provision of 
services to consumers. This is taken if the broad division of economic sector is applied, namely 
primary, manufacturing and service sector. For general reading on FDI and economic sector, see 
Laura Alfaro. Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter? Harvard Business 
School . April 2003, <http://www.people.hbs.edu/lalfaro/fdisectorial.pdf.>, accessed on 28 January 
2014. 
264 S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 250. 
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products.
265
 It was described as ‗diametrically at odds‘ when compared to other cases 
which apply a much narrower approach.
266
  
 
It is not firm whether it is a ‗must‘ that investments in like circumstances should be 
in the same economic sector.
267
 What was worrying about the inconsistency between 
the OEPC v Ecuador and other investment cases is not so much on the economic 
sector factor, but rather the absence of firmer criteria that could be relevant across 
cases. There is an absence of substance in the OEPC v Ecuador decision that could 
otherwise fill the essence of like circumstances.   
 
Hence, some scholars have suggested the role of competition as a factor of 
likeness.
268
 It is presumed that two investments are considered alike if they are 
competing with each other. In investments, the investors in the same business will 
generally strive to gain profit in the same investment climate. This is in line with the 
purpose of the national treatment provision to ensure foreign investors a level 
playing field and similar competitive opportunities with the local investments.
269
  
                                                 
265 OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18), paras168-173. 
266 This case is often compared to Methanex v USA which highlighted differences in the methanol and 
ethanol industry. Kurtz, ‗The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration‘ (n 40). See 
also Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press 2008) 252. 
267 Kurtz suggested that it is a must that likeness is between investments in the same economic sector. 
See Jurgen Kurtz, ‗Balancing Investor Protection and Regulatory Freedom in Investor‐State 
Arbitration: The Complex Search for State Purpose in a National Treatment Inquiry ‘ [2012] Institute 
for International Law and Justice, < 
http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/KurtzBalancingInvestorProtectionandRegulatoryFreedomPap
er.pdf>, accessed on 6 October 2013. In the case of CPI, Inc. v Mexico, the tribunal regarded that it is 
‗necessary‘ to begin with the assessment of the same business or economic sector. See CPI, Inc. v 
Mexico, (n 98), para 120. This thesis will however put forth a view that likeness can occur across 
economic sector if the circumstances permit (so as to contrast with OEPC v Ecuador). See further 
discussion in Ch.6. 
268 Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International Investment 
Law and the WTO‘ (n 102). See also UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass (n 
206), para 17.  
269 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 
151. 
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The discussion over the relevance of competition in investment cases can be seen in 
the case of Methanex v USA. The tribunal did not explicitly rule out its relevance but 
obviously did not consider it as a basis of likeness either. The argument that likeness 
should be construed from the viewpoint of competition of the investments was 
brought by the claimant. The tribunal instead was inclined to reject likeness between 
the competing investments of methanol and ethanol because of the existence of 
another methanol investment which was in ‗most‘ like circumstances. The rejection 
of the competition test raises question of what likeness should sensibly be. The 
rejection was not due to substantiated justifications of the discrimination by the host 
state but fearing the perverse state of ignoring a more identical methanol producer 
elsewhere. Similarly, in the case of UPS v Canada, Feldman v Mexico and Pope & 
Talbot, the tribunals did not construe the obvious competitive situations of the 
claimants and the comparators. In the case of UPS v Canada, the competitive 
relationship between the investor and the national postal company was not given 
weight by the tribunal when construing likeness. The tribunal was distracted by more 
specific differences in the type of service that the investments are operating. Dean 
Ronald A. Cass dissented the direction of the tribunal and elaborated that; 
 
‗The most natural reading of NAFTA Article 1102, however gives weight to 
a showing of competition between a complaining investor and an investor of 
the respondent party in respect of the matters at issue in a NAFTA dispute 
under Article 1102. Article 1102 focuses on protection of investors and 
investments against discriminatory treatment. A showing that there is a 
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competitive relationship and that two investments are similar in that respect 
establishes a prima facie case of like circumstances.‘270 
 
In a similar vein, the tribunal in the case of Corn Product International, Inc. v 
Mexico acknowledged the role of competition as a basis of likeness. The tribunal 
held that that the High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) tax has altered the terms of 
competition of the investment products involved.  The competitive relationship 
between HFCS and the domestic sugar has brought to the similar treatment by 
Mexican law as being interchangeable.
271
 In the context of investment law, such 
competitive relationship is an appropriate indicator of likeness. 
 
In relation to competition, the tribunals had to encounter the relevance of 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence. The relevance of decided GATT/WTO decisions of the 
products in question is normally raised by the claimants in the attempt to support 
their arguments.
272
 The Methanex v USA tribunal was however mindful that GATT‘s 
context is different to investment and was reluctant to adopt the practice in that 
issue.
273
 On the other hand, in CPI, Inc. v Mexico, the tribunal acknowledged the 
relevance of ‗like products‘ test in GATT/WTO to the application of NAFTA Article 
1102. The verdict of ‗like product‘ is helpful to determine the nature of the 
investment involved, even though it does not mean like circumstances.
274
 The 
                                                 
270 UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, (n 206),  para 17. 
271 CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 120. 
272 See for instance CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), Cargill, Inc. v Mexico, (n 183), Methanex v USA, (n 
19). 
273 The Methanex tribunal was taking a cautionary step in concluding the application of ‗like product‘ 
in the case. The tribunal however has mentioned earlier in its judgment that due to the similarity in 
language with GATT Article III, there is a possibility that GATT jurisprudence would assist the 
tribunal in deciding the case. See Methanex v USA (n 19), Part II, Chapter B, para 6. See also 
reference to Methanex v USA in CPI v Mexico (n 98), para 123.  
274 CPI, Inc.  v Mexico (n 98),  para 122. The reference of ‗like products‘ in article III of the GATT is 
inadequate for investment agreements. ‗National Treatment‘ (n 151). 
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GATT/WTO‗s experience in national treatment in the ‗most authoritative fashion‘ 
may provide assistance to international investment.
275
  
 
The conclusiveness of the competition test is another issue. Although it is described 
as a prima facie case of in like circumstances,
276
 the tribunals could not turn a blind 
eye to other factors. The term circumstances must encompass the policy objectives 
and other relevant criteria. In this regard, the tribunal in the case of Cargill Inc. v 
Mexico held that likeness in the investment products and the competition thereof 
could not guarantee like circumstances. The tribunal referred to GAMI v Mexico and 
Pope & Talbot and asserted that there must be something more than likeness of 
goods.
277
 This is a sensible view as it acknowledged the role of competition but 
opens the possibility of it being refuted in appropriate circumstances. A comparison 
can be made to cases which do not regard the relevance of competition at all when it 
is the most obvious indicator of likeness at the time where other plausible criteria are 
less convincing.
278
  
 
The scantiness of the competition test to cover all types of investment cases was 
highlighted by Walde.
279
 While competition may indicate likeness, it is not necessary 
to search for competitiveness of the comparators if it is not relevant to the issue in 
question. In facing a particular less favourable treatment, it may be more appropriate 
to industrially compare the investments.
280
 In the case of Nykomb v Latvia, the 
                                                 
275 See Walde, ‗In the Arbitration under Article 26 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Nykomb v. The 
Republic of Latvia-Legal Opinion‘ (n 170) , para 39. 
276 UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, (n 206),  para 17. 
277 Cargill, Inc. v Mexico, (n 183), para 195. 
278 See for instance Methanex v USA, (n 19). 
279 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
280 The term ‗ industrial comparability‘ was introduced in late Prof. Thomas Walde‘s in his article 
above. Walde, ‗In the Arbitration under Article 26 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Nykomb v. The 
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tribunal did not construe the competition test as the industrial characteristics of the 
comparators were evident. The industrial characteristics considered were the use of 
same technology i.e co-generation, similar age of construction and similar capacity 
of production which make both investments fall under the 1995 Entrepreneurial Act. 
In that case, the comparators were considered in like situation because they were all 
supplying electricity to Latvenergo and were operating an environment friendly co-
generation. The test of likeness in Nykomb v Latvia required a look into the technical 
characteristics of the investments.
281
 
 
The case of Nykomb v Latvia also indicates the construction of likeness from the 
viewpoint of local legislation. Similar host state guarantees may render the 
investments covered in similar circumstances. Host states guarantee can be in the 
form of contracts, laws enacted or government circulars of which are relied upon by 
investors. In Nykomb v Latvia, the fact that Windau, Gulbene and Siltums entered 
into contract with Latvenergo roughly at the same period, the investments were 
therefore entitled to the same double tariff pursuant to the Entrepreneurial  Law 
1995.
282
  
 
Similarly, in CPI, Inc. v Mexico,
283
 the Mexican government made a commitment in 
writing guaranteeing access to duty-free imported yellow corn for the purpose of 
producing HFCS in April 1994. Acting in response of that commitment, the joint 
venture was concluded. However, when the Federal Congress in Mexico enacted a 
                                                                                                                                          
Republic of Latvia-Legal Opinion‘ (n 170). Competition and its relevance to investment test of 
likeness will be discussed in depth in Ch.3 and 6.    
281 This was concluded briefly by the tribunal, by inference of the earlier discussions in the award. See 
Nykomb v Latvia, (n 250), 4.3.2 (a), pg34.  
282 Ibid., 3.5.2, pg 16 
283 CPI Inc.v Mexico, (n 98), para 28. 
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legislation which exempt from tax all soft drink manufactured using sweeteners 
made exclusively from cane sugar, it was as if Mexico has closed off access for 
HFCS to the soft drinks market because soft drink bottlers switched en masse to the 
use of the untaxed cane sugar as sweeteners.
284
 The tribunal concluded that the 
HFCS tax was a violation of national treatment.
285
  
 
However, some tribunals have disregarded the dynamic criteria of investment nature, 
operation and management. In the case of ADF Group Inc v United States of 
America, the tribunal did not look at the investment circumstances of the investor as 
compared to the local comparators.
286
 While the US comparators were not affected 
by the ‗Buy America‘ clause - considering that their steel fabrication were originally 
from and within America, the claimant‘s ordinary cause of business of fabricating 
steel via its subsidiary in Canada was considered against the US law.  By fabricating 
steel within US, it would cause the investment ‗a massive expenditure‘ having to 
manage it in different locations and hiring additional workers, which would be 
unnecessary if it was to be done via the claimant‘s subsidiary in Canada. The 
tribunal applied the like situation test and plainly asserted that it would be unnatural 
for investors to fabricate steel abroad while other locals perform it locally. The fact 
that the foreign investor was not allowed to use its own facility unlike the US 
investors
287
 was a barrier in investment which denied the dynamics of investment 
and the protective aim of international investment agreements.  
 
                                                 
284 CPI, Inc.v Mexico, (n 98), para 51. 
285 Ibid.,  para 143. 
286 ADF Group Inc. v USA, (n 173), para 157. 
287 See Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 
7) 186. 
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The investment cases so far have not emphasised directly and explicitly the issue of 
different economic competencies of investments, but it is a potentially important 
criterion. An investment with limited use of technology could not be considered 
alike with a full-tech investment which is able to produce bigger volume of 
production. An investment with many years of experience and expertise should not 
be compared with a new investment with limited expertise. As far as small 
businesses are concerned, it is generally observed they are vulnerable and are more 
likely to close operation.
288
  
 
One may argue that if such a criterion is undertaken, investments will always tend to 
differ and the national treatment provision will not serve its purpose.  Disadvantaged 
investments of technology, scale, expertise and financial cap thus needs stronger 
investment support to keep them running. Due to the open nature of investment 
opportunities in the world today, it becomes inevitable that small enterprises and big 
multinational corporations meet. These different entities portray different levels of 
technical advances and financial strength but are nevertheless expected to compete in 
the same investment setting. This reality of inequality has urged states to support 
these industries until they are matured enough to compete internationally. 
 
There are at least two cases that may be indicative towards this direction. This was 
not declared as a rule but could be accepted by the tribunals depending on the 
rational of such distinction. In Parkerings v Lithuania, the size of the project of 
Pinus Proprius and BP was taken into consideration.
289
 Although the investments 
were not viewed in terms of operative equality, the tribunal took cognizance that the 
                                                 
288 Graham Bannock, The Economics and Management of Small Business: An International 
Perspective (Routledge 2005) 1. 
289 Parkering v Lithuania, (n 257), para 396. 
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different scale of project should not be taken as in like circumstances. In another 
case, Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
the tribunal took into account the experience and expertise of the local investor as 
compared to the foreign investors in the same project.
290
 
 
The examination of likeness includes the broader circumstances of the investors in 
question. This suggests that two investments should not be regarded as in the same 
circumstances despite identical physical attribution to the investments because of a 
broader dispute between the host state and the investor state. There are at least two 
investment cases that have considered the broader dispute as a factor in determining 
likeness. In the case of Pope & Talbot v Canada, the tribunal agreed that the legal 
context in determining likeness includes the entire background of the dispute 
between Canada and the United States concerning softwood lumber trade.
291
 The 
tribunal saw that the underlying economics of softwood lumber industry in Canada 
made the comparators unlike and that the new entrant‘s allocation choice by Canada 
had a reasonable nexus with a rational and non-discriminatory policy.
292
  In the other 
case of CPI, Inc. v Mexico, the discrimination was a countermeasure to a broader 
dispute between US and Mexico on the ban of Mexican sugar cane products. The 
tribunal did not however take into account the Mexican denied access to the US 
market and concluded that the comparators are adequately alike for the purpose of 
Article 1102.
293
   
 
                                                 
290 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter 
‗Bayindir v Pakistan’ ) ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 27 August  2009, para 410.  
291 Pope & Talbot , (n 20), para 77, p.34. 
292 Ibid.,  para 93, p41. 
293 CPI  Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 129. 
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The assessment of likeness as analysed above is factual dependant. The tribunal have 
taken into consideration several factors, i.e the economic sector, competition, 
industrial comparability, operative equality, guarantee by host state and broader 
dispute or circumstances. The tribunals have however done so independently, often 
ignoring other aspects of likeness while highlighting another. There is a need for a 
systematic assessment of the criteria of likeness which is the driving motivation of 
this thesis.   
 
6.0 Legitimate Regulatory Measures 
 
A typical national treatment clause in investment treaties generally textually requires 
two matters; firstly whether there is less favourable treatment and secondly whether 
the comparators are in like circumstances.
294
 A literal reading of the national 
treatment provision would conclude suffice the findings of the two requirements. In 
Thunderbird v Mexico, the tribunal in responding (albeit indirectly) to the three-part 
test proposed by the claimant, asserted that the finding of national treatment must 
follow the plain wording of the text. The obligation of the host state is to accord non-
discriminatory treatment to foreign investors. The tribunal held that the claimant 
must show firstly, whether there was less favourable treatment and secondly whether 
the investments were in like circumstance.
295
  
 
                                                 
294 The extraction of these two matters can be seen for instance from article 1102 of NAFTA: 
‗Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments.‘ 
295 Thunderbird Case, (n 199) paras 175-176. This case did not proceed beyond the finding of less 
favourable treatment and thus it could not be further ascertained as to how the tribunal would or 
would not construe the justification of the measure as part of its assessment. 
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To the exception of some investment treaties that provide for the general exceptions 
which are applicable in the national treatment assessment, investment awards 
generally considered the assessment of justification as part of the analysis of national 
treatment. The analysis of the legitimacy of the regulatory measure is rather 
judicially developed in the investment disputes. The tribunals have not outlined 
explicitly this methodology, but it can be inferred from its construction and its 
responses to the more explicit assertions by the disputing parties. The case of Pope 
& Talbot, Inc. v Canada is often referred to in cases and scholarly writings in 
reference to the examination of legitimate regulatory measure as the third test in a 
national treatment assessment.  The tribunal in its award mentioned: 
 
‗Differences will presumptively violate Article 1102(2), unless they have a 
reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not distinguish, 
on their face or de facto, between foreign owned and domestic companies, 
and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing 
objectives of NAFTA.‘ 296 
 
This was further highlighted in the subsequent paragraphs that the tribunal would 
construe the reasonable nexus between the measure and a rational, non-
discriminatory government policy if the parties use the substance of an agreement or 
                                                 
296 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, (n 20), paras 31-104. Despite the reference to the case of Pope & 
Talbot in  relation to the three steps involved, a close reading of the case would reveal that the 
likeness test and the reasonable nexus between the measure and a rational non-discriminatory policy 
are not clearly demarcated. The three steps may or may not be independent to each other depending 
on the facts of the case. The second and third tests are conducted in a merged manner. This 
observation will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. Generally, the three pronged 
test is deduced by scholars from the approach of the tribunals in construing national treatment 
assessments. See in particular Weiler, ‗Saving Oscar Chin: Non-Discrimination in International 
Investment Law‘ (n 110); Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, 
Discrimination, and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (n 135) 447.  
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measure as an unchallengeable basis for discrimination.
297
 In Parkerings v Lithuania, 
the tribunal asserted, 
 
‗However, the situation of the two investors will not be in like circumstances 
if a justification of the different treatment is established.‘298 
 
The importance of rational or justification can be regarded as inherent in a 
discrimination assessment. For instance, elsewhere in the case of Saluka Investments 
BV v The Czech Republic which invoked discrimination under a broad fair and 
equitable treatment provision, the tribunal construed a systematic assessment of 
comparable situation of the banks, differential treatment and the assessment of lack 
of justification.
299
  
 
One obvious feature in international investment law is the absence of the expressed 
general exceptions of the obligations in the international investment agreements. The 
tribunals however, directed by reasons and common practice in other experienced 
jurisprudence such as GATT/WTO, have undertook the examination of whether the 
host states have the legitimate reasons justifying the discriminatory measure. In the 
case of Feldman the tribunal asserted that: 
 
                                                 
297 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, (n 20), para 81. 
298 Parkerings v Lithuania, (n 257), para 375. 
299 See Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, (n 251), para 313. The case was concerning 
Article 3 of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Kingdom of The Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, signed on 29 April 199. 
The provision involved  is worded as below:  
‗Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the investments of 
investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal thereof by those investors.‘ 
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―In the investment context, the concept of discrimination has been defined to 
imply unreasonable distinctions between foreign and domestic investors in 
like circumstances.‖300 
 
Every discriminatory measure must have reasonable nexus to a rational, non-
discriminatory government or international policy.
301
 The question of the legitimacy 
of a discriminatory measure is determinative on whether two investments are in like 
circumstances, if the latter is construed from the legislative point of view.
302
 Thus in 
investment cases, the tribunals construed this question in two instances, firstly 
together with likeness in determining appropriate comparators and secondly, as a 
third step to determine whether the discriminatory measure is justified. A detailed 
discussion on the plausibility of these approaches will be in Chapter Six under the 
independent or merged justification test.  
 
The approach taken by tribunals is on a case by case basis and the exceptions and 
test of reasonableness are derived from various sources and analogy. In the reading 
of national treatment, there is a minimum presumption that it condones distortions 
and discrimination and promotes public and environmental protection, as understood 
across international economic law where national treatment is more familiar.
303
 It is 
thus not surprising if GATT/WTO is referred to or incorporated into the 
interpretation of national treatment and investment treaties.
304
  The approach taken in 
the case of SD Myers, Inc. v Canada is an example of placing the scope of national 
                                                 
300 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 170. 
301 Pope & Talbot , (n 20), para 81. 
302 Ibid., paras 75-76. 
303 Alvarez, mentions that the WTO jurisprudence contains similar principles, hence the presumption. 
See Jose E. Alvarez, 'The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime', (n 155). 
304 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (n 27) 187. 
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treatment in the existence of an environmental concern. Although there is no clear 
exception that excludes environmental regulations from being challenged by 
investors, the tribunals seemed to be aware that it deserves cautionary examination. 
The conclusion so far is that not all environmental regulations are legitimate, as it 
must be reasonably invoked in the absence of other alternatives. Damage caused to 
investors because of environmental regulations must only be when it is necessary.  
 
In the case of SD Myers Inc. v Canada, the tribunal took note of the approach by 
GATT/WTO which referred to Article XX (General Exceptions) in the attempt to 
read the overall legal context of national treatment. In exercising the same approach, 
the tribunal noted the NAFTA companion agreement NAAEC which provides for 
the establishment of high levels of environmental protection by states. This allowed 
a further examination of whether the less favourable treatment of the like 
investments was justified by legitimate public policy measures, pursued in a 
reasonable manner. By reasonableness, the tribunal also highlighted the need to 
avoid trade distortions that are not justified by environmental concerns. The tribunal 
found that Canada‘s action was not motivated genuinely by environmental concerns 
but rather by indirect protectionist motive to maintain the future ability to process 
PCBs within Canada. As there were a number of legitimate ways that Canada could 
do to achieve its motive, the prevention of SDMI from exporting PCBs for 
processing in the USA was unreasonable and a breach of Article 1102 NAFTA.
305
 
 
This scope of application provides space to the host government in exercising their 
sovereignty in regulation. The OECD Declaration has also mentioned that 
                                                 
305 SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24), paras 246-257. 
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investments must be consistent with the maintenance of public order, the security 
interest of the host states and international peace and order. They are collectively 
meant to provide flexibility in the interpretation of the national treatment obligation 
by allowing reasonable and legitimate regulatory measures.
 306
 
 
The reasonableness test in the context of investment must be able to produce a 
balanced and ideal application of national treatment. The national treatment principle 
must provide clear and predictable scope of protection to the investors while 
allowing host states to pursue its national interest. In the past cases, host states were 
alleged to introduce discriminatory measures that affect foreign investors under the 
rationales such as for environment protection,
307
 national security
308
 and economic 
countermeasure.
309
  An observation by UNCTAD has also revealed that many 
regulatory changes have occurred among countries that has made the investment 
framework less welcoming.
310
  As for the foreign investors, this trend is worrying 
because host states may drastically change the regulatory set up that is legitimately 
relied upon by foreign investors.
311
 
 
The tribunal in the case of Occidental v Ecuador has stretched the likeness test to 
include investors across different economic sectors in the view of protection towards 
                                                 
306 UNCTAD recognises the ‗economic asymmetry‖ that require a degree of flexibility of national 
treatment especially in developing countries. See UNCTAD ―National Treatment‖ 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol.IV) p 2.  
307 SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24), Methanex v USA, (n 19). 
308 For better control over tax revenue, discourage smuggling, protection of intellectual property and 
prohibition of grey market sales. See Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 176. 
309 CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98). 
310 World Development Report 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (n 7). See also 
Sauvant, ‗FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise‘ (n 13).  
311 On environmental regulation, see Waelde and Kolo, ‗Environmental Regulation, Investment 
Protection and ―Regulatory Taking‖ in International Law‘ (n 39) 819. 
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foreign investors but failed to explain the reasonableness of doing so.
312
 In UPS v 
Canada, the tribunal failed to examine the reasonableness on an acceptable threshold 
to prove why two investments are not in like circumstances when they are in obvious 
competition and in the same economic sector.
313
  
 
The reasonableness of the ‗Buy America‘ measures was also not discussed by the 
tribunal in ADF Group Inc v America. The tribunal rejected the claim because the 
investor failed to identify a US steel manufacturer or fabricator which was treated 
differently.
314
 The search for a comparator as required by the tribunal is almost 
impossible because a local investor would not possibly fabricate steel abroad, unlike 
the foreign investor which has parts of its facilities in its home state. The 
examination of likeness should not necessarily be confined to the physical location 
of the facilities, but could be viewed from another account such as the freedom of 
using the investment‘s own facilities regardless the location.315 As such it is 
plausible to examine the reasonableness of the measure especially its impact on an 
investment. In responding to the respondent‘s allegation that the investor‘s claim 
was a claim relating to ‗goods‘ not ‗investment‘, the tribunal mentioned: 
 
‗Those areas include ―management, conduct and operation‖ of a Canadian 
―enterprise‖  in the US and the goods produced by such enterprise in the 
territory of the US can be regarded as investments of the Canadian investor 
                                                 
312 OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18),  para 173. 
313 UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass (n 21), para 17. 
314 ADF Group Inc. v USA (n 173), paras 156-7. 
315 The same view has been mentioned in Andrew Newcombe, see Newcombe and Paradell, Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 7) 185. 
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and are closely related to , and are the results of, the ―management, conduct 
and operation‖ of the enterprise‘316 
 
 The exception under the ground of national interest is not fully developed in 
national treatment jurisprudence. However, there are indicators by UNCTAD that 
host states are increasingly exploiting gaps in the international regime to introduce 
protectionist measures and invoking the justification of ‗national security‘ or 
‗interest‘. Among potential areas are favouring products with high domestic contents 
in government projects, subsidy like incentives for domestic investors and barriers 
on products which may affect investments.
317
 It is predicted that more protectionist 
measures will be introduced, testing the doctrine of national treatment to its full 
capacity. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
 
Based on the existing cases, this chapter has attempted to draw the pattern of 
interpretation of the national treatment principle in international investment cases. 
The appreciation of the objectives, scope and features of the national treatment 
principle is crucial in order to result in a directed and contextual interpretation and 
application of the doctrine. This provides the framework of the sub-tests on 
determination of likeness and reasonableness that builds up the substantive reasoning 
of the tribunals. Accompanied by the acknowledgment of the distinctive nature of 
investments and how investments are affected by a government measure, the 
                                                 
316 ADF Group Inc v America, (n 173), para 155. 
317 ‗Investment Policy Developments in G-20 Countries‘ (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2009).   <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20099_en.pdf>, accessed on 21 August 
2013. 
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tribunals should be able to understand the situations of investments and assess 
likeness therefrom.   
 
The observations in this chapter are not conclusive as this research will continue to 
study similar protections under the GATT/WTO, European Union Law and 
International Human Rights law and derive possible methods and analogies that can 
be transposed in international investment law. It has however laid an important 
foundation for the comparisons to take place.  
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Chapter 3 
RELEVANCE OF GATT/WTO DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL TREATMENT 
TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The interaction of trade and investments are interwoven in the practical world, but 
the legal structure which governs both areas is fragmented.
318
 The point of similarity 
between these separate fields of laws is the non-discrimination principle, manifested 
in the national treatment and most favoured nation provisions. The key issue in this 
chapter is to determine whether the interpretation of national treatment in trade could 
provide interpretative guidance to international investment law. To attempt this 
question, this thesis firstly lays the foundation of comparison; beginning with the 
underlying philosophies of trade and investment followed by the basis of comparison 
of the national treatment principle in both jurisprudences. It will then look at the 
various incorporations of national treatment provisions in the WTO texts and explain 
the relevance of GATT as the major comparison.  
 
                                                 
318 Mary E Footer, ‗On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship Between Foreign 
Investment and International Trade‘ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauve (eds), Prospects in 
International Investment Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
<http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item7113132/?site_locale=en_US>, accessed on 12 
June 2013; T. Broude, ‗Investment and Trade: The ―Lottie and Lisa‖ of International Economic 
Law?‘ (2011) 8 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1741>, accessed  on 28 January  2014. 
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The primary part of this chapter is to examine the analysis of likeness in the 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence and to see what lessons that could be learnt. As will be 
further developed in this chapter, it is concluded that the GATT/WTO jurisprudence 
is highly instructive especially in assimilating the economic context of the 
interpretation of likeness. This is achieved by highlighting the competitive 
relationships between the comparators. This is apt, considering that the investment 
treaties are economic legal instruments. This would be in line with the contextual 
interpretation as required in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). Thus, in so doing, this chapter will examine references to 
GATT/WTO in the investment decisions, the view of the scholars on its acceptance 
and rejection, and the suitability of the relevant tests of likeness in GATT/WTO 
namely; the traditional physical characteristic approach, the aims and effect test, 
directly competitive or substitutable approach (DCS) and the product process 
doctrine. 
 
The last section of this thesis is dedicated to the finding of legitimate regulatory 
measures. The intrinsic difference as highlighted by many scholars is the absence of 
an exception provision similar to Article XX of GATT/WTO.
319
 This thesis finds 
interesting lessons, in particular the use of the chapeau which resembles the 
proportionality test that needs to be further propagated in international investment 
law. It also highlights the methodological need for flexibility in applying both the 
three prong test and merged justification test as an after effect of the incorporation of 
a similar Article XX GATT/WTO exception in investment treaties. 
                                                 
319 Barton Legum and Ioana Petculescu, ‗GATT Article XX and International Investment Law‘ in 
Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: 
World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2013); Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of 
Comparativism: National Treatment in International Investment Law and the WTO‘ (n 102). 
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This chapter generally supports the comparative exercise towards coherence (though 
not necessarily full convergence),
320
  the proliferation of the rule of law in the 
application of the non-discrimination principle
321
 and the development of 
international investment law which takes into account the experience of other 
jurisprudences with similar questions.
322
 
 
2.0 The Underlying Philosophy of GATT/WTO: A Comparison to Investment 
 
The entire philosophy of GATT stems from the idea of liberalisation.
323
 
Liberalisation was promulgated following the collapse of the international economy 
after the World War I which was aggravated by trade restrictions and protectionist 
measures.
324
 It was a worldwide traumatic experience of the 1920s and 1930s that 
                                                 
320 Broude used the term ‗consolidation‘. A cautioned view could be seen in Tietje in that the merge 
would overburden the systems. This thesis agrees that this comparison is not to call for a merger but 
rather coherence in the general development of international economic law. See T. Broude, 
‗Investment and Trade‘ (n 318); Christian Tietje, ‗Perspectives on the Interaction between 
International Trade and Investment Regulation‘ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects 
in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
See also JHH Weiler, ‗Cain and Abel- Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law‘, The 
EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (Lindahl Lectures) 
(Oxford University Press, USA 2000). 
321 Tietje, ‗Perspectives on the Interaction between International Trade and Investment Regulation‘ (n 
320). 
322 Anthea Roberts, ‗Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping  the Investment Treaty 
System‘ [2013] 107 American Journal of International Law. 
323Alan O. Sykes, ‗Protectionism As a Safeguard:  A Positive Analysis of the GATT Escape Clause 
with Normative Speculations‘ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 255. 
324 The controversial U.S Hawley –Smoot Tariff in 1930 was an example of high tariff set by the 
Republicans in power and was later reduced by the Democrats. Although the tariff was not a direct 
causation to the Great Depression, it had caused to a drop of domestic imports and further led to other 
symmetric effects including the ‗inability of foreign countries to earn dollars from exports to United 
States‘ and higher trade barriers which aggravated the international tension. Douglas A Irwin, ‗From 
Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 
1930s‘ in Michael D Bordo, Claudia Dale Goldin and Eugene Nelson White (eds), The Defining 
Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century (University of 
Chicago Press 1997) 336. See also Robert E Hudec, ‗Circumventing Democracy: The Political 
Morality of Trade Negotiations‘ (1992) 25 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 311, 313.; Bussière, P rez Barreiro, Straub, and Taglioni, ‗Protectionist Responses to the 
Crisis‘ (n 244). 
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discouraged international trade.
325
 States felt the urge to revert to the pre-war I 
economic conditions.
326
 It was a difficult setting in the 1930s having to face with the 
rise and threat of fascism, that the democratic bloc gathered effort towards 
international cooperation in trade and finance by ending unregulated protectionism. 
By the removal of trade barriers and protectionist measures, states were able to trade 
liberally in the view that it would enhance the economic condition and the living 
standards of the people. This led to the negotiation of GATT which clearly 
enunciated the motivation to enhance the economic and living standard by liberating 
trade.
327
 The preamble reads, 
 
‗Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and 
expanding the production and exchange of goods.‘328 
 
The preamble confirmed the recognition of the benefits of liberalisation in trade by 
way of efficiency of trade and production popularly put forth in the theories of 
absolute and comparative advantage.
329
 In order to materialise the theory and the 
                                                 
325 Douglas A Irwin, Petros C Mavroidis and Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 5.  The other concern was the failure of the monetary system. 
326 Great Britain and France were the largest foreign investors prior the First World War where 
commodities and people were able to move freely and on adherence to the international gold standard. 
See  Cameron and Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World (n 53) 284–289. 
327 The philosophy of liberal trade is related to the theory of comparative advantage which promotes 
beneficial specialization, economic growth and higher standards of living. OECD, ‗Trade Principles 
and Concepts‘ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1995) OCDE/GD(95)141 
5, < http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/pdf/oecd_te_1995.pdf>, accessed on 5 October 2013. 
328 GATT 1947, Preamble.  
329Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (Prometheus Books 1991); David Ricardo, On the Principles of 
Political Economy, and Taxation (John Murray 1821); John Aldrich, ‗The Discovery of Comparative 
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benefits accruing to it, it required a move towards liberalisation, again pledged in the 
preamble that it can be achieved by ‗substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce‘.330 GATT was an outcome of reciprocity of states in order to agree to 
remove trade restrictions against the protectionist background at that time.
331
 
 
 
Considering that the whole aim is towards liberalisation, it is not surprising that 
protectionism is casted as a contrasting element.
332
 This is evidenced in the 
prohibition of protectionism in the GATT in Article III(1). Article III(1) prohibits 
internal taxation and regulation on imported or domestic products ‗so as to afford 
protection to domestic production‘. GATT functions as a safeguard to the tariff 
reduction negotiations made among the countries. It survived the International Trade 
Organization (also referred to as the Havana Charter) and is maintained under the 
new WTO. The WTO regarded GATT as a ‗past liberalisation effort‘ in its 
preamble. It continues to serve as the spinal trade regulating instrument together with 
other newly introduced texts in the Marrakesh Agreement to what is called as the 
post war ‗new protectionism‘ in the form of non-tariff barriers (NTB).333 It is 
gathered from the whole structure of GATT and WTO that it aims to ‗secure 
                                                                                                                                          
Advantage‘ (2004) 26 Journal of the History of Economic Thought 379, 379–399; Cameron and Neal, 
A Concise Economic History of the World (n 53) 276.  
330 GATT 1947, Preamble. 
331 The importance of reciprocity is explained by Trebilcock and Fishbein as opposed to unilateral 
liberalisation as a refinement of the classical trade theory. Pauwelyn also recognised the ‗reality‘ that 
made it impossible for states to liberalise unilaterally. See Michael Trebilcock and Michael Fishbein, 
‗International Trade: Barrier to Trade‘ in Andrew T Guzmán and AO Sykes (eds), Research 
Handbook in International Economic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 4; Joost Pauwelyn, 
‗Transformation of World Trade, The‘ (2005) 104 Michigan Law Review 1, 10.  
332Alan O Sykes, ‗Protectionism As a Safeguard:  A Positive Analysis of the GATT Escape Clause 
with Normative Speculations‘ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 255; Alan O Sykes, 
‗Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade‘ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 1, 1. 
333Dominick Salvatore, ‗Protectionism and World Welfare: Introduction‘, Protectionism and World 
Welfare (Cambridge University Press 1993) 3.  
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liberalisation‘. The effort to secure liberalisation continues in subsequent negotiation 
rounds to obtain freer trade.
334
 
 
As a point of discussion, the question is, are investment treaties equally aimed for 
liberalisation? To answer this question, it is helpful to begin at looking at the 
preambles of investment treaties. The investment treaties are generally entitled 
‗promotion and protection‘ or ‗encouragement and protection‘ and the contents are 
built up towards this aim.
335
  The historical evolution of investment treaties also 
suggests that investment treaties were motivated by the aim to protect citizens‘ 
property in a foreign country.  One could reasonably and appropriately infer that 
investment treaties are primarily aimed at protection of foreign investments.
336
  
 
However, a broader assessment of the regime would indicate that investment treaties 
are also associated to liberalisation.
337
 The protection accorded to investments gives 
a liberalisation effect. Investments also enjoy liberalisation as a result of the 
protection depending on the scope of the investment treaties, i.e whether they include 
established or pre-establishment stage or certain economic sectors.   
                                                 
334 The Uruguay Round was a prolonged and persistent negotiation towards further liberalisation. The 
next negotiation was the Doha Round which aimed to achieve liberalisation in agriculture. John 
Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (DIANE Publishing 
1995); Sungjoon Cho, ‗Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, The‘ (2009) 45 
Texas International Law Journal 573. 
335See for instance US-Latvia BIT (1995) entitling ‗encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investment‘ at <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_latvia.pdf>, accessed on 27 August 
2013. See also Croatia-Sweden BIT (2000) which contains in its preamble ‗promotion and reciprocal 
protection of investments‘, at <http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia_sweden.pdf>, 
accessed on 27 August 2013. The important features generally found in the investment treaties which 
guarantee protection to foreign investors are compensation for expropriated investments, national and 
most favoured nation treatment, full protection and security and fair and equitable treatment sealed 
with the right to recourse in international arbitration. 
336 A further discussion of the underlying philosophy of investment treaties to provide protection to 
foreign investors is elaborated in Ch.2. 
337Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‗Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime‘ (1997) 
19 Michigan Journal of International Law 373; Vandevelde, ‗Political Economy of a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, The‘ (n 235); Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‗Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
The‘ (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 469.  
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Along this line, one could also argue that the trend in today‘s investment treaties is 
shifted towards more liberalisation effect. There are investment treaties that are 
explicit in liberalisation as enshrined in their titles.
338
 There are also an increasing 
number of investment treaties and free trade agreements with investment chapters 
that provide for national treatment at the pre-establishment stage. The 2004 Canadian 
FIPAs, 2004 US Model treaties, NAFTA and CAFTA are of this feature.
339
  The 
German Model BITs which constitute a large portion of the world investment treaties 
also gives the right of foreign investors to access the German markets.
340
 
 
Both the trade and investments treaties are agents of liberalisation, the former aims 
for it, while the latter plays a contributory role. The only caution related to 
liberalisation and the interpretation of national treatment stems generally on the 
possibility that an over-emphasised assessment of liberalisation aim in investment 
treaties would result to a stretch of pro-investment interpretation of investment 
substantive provisions, more than investment- protection-aimed investment treaties 
would.
341
 This thesis suggests that both liberalisation and protection aims are not 
                                                 
338 See Japanese BITs, for instance Japan-Laos BIT 2008.  The title of the agreement mentions 
‗liberalisation, promotion and protection of investment‘.  Japan-Laos BIT 2008, 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Japan_Laos.pdf>, accessed on 20 August 2013. It is 
similarly worded in the Korea-Japan BIT 2002, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_japan.pdf>, accessed on 20 August 2013. In regards 
of investment treaties of this nature (having both protection and liberalisation aims), Marino Baldi has 
expressed his reservation as to their effectiveness. See Baldi, ‗Less May be More: the Need for 
Moderation in International Investment Law‘ (n 51). 
339 See elaboration on pre-establishment national treatment provisions in Ch.2. 
340 Otto Sandrock, ‗The Right of Foreign Investors to Access German Markets: The Meaning of 
Article 2(1) of the German Model Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments‘ 
(2010) 25 ICSID Review 268. 
341 This thesis thus exercise caution in using the word liberalisation so as not to be referred as the aim 
of investment treaties. Liberalisation in the context of discussion is ‗liberalisation of investment‘ as 
compared to the ‗liberalisation of trade‘ in the WTO law. It means the reduction of barriers or 
stringent rules that brings effect to the expansion of investment opportunities. Some writings refer 
liberalisation to liberalisation of (mere) regulatory framework, while in others it is loosely used 
together with protection without emphasising on the consequences following it. Vandevelde stated 
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contradictory but differ only as to the orientation of importance, in which investment 
treaties primarily prioritise protection more than liberalisation.
342
 
 
An obvious impact that is related to the concept of liberalisation is that it provides a 
clear justification to combat protectionism. The GATT/WTO has made it even more 
explicit as a purposive direction of the national treatment provision in Article III(1). 
Even though such explicit indication is absent in investment treaties, it could be 
logically inferred that the aim of protection equally denounces protectionism. 
Protection of investments also means to protect them against protectionism. The 
protection of investments in the context of the national treatment provision ensures a 
level playing field between investors in competing investment opportunities. There is 
economic logic in the need of protection against protectionist measures which are 
faced similarly by both traders and investors. 
 
The next important similarity in the underlying philosophy of trade and investment is 
the maintenance of the principles of justice and the rule of law in the prohibition of 
                                                                                                                                          
that ‗BITs advertised themselves as instruments of liberalization, i.e, instruments for the facilitation 
and protection of international investment flows‘. See Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‗Investment 
Liberalization and Economic Development:  The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties‘ (1998) 36 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 501, 503. If liberalisation is taken as the aim of investment 
treaties, it would mean that all measures introduced by host states must undertake not to defeat the 
purpose of liberalisation. It would cast greater impact on investments as compared to  liberalisation in 
trade as trade only involves the movements of goods and services which do not have eternal impact 
on the manufacturing based outside the importing countries and less regulatory measures. On the 
other hand in investments, liberalisation allows the presence of foreign investments/ investors 
operating equally and enjoying greater protection than the domestic industry which means that more 
regulatory measures are exposed to breach of investment treaties.  
342 The historical assessment of investment treaties would also reveal that the main drive for the 
introduction of the treaties was the lack of protection for foreign investors. In the same vein, Christian 
Tietje marked that ‗modern investment law has, in contrast to trade law, has been developed because 
of the shortcomings of traditional public international with regard to the protection of interest of 
private economic actors.‘ See Tietje, ‗Perspectives on the Interaction between International Trade and 
Investment Regulation‘ (n 320). 
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discrimination.
343
 Without the national treatment provision in both jurisprudences, 
investors and foreign goods are exposed to certain discrimination.
344
 This would tilt 
the level playing field and flaw the competitive environment of investments and 
trade. Although the maintenance of rule of law is relatively needed more by the 
investors than trade (considering the physical presence of investment in the host 
state, the obsolescing bargain and the weaker status of the foreign investors), the 
GATT/WTO is more protective to imported goods. This is ascertained from the more 
certain approach in highlighting the role of competition as the catalyst of likeness in 
national treatment. It lifts the assessment to have some economic basis relevant to 
the interpretation of GATT/WTO and investment treaties which are economic based 
international legal instruments.  
 
Thus, at least in the underlying philosophy of national treatment in GATT/WTO and 
investment treaties, disciplining states against protectionism and the emphasis on 
competition constitute significant grounds of similarity that would justify guidance 
by way of interpretative context for investor-state arbitration.
345
 Both are aimed at 
                                                 
343 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‗International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration‘ (2009) 16 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 513 (2009) 
<http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol16/iss2/6>, accessed on 14 October 2013. 
344 In the context of investment, see  Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: 
Boosting Good Governance and Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3).  Whereas, in the 
trade context, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‗Why Rational Choice Theory Requires a Multilevel 
Constitutional Approach to International Economic Law - A Response to the Case Against Reforming 
the WTO Enforcement Mechanism‘ (2008) 2008 University of Illinois Law Review 360. Both 
literatures suggest the importance of external discipline to complement national constitutionalism in 
an increasing globalising world based on principles of justice which includes the non-discrimination 
principle. In line with this, see also Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005).; Jan Paulsson, ‗Enclaves of Justice‘, The Rule of Law Conference, University 
of Richmond, 12 April 2007, < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707504>, 
accessed on 15 October 2013. For a counter argument, see David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing 
Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge University Press 
2008). 
345 In the same vein, Verhoosel has highlighted two ways in which WTO can come into play in 
investment arbitrations in the context of the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment. Firstly is by 
way of A38 of the ICJ Statute as applicable law and the second one is by way of Article 31(3)(c) of 
the VCLT as interpretative context. This thesis is in line with the second method which requires 
further assessment of the wider context of general international law. See Verhoosel, ‗The Use of 
 109 
 
prohibiting national –based discrimination measures and regards protectionism as a 
red flag that indicates the breach of the provision. In both jurisprudences, the 
existence of protectionist measures can be indicative of an irrational measure unless 
it can be proven otherwise as a reasonable and legitimate measure under investment 
arbitrations or fall under the exceptions of GATT Article XX.  
 
3.0 The Basis of Comparison 
 
It was not until the emergence of NAFTA Chapter 11 national treatment cases that 
attention to cross read international investment law version of national treatment 
with GATT/ WTO occurred.
346
 Presuming similarity from the long tradition of 
national treatment in GATT/WTO, some investment tribunals have considered the 
relevance of the jurisprudence in the interpretation of national treatment.
347 
 
 
Although reference to GATT/WTO is already a practice, the basis of doing so has 
not been properly laid. The tribunals have not examined thoroughly the relevance of 
GATT/WTO in the context philosophies of national treatment. An examination of 
national treatment in GATT must not automatically render similar interpretation in 
                                                                                                                                          
Investor–State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO 
Law‘ (n 121). 
346The national treatment provision appears in all the basic WTO texts, namely General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Of the three, GATT contains the most articulated 
adjudication of national treatment. Cases which have debated the relevance of the GATT 
jurisprudence are for instance S.D. Myers Inc. v Government of Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Partial 
Award, 13 November 2000; Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA, 
Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001; Methanex Corporation and United States of America 
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits,3 August 2005; CPI 
Inc. v Mexico, (n 98).  
347 CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 122; Todd Weiler, ‗NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the 
Growth of International Economic Law‘ [2002] B.L.I 159 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol12/article12-4.pdf>, accessed on 14 October 2013. 
In contrast to that, see Methanex v USA, (n 19), para 6. 
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international investment.
348
 There is a need of careful examination on the basis of 
comparison and the relevant principles suitable for transposition. We have seen that 
the underlying philosophies are similar in the sense that both promote level playing 
field and competition. Both protect the comparators against discrimination based on 
nationality. This is a useful parameter of likeness that should be emphasised in a 
national treatment comparison enquiry in both jurisprudences.    
 
So much on the philosophy, this section then proceeds by looking at the practical 
interaction between the regimes. To begin with, both GATT/WTO and international 
investment are part of the bigger branch of international economic law. They are the 
two main forces that integrate national economy into the international economy 
which contributes to economic globalisation.
349
 The inter-relatedness between trade 
and investment can also be seen from the initial suggestion to include investment in 
the Uruguay Round 1994.
350
 Investment however remained outside the system due to 
the non-readiness of states concluding an international investment treaty on a 
multilateral basis. It became a regime of its own when states began concluding 
BITs.
351
 
 
Apart from market liberalisation and protection of investment, the two 
jurisprudences serve similar economic purpose which includes raising the standards 
of living and greater economic cooperation.
352
 Trade and investment treaties contain 
                                                 
348 ‗Like product‘ in GATT does not necessarily bring the same interpretation of ‗like circumstances‘ 
in international investment. See  CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 121.  
349 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (OUP USA 2004) 3. 
350 Thomas L Brewer and Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and Multinational 
Enterprises (New Ed, OUP Oxford 2000) 46. 
351 Alvarez, ‗The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime‘, (n 155) 96.    
352See preamble to GATT which mentions ‗with a view to raising standards of living‘. Similar 
emphasis is in BITs, for instance the US BIT Model 2004 which desires ‗to promote greater economic 
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guarantees and protections, including the national treatment obligation to achieve 
harmonious trading and investment atmosphere and to avoid states seeking self-
interest economic policies.
353
  
 
The resemblance in which both regimes serve is apparent. Both regimes seek at 
providing a guideline in which foreign investors and imported goods can be subject 
to domestic regulations. By some scholars, it is regarded as ‗disciplining‘ the host 
and importing states from imposing regulations which are unjustifiable and 
discriminatory which are against the commitments entered into in WTO and 
investment agreements.
354
 
 
It is observed that both investments and trade fear the same threat; regulatory 
barriers in various forms such as taxes, permits and licences which could be 
discriminatory against foreign trades and investments. In some circumstances, the 
same government measure can result to claims in both jurisprudences.
355
 For 
instance, Mexico‘s imposition of tax on HFCS was challenged in an investment case 
                                                                                                                                          
cooperation‘ and to ‗maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living 
standards‘. 
353An example of domestic regulation that contributed to trade retaliations was the US-Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff 1930. See Hudec, ‗Circumventing Democracy‘ (n 324); Bussière, Pérez Barreiro, Straub, and 
Taglioni, ‗Protectionist Responses to the Crisis‘ (n 244); Robert E. Baldwin, ‗The Political Economy 
of Trade Policy‘ (1989) 3 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 119–135.  Similarly, in international 
investment, discriminatory treatment would cause deprivation of alien property and lead to claims 
towards the host government which eventually discourage investments.  
354 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3); Kurtz, ‗Balancing Investor Protection and 
Regulatory Freedom in Investor‐State Arbitration: The Complex Search for State Purpose in a 
National Treatment Inquiry ‘ (n 267). 
355Archer Daniels Midland Co and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc v the United Mexican States 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/05 (NAFTA), Award, 21 November 2007; CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98). 
See also See Tania S. Voon and Andrew D. Mitchell, ‗Time to Quit? Assessing International 
Investment Claims Against Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia‘ (2011) 14 Journal of International 
Economic Law, Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 560, for possible trade and investment 
claims against plain tobacco packaging. See also Verhoosel, ‗The Use of Investor–State Arbitration 
under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law‘ (n 121). 
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CPI, Inc. v Mexico
 356
 and GATT case Mexico-Tax Measures on ‘Soft Drinks’ and 
Other Beverages.
357
 The high probability of the same measure being challenged in 
both jurisprudences could occur especially in trade-oriented FDIs, when host states 
introduce non tariff-barriers with local content requirements or other performance 
requirements. 
 
From the viewpoint of the host states, the national treatment provision in both WTO 
and investment treaties has caused limited space of regulation.
358
 The rapid flow of 
foreign goods, services and investments creates threat on the host states, especially 
its concern to determine its own economy. Naturally, host states need to protect their 
strategic industries and sensitive national security goals relating to matters such as 
food, communication, transportation, nation building and environment. This 
common need of regulation and justifications thereof are often the same arguments 
put forth by host states when confronted with claims of national treatment. There is 
similarity in the economic logic
359
 that has led to presumption of consistency
360
 due 
to the closeness of the subject and the players of the jurisprudences. 
 
The comparison of GATT/WTO and investment in the context of national treatment 
may appear to some as academic and philosophical as leading to no end or difficult 
to grasp, but be that as it may, it is undoubtedly a living and practical concern. Apart 
                                                 
356CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 47. 
357
  Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 
WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, 3.  
358Henrik Horn and Petros C.Mavroidis, ‗Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of 
National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination‘ (n 122) 40.  
359Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3).  
360
There is a presumption of consistency in common principles that also exist in other jurisprudences, 
even though the context or text differ in each BIT. For instance, the national treatment and MFN 
provisions which also exist in WTO. See Jos  E. Alvarez, ‗The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment 
Regime‘ (n 155) 94, 96. 
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from the closeness of the substantive area of trade and investment, this interaction 
will remain so as the players in the trade and investment legal fraternity are 
increasingly merging and linking. This includes the composition of counsels, 
arbitrators and even academic scholars in both areas. The reflection of this 
interaction is obvious in investment cases where trade references are deliberated by 
the tribunals. 
 
Experienced and the structured judicial system of WTO also allows for a more 
coherent adoption of approaches taken by the panels.
361
 International investment 
tribunals on the other hand operate at a parallel level, where no tribunal can claim 
superior over the other. The unique absence of the doctrine of judicial precedence 
has additionally increased the complicated quest for coherence.  
 
The points forwarded contribute to the basis of comparison between the 
jurisprudences. The real global economic development today involving intra-firm 
investments and the increasing promulgation of free trade agreements containing 
investment chapters heightens the closeness of trade and investments.
362
 The best 
approach for the future of both jurisprudences to exist harmoniously is by positive 
interaction, and the way suggested in this thesis is by coherent interpretation.   
 
 
                                                 
361 There is a consistency in interpretation in WTO law and many earlier interpretations on substance 
and procedures survived in subsequent DSB reports. See  Isabelle Van Damme, ‗Treaty Interpretation 
by the WTO Appellate Body‘ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 605 -648. 
362 Footer, ‗On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship between Foreign Investment and 
International Trade‘ (n 318). 
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4.0 National treatment in WTO  
 
The national treatment provision also appears in all other basic WTO texts, namely 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).
363
 GATT however contains the densest jurisprudence on national treatment 
as it was introduced much earlier and longer than the other texts, prior and after the 
establishment of WTO.
364
 The national treatment on internal taxation and regulation 
provision in Article III of GATT reads: 
 
1. The [Members] recognize that internal taxes and other internal 
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and 
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of 
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to 
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production. 
 
2. The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the 
territory of any [Member] shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to 
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.  Moreover, no [Member] 
shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or 
                                                 
363Article XVII GATS. The provision is broad applicable ‗to all measures affecting the supply of 
services‘. See also Article 3 in TRIPS. 
364GATT was signed in 1947 and it was restated in 1994 together with the introduction of other texts 
in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994). 
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domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1. 
….. 
4. The products of the territory of any [Member] imported into the territory of 
any other [Member] shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not 
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which 
are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport 
and not on the nationality of the product. 
 
Cases on discrimination emerged rather early in GATT, and scholarly writings are 
immense.
365
 Early discrimination cases have been brought to the GATT panels on 
various state measures as inconsistent with the national treatment obligation  such as 
state‘s assistance paid to the purchasers of local machinery,366 higher excise tax on 
imported petroleum, certain chemicals and certain imported substances
367
 and 
facially discriminatory laws relating to patent production.
368
 More national treatment 
                                                 
365 Among the scholars who contributed to discussions on national treatment are GartenVerhoosel, 
Robert E. Hudec, Henrik Horn, Jurgen Kurtz, Petros C. Mavroidis, Nicholas Di Mascio, Robert 
Howse, Donald Regan, Michael Ming Du, Alan O. Sykes, JoostPauwelyn, Federico Ortino, Sungjoon 
Cho and Mark Liang. 
366 GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833, 
adopted 23 October 1958, BISD 7S/60. 
367 GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, 
L/6175, adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136. 
368 GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, adopted 
7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345. 
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cases were brought under the WTO, some landmark cases are such as the 1992 Malt 
Beverages Case,
369
 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Case
370
 and EC-Asbestos.
371
 
 
In order to establish a national treatment violation for internal taxation, it requires the 
examination of whether the imported products are like products and whether they are 
taxed in excess of the domestic products.
372
 It is also required by informed 
application that internal taxation must not be applied so as to afford protection to 
domestic production.
373
 Further, in Note Ad Article III for internal taxation, it 
requires addressing the question whether the imported and domestic products are 
directly competitive or substitutable. The articulation of the questions above has 
already passed a span of more than half a century. In the determination of likeness 
for instance, it is commented that there is no other place elsewhere which is more 
enthusiastic than in trade.
374
 The experience and the structured judicial system of 
WTO also allows for a more coherent adoption of approaches taken by the panels.
375
  
                                                 
369 The panel interpreted likeness according to the purpose of the measure and the effects thereof, 
based on the ‗so as to afford protection‘ phrase in Article III(1). The aims and effect test was applied 
again in US Taxes on Automobiles 1994. 
370 This case marks the rejection of the aims and effects test. However, Hudec opined that the 
rejection was not absolute and there is still some use in the aims and effect test.E. Hudec, 
‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ―Aim and Effects‖ Test‘ (n 123). 
371 This case highlights the application of the competitiveness test. 
372 Article III (2) GATT 1994. 
373 The phrase ‗so as to afford protection‘ is contained in Article III (1) GATT 1994. See also 
Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p 27-31. 
374Joost Pauwelyn used the phrase ‗obsession with likeness‘ and suggested to focus on the 
impermissible criterion that is discrimination based on national origin. However, it is submitted in this 
thesis that examination of likeness is equally necessary and unavoidable especially in cases of de 
facto discrimination and in order to determine the covered trade or investments. See Joost Pauwelyn, 
‗Comment: The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness‘ in Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauv  
(eds), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge University Press 
2008). 
375
 The shift or mixture of approaches taken i.e the traditional physical characteristic test, the aims 
and effects test and competitiveness test is part of the development of the regime yet retaining a 
considerable degree of consistency. According to V.Damme, there is a consistency in interpretation in 
WTO law and many earlier interpretations on substance and procedures survived in subsequent DSB 
reports. See  Van Damme, ‗Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body‘ (n 361).  
International investment tribunals on the other hand operate at a parallel level, where no tribunal can 
claim superior over the other. The unique absence of the doctrine of judicial precedence has 
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There are also discussions to facilitate trade by including regulations on investments 
relating to trade in the WTO. The areas of work on trade and investment in WTO can 
be seen from the Working Group on the Relation between Trade and Investment, the 
TRIMS and GATS.  While GATT concerns products, GATS covers services which 
contain even closer resemblance in the subject of comparison. Services have no 
physical characteristics and the transactions are intangible like most investments.
376
 
They are not concerned at protecting the tariffs or border measures but are subject to 
the various domestic measures and regulations. Services may also overlap with 
foreign investment, especially in the third mode of service covered by GATS which 
requires ‗commercial presence‘ where ‗the foreign supplier establishes and controls 
an affiliate, subsidiary or representative office within the territory of the importing 
member‘.377 However, the scope of application of GATS is small; only in the service 
sectors explicitly committed by the members.
378
 Being also relatively new, there are 
a limited number of cases involving GATS violations.
379
 The GATS jurisprudence is 
still uncertain and in need of coherence.
380
 It is even said that it is GATS that should 
                                                                                                                                          
additionally increased the complicated quest for coherence. 
376The scope of GATS and the abstract characteristics of services was explained by Zacharias. 
Zacharias, ‗Article 1 GATS Scope and Definition‘ in RüdigerWolfrum and Peter-Tobias Stoll (eds), 
WTO--trade in services (BRILL 2008) 40; Nicolas F Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International 
Trade in Services: ‘Likeness’ in WTO/GATS (Cambridge University Press 2010) 4. See also Footer, 
‗On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship between Foreign Investment and 
International Trade‘ (n 318). 
377Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services (n 376) 26; Martin Molinuevo, 
‗Can Foreign Investors in Services Benefit From WTO Dispute Settlement? Legal Standing and 
Remedies in WTO and International Arbitration‘ in Marion Panizzon and others (eds), GATS and the 
Regulation of International Trade in Services: World Trade Forum (1st edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2008) 309. 
378 Note by the Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120, dated 10 July 
1991. Within the sectors, services are exposed to regulatory measures from every angle of its 
operation which may overlap with national treatment under investments treaties. See Werner Zdouc, 
‗WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS‘ (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic 
Law 295. 
379 Among the cases are Appellate Body Report, Canada-Autos, EC-Bananas III, Mexico Telecoms, 
US-Gambling, China-Publications and Audiovisual Products. 
380Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services (n 376)5. 
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learn lessons from the international investment law, in particular NAFTA, and not 
the other way around.  
In relation to goods, the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) was 
introduced to enhance further the scope of GATT to prohibit investment measures 
which have impact on trade.
381
 The attention to investments issues relating to trade 
and the introduction of TRIMS rooted from the GATT Panel Report, Canada — 
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) case
382
 where the 
United States argued that the FIRA contained trade distorting effects. Although there 
were doubts as to the competence of panel to hear the issue of investment, it was 
decided that that the panel could do so as long as within trade-specific issues within 
the scope of GATT. Thus it concluded that if a government‘s measure on investment 
(here the FIRA) could impact or discriminate imported goods, it is inconsistent with 
Article III:4.
383
 GATT still had its limit, not wide enough to cover other aspects of 
investments covering exports performance requirements.
384
 In Article 2 of TRIMs, it 
prohibits the introduction of trade investment measures that are inconsistent with the 
obligation of national treatment and general elimination of quantitative restrictions 
provided for in Article III and XI of the GATT. Trade may be affected if the host 
states impose measures to reduce imports by foreign investors or promote exports 
from host states by way of export performance requirements, trade balancing 
                                                 
381 Regulation of TRIMs was advanced particularly by developed states during the Uruguay Rounds 
and was opposed by developing countries that tried to hold on to their existing positions. See Croome, 
Reshaping the World Trading System 256–261. 
382 GATT Panel Report, Canada — Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (―FIRA‖), 
L/5504, adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140. 
383 See at para 6.1.  
384Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur Edmond Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer, The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (Springer 2005) 445. See also A. Claire Cutler 
and Mark W. Zacher, Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes (UBC Press 
1992) 123. 
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requirements or local content requirements.
385
 Although TRIMs have some 
overlapping aspects with investment, the area is only scoped to investments which 
give impact on trade. Similar to GATS, TRIMs is relatively new and there have been 
not many cases decided to shape a matured jurisprudence on national treatment.  
 
5.0 ‘Likeness’ in GATT/WTO and International Investment Law Compared 
 
In both jurisprudences, the national treatment only prohibits discrimination between 
covered products and investment which are alike. Covered products in trade are ‗like 
products‘, while in investment it is termed ‗like circumstances‘ and generally 
referred to as the ‗comparator‘.386 The complexity of determining likeness is 
acknowledged in both jurisprudences. In trade, the relativity of the interpretation was 
described as an ‗accordion‘ because it stretches and squeezes in different places 
where it is applied.
387
 Although it is inevitable to determine likeness on a case by 
case basis, the GATT/WTO panels generally applied the basic approach set in the 
1970 Report of the Working Party on Boarder Tax Adjustments which are the 
product‘s end uses in a given market, consumers‘ tastes and habits, which change 
from country to country and the product‘s properties, nature and quality.388 The 
likeness test did not stop at examining the physical characteristics of the products, 
but to the processes involved in production, the competitive nature of the products 
and the likeness of the products from the regulatory point of view.  
                                                 
385Examples of inconsistency is also illustrated in the Annex of the TRIMs Agreement. See also 
‗Elimination of TRIMs: The Experience of Selected Developing Countries‘ (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2007) 2. 
386Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 338.  
387
 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97, p 21. 
388 Report of the Working Party on Boarder Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, para 18. 
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The relevance of GATT/WTO to investment in the context of national treatment has 
become a much debated subject. There is no consensus of whether GATT/WTO is 
relevant or irrelevant to investment. In Methanex v USA for instance the 
GATT/WTO is a non-comparable regime and its relevance was rejected in totality. 
On the other hand in other cases such as CPI  Inc. v Mexico and SD Myers, the 
GATT/WTO approach is more welcomed.
389
 There is always a tendency that 
GATT/WTO is referred to despite the contextual differences that may exist 
390
 due to 
the long tradition of national treatment in international economic practice.
391
 Kurtz 
highlighted this phenomenon in the investment arbitral practice before reaching 
individual juridical approaches.
392
  
 
The subsequent part of this chapter scopes itself to study the most articulated 
interpretation tools available in GATT/WTO in determining likeness. The tests are 
the traditional physical characteristic approach, the aims and effects test, the directly 
competitive or substitutable approach (DCS) the product process doctrine. 
 
5.1 Traditional Physical Characteristic Test 
 
The traditional characteristic test has so far been used in trade cases to examine ‗like 
domestic products‘ as required in AIII:2 GATT. It involves examination of product‘s 
                                                 
389For instance, in the case of CPI, Inc.  v Mexico (n 98) the tribunal considered likeness of the 
products between HFCS and sugar cane as decided in WTO as ‗highly relevant‘ and in the case of SD 
Myers, the tribunal acknowledged GATT/WTO‘s approach in searching for the context of national 
treatment and applied the same method. 
390J. H. H. Weiler, ‗Cain and Abel- Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law‘ (n 99)1. 
391Todd Weiler, ‗NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International Economic Law‘ 
[2002] B.L.I, 159. 
392 Jurgen Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International 
Investment Law and the WTO‘, (n 102) 244. 
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properties, nature and quality, its end uses (consumers‘ tastes and habits) and 
product‘s classification in tariff nomenclatures.393 While it is a plausible significant 
approach in GATT/WTO,
394
 it is hard to assume direct adoption of similar exercise 
in international investment law bearing in mind that the subject of comparison in 
international investment law are investments which may have no physical 
characteristics to turn into.  Investments vary in their activities, sizes, technologies, 
forms and orientations.
395
 
 
Investment cases however did turn to this criterion, albeit indirectly. In Methanex v 
USA, the claimant urged for concluding likeness between ethanol and methanol 
producers due to the competitive relationship between them, and in reference to 
GATT jurisprudence. The claimant has also indicated that they both produce the 
same product-oxygenates used in manufacturing reformulated gasoline, suggesting a 
characteristic approach.
396
 This was counterclaimed by the respondent claiming that 
even if GATT jurisprudence can be compared with, both ethanol and methanol will 
not satisfy the four part test in the Asbestos case as they differ chemically and have 
different end-users.
397
 
 
The tribunal was in principle obvious in avoiding the direct application or reference 
to GATT/WTO jurisprudence. However, realising it or not, it had in fact resorted to 
                                                 
3931970 Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, adopted on 2 Dec 1970, BISD 
18S/97, para 18. See also Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, 
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, adopted 1 November 1996, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, 125  para 5.6. 
394 GATT as a commercial agreement, would eventually examine the performance of products in 
comparison in a given market whether competitive or not, or how any government measure would 
commercially affect the products. This is very much linked to product‘s properties, nature and quality, 
its end uses (consumers‘ tastes and habits). 
395  The types of investments includes services, licenses, commissions and other investment activities 
enlisted in investment treaties which may not involve products. 
396 Methanex v USA, (n 19), para 23. 
397Ibid., paras 24-25. 
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comparison of the characteristics of the products by allowing the more identical 
comparator to be in the most like circumstances. This is akin to the traditional 
characteristics test in GATT/WTO.
398
 The tribunal in Methanex v USA has however 
adopted too narrow an approach.    
 
The assertion to refer to GATT/WTO by the claimant has some logic which follows 
through.
399
  Comparison of the products of investments assumes likeness in the 
activities and sectors of the investments. The area of trade and investments are inter-
related that it is impossible to strike clear demarcating lines. The approach taken in 
GATT/WTO is neutral and could also be inherent in investments out of an ordinary 
examination of likeness. The traditional characteristics test in the GATT/TWO is not 
mandated by the treaty but was a suggestion by the 1970 Working Party Report on 
Border Tax Adjustments which was eventually applied in cases.  The comparison of 
the core products of investments at issue could be helpful in understanding the nature 
and operation of the investment. It is in line with investment protection in such that it 
is reasonable to look at the investments in the viewpoint of commercial similarity. A 
notable example of a case that disregarded the examination of investment activity is 
OEPC v Ecuador. In this case, the tribunal made equal petroleum based investment 
to flowers and agricultural investment which resulted to a broad, cross sector effect 
of national treatment coverage.  
 
The extent of such approach however, as compared to GATT, is limited. This must 
not be a conclusive criterion of likeness in investment law but rather its first 
                                                 
398 Ibid., para 19. 
399 The tribunal rejected the reference to GATT/WTO and regarded it and international investment as 
two distinct regimes; See Ibid., para 35. 
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indicator. Other tests of likeness should take place afterwards.
400
 The reason for such 
a reservation is that too much scrutiny on the physical being of the investment 
products or services would lead to the loss of contextual implementation of national 
treatment.
401
 The further detail a distinction is made, the more it actually emphasises 
the similarity. 
402
 It will also be undesirable to conclude that the examination of 
likeness is almost close to ‗identical‘ that would undermine the application of the 
national treatment obligation, being one of the most important cornerstone in 
international investment treaties.
403
 This observation was equally made in the 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence by Hudec. He claimed that this test sometimes had no 
purpose oriented criteria and suggested ‗competition‘ as the desired contextual 
reading of GATT/WTO as opposed to mere examination of physical 
characteristics.
404
 
 
Caution must also be made if reference is made to tariff related distinctions in WTO 
as a method to determine physical likeness.
405
 Tariffs are deliberately made with fine 
distinctions so as to allow discrimination to non-participating countries from 
                                                 
400In Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada, (n 20), para 78; the tribunal asserted that as a first step to the 
analysis of likeness, comparison must be made among investments in the same business or economic 
sector. This approach was also adopted in Parkerings v Lithuania in determining likeness in most 
favoured nation claim. See Parkerings v Lithuania, (n 257), para 371. 
401Quality, resemblance, product processes may deviate one from the competitive relationship.  See 
Robert E. Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‗Aim and 
Effects‘ Test‘ (n 123) 623; Robert E. Hudec, ‗―Like Product‖: The Differences in Meaning in GATT 
Articles I and III‘, (n 123). 
402UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass (n 206). 
403UPS v Canada, (n 21), p. 53, Methanex v USA, para 19; ADM v Mexico, para 202. 
404E. Hudec, ‗‗Like Product‘: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III‘ (n 123); E. 
Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‗Aim and Effects‘ Test‘ (n 
123).  
405
 Example of panel reports which adopted tariff classification in determining likeness are  EEC - 
Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, BISD 25S/49; Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling 
Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, BISD 34S/83; United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/9, adopted on 20 May 1996. 
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benefitting the tariff.
406
 Tariff distinctions do not depend on competitive 
significance, but to limit concessions to products that would not threaten domestic 
producers. If this is so applied in investment, local industries will always be 
protected by fine distinctions.  
 
One may also shed light on the recent cases brought by Apple against Samsung in 
the legal battle over smartphone technologies. It is difficult to determine what is 
‗like‘ in very closely similar products. A detailed characteristic test may result to 
unlikeness, but a broader commercial overview would take into account the 
competitive relationship between them.
407
 This is an example of a case that may be 
brought under the auspices of both GATT/WTO and investment laws where the 
question of likeness will be an issue in determining like circumstances or like 
products. Thus, the traditional characteristics test is helpful to determine likeness in 
international investment law. However as discussed above, it is limited to assist the 
determination of economic sector and as a preliminary step before other rigorous 
assessment of likeness takes place. 
 
5.2 Relevance of Competitiveness Test 
 
In GATT/WTO, a violation of national treatment will likely occur if a measure 
discriminately detriments the competitiveness of a foreign product as compared to 
                                                 
406Hudec suggested that like products should not allow fine distinctions is involving internal 
measures. See E. Hudec, ‗―Like Product‖: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III‘ (n 
123). 
407 This case was brought under intellectual property law. The US Court of Appeal granted an Apple 
an injunction  against Samsung. See Apple, Inc. v Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Samsung Electronics 
America, Inc. and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC., Case No. 11-CV-1846,US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,14 May 2012. See opposite decision in the UK High Court that 
rejected  the similarity between Apple and Samsung contested products, at Samsung Electronics (UK) 
Ltd v Apple Inc [2012] EWHC 1882 (Pat) (9 July 2012). 
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local like products. In practice, competition is applied more than the characteristic 
features and tariff classification.
408
 It is examined from the customers‘ perspective 
which includes the common end-users,
409
 elasticity of substitution (where the 
consumers consider as alternative or directly competitive and substitutable),
410
 and 
the market place.
411
 
 
The question to be determined is whether competition is a relevant factor in 
determining likeness in the investment context. Competition as a criterion is not 
mentioned expressly in international investment treaties.
412
 The test was rejected in 
Methanex v USA.
413
 Similarly, it was not considered in UPS v Canada. The UPS v 
Canada decision however contained a separate statement which criticised this 
approach. It emphasised that the most natural reading of NAFTA Article 1102 is to 
give substantial weight to a showing of competitiveness between the investments.
414
 
The case of CPI  Inc.  v Mexico is perhaps a clearer example of an investment case 
that acknowledges competition as a factor. The tribunal observed that the tax 
measure has altered the terms of competition between the investments which were in 
direct competition.
415
  
 
                                                 
408Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services (n  376) 108.  
409Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (n 387) p25. 
410Appellate Body Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, 
WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, DSR 1999:I, 3, para 114. See also Won-Mog Choi, 
‘Like Products’ in International Trade Law: Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence 
(Oxford University Press, USA 2003) 109. 
411 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243, para 99. 
412  See Annex 1, Ad Article III GATT. 
413 Article 1102 must be read ‗on its own terms and not as if the words ―any like, directly competitive 
or substitutable goods‖ appeared in it‘. Methanex v USA, (n 19) para 37. 
414UPS v Canada, Separate Statement (n 206). 
415CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98) para 120. 
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This thesis asserts that the competition test is the biggest lesson that investment 
tribunals could learn from GATT/WTO.  Similar to GATT/WTO, the underlying 
economic philosophy of the investment regime is to ensure the economic level 
playing field in competing circumstances. This is supported by the statements often 
included in the preambles of many investment treaties to promote competitive 
equality, economic cooperation or efficiency.
416
 This renders a legal basis for the 
application of the competition test as it guides the national treatment interpretation 
towards the objects and purpose of the treaties. It is also more significant than mere 
characteristics test as the latter could misdirect tribunals to simple dismissal or 
breach in unguided application. Eventually, the competition test brings the 
examination of likeness closer to the economic context of investment treaties. 
 
The consideration of competitiveness of investment in likeness also corresponds 
with the general aim of investment treaties to protect foreign investors who have a 
relatively weaker legal status as compared to local investors. The locals, who possess 
voting powers, are influential in the determining of favourable treatments, law or 
legislations either through democratic means or populist preference or manifestos by 
the government to keep it in power. The introduction of investment barriers through 
legislative and regulatory measures such as public procurements, incentives and 
subsidies are particularly obvious in developing countries. 
417
 The situation of 
                                                 
416 The Singapore-China BIT (1985) mentioned ‗economic cooperation‘. See   Singapore-China BIT 
(1985) < http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_singapor.pdf>, accessed on 31 August 
2013. NAFTA also provides ‗economic cooperation‘ and to ‗enhance competitiveness‘ of their firms. 
In Article 102, among the objectives of NAFTA is to ‗promote conditions of fair competition‘. See 
NAFTA, < http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf>, accessed on 31 August 2013. 
417 World Development Report 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (n 7). 
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foreign investors in this aspect needs the rule of law to preserve the non-
discriminatory principle.
418
  
 
The argument of construing likeness towards competition is forwarded by Kurtz in 
his articles.
419
 He also notes the natural role that the national treatment provision 
should play in combatting protectionism by eliminating discriminatory measures 
detrimental to the competitiveness between foreign and local investments.
420
 This 
thesis expands this discussion by highlighting the intrinsic features of investments 
that would require attention.  
 
There are a few considerations of competition in the investment context. Firstly, the 
more appropriate approach to pursue competitiveness is from the ‗viewpoint of the 
industry‘ as compared to consumers in GATT/WTO.421 Some investments may not 
have direct consumers as in trade. Competition is thus not necessarily felt from 
consumerism but from other aspects of investments which are assessable by the 
industry. Secondly, it is the subject matter of competition or what competition 
actually strives for. In trade, the competition aim is the market, while in investment it 
is the investment viability and profit which may not be relatively reducing other 
investments as a result of one investment‘s better treatment. Thirdly, the equality of 
competitive opportunities
422
 strived by investments are not confined to the profit or 
                                                 
418 Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (n 344); Paulsson, ‗Enclaves of Justice‘ (n 344). 
419 Kurtz, ‗The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration‘ (n 40); Kurtz, ‗The Merits 
and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in International Investment Law and the WTO‘ (n 
102). 
420 Kurtz, ‗Balancing Investor Protection and Regulatory Freedom in Investor‐State Arbitration: The 
Complex Search for State Purpose in a National Treatment Inquiry ‘ (n 267). 
421The term ‗industrial comparability‘ was introduced in late Prof. Thomas Walde‘s article on national 
treatment. See Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good 
Governance and Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3). 
422Joost Pauwelyn, ‗Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt the WTO‘ 
(2004) 15 EJIL 575–592. 
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loss generated from the products, but includes equal taxes, regulations or procedures 
from the ‗establishment‘ to ―management,‖ ―conduct‖ and ―operation‖ and 
―expansion‖ of that investment, and up to the final ―sale or other disposition‖ of the 
same investment.
423
 The scope of competition is wider than in the trade context. 
Furthermore, having assets and business rooted in a foreign country requires even 
more predictability in government measures including not less favourable 
treatment.
424
  
 
 It is also pertinent to note that while market-based competition test could be applied 
in almost all (if not all) comparisons of products in GATT/WTO, it may not be an 
ideal test for investments in certain circumstances. There are investments which do 
not compete with each other in the market but could be rendered in ‗like 
circumstances‘. Thus, while it is apparent that the existence of competitive 
relationship between two investments in the same economic sector is evidence of 
likeness, competition in this aspect is not a comprehensive criterion that should be 
imposed on tests of likeness. Investments which are not in market competition but in 
like circumstances still require similar treatment. There could be instances where two 
investments which are given a construction project on specified sites are treated 
differently,
425
 or in certain energy market where the market is liberalised not to 
increase competition but to address shortage of power.   
 
                                                 
423See ADF v USA (n 173).  
424 Investment is subject to a wider range of political risks than trade as it operates within the territory 
of the host state. See Noah Rubins and Stephan Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and 
Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oceana TM 2005) 23. 
425 Parkerings v. Lithuania (n 257). The appropriate test here is to see whether there is competition in 
investment opportunities. 
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In terms of substitutability, the differences between products and investments are 
obvious. Firstly, investments are not substitutable by nature. Even if it is applied, it 
is hard to assess it from any or whose perspective. Secondly, as an analogy to other 
non-discrimination principle which does not involve products such as human rights, 
the likeness test does not go as far as substitutability. Furthermore, the 
substitutability test will be difficult, unfair and illogical to be applied in international 
investment for its narrow effect which would consequently defeat the primary aim of 
national treatment to protect foreign investments against less favourable treatment. 
 
These cautions addressed do not however negate the importance of competition, but 
rather enhances the relevance and proper application in the context of investment. It 
is almost ‗a one rule captures all‘ test except for only small exceptions of cases. It is 
therefore suggested by this thesis (as could be seen in Chapter Six) that competition 
is a significant indicator of likeness, the effect of which would render the host state a 
bigger burden of proof to claim otherwise.   
 
5.3 Aims and Effects Test 
 
The aims and effects test involves the examination of the basis of a regulatory 
measure within the determination of likeness. The origin of this approach in 
GATT/WTO is laid in Article III:1 which specifies that government measures should 
not be applied to imported or domestic products ‗so as to afford protection‘ to 
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domestic protection. This test was first applied in US-Malt Beverages and the Panel 
in US-Taxes on Automobiles.
426
  
There are some issues involved if aims and effect test is to be adopted in investment 
tribunals. The issues are whether protectionism must be established in every national 
treatment case and whether it is plausible to determine the legitimacy of the measure 
within the determination of likeness. 
Investment treaties do not literally specify ‗protectionism‘ as that of GATT/WTO. 
Kurtz argues that the absence of ‗so as to afford protection‘ does not mean that the 
national treatment cannot be read under the purview of protectionism. It is the 
underlying political economy that reveals similar risk as in trade.
427
 This is 
particularly a plausible observation, as the purpose of national treatment is to avoid 
nationality based discrimination. It aims at avoiding both nationality targeted and 
nationality affected discriminations. Protectionist measures will provide a red flag to 
a possible breach of the national treatment provision. It is therefore appropriate to 
scrutinise whether the measure has protectionist aims and whether it discriminately 
affects foreign investors. There are at least two positive effects of construing 
protectionism, firstly is that it will lessen the broad application of discrimination and 
secondly, it feeds the national treatment principle a purpose, context or direction. 
The investment regime could learn from the clear interconnection between 
protectionist measures and competitive opportunity made by the Appellate Body in 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages. The Appellate Body mentioned: 
                                                 
426Mireille Cossy, ‗Some Thoughts on the Concept of ―Likeness‖‘ in Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl 
and Pierre Sauv  (eds), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 342. 
427 Kurtz, ‗Balancing Investor Protection and Regulatory Freedom in Investor‐State Arbitration: The 
Complex Search for State Purpose in a National Treatment Inquiry ‘ (n 267) 8. 
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The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in 
the application of internal tax and regulatory measures.  More specifically, 
the purpose of Article III "is to ensure that internal measures ‗not be applied 
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production‘". Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of the WTO to 
provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation 
to domestic products.
428
 
 
The difference is that in the investment context, it is done the other way around. As it 
is clear that investment treaties are intended to provide protection to foreign 
investors in the form of equality of competitive conditions by way of national 
treatment, protectionist aims should be regarded as the adversary and be combatted.  
Investment cases have so far put more importance to the second part of the aims and 
effects test in the assessment of de facto discrimination. The search for protectionist 
aims has been avoided despite the relevance or assistance that it may cast on the 
legitimacy of the measure.
429
 The aim test in GATT requires a test to examine that 
discrimination was a ‗desired outcome‘ rather than a ‗non-incidental consequence‘. 
Construing protectionist aims is regarded as ‗a surmountable burden to the 
Claimant‘, much of which revolve around construing the whole matter as one of 
finding the ‗intent‘ rather than a more objective finding of ‗aim‘.430 The Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages II has provided a helpful insight on how to construe 
                                                 
428 Appellate Body, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 
adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996: I, 97,p.16. 
429Methanex v USA , (n 19) para 23. In the case of CPI Inc. v Mexico, the claimant persuaded the 
tribunal to apply aim and effect test, although not worded as so, to look at the protectionist legislation 
designed (para 55), but the tribunal seemed to examine the effect test regardless whether the tax was 
to raise Mexican revenue or assist the Mexican sugar industry in time of crisis, the tax would still 
produce an effect upon the HFCS producers. See CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98) para 55, 119. 
430 This matter is elaborated in Ch. 6 in the discussion of protectionism and application of the aims 
and effects test in investment disputes. 
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protectionist aims. It can be done by ‗objective analysis of the structure and 
application of the measure in question‘ and ‗its protective application‘ from the 
‗design, the architecture and the revealing structure of the measure‘.431  The 
challenge of ‗regulatory protectionism‘ is recognised in the GATT/WTO 
jurisprudence. This term emerged to respond to new protectionisms that took 
place.
432
 In the Beef Hormone case for instance, facially non-discrimination policy 
may also constitute regulatory protectionism.
433
 
The aims and effect approach means that the regulation will be the subject of 
scrutiny. The logic of this can be seen in the GATT/WTO US-Malt Beverages case, 
where the regulatory distinction which marks the characteristics of ‗low‘ and ‗high‘ 
alcohol was alleged to be motivated by protectionist aims.
434
  Rather than construing 
the characteristics of the products, the panel construed the underlying reasons of 
such distinction. As the underlying reason was motivated by protectionist aim, it 
rendered the characteristic distinction arbitrary. The approach in this case was 
however not adopted in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (despite its emphasis on 
protectionism) which preferred to keep the examination of ‗so as to afford 
protection‘ as a separate inquiry. This may be understandable in the trade context 
where the physical characteristics are obvious and that comparison can be made 
therefrom, but in the context of investment, the protectionist aim can be embedded in 
                                                 
431 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II,  WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 
November 1996, p. 29. See also the conclusion of the Appellate Body in the case of Canada 
Periodicals on how the magnitude of the differential taxation, the several statements of the 
Government of Canada's explicit policy objectives in introducing the measure and the demonstrated 
actual protective effect of the measure and the design and structure of Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act 
was clearly to afford protection to the production of Canadian periodicals. Canada-Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, AB-1997-2, adopted 30 June 1997, page 32. 
432Sykes, ‗Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade‘ (n 332). 
433 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13February 1998, DSR1998:I, 135. 
434 US-Malt Beverages Case United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, 
Report of the Panel adopted on 19 June 1992 (DS23/R – 39S/206). 
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the investments constituting the regulatory differences and would be inevitable to be 
determined in the likeness enquiry. The examination of the protectionist motivation 
could be conducted together with the assessment of the reasonableness or rational of 
the regulatory measure.
435
  
Be that as it may, it all boils down to whether the measure is rational or reasonable. 
The protectionist aim is a significant indicator of a likely irrational measure. In this 
aspect, international investment treaties are analogous to the trade law as both 
regimes call for a rational and reasonable basis for the difference of treatment. The 
GATT/WTO in the chapeau of Article XX exception clause prohibits arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries even where discriminatory regulations 
are necessary.
436
 Although one may argue that the absence of a similar Article XX 
exception would result to a non-guarantee of the justifications, the investment treaty 
interpretation is nevertheless subjected to the reasonableness or rational of the 
measure regardless of any ground. The word ‗rational measure‘ appears in many 
investment cases. Rational relates to the ‗policy objective‘ of a measure which could 
assist the definition of ‗circumstances‘ of the investments. It is inherent in 
international investment law as an international legal instrument. It was also 
emphasised in the OECD Declaration on International and Multinational Enterprises.  
5.4 Relevance of Product Process Doctrine (PPM)  
 
The product process doctrine (PPM) examines and regulates the processes involved 
in the production. Such regulation may be discriminatory and exposed to allegations 
                                                 
435 This thesis hence suggests that there are circumstances when the assessment of likeness should be 
merged with the assessment of justification for a meaningful interpretation of national treatment. See 
Ch.5 and 6 on independent and merged justification methodology.  
436 The chapeau constitutes an additional requirement to invoke Article XX apart from the exceptions 
listed. 
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of GATT/WTO violation for restricting trade. This is not only a matter of interest to 
the traders who quest for freer trade, but to the importing country in order to pursue 
domestic or national interest and the non-governmental agencies especially when 
involving health, safety or the environment.
437
 
 
In GATT/WTO, there is no direct suggestion that products or investments should be 
differentiated based on the ‗processes‘ of products. It was however applied in a 
number of GATT/WTO cases. To mention as examples are the Tuna/Dolphin case
438
 
where the US imposed adoption of dolphin friendly techniques on fishers, and the 
Turtles case
439
 where every U.S. trawler fishing waters inhabited by sea-turtles must 
be equipped with a Turtle Excluder Device (TED).
440
 On one side, PPM is said to be 
an effective tool to promote environment, health and safety standard but on the other, 
it is also criticised for exposing room for unilateral and exterritorial dictation of 
domestic standards or societal value
441
 which could press developing countries and 
overexert the scope of interpretation.
442
 
 
While in trade the question is whether two products can be considered unlike 
because of the ‗process‘, in the investment context the same question can perhaps be 
asked to test likeness based on the ‗operation‘ or ‗investment processes‘ of the 
                                                 
437‗Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the World Trade Organization: Challenges and 
Conflicts‘ Sustainable Development Law and Policy, Volume 6 Issue 2, 2006. 
438 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 ILM (1991) 1594; United States-Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna, 33 ILM (1994) 936. 
439 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755. 
440 See also EC-Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
(DS369). 
441Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services (n 376) 6. 
442
Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‗The Product/Process Distinction - An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining ‗Unilateralism‘ in Trade Policy‘ (2000) EJIL, Vol. 11  No.2 p249-289 See also Robert 
Howse, ‗The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade 
and Environment Debate‘ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491. 
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investments. Can an investment be unlike if it operates in a way which could cause 
damage to the environment or infringe human labour rights or hazardous to health 
and safety as compared to other investments in the same sector? There is a tendency 
for tribunals to compare investments from the viewpoint of the regulatory measure 
which affect the operation or the investment process of the investment. For instance, 
in ADF v USA , the United States imposed local content conditions (Buy America) 
which affected the claimant‘s steel fabrication work intended to take place in its 
facility in Canada. Although the tribunal eventually rejected the claim because of the 
absence of relevant competitive situation, the whole idea of comparison was made 
on the process or operation of the investment.
443
 
 
It is understandable that in GATT/ WTO the issue of PPM is hotly debated, mainly 
because the comparison of likeness involved should be on ‗like products‘, an explicit 
limitation in the national treatment provision. Any comparison other than the 
physical characteristics of the products (in this sense the non-physical aspects 
(NPA)), should be discarded.
444
 However, the PPM may be a lot useful in 
international investment considering that the search is on ‗like circumstances‘ of the 
investments. Although there may be views that by introducing the PPM in 
investment law, it is as if an attempt to search for the dissimilarities of two 
investments rather than ‗likeness‘ as manifested in the investment treaties, the two 
tests actually serves the same end. 
445
 While the foreign investors need to prove 
likeness, the host states have to prove unwise. This adverse effect is a natural 
                                                 
443 In this case, the rational of the Buy America condition was not deliberated in depth by the tribunal. 
See ADF v USA (n 173). 
444Christiane R. Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2011), Cambridge International Trade and Economic Law 151. 
445 For example, two investments processing wood are considered alike from the surface and nature of 
their investments but by applying PPM, the environmental compliance for instance is scrutinised. This 
exposes the investments to the likelihood of being unlike. 
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examination in indicating a matter in law. 
 
The other concern of PPM in GATT/WTO is that it involves imposition of 
exterritorial standards to other countries. This has less impact in investment as 
protected investments are only those operating inside the host state. It appears to be 
appropriate for host states to take regulatory measure to safeguard its own domestic 
environmental, health, safety or other legitimate measures within its own territory as 
long as they are reasonable.
446
   
 
By the application of PPM and aims and effects test, it will give impact on the 
sequence determination of likeness and it‘s rational. The determination of likeness 
will occur simultaneously if not after the rational and the effect the measures are 
determined. This is against the conventional method suggested in investment 
tribunals, presumably familiarised from GATT/WTO which justifies a measure after 
a violation has occurred by way of Article XX (General Exceptions). Although one 
may see the absence of similar Article XX in most investment treaties as a 
deficiency, it actually also open room for a few advantages. Firstly, it allows more 
flexibility for government regulatory measure to be justified as opposed to the closed 
subheadings as in Article XX.  Secondly, a regulatory measure will not be regarded 
as breaching the national treatment obligation before the examination it‘s rational 
and justification.
447
 Thirdly, it avoids redundancy and leads to a practical assessment 
of likeness. 
                                                 
446Feldman v Mexico, (n 15) para 170. 
447 Legitimate regulatory measure should be 'redeemed' not justified'. Sungjoon Cho, Free Markets 
and Social Regulation: A Reform Agenda of the Global Trading System (Kluwer Law International 
2003) 67. 
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6.0 Legitimate Regulatory Measures 
 
The GATT/WTO introduces a separate assessment of justification after a violation 
has occurred. This is done by invoking one of the exceptions in Article XX.  Article 
XX of GATT lists exceptions among others;  measures which are necessary to 
protect public morals,  to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, secure 
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with GATT, 
protection of national treasures of artistic, historical value and conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources.
448
 These exceptions constitute non-economic societal 
values that balance the trade obligations.   
 
A noticeable number of investment agreements are gearing towards this approach 
either by expressed reference or incorporation of similar exceptions.
449
 Some 
writings have sceptically expressed the role of the general exceptions in international 
investment law.
 450
 It could be agreed along this line that the inclusion of the general 
exceptions would result to a restricted assessment of regulatory measures, especially 
in response to new issues in the increasingly complex economic world and 
regulatory states. If this incorporation is intended to balance the non-economic 
                                                 
448 Article XX provides other exceptions including those relating to products of prison labour and 
trade in gold and silver.  
449 See for instance Article 200 (1) of the China-New Zealand FTA which adopts an expressed 
reference approach, stating that ‗for the purposes of this Agreement, Article XX of GATT 1994 and 
its interpretative notes and Article XIV of GATS (including its footnotes) are incorporated into and 
made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis.‘ < http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-
Text-of-the-agreement/18-Chapt-17-Exceptions/index.php> , accessed on 4 September 2013. An 
example of incorporation of similar list of exception are the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA), the Singapore-Jordan BIT in Article 18 and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in 
Article 24(2)(b), all available at < 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2009%20ASEAN%20Comprehensive%20Investment%20Agreement-
pdf.pdf>; < http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Singapore_Jordan.pdf>; < 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf>; accessed on 4 September 2013. 
450 See C line L vesque, ‗The Inclusion of GATT Article XX Exceptions in IIAs - A Potentially 
Risky Policy‘ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law 
and Policy: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2013); Legum and Petculescu, ‗GATT 
Article XX and International Investment Law‘ (n 319). 
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societal values, it is submitted that it could alternatively be done by the application 
of general principles already available in international law such as the principles of 
reasonableness and proportionality.  Having said that, this thesis however does not 
go as far as suggesting the incorporation or non-incorporation or of a similar Article 
XX, but rather focuses on how the interpretation of legitimate regulatory measure 
generally in the national treatment context could be benefitting investment law.  
 
A valuable lesson that could be learnt is from the chapeau of Article XX which 
requires that measures must not be applied in a manner that would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade. While the lists itself constitutes similar assessment of rational and legitimacy 
of the government measures and reasonable nexus to rational government policies as 
in investment disputes, the chapeau filters the invocation which is akin to the 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The principle of proportionality in 
particular has an unclear standing in investment arbitrations.
451
 In the cases of US-
Gasoline and US-Shrimp for instance, the measures were provisionally justified 
under Article XX (g) but the application of the measure did not pass the 
requirements of the chapeau.
452
 The Appellate Body in US-Shrimp described the 
chapeau as ‗the prevention of the exceptions of [Article XX] and ‗one expression of 
the principle of good faith‘. 453 Looking at the chapeau  in this perspective will 
support the application of the proportionality test in investment arbitrations. 
                                                 
451 The elaboration of the need of proportionality test and its lack of explicit application is in Ch.5.  
452 The Panel in the case of US-Automative Spring Assemblies emphasised that the chapeau of 
Article XX is not on the measure itself, but on the application of the measure. Peter van den Bossche, 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd Ed., 
Cambridge University Press 2008) 651. See Appellate Body Report- US-Shrimp, paras 185-186 and 
Appellate Body Report-US-Gasoline, p28-29; US-Automative Spring Assemblies , GATT B.I.S.D 
(30th Supp) at 125, para 56 (1983), adopted on May 26, 1983. 
453 Appellate Body- US-Shrimp, para 151, 158. 
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Similarly referring to the importance of proportionality is the use of the term 
‗necessity‘ in Article XX. Not all the exception list contains this term. This suggests 
a less stringent requirement in the items.
454
 Although the necessity test is somewhat 
problematic in the GATT/WTO jurisprudence, it could be discerned from the most 
striking view that it only allows exceptions if there is ‗no alternative measure‘.455 
This is also known as the ‗least restrictive measure‘ or ‗least GATT-inconsistent 
measure test‘. 456 The Appellate Body in the case of Appellate Body Report, Korea-
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, (Korea-Beef AB 
Report) mentioned;  
 
‗As used in Article XX(d), the term "necessary" refers, in our view, to a range of 
degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies "necessary" understood as 
"indispensable"; at the other end, is "necessary" taken to mean as "making a 
contribution to." We consider that a "necessary" measure is, in this continuum, 
located significantly closer to the pole of "indispensable" than to the opposite 
pole of simply "making a contribution to".‘457 
 
However the application the necessity test would potentially severely limit the host 
states‘ regulatory space in pursuing the democratic mandate. The relevance of the 
necessity test itself is debated in the trade context as intruding or causing excessive 
                                                 
454 Christopher Doyle, ‗Gimme Shelter: The Necessary Element of GATT Article XX in the Context 
of the China-Audiovisual Products Case‘ (2011) 29 Boston University International Law Journal 143. 
455 If there is ‗no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with 
it‘. See Thailand-Cigarretes, para 75.  See also US-337 of the Tariff Act 1930, GATT B.I.S.D (36th 
Supp)at 345, para 5.26 (1989). As for the uncertain and ambiguous nature of the interpretation of 
necessity,  Ibid. 
456 Dukgeun Ahn, ‗Environmental Disputes in the GATT/WTO: Before and after US - Shrimp Case‘ 
(1998) 20 Michigan Journal of International Law 819. 
457 Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
161, WT/DS161,169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), para 161. 
 140 
 
infringement on the economic sovereignty of member states.
458
 The difference of 
subject of regulation between trade and investment becomes handy to justify 
difference at this particular juncture. While the effect of trade is limited to the 
movement of goods, investment tribunals have to consider the effect of the 
investments considering the long term presence of the investments themselves on its 
territory. Hence, in this particular aspect, while the necessity test could cast guidance 
in the proportionality test, the investment law is not entrenched to prohibit any 
restrictive measure to the investors but rather unreasonable ones proportionately 
executed.  
 
There is a point to be commented whether there is such thing as ‗justifiable 
discrimination‘ in investment law. It is argued in scholarly articles that by including 
exception list, it is as if recognising that international investment law permits 
justifiable discrimination.
459
 It is submitted here that this is more of a superficial 
issue as firstly, it is a normal legal practice that rules have exceptions and secondly 
that when there is discrimination there is no harm of calling a discrimination a 
discrimination, a spade a spade, and then having it justified. This is the approach 
already adopted in the three prong test in the context of national treatment. As will 
be explained in Chapter Six, the construction of likeness involves flexibility in which 
the justification of the measure can be assessed simultaneously or separately. Thus, 
the examples that one can discern from investment cases such as Methanex v USA, 
would suggest that the measure was discriminatory but justifiable. The point rather is 
that exceptions exist in the form of justification, deference or legitimacy of the 
                                                 
458 Ahn, ‗Environmental Disputes in the GATT/WTO‘ (n 456). 
459 Legum and Petculescu, ‗GATT Article XX and International Investment Law‘ (n 319); Lévesque, 
‗The Inclusion of GATT Article XX Exceptions in IIAs - A Potentially Risky Policy‘ (n 450). This 
thesis agrees however that the inclusion of similar Article XX would not yield significant difference 
to investment arbitration. 
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measure with or without the physical exception list and could be conducted flexibly 
whether in the assessment of likeness or afterwards. Or if one is to put it another 
way, the GATT/WTO jurisprudence methodology of ‗violation first, exception later‘ 
can occur in investment disputes on national treatment in certain circumstances.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes that GATT/WTO is able to provide guidance in the 
interpretative context of international economic law. The role of competition in 
particular is essential in guiding the interpretation of likeness closer to achieving the 
philosophies of national treatment to provide level playing field in investments. It 
has also highlighted the role of national treatment as an agent to curb protectionism, 
a common enemy. As to other methods of interpretation of likeness, in particular the 
aims and effect test and the product process doctrine, it is observed that they are 
more relevant to the international investment context as compared to trade. While 
they may be debated heatedly in trade, they may be more welcomed in investment. 
Last but not least the chapeau in Article XX supports the importance of the principle 
of proportionality that should be further developed in investment disputes. All in all, 
the comparative exercise with the GATT/WTO by way of analogy has resulted in 
positive findings that should be able to assist the evolving principle of national 
treatment in international investment law.
460
 
 
 
                                                 
460 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3); Roberts, ‗Clash of Paradigms: Actors and 
Analogies Shaping  the Investment Treaty System‘ (n 322). 
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Chapter 4 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE EU LAW TO THE INTERPRETATION OF 
NATIONAL TREATMENT 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
 
The comparison between international investment law and the European Union (EU) 
law is hoped to convey a fresh discussion in the area. While the current attention 
between the two jurisprudences is heavily on the new EU competence on investment 
treaties and its impact on the current bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of the 
member states, this thesis embarks on a positive dimension.
461
  It primarily seeks the 
possibility of taking lessons from the EU‘s vast jurisprudence on non-discrimination 
from two areas of the law, namely free movement of capital (FMoC) in Article 63(1) 
                                                 
461 The conflict between the EU law and intra-EU bilateral investment treaties is intense as they 
contain overlapping or similar subject matters.  Due to the same regulatory measures, the ECJ fears 
that by maintaining BITs they may interfere with the EU law, for instance, when it chooses to restrict 
capital movements in accordance to Article 65 TFEU (ex Article 58 TEC).  The existence of the EU 
law and intra-EU BITs is described to be from ‗independent parallelism‘ into ‗increasing interaction‘ 
between the two jurisprudences.  See Case C-249/06 Commission of the European Communities v 
Kingdom of Sweden [2009] ECR I-1335 and Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-
1301. See also Nikos Lavranos, ‗Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and EU Law‘ (2010) 
<http://www.esil-en.law.cam.ac.uk/Media/Draft_Papers/Agora/Lavranos.pdf>, accessed on 14 
October 2013 ; Angelos Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2011).  
So much as this research is not concerned about the intra BITs entered into by member states, it will 
not examine the conflicts which have arisen or potential to arise therefrom. It proceeds from this 
interaction only by acknowledging the similarity of regulatory interest between the two. Just as the 
EU views restriction of capital movement as an impediment to its aim of an internal market, 
international investments agreements also regards the introductions of taxes amounting to indirect 
interventions which could give rise to substantive claims under the agreements. For the discussion of 
taxes and indirect intervention, refer to Thomas W Walde and Abba Kolo, ‗Investor-State Disputes: 
The Interface Between Treaty-based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty‘ 
(2007) Vol.35 Intertax 424. 
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TFEU ex Article 56(1) EC and freedom of establishment (FoE) in Article 49 TFEU 
(ex Article 43 TEC).
462 
 
The focus on FMoC and FoE is due to the similarity in the obligation of the member 
states to adhere to the non-discriminatory principle in investment related area. 
Member states can only exercise their competence in regulation consistently with the 
European Union law, i.e the four freedoms and the general non-discrimination 
clause. This affect the member state‘s regulatory space, in particular matters of direct 
taxation (income and incorporate taxes) which are preserved to the member states.   
 
The ECJ has many years of experience in dealing with discriminatory measures of 
the member states. This is evidenced in its body of jurisprudence. It evolved since 
the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and by case 
laws decided by the European Court of Justice.
463
  
 
This chapter mainly deals with the direct taxation cases as they constitute a 
significant piece of free movement of capital and freedom of establishment cases in 
the EU jurisprudence.
464
  They contribute substantial obstacle to the full 
                                                 
462 Treaty of Lisbon (Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community), (2007/C 306/01),  signed on  13 December 2007, entry into force 1 December 
2009, <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0001:0010:EN:PDF>, accessed on 12 
September 2013. 
463
 The EEC was established in the Treaties of Rome 1957 and was amended several times. Among 
the important ones are the Single European Act (1986), Treaty on European Union, known as the 
"Maastricht Treaty" (1992), Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Treaty of 
Lisbon (2007). The Treaty of Lisbon marks the current framework of EU law which consists of the 
Treaty of European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the latter containing the Treaties of Rome. 
464 Discrimination claims are brought in many direct taxation cases, which has at least of 20 years of 
experience after the case of Avoir Fiscal in 1986. Tom O‘Shea suggested that there was an earlier 
case, Humblet v Belgian State on direct taxation preceding Avoir Fiscal. O‘Shea, ‗Freedom of 
Establishment Tax Jurisprudence: Avoir Fiscal Re-visited‘ (n 128). See also Case 270/83 Commission 
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establishment of the EU, as observed in the case laws of the two freedoms.
465
 The 
domestic legislations which are not wholly or mainly relating to taxation is not 
excluded in the tax exemptions in many treaties.
 466
  As tax is normally not defined 
in investment treaties, it has created a difficult and blurry area of direct or indirect 
taxations. At the end, the test is to determine the substance of the discriminatory 
measure (which may include tax measures) that would enable a claim under national 
treatment.
467
 Furthermore, tax regulations are expected challenges that must be faced 
by international investment in a foreign territory. This explains the existence of past 
investment cases that involved challenges of tax measures of the host states, to name 
a few, taxes on soft drinks (CPI Inc.  v Mexico and ADM v Mexico) and  tax rebates 
in Feldman v Mexico and OEPC v Ecuador.
468
 
 
Other forms of regulatory measures which impede or discriminate the freedoms will 
be construed if they are featured within the two freedoms.
469
 Landmark cases in 
which important general principles are derived from, although originated outside 
FMoC and FoE, such as the ‗rule of reason‘ in Cassis de Dijon will be 
acknowledged in the discussions.
470
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
v France  (‗Avoir Fiscal Case‘)[1986] ECR 0273; Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgian State (`Humblet') 
[1960] ECR 559. 
465 Paolo Arginelli, ‗The Discriminatory Taxation of Permanent Establishments by the Host State in 
the European Union: a Too Much Separate Entity Approach‘ (2007) 35 Intertax 82–116. 
466 For instance, the Mongolia-Korea BIT in Article 7 has excluded from its national treatment 
provision ‗any international agreement or domestic legislation relating wholly or mainly to taxation.‘ 
See Korea-Mongolia BIT, signed 28 March 1991, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_mongolia.pdf>, accessed 24 September 2013. 
467Walde and Kolo, ‗Investor-State Disputes: The Interface between Treaty-based International 
Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty‘ (n 461). 
468 ADM v Mexico, (n 355), para 80; CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 40; Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), 
para 7, OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18), paras 29-32. 
469 However, as the scope of the cases brought under FoE and FMoC are mostly relating the member 
states‘ capital and establishment policies, we could rarely see other variance of justifications of 
exceptions brought as most are fiscal-based justifications. 
470
 Cassis de Dijon, (n 35). 
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This chapter highlights the increasing relevance of the EU law due to the recent 
development of economically integrated communities involving investment 
agreements. A striking example is the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA).
471
 Other examples are the African Economic Community (AEC) 
and at a lesser integration level, the CAFTA-DR and NAFTA.
472
 The questions are 
whether the function of non-discrimination principle in these instruments is similar 
to the EU and if so, whether they can adopt the EU approach in construing non-
discrimination cases. This chapter will primarily explore these interesting 
possibilities and put forth the observations and suggestions on the matter. 
473
 
 
Before any transposition or ‗benefiting the tools of interpretation‘ is proposed, this 
chapter begins with an examination of the underlying philosophy of the EU law so as 
to situate the whole discussion into its proper perspective. This basic process is also 
essential to lay points of similarity and demarcation which calls for the compatibility 
of the two jurisprudences at hand. Such piece of material deserves emphasising so as 
to provide an informed and well-studied analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
471 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) 2009, signed on 26 February 2009, 
<http://www.thaifta.com/ThaiFTA/Portals/0/acia_sign.pdf>, accessed on 12 September 2013. 
472 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), signed 3 June 1991, entered into 
force May 1994, < 
http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/HTML/legal_review/Annexes/Annexes%20III/Anne
x%20III-03.pdf>, accessed 21 September 2013; Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) , 
signed 28 May 2004, < http://www.caftalaw.net/cafta-text>, accessed on 20 July 2013; North 
American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and 
the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 [entered into force 1 
January 1994]. 
473 This chapter will also shed general observations in respect of other investment treaties with lesser 
aim of economic integration. 
 146 
 
2.0 The Underlying Philosophy and the Nature of Integration of the European Union 
 
The EU is a direct effort of peace and prosperity after the World War II in the 
European region. Geographically, it is located in the areas devastated by war. 
Demographically in its promulgation, it was entered into by previous warring states. 
Still bearing the scars of the war, the prevailing view of the time was that economic 
cooperation would increase cross-border transactions and business settings whilst 
mitigating tendencies of military conflicts.
474
 Thus, there was a determination to 
avoid possible future conflicts and to curb signs of protectionism which was 
emerging.
475
 The integration of the EU was necessary and urgent in the context of 
the political economy in the region– inter alia, as it was costly to defend individual 
states in case of military attacks
476
 and that there was a need to rebuild Europe which 
was physically and economically affected by the war. The six initiating states of the 
European Community namely France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Luxemburg embarked in the first cooperation in coal and steel which then led to the 
promulgation of Treaty of Rome for further integration. The manifestation of 
achieving economic cooperation is seen in the preambles of the treaties. Article 2 of 
the Treaty of Rome mentioned: 
 
‗The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to 
                                                 
474John R Oneal and Bruce Russett, ‗The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992‘ (1999) 52 World Politics 1; Joseph M 
Grieco, ‗The International Political Economy Since World War II‘ [2001] Columbia International 
Affairs Onliane (CIAO) <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=6843>, accessed  on 28 January 2014. 
475Brita Sundberg-Weitman, Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality: Free Movement of Workers 
and Freedom of Establishment Under the EEC Treaty (North-Holland Pub. Co. 1977) 9. 
476 It was necessary to include the German economy in the integration to avoid conflicts or threats to 
the neighbouring countries. Europe was very weak after the war to face threat from amongst 
themselves or the external threat of soviet expansion. 
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promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an 
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the 
States belonging to it.‘ 
 
This is where the EU law takes a step ahead in establishing a higher level of 
integration and cooperation than what is required in WTO and international 
investment treaties. The EU has been described as sui generis in this sense, as its 
objective is beyond a mere trade integration. The objective of the common market in 
the EC Treaty- now ‗internal market‘ in the Lisbon Treaty477 is the distinctive 
element that requires deeper level of integration and commitment from the member 
states. This allows the free movement of the production factors which are goods, 
services, persons and capital (which constitute workers and capital) to enable high 
mobilisation of the factors of production and to realise the macro-economic 
objectives as enshrined in the EU.  
 
The integration is supported with institutions of the EU, i.e the EU Parliament, EU 
Commission, and the ECJ. The EU Parliament ensures the democratic process in the 
policy making of the EU while the Commission manages the rules and technical 
harmonisation. The national authorities are obliged to ensure its compliance. At the 
judicial level, the ECJ interprets and develop the jurisprudence. The relationship 
between the national law and the EU law is under the principle of supremacy. 
Whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of EU law and the provisions of 
                                                 
477The Lisbon Treaty embodies the same aim again in Article 2 TFEU. 
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the domestic (national) law of a member state, then EU law will prevail.
478
  The 
other principles integral to the EU law are the principles of direct effect, 
proportionality and subsidiarity.  
 
A further analysis of the nature of EU integration would suggest that it is a step 
towards political integration.
479
 The proponents of this idea stem their reasoning 
from the historical evolution of the EU law. Pescatore regarded political integration 
as the distant aim of the EU (European Community then) which it tries to achieve 
after the customs union and economic union. There were drafts in the 1950s to 
establish a European Political Community and a European Defence Community as a 
collective effort to curb the advancement of the Soviet Union military but were then 
aborted. Attempts to create political integration as an aim of the European 
community is also said to be recorded in the Hague Conference of 1969.
480
 
 
If political integration is found as the dominant philosophy of the EU, the impact on 
the oneness of the market will be much greater as the power to regulate shifts 
immensely from the member states to the EU. Because of the constant debates on the 
extent of the intended political integrations and the exact definition of the European 
                                                 
478 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v NederlandseAdministratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR1, Case 
6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 and Case 11/70 InternationaleHandelsgesellschaftmbH v 
Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
479Matej Avbelj, ‗Theory of European Union‘ (2011) 818 European Law Review 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1976376> accessed 29 January 2014; Pierre 
Pescatore (ed), Law of Integration (1st edn, Springer 1974) 23. 
480‗Meetings of the Heads of State or Government‘ (1970) 1 E.E.C Bulletin 12 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/1451/1/hague_1969.pdf>, accessed  on 29 January 2014. On the progressive 
integration of the EU, it is described as an ‗irreversible advance‘ and would continue in the future. 
See Michael J Geary, ‗The Process of European Integration from The Hague to Maastricht, 1969-92: 
An Irreversible Advance?‘ [2012] Debater A Europa 
<http://ftp.infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/database/000048001-000049000/000048470.pdf> , accessed on 29 
January 2014. 
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entity and identity,
481
 it is thus important to evaluate the EU law as it is currently 
representing. For the purpose of this research, it is appreciated that the EU law is a 
deep ‗economic integration‘ which has become the orientation of the ECJ decision 
makings. First and foremost, the aim of economic integration is apparent and self-
explanatory in Article 2 of the TFEU that it shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe ‗based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy and aiming at full employment and social 
progress‘. Substantively, it is supported with the freedoms granted which have a 
profound economic basis, as they are themselves factors of production (goods, 
services, labour and capital). The establishment of the EU law was heavily grounded 
on the economic ideas
482
 and that the economic philosophy was the ‗aggregate 
economic phenomena‘ which shaped the jurisprudence.483 In this aspect, the EU 
historical timeline portrays the shifts towards the betterment of economic integration 
by the introduction of the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty and 
the recent Lisbon Treaty with more economic power to the EU. In terms of decisions 
of the ECJ, it has even been argued that the EU law construes justice in the 
‗economistic nature of justice‘.484 It is observed that the ECJ has put the EU agenda 
in achieving an internal market above national interest, albeit reserving restrictive 
areas for justifications for member states.
485
 
                                                 
481 Terms used relating to the entity and identity of the European Union are generally 
‗supranationality‘, ‗federalism‘ and ‗constitutionalism‘. 
482Philip Allott, The Health of Nations (Cambridge University Press 2002) 258 . 
483Ibid. 
484 The tendency of the EU law to construe justice from the economic point of view was criticised as 
opposed to the ‗perceived notion of justice‘. Andrew T Williams, ‗Promoting Justice After Lisbon: 
Groundwork for a New Philosophy of EU Law‘ [2010] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies; Andrew T 
Williams, ‗Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law‘ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 549. 
485
In the case of Commerzbank, the court held that the national provision that provides unequal 
treatment to a German company with a branch in the UK in relation to repayment supplement as 
compared to UK resident companies is discriminatory and is to the disadvantage of companies having 
seats in other member states. The fiscal residence justification brought forth by UK was not accepted.  
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The difference in the nature of integration - the EU being a supra-national entity as 
opposed to mere ‗treaty relationships‘ of investment treaties- do not necessarily 
conclude that they are contradictory to each other. The difference generally rests on 
the degree of integration, but to a considerable extent both jurisprudences strive for 
economic integration and liberalisation. Both jurisprudences apply the principle of 
non-discrimination in the same way and are concerned with the same discriminatory 
measures imposed by the member states/ host states. Where free movement of 
capital and establishment are granted, they provide a substantial level of investment 
protection and where investment protection is provided in investment treaties, it  
provides a substantial level of freedom, vice-versa.  The next subsection will explore 
these similarities. 
 
3.0 The Analogy: The EU Law and International Investment Law on National 
Treatment 
 
The EU is a regional economic integration which binds its members to achieve an 
internal market. This is manifested in Article 26(1) and (2) Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (hereinafter the ‗TFEU‘) (ex Article14 TEC) which reads:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Similarly held was in the case of Halliburton where the non-resident company set in the EU should be 
able to enjoy the community freedom of establishment even though it was owned by a US parent 
company. The legal capacity of ‗pseudo-foreign company‘ was later detailed in the Uberseering case. 
Refer Case C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Commerzbank AG 
(`Commerzbank') [1993] ECR I-4017; Case C-1/93 Halliburton Services BV v Staatssecretaris van 
Financien, [1994] ECR I-1137. 
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1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring 
the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties. 
 
2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties. 
 
In so accomplishing this objective, the member states have agreed to exclude 
discriminatory measures on the ground of nationality (Article 18 TFEU (ex Article 
12 TEC)) and prohibit regulatory measures which would impede the free movements 
guaranteed in the treaties. The freedoms guaranteed are free movement of goods 
(Articles 34-36 TFEU (ex Articles 28-30 TEC), services (Article 56-7 TFEU ex 
Articles 49-50 EC), persons (Article 45-8 TFEU ex Articles 39-42 EC), capital 
(Article 63(1) TFEU ex Article 56(1)) EC and the freedom of establishment (Article 
49 TFEU ex Article 43 TEC). 
 
The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) 2009 and the African 
Economic Community (AEC) are notable examples of investment agreements which 
resemble this feature. They contain similar objective. The preamble of ACIA 
emphasises the following: 
 
‗Reaffirming the need to move forward from the AIA Agreement and the 
ASEAN for the Promotion and Protection of Investments signed in Manila, 
Philippines on 15 December 1987 (―ASEAN IGA‖), as amended, in order to 
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further enhance regional integration to realise the vision of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (―AEC‖)‘ 
 
The ASEAN Economic Community outlines that it will become a ‗single market and 
production base‘. In order to achieve this, it comprises free flow of goods, free flow 
of services, freer flow of capital and free flow of skilled labour.
486
 In addition to that, 
the economic sectors are gradually liberalised, fortified with the protection of foreign 
investors via ACIA.  Under ACIA, the main objective as stated in Article 1 is to 
‗create a free and open investment regime‘.  
 
The African Economic Community (AEC) sets a similar standard. Article 2 of the 
AEC Treaty notes that‘ 
 
 ‗THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES hereby establish among 
themselves an African Economic Community (AEC).‘ 
 
The AEC provides freedom of establishment in Article 43 and free movement of 
capital in Article 45.  
 
Similar to the EU incorporation of the non-discrimination principle to safeguard the 
fundamental freedoms and uphold the success of the EU economic integration, 
ACIA also includes the non-discrimination principle to promote and ensure the 
realisation of its economic integration objective. It is done by way of investment 
liberalisation and obliging all member states to provide national treatment to other 
                                                 
486 Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, signed 20 November 2007, 
<http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-on-the-asean-economic-community-blueprint>, full 
version is available at < http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf>, accessed on 21 September 2013. 
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states‘ investors and /or investments with respect to admission, establishment, 
acquisition, etc in their territories.
487
 The principle of non-discrimination in the AEC 
is however only apparent in the most favoured nation principle in Article 37.  It 
adopts a wider approach (includes any restriction) which would be covered under the 
general freedom of establishment and free movement of capital guaranteed by the 
treaty.  
 
Generally, the  ‗negative integration‘ in the EU law in the context of the non-
discrimination principle is similar to investment treaties as it includes areas which 
are not within the direct sphere of the EU law to regulate, such as direct taxation, but 
are left to the member states as long as they do not contradict the treaties.
488
 It forms 
part of the ‗decentralised‘ model of the common market in which the national 
regulatory autonomy is not interfered as long as the regulations are applied equally 
to home and host states‘ goods or persons.489 This negative integration and 
decentralised model are made possible with the principle of non-discrimination.
490
  
 
The logic of analogy is straightforward. The EU law grants free establishment of 
investments and free movement of investment capitals and thus obligates the 
member states to adhere to the non-discrimination principle. Similar to the effects of 
some investment treaties such as the ACIA, CAFTA-DR and to some extent 
NAFTA, the EU law encourages investments in other member states and prohibits 
                                                 
487 ACIA 2009, (n 471), Article 5. 
488 Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland. Schumacker ('Schumacker'), [1995] ECR I-225, 
para 21. 
489Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (3rd edn, OUP Oxford 
2010) 18. 
490The EU law regards the principle of non-discrimination as the first necessary step towards 
achieving an internal market . Sundberg-Weitman, Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality (n 475) 
11. 
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the state to discriminate against them. Where it involves non-residents discriminated 
against residents,
491
 it becomes akin to a national treatment situation in investment 
treaties. The ECJ in the Truck Center explicitly mentions the benefit of national 
treatment in the EU setting: 
 
 ‗In the case of companies, it should be borne in mind that their registered 
office for the purposes of Article 58 of the Treaty serves, in the same way as 
nationality in the case of individuals, as the connecting factor with the legal 
system of a Member State. Acceptance of the proposition that the Member 
State of residence may freely apply different treatment merely by reason of 
the fact that the registered office of a company is situated in another Member 
State would deprive Article 52 of the Treaty of all meaning. Freedom of 
establishment thus aims to guarantee the benefit of national treatment in the 
host Member State, by prohibiting any discrimination based on the place in 
which companies have their seat (see Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT 
Group Litigation, paragraph 43; DenkavitInternationaal and Denkavit 
France, paragraph 22; and Case C-284/06 Burda [2008] ECR I-0000, 
paragraph 77).‘492 
 
As for the reading from the EU perspective, Steffen Hindelang had made a 
connection between free movement of capital and freedom of establishment in the 
                                                 
491 It is pertinent to point that the EU law grants freedom not only to nationals of other member states 
but also to the nationals of the states themselves domestically. See C-9/02 de Lasteyrie du Saillant 
[2004] ECR I-2409 where the French tax was regarded by the ECJ as preventing its own citizens from 
transferring their residence abroad. Also, treating alike two different circumstances may also amount 
to discrimination. 
492 Case C-282/07 Etatbelge-SPF Finances v Truck Center SA, (Truck Center Case)[2008] I-10767,  
para 32. 
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EU law with national treatment. 
493
 He linked the situation of comparison between 
cross-border and domestic situations to the international law principle of ‗national 
treatment‘.494 Reference to the EU tax discrimination matters to ‗national treatment‘ 
is also made by Tom O‘Shea in his analysis of the concept of comparability and 
discrimination in the EU law.
495
 The possibility of interaction between the EU law 
and international investment in the context of national treatment are also affirmed by 
some scholars within international economic law.
496
  
 
There is no direct attempt to refer to the EU law in investment arbitration cases. 
Mentions however were made on the possibility of reference. Among those who 
noted the possible interactions were Thomas Walde and Federico Ortino.
497
  Walde, 
in relating investment treaties to the ECJ (on the importance of protectionist element 
in discrimination cases) commented,  
 
                                                 
493 In his words with regard to free movement of capital; Art 56 EC (now A63 TFEU) also includes a 
prohibition of discrimination. If cross-border and domestic situations are compared, then this 
corresponds to the international economic law principle of national treatment. And he quoted P. 
Rudolf Dolzer from his book Wirtschaft und kultur im Volkerrecht. Hindelang, The Free Movement 
of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment (n 127) 129–135.  
494Ibid 130. See generally: Juillard, ‗Freedom of Establishment, Freedom of Capital Movements, and 
Freedom of Investment‘ (n 90). 
495O‘Shea, ‗Freedom of Establishment Tax Jurisprudence: Avoir Fiscal Re-visited‘ (n 128). See also 
Philip Laroma, 
‗Freedom of Establishment & EC Tax Law: The Case for ECJ consistency,Comparability: Consistent 
or Not Consistent?‘ (Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 2009) 5 < 
http://ials.sas.ac.uk/postgrad/courses/docs/MA_Tax_Working_papers/PHILIP_PUBBLICATION_FI
NA.pdf >, accessed on  28 January 2014. 
496Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3); Walde and Kolo, ‗Investor-State Disputes: The 
Interface between Treaty-based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty‘ (n 461); 
J. H. H. Weiler, The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? 
(Lindahl Lectures) (Oxford University Press, USA 2000); Stephan W. Schill, ‗Multilateralization 
through Interpretation: Producing and Reproducing Coherence in Investment Jurisprudence‘ in The 
Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
497 Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3); Ortino, ‗From ―Non-Discrimination‖ to 
―Reasonableness‖: A Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law?‘ (n 63). 
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‗A similar approach would and has been used by the European Court of 
Justice to identify a discriminatory purpose of governmental measures. It is 
rather the effect than a particular individual intention which determines the 
finding of discrimination. While WTO cases deal with trade -not investment- 
and ECJ cases mainly with freedom of movement (which is mainly an issue 
of investment access), their (they are) by now very extensive and 
authoritative jurisprudence on discrimination cannot be ignored when issues 
of discrimination are raised under investment treaties.
498
  
 
The analogy between the EU and investment can be seen from the similar effect that 
both regimes have on the liberalisation of investments. The EU jurisprudence of 
freedom of establishment and free movement of capital facilitate investment 
opportunities for the nationals of the EU member states to pursue establishment of 
investments in another member state. By freedom of establishment in Article 49 of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the member states are prohibited from restricting nationals of 
another member state to establish or manage their undertakings in the state. Article 
49 TFEU reads:  
 
‗‘... restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member 
State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such 
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the 
territory of any Member State. 
 
                                                 
498 Walde, ‗In the Arbitration under Article 26 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Nykomb v. The Republic 
of Latvia-Legal Opinion‘ (n 170) para 41. 
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Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in 
particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of 
Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of 
the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of 
the Chapter relating to capital.‘ 
 
 
This provision allows nationals of a member state to self-employ or set up 
companies in another member state. It is a broad fundamental freedom allowing 
efficient allocation of production factors in the EU including goods, services and 
capital. It obliges member states to allow nationals of the other member states to 
participate in a ‗stable and continuous basis‘499 in the economic life500 of the host 
state. The freedom of establishment involves the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite 
period.
501
 These characteristics are similar to the characteristics of foreign 
investments generally covered in investment treaties as investments must be of 
‗certain duration‘.502  
 
                                                 
499Case C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] ECR 1-4165, para 25. 
500 In the case of Case 2-74 Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 00631, the court elaborated that 
freedom of establishment within the sphere of activities as self-employed persons  is intended to 
oblige member states to facilitate effectively the economic and social interpenetration of nationals of 
the other member state within the community of the host state.   
501Case C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others 
[1991] I-03905 (Factortame case), para 20-22; the registration of a vessel was regarded as an exercise 
of freedom of establishment as it serves as a vehicle for the pursuit of economic activity that includes 
fixed establishment in the State of registration. 
502Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 31 July 2001, para 54.  
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This is similar to treaties which grant the right of access, commonly by way of the 
national treatment or most favoured nation provisions. The ACIA provides freedom 
of establishment by way of granting non-discrimination in the pre-establishment of 
investments. Article 5 (1) of ACIA reads:  
 
‗Each Member State shall accord to investors of any other Member State 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its 
own investors with respect to the admission, establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory.‘503 
 
Similar language can be found in Article 10.3 of CAFTA-DR, Article 3 in the 2004 
US-Model BITs, Article 3(1) of the 2003 Canadian Model BIT, the Japanese Model 
BITs and NAFTA.
504
  By granting right of access, the host states are prohibited from 
discrimination from the establishment stage of foreign investments in the host states. 
Apart from regional trade or investment treaties, a country adopting mutual national 
treatment model which grants a common regime of entry and establishment within 
the states, creates the same effect as the freedom of establishment as in the TFEU.
505
 
With regards to the German BITs, although it does not explicitly contain the right of 
establishment, it was suggested by Sandrock that it exists nevertheless via two 
methods, firstly by way of the interpretation of ‗investment‘ and ‗investor‘ and 
secondly via German administrative law of subjective public rights that eventually 
                                                 
503 Article 5(2) ACIA 2009 provides similar protection for ‗investments‘.  
504 NAFTA, Article 1102. 
505P Gugler and V Tomsik, ‗The North American and European Approaches in the International 
Investment Agreements‘ (2007) 4 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 12 
<http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1082>,  accessed on  28 January 
2014. 
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lead to the same effect of access.
506
 Sandrock‘s argument could be to some extent 
reflecting other BITs as the restrictions imposed by host governments prior entry are 
normally administrative in nature, and what foreign investors should do is to comply 
with the requirements. Once the requirements are complied with and the investments 
are admitted, the investments enjoy the permanent presence of the investments to 
carry out their economic activities.
507
 
 
As for other investment treaties which adopt the post establishment approach, this 
freedom is extended once the investments have entered into the host states. China, 
Hong Kong
508
 along with other European BITs regulates access of foreign investors 
in their treaties.
509
 BITs of this kind allow admission of investments ‗in accordance 
to the law‘.510  
 
As far as free movement of capital is concerned, Article 63 of the TFEU provides 
that ‗all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.‘ This article, which came later 
in the EU jurisprudence, is an outcome of progressive advancements to liberate 
                                                 
506Sandrock, ‗The Right of Foreign Investors to Access German Markets: The Meaning of Article 
2(1) of the German Model Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments‘ (n 340). 
507The correlations between freedom of establishment as a well-settled concept and freedom of 
investment is attempted by Juillard in his article. The two are not synonymous, but related. See 
Juillard, ‗Freedom of Establishment, Freedom of Capital Movements, and Freedom of Investment‘ (n 
90) 333. 
508Zeng Huaqun, ‗Initiative and Implications of Hong Kong‘s Bilateral Investment Treaties‘ [2010] 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade 2. 
509Berger, ‗China‘s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Substance, Rational and 
Implications for International Investment Law Making‘ (n 166); Gugler and Tomsik, ‗The North 
American and European Approaches in the International Investment Agreements‘ (n 505). 
510The nature of European BITs in adopting  investment control is also referred to as ‗European 
approach towards FDI regulation‘ or BITs containing ‗admission clause‘ . See Julien Chaisse, 
‗Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment—How Will the New EU 
Competence on FDI Affect The Emerging Global Regime?‘ [2012] Journal of International Economic 
Law <http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/02/20/jiel.jgs001>, accessed on 28 January 
2014. 
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movement of capital. The coverage nomenclature of capital movements in the 
European Union law is broad and it includes direct investments.
511
  
 
Similarly, most investment treaties incorporate provisions on free transfer of fund 
which enables investors to bring in and out capital and profit from the host state. The 
Netherlands-India BIT for instance provides: 
 
‗Repatriation of Investment and Returns 
 (l)   Each Contracting Party shall assure to investors of the other Contracting 
Party, without delay and on a  non-discriminatory basis, the unrestricted 
transfer inter alia of: 
 (a) Capital and additional capital amounts  used to maintain or increase 
investments; 
 (b) Net operating profits including dividends and interest; 
 (c) Repayments  of any loan  including  interest thereon, relating to the 
investments; 
 (d)   Payment  of  royalties   and  service  fees as far as it is related to the 
investment; 
 (e) Proceeds of sales or liquidation of the investment; 
                                                 
511 Of other aspects, it includes personal funds, real estate investments or purchases, securities 
investments and  granting of loans and credits. This is contained in Directive 88/361 of June 24, 1988 
which was earlier adopted in Article 73b(1) EC (The Maastricht Treaty) and  Article 56(1) EC 
(Amsterdam Treaty). Directive No.88/361 is still referred to by the ECJ despite it being significantly 
reproduced in the treaties. It was said to have the same indicative value in the case of Trummer and 
Mayer. See Case C-222/97 Manfred Trummer and Peter Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661.The directive 
gave full liberalisation of capital to the European Community with transitional arrangements for some 
member states. 
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 (f) The earnings of nationals of one Contracting Party or of any third state 
who work in connection with investments in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. 
 (2) Currency transfer under paragraph (l) shall be in a freely convertible 
currency.  Such transfers shall be made at the prevailing market rate of 
exchange on the date of transfer.‘ 512 
 
 
This model of the right of transfer of funds provision is common in many investment 
treaties, such as in the Article 6 of Mongolia-Korea BIT,
513
 Article 45 of the AEC 
and Article 13 of ASEAN (ACIA). It provides an unrestricted effect of transfer of 
fund, thus result to a huge effect of protection to foreign investors. There are some 
investment treaties however which provide reservations such as the India-Malaysia 
BIT which guarantees free transfer of fund ‗subject to its law, regulations and 
national policies‘. 514 Be that as it may, there is still a substantial level of freedom of 
movement of capital that is granted by the right of transfer of fund in the investment 
treaties, and the law, regulations and national policies must be construed strictly so 
as not to impede unjustifiably the essence of the freedom. Capital inflows in both the 
EU and investment face similar threats of restrictions including exchange 
restrictions, capital account transactions and international payment or transfer. By 
providing that each party shall assure to investors of the other Contracting Party 
without delay and on a non-discriminatory basis the unrestricted transfer of 
funds/capital, the BITs are actually seeking to ensure the competitiveness of foreign 
                                                 
512 Article 7, Netherlands- India BIT, signed 6 November 1995 , entry into force 1 December 1996, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_india.pdf>, accessed 21 September 2013. 
513 Mongolia – Korea BIT, signed 28 March 1991, < 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_mongolia.pdf>, accessed 24 September 2013. 
514Article 6, India-Malaysia BIT, signed 3 August 1995, entry into force 12 April 1997, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/India_Malaysia.pdf, accessed 21 September 2013. 
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investor/investment. It must be noted that similar issues revolve in the EU law. 
Within the EU member states, capital integration is also regarded as a challenging 
progress as it involves sensitive domestic political concerns and economic policies. 
Thus, even when eventually the EU member states agreed on the direct effect of free 
movement of capital, there are still various justifications that the member states 
attempted to seek when their regulatory measures are challenged as evidenced in the 
decided cases.
515
  
 
This is where the learning process is essential. The investment law could learn from 
the vast case laws from the EU jurisprudence. Especially in the context of ACIA 
where no case so far has been brought,
516
 it is key responsibility of the arbitrators to 
decide the direction of interpretation. In the context of freedom of establishment for 
instance, there are many case laws where national legislations were challenged for 
infringement of the freedom.
517
 Analogy to the EU law helps the international 
                                                 
515The dilemma around Article 63 is even more so as it has an erga omnes effect, which extends the 
right to third countries.  Being aware of the huge scope of this freedom and the sensitivity of capital 
taxation to domestic economy, the TFEU provides exceptions on third countries and on other general 
grounds such as in tax treatment and prudential supervisions or public policy and security under very 
specific circumstances, see Article 64(1) and 65 TFEU. 
516 However, there was a case under the 1987 ASEAN Treaty for Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (before the entry of ACIA) which is worth noting. The tribunal in that case eventually 
found lack of jurisdiction. See Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd., v Government of the Union of 
Myanmar, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Arbitral Tribunal,  ASEAN I.D. Case 
No. ARB/01/1, Award, 31 March 2003 (42 ILM 540 (2003). See also elaboration of the case in Lay 
Hong Tan, ‗Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?‘ (2004) 53 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 935. 
517 The case of Avoir Fiscal in 1983 marked a significant era in the development of freedom of 
establishment of companies in the EU law. It progressed further with the decisions of landmark cases 
which imposed national legislations or established principles to respond to, such as Centros’s ‗seat 
doctrine‘ and Bachman’s ‗fiscal cohesion defense‘. By the decisions in many FoE cases, the ECJ has 
indirectly ‗fashioned‘ the landscape of member states‘ tax policies. This portrays the significant role 
of the non-discrimination principle in the negative integration of the EU law. The member states have 
to eventually tailor their internal tax system following the decisions based on the basic rule that even 
though direct taxation is a matter of competence within the member states, it must be exercised 
consistent with the EU law. See Eddy Wymeersch, ‗Centros: A Landmark Decision in European 
Company Law‘ [1999] Financial Law Institute Working Paper 99-15 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=190431> , accessed on 29 January 2014.  For 
cases, see Marks & Spencer, paragraph 29; Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT 
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investment regime to analyse the impact of the approaches taken by ECJ. Where the 
approach is suitable to the investment context, they may be instructive to the 
arbitrators.
518
  
 
3.0 Like Situations  
 
The EU law acknowledges that the guiding methodology in discerning 
discrimination is by comparing claimants with a comparator in the same situation. In 
the case of Test Claimants the court re-emphasised this requirement, 
 
‗In order to determine whether a difference in tax treatment is discriminatory, 
it is, however, necessary to consider whether, having regard to the national 
measure at issue, the companies concerned are in an objectively comparable 
situation.‘519 
 
Despite the huge volume of cases on discrimination, the EU jurisprudence does not 
have a certain criteria of likeness (or criteria associated to likeness) similar to that 
can be found in the GATT/WTO.
520
 This in a way provides a level of flexibility to 
the ECJ in deciding what constitute like situations of the comparators. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                          
Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11673, paragraph 36; and Case C-182/08 GlaxoWellcome [2009] 
ECR I-0000, paragraph 34. 
518 Roberts, ‗Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping  the Investment Treaty System‘ (n 
322). 
519 Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v Comm’rs of Inland 
Revenue, [2006] ECR I-11,673. See also Schumacker,(n 488),  para 30 and Case C-311/97 Royal 
Bank of Scotland [1999] ECR I-2651, para 26. 
520The tests are the characteristics test, the competitive and substitutability test, the aims and effects 
test and the PPM. Refer to Ch.3 for more discussion. 
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the ECJ managed to highlight certain principles in discerning discrimination judging 
from the case laws.
521
 This section will extract the principles from the jurisprudence. 
4.1 ‘Situation’ as Paramount Consideration 
 
The emphasis on the ‗situations‘ of the comparators is obvious and paramount in free 
movement of capital and freedom of establishment cases, that even the most 
established principles could be put to second. The ‗seat doctrine‘ in company law for 
instance was put in controversy in the Centros case.
 522
  Another example is, by 
providing equal treatment in the annual income tax assessment to non-residents in 
direct taxation, it deviates from the normal international tax practice which would 
normally be granted on a reciprocal basis to non-residents by way of Double 
Taxation Treaties.
523
 This would otherwise be reserved within the sphere of the host 
states in international investment law and would likely by justifiable for 
discriminatory treatment. In general, the Court would accept objective differences in 
given circumstances.
524
  
                                                 
521 On the contrary, there are critiques by scholars due to the variation of reasoning by the ECJ in a 
number of cases. Mason & Knoll regarded discrimination on tax cases as the following: 
‗Determining whether taxpayers are similarly situated is therefore crucial for determining 
whether there is discrimination. But the ECJ has not provided clear guidance on when 
resident and nonresident taxpayers are similarly situated, such that they must be taxed the 
same way, and when they are not. The resulting collection of decisions is a hodgepodge, 
lacking any clear set of guiding principles.‘ 
Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll, ‗What Is Tax Discrimination?‘ [2012] Faculty Scholarship, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 1030. See also Dennis Weber, ‗The Bosal Holding Case: 
Analysis and Critique‘ (2003) 4 EC Tax Review 220; Michael J Graetz and Alvin C Warren Jr., 
‗Income Tax Discrimination: Still Stuck in the Labyrinth of Impossibility‘ (2012) 121 The Yale Law 
Journal.;Alvin C Warren and Michael J Graetz, ‗Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and 
Economic Integration of Europe‘ (2006) 115 Yale Journal of International Law 1186. 
522Eva Micheler, ‗The Impact of the Centros Case on Europe‘s Company Laws‘ (The Company 
Lawyer, June 2000). See Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] I-
01459. 
523 Schumacker (n 488).  See also O‘Shea, ‗Taxation of Non-Residents‘ (n  128). 
524 In the Truck Centre case, the court took into consideration the capacity of the state that affects the 
situation of the comparators. Truck Center Case, (n 492), para 42.  See also Mady Werner, ‗Analysis 
of the ECJ‘s Recent Judgment in Case C282/07, Etat belge-SPF Finances v Truck Center‘ (2009) EC 
Tax Students‘ Conference Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
<http://ials.sas.ac.uk/postgrad/courses/docs/MA_Tax_Working_papers/Mady_PUBLICATION_FIN
AL.pdf>., <http://ials.sas.ac.uk/postgrad/courses/MA_tax_law_workingpapers.htm>, accessed on 23 
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As a general rule in direct taxation, the situations of residents and non-residents are 
not comparable.
525
 This is found in the international tax law principles of residence 
and territoriality which are adopted by most national laws. According to these 
principles, residents are taxed based on their worldwide income while non-residents 
are taxed on their acquired income within the territory. This renders the 
incomparability of residents and non-residents in taxation. However, with the 
implementation of the EU law which seeks for free movement of factors of 
production, conflicts are found with the grounded international tax practice known 
among the member states. There is no clear rule which take precedence of this 
incomparability, but case laws have suggested incomparability can only be the case 
if member states can prove it objectively. To prove the objectivity of a 
discriminatory measure, the situations of the comparator is key. 
 
As far as companies are concerned, nationality of a company is determined based on 
its seat of establishment. Resident and non-resident companies are as a rule non-
comparable. If the court, by construing the measure in light of the discriminatory 
effect it cause to the non-resident companies in comparison to resident companies 
which are in like circumstances which could undermine the effet utile of the EU law, 
the court could deviate from this general rule. The ECJ in the case of Commission v 
                                                                                                                                          
September 2013; O‘Shea, ‗Truck Center: A Lesson in Source vs. Residence Obligations in the EU‘ (n 
128), <http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/staff/oshea/52215.pdf> , accessed 23 September 2013. 
525
Schumacker (n 488),  para 31, D v Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingenbuitenlandte Heerlen, para 28.It must be noted that in 
respect of comparability, the EU law deals with comparison between different sets of comparators- 
residents and non-residents, among two residents or among two non- residents located inside and 
cross border. The one which is similar to the national treatment concept and coverage in international 
investment treaties is involving residents and non-residents as in most cases discrimination against 
non-residents also means discrimination against other nationalities. This nevertheless does not render 
other comparisons irrelevant. The principles derived from the courts deliberation on the comparison 
could still be applied by analogy to non-nationals, similar to how analogy of important principles on 
discrimination from personal tax or inheritance cases. 
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France (Avoir Fiscal) emphasised that residence could not always be the 
differentiating factor. The court made an important observation: 
 
‗Acceptance of the proposition that the member state in which a company 
seeks to establish itself may freely apply to it a different treatment solely by 
reason of the fact that its registered office is situated in another member state 
would thus deprive that provision of all meaning .‘526 
 
If by such differentiation it leads to overt or covert discrimination, it will still be 
impeding the EU law. The result of discrimination can only be seen if two 
companies of the same situations are compared. In the case of Sotgiu, the court 
mentioned to this effect, 
 
‗...that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid not only overt 
discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat, 
but all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other 
criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result.‘ 527 
 
The situation of the comparators was articulated in the case of Bouanich highlighting 
that if the difference of treatment occurs out of an occasion, the occasion must be 
objectively justified. In the case of Bouanich, the Swedish legislation was challenged 
for discriminating against non-resident shareholders with regards to the repurchase 
of shares. The repurchase of shares by residents was taxed as a capital gain and 
deducted for the cost of acquisition but was regarded as a distribution of a dividend 
                                                 
526 Avoir Fiscal Case, (n 464), para 18. 
527
Case 152/73 Sotgiu v DeutscheBundespost [1974] ECR 153, para 11. 
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amounting to no deduction. This results to tax advantage for resident shareholders. In 
construing likeness of the resident and non-resident shareholders in this case, the 
court found that had it not been because of the action of repurchase of shares, the 
two residents are considered in like circumstances.  The point of comparability falls 
on ‗the occasion of the purchase of the share‘ and the court did not see any objective 
reason to justify the discrimination, as there was nothing extraordinary but a 
repurchase of shares. The court concluded the existence of an arbitrary 
discrimination.
528
 Thus, two comparators which are otherwise similar can be in a 
different situation because of an occasion. However, justification of that occasion is 
essential.  
 
In another case, the court ruled that if an objective situation is relied upon for a 
discriminatory treatment, that discriminatory treatment must be effective to achieve 
the intended objective situation. In the case of Manninen, tax credit was granted by 
the Finnish government to compensate for double taxations.
529
 The compensation 
was limited to dividends received from domestic corporations. As a result of this, 
revenue from capital of non-Finnish origin receives less favourable tax treatment 
than dividends distributed by companies established in Finland. Although Finland 
has attempted to draw the difference of character between the companies – claiming 
that Finnish companies are already subjected to corporation tax which in turn entitles 
the shareholders for tax credit- the court urged to construe the situations at hand. The 
court concluded that the shareholders fully taxable in Finland (regardless of whether 
receiving dividends from a foreign or domestic company) eventually found 
themselves in a comparable situation because they are equally exposed to double 
                                                 
528 Case C-265/04 MargarethaBouanich v Skatteverket [2006], paras 38-41. 
529 Case C-319/02, Manninen, [2004] ECR I-7477, para 13. 
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taxation. When Finland relied on the justification of compensating for double 
taxation, there is no reason to deprive a shareholder receiving dividends from 
another member state if they equally face the risk of double taxation. 
 
Another method of construing ‗situation‘ is by looking at the legal position of the 
comparators. If the position of the law is similar in covering the comparators, there is 
no objective reason to discriminate them. In the existence of a specific legal 
provision that groups the comparators in like situation, the court is reluctant to accept 
justifications to group them apart. This is also termed as ‗legal comparability‘530 as 
the position of the law governing the parties is examined of which similarity is 
derived.
531
 In the case of Commission v France (Avoir Fiscal), since the companies 
were treated the same way for the purpose of taxing the profits, there is no 
objectivity on the discriminatory measure when it comes to the granting avoir fiscal 
later. France has admitted that there is no objective difference relating to the 
treatment.
532
 Similarly, in the case of Arens-Sikken, the court highlighted that by 
providing similar treatment in inheritance of both categories of persons under 
comparison the same way for the purpose of tax, there is no objective difference 
between them.
533
  
 
                                                 
530
Refer to 
Michael Lang, ‗Recent Trends in ECJ Case Law in the Area of the Freedoms and Direct Taxation‘, <h
ttps://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC8QFjAA&url=ht
tp%3A%2F%2Fwww.ibdt.com.br%2Fmaterial%2Farquivos%2FAtas%2FIBDT_10_June_2010_ECJi
.ppt&ei=uhDpUqKiI6v07Abk7IC4CA&usg=AFQjCNE_I0yTQTbrTZxPzOtTTiMqKGPvag&sig2=4
YiZQm2WGSMj6AS24HzFDg> accessed on 28 January 2014. 
531
 See also Case C-11/07  Hans Eckelkamp and Others v Belgische Staat [2008]  I-06845. 
, para 63 and Case C-170/05 Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France [2006] ECR I-11949, 
paragraph 35. 
532 Avoir Fiscal, (n 464), para 20. 
533
Case C-43/07 D.M.M.A. Arens-Sikken v Staatssecretaris van Financien (`Arens-Sikken'), [2008] 
ECR I-0000. 
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The next method is by construing the factual differences of the comparators. In the 
case of Schumacker, the ECJ took cognisance of the factual differences between the 
residents and non-residents which overrides the general rule of non-comparability of 
the two categories of persons.
534
  The Germany income tax law applied different tax 
regimes to peoples under these classifications in which residents are subject to tax on 
all their income (‗unlimited taxation) while non-residents in Germany are subject to 
tax only on the part of their income arising in Germany. By this arrangement, non-
residents are deprived from having their annual wages tax adjustment made by the 
employer and from the annual income tax assessment by the administration. This 
consequently could not qualify them for reimbursement of any overpaid tax at the 
end of the year. Although Germany put forth the rationales of difference of treatment 
of non-residents based on the territoriality argument assuming that generally the 
income received in the member state is only part of the total income (the rest of 
which will be taxed at the place of residents), it was observed in this case that the 
claimant has no income derived from his state of resident and thus results to his 
personal and family circumstances are taken into account neither in the state of 
residence nor in the state of employment. The court took cognisance of this situation 
and did not uphold Germany‘s concern of non-residents enjoying tax benefits in both 
States.
535
 The court deviated from the general rule of non-comparability of residents 
and non-residents due to the non- objectivity of the host state reasons maintaining 
the rule and in corresponding to the particular circumstances of the claimant. The 
court consistently decided in the case of Gschwind, that there was comparability as 
the claimant did received substantial income from his State of residence.
536
 
 
                                                 
534 Schumacker, (n 488), para 40. 
535 Ibid. 
536Case C-391/97 Gschwind [1999] ECR I-5451. 
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Lastly, it is notable that the court took cognisance of the reliance on previous 
preferential treatment accorded by the member state. In the case of Commerzbank, 
the justification brought by the member state was that because non-residents enjoy 
privileged treatment in not having to pay tax normally paid by resident companies, 
they therefore were not entitled to repayment supplement. The ECJ held that: 
 
‗The fact that the exemption from tax which gave rise to the refund was 
available only to non-resident companies cannot justify a rule of a general 
nature withholding the benefit. That rule is therefore discriminatory.‘537 
 
This entails that if a member state relies on a previous preferential treatment created 
for non-nationals it would be discriminatory to treat unfavourably on a general 
nature based on that difference. 
 
4.2 The Principle of ‘Effet Utile’ and Likeness 
 
It is observed that the finding of likeness need not necessarily be in the form of 
stand-alone criteria which are applied in different sets of circumstances, but could be 
a principle that is inherent in all cases. The important principle that the ECJ 
collaterally took cognisance of is the principle of ‗effet utile‘. 
 
The principle of effet utile is also termed as the doctrine of effectiveness. Applying 
this doctrine, the adjudicator would construe the design and purpose of the 
legislation and the effects it sought to achieve. This is how the court would fill in a 
                                                 
537
 Case C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Commerzbank AG [1993] 
ECR 1993 I-04017 para 19. 
 171 
 
gap as a teleological method of interpretation.
538
 Walde regarded the principle of 
effectiveness as a key principle of interpretation which can be used ‗to create a 
presumption against and interpretation which leaves no meaning or effect to a 
particular textual element‘.539 
 
The EU law imposes a strict approach in tolerating justifications for discriminations 
by member states. It constantly emphasises the effet-utile or useful effect to its raison 
d’etre of the EU law; i.e achieving an internal market. The catalyst of the prohibition 
of discrimination is that it protects the functioning of the EU internal market. Thus, 
if a member state introduces a discriminatory measure, the test is also whether the 
measure hinders or restricts the realisation of the EU freedoms as guaranteed in an 
internal market or likely discourages cross-border economic activities.  
 
The use of effet-utile is especially very apparent in the areas in which the EU has no 
direct regulation such as in direct taxation.
540
 In the case of Cadbury Schweppes, a 
national measure is not justified if it relates to a justification sought to circumvent 
the application of the legislation of the state concerned.
541
 In the case of 
AmministrazionedelleFinanzedelloStato v Simmenthal SPA, 
542
 the ECJ held that : 
 
                                                 
538 Nial Fenelly, ‗Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice‘ (1996) 20 Fordham 
International Law Journal 674. 
539 Thomas W Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‘ in Christina 
Binder and others (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Christoph Schreuer (OUP Oxford 2009) 738. 
540 This includes cross-border inheritance taxation. See Case C-513/03, Van Hilten-Van der Heijden 
[2006] I-01957. 
541 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue [2006] I-07995, para 76. 
542Case 106-77 AmministrazionedelleFinanzedelloStato v Simmenthal SPA (No 2) (1978) 3 CMLR 
263, para 17. 
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‗It must be pointed out in that regard that the requirement of non-
discrimination laid down by the Court cannot be construed as justifying 
legislative measures intended to render any repayment of charges levied 
contrary to Community law virtually impossible, even if the same treatment 
is extended to taxpayers who have similar claims arising from an 
infringement of national tax law. The fact that rules of evidence which have 
been found to be incompatible with the rules of Community law are 
extended, by law, to a substantial number of national taxes, charges and 
duties or even to all of them is not therefore a reason for withholding the 
repayment of charges levied contrary to Community law.‘ 
 
The ECJ has been very firm in the effet-utile of the integration. The non-
discrimination principle does not function solely to achieve this aim but is supported 
by the fall back general prohibition of restriction where the requirements to fulfil a 
discrimination case is not met.
543
 
 
However, in order to apply this principle in the investment context, caution must be 
made to the EU experience as to the restrictive effect of discrimination cases. 
Discrimination analyses are often prematurely concluded on the effet-utile basis.
544
 
                                                 
543It is regarded as a two prong investigation, as in Gebhard (n 499), Case C-250/95 Futura 
Participations and Singer [1997] ECR I-2471 and Truck Center Case (n 492). The fact that 
restrictions can still occur if the regulation is not discriminatory is referred to as the drawback of 
discrimination tests. Especially in the context of free movement of goods and services, the market 
access test is alternatively applied to identify regulatory measures that constitute restriction or 
hindering the market access. See Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (n 489) 19;Gabrielle 
Pizzuto, ‗Restriction Analysis in ECJ Tax Jurisprudence Relating to the Freedom of Establishment: Is 
the Court Reinventing the Wheel?‘ (2009) EC Tax Students‘ Conference Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies <http://ials.sas.ac.uk/postgrad/courses/MA_tax_law_workingpapers.htm>., 
<http://ials.sas.ac.uk/postgrad/courses/MA_tax_law_workingpapers.htm>, accessed on 23 September 
2013. 
544It is said to be too easy to conclude a discrimination case Ruth Mason, ‗A Theory of Tax 
Discrimination‘ [2006] NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 09/06 
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Literatures have also commented that this is an emerging approach in the EU tax 
cases, known as the ‗restrictive discrimination‘ approach.545 In the EU cases, the 
discussions are not constructed separately, and thus one would find that the 
restriction test is applied almost naturally with the discriminatory assessment.
546
  
 
Technically, differing to the EU law, the discussion of the national treatment in 
investment treaties is placed as a separate substantive claim. The question of 
restriction is not invoked in national treatment, although substantively, the claimant 
may resort to fair and equitable treatment as a fall back claim in the event if national 
treatment claim is not satisfied. The investment treaties do not extend to prohibit all 
restrictive measures which hinder foreign investment, thus adopting the restrictive 
approach in lieu of discrimination would render excess of jurisdiction of the claims. 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=978880&download=yes>, accessed on 29 
January 2014. 
545
Mattias Dahlberg, ‗The European Court of Justice and Direct Taxation: A Recent Change of 
Direction?‘ in Krister Andersson, Eva Eberhartinger and Lars Oxelheim (eds), National Tax Policy in 
Europe (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2007) . On the account of judicial philosophy, the EU law is 
commented heavily on the direction of justice and values adopted in the jurisprudence. It has been 
argued that the EU law construes justice as ‗economistic nature of justice‘ as opposed to the 
‗perceived notion of justice‘. See Williams, ‗Promoting Justice after Lisbon‘ (n 484); Williams, 
‗Taking Values Seriously‘ (n 484). This is due to the establishment of the EU which was heavily 
grounded on the economic ideas. See Allott, The Health of Nations (n 482) 258. Allot agreed that the 
economic philosophy was the ‗aggregate economic phenomena‘. This can also be seen from the 
economic oriented aims from the Single European Act in 1987 to the recent Lisbon Treaty.  
546 Another way of looking at this phenomenon is by referring it as an ‗elaborated discrimination‘ 
approach which maintains the importance of the principle of non-discrimination in EU law. The 
argument is that if the analysis is taken over by the restrictive approach, the consequence is that every 
measure introduced by member states would be a restriction and have to be adjudicated. It is also 
important to bear in mind that member states possess tax sovereignty and thus they deserve to 
introduce measures for the national interest provided that they are objectively reasoned. In the 
absence of any harmonisation, the member states can by way of bilateral agreements prevent double 
taxation by allocating powers of taxation among themselves (see Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt [1999] ECR I-06161, para 
57. See also Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793, paras 24 and 30 [1999] ECR I-6161, paragraph 
57). By elaborated discrimination, it suggests that the interpretation of discrimination is extended to 
the objectivity of the measure adopted to the effet-utile of the EU treaties. This is true as in most of 
the cases, the courts took the approach of determining comparability of the situations and the 
objectivity of such comparability. This second observation provides more sense as a proper analysis 
of discrimination would naturally require the objectivity of the comparison so as to justify the 
comparability, hence the ‗elaborated discrimination‘. 
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Thus the effect of restrictive reading of the non-discrimination treatment would 
highly likely occur in the EU context, and less likely in investment law.
547
  
 
4.3 Other observations on the Determination of Likeness 
 
The first observation is the narrowness of the scope of examination. It is important to 
note that in so comparing the EU jurisprudence of free movement of capital and 
establishment to the investment law, one would notice that the EU law does not 
construe the physical/ tangible aspects of the subjects of investments as in 
investment tribunal. There is no reference of the economic sector as a criterion of 
likeness in the EU jurisprudence.
548
 This is due to the nature of grounds of actions in 
both jurisprudences. On the other hand, the national treatment provision in 
investment treaties is a separate substantive claim which requires the tribunal to 
assess likeness from the very type or nature of the investments. Determining the 
economic sector of the investments is a preliminary assessment of likeness in 
investment law. In the EU law on the other hand, the claims are brought under free 
movement of capital and freedom of establishment and thus comparison is conducted 
directly on the aspect of capital and establishment. Thus, the narrow scope of 
comparison in the EU law does not mean that it ignores other elements/criteria of 
likeness, but because the EU discrimination assessment does not require so. 
 
                                                 
547 The restrictive effect by the application of unguided effet utile is anticipated. Thus, the principle 
should be exercised in ‗great care‘ taking into account the overall policies, so as not to ‗make the 
treaty and its elements more effective than they appear on paper on the assumption that this is what 
the parties (and the Vienna Rules) wanted?‘ See Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: 
Experiences and Examples‘ (n 539) 739. 
548In the case of Avoir Fiscal (n 464), there was an indication that the comparison was made within 
the insurance sector, but the emphasis was not insurance as a sector but the legal positions in the 
insurance sector which turned the examination on the legal situations of the comparators.   
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Despite the narrow scope of comparability, it enables the ECJ to explore the 
potentials of the circumstances within the context of establishment and movement of 
capital between the comparators. This allows scrutiny on how a measure would 
impact on comparators from the two viewpoints. Investment law benefits from this 
process because establishment and capital movement are significant elements of 
investment. It is observed that the investment tribunals should take cognisance of 
these aspects towards a more investment approach of analysis as compared to the 
heavily trade approach of characteristic examination which may only be relevant to 
the preliminary assessment of likeness in determining the economic sector. 
 
Secondly, it is observed that justification arguments are often found occurring at the 
comparability level.
549
 In the Blanckaert case for instance, the member state claimed 
the cohesion of its tax system as the justification of the discriminatory treatment. The 
member state insisted that there is an objective difference between a non-resident 
taxpayer who is not insured under the Netherlands social security system and a 
resident who is insured. Contrary to the non-residents, the residents are liable, as a 
rule to pay contributions under that system. The court construed this justification in 
assessing the likeness of the situation of the comparators and concluded: 
 
‗The answer to the first question must therefore be that Articles 56 EC and 58 
EC must be interpreted as not precluding a law of a Member State under 
which a non-resident taxpayer who receives income in that State only from 
                                                 
549Recent cases of the EU are those cases from 2005 onwards, following the analysis of trends in ECJ 
case law in the area of the freedoms and direct taxation by Michael Lang. The cases are grouped in 
several phases – before 1986 where there were no tax cases, between 1986-2005 which marked the 
EU restrictive approach in accepting justifications by member states and from 2005 onwards where 
ECJ started to give emphasis on, inter alia, proportionality and construing justification at 
comparability level.  
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savings and investments and who is not insured under the social security 
system of that Member State cannot claim entitlement to tax credits in respect 
of national insurance, whereas a resident taxpayer who is insured under that 
social security system is entitled to those credits when his taxable income is 
calculated, even if he receives only income of that same kind and does not 
pay social security contributions.‘550 
 
Similar approach is taken in other cases such as the Truck Centre case
551
 and D. v 
Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst.
552
 In the case of D, the member state justified its 
discriminatory treatment by the existence of a bilateral tax convention for avoidance 
of double taxation which only extends to residents to the other state party to the 
convention. The court mentioned,  
 
‗The fact that those reciprocal rights and obligations apply only to persons 
resident in one of the two Contracting Member States is an inherent 
consequence of bilateral double taxation conventions. It follows that a 
taxable person resident in Belgium is not in the same situation as a taxable 
person resident outside Belgium so far as concerns wealth tax on real 
property situated in the Netherlands.‘553 
 
Determining justification at the comparability level is also practiced by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as will be seen in Chapter 5. This supports the 
                                                 
550Case C-512/03, J.E.J. Blanckaert v Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/OndernemingenbuitenlandteHeerlen, (2005) I 7685 para 51. 
551 Truck Center Case (n 492). 
552
 Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te 
Heerlen (2005) I 05821 
553
 Ibid.,  para 61. 
 177 
 
relevance of this approach in discrimination cases. In some cases, it is more practical 
to determine the justification during the assessment of likeness. Although this 
approach would likely depart from the three-prong test as in Pope & Talbot, Inc v 
Canada (which is similar to GATT/WTO), it is a could be an effective method of 
interpretation. 
554
 Chapter 6 will elaborate on the suitability, practicality and 
application of the merged justification test in investment cases.    
5.0 Justifications 
 
5.1 Common Justifications Brought by Member States 
 
Justifications for discriminatory measures can be brought under the exceptions 
provided for in the TFEU. A notable exception for free movement of capital contains 
in Articles 64 and 65 of the TFEU which provide for justifications on the application 
of third countries, public policy and public security. On a wider scope, and where 
there is no direct exception, the court also construes justifications by reasons of 
‗overriding general interest‘555 coupled with the principle of proportionality in which 
makes any justification confined only to what is necessary to achieve the legitimate 
objectives.
556
 This is also where the ‗rule of reason‘ takes place.557 It is observed that 
the ECJ has been very reluctant in accepting most of the justifications brought forth 
                                                 
554 In investment cases, the general approach taken by the tribunals are by considering three matters, 
firstly whether the comparators are in like situations, secondly, whether there is less favourable 
treatment and thirdly whether there is any reasonable justification for the discriminatory treatment. 
See Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada (Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001), para 78. 
555
 Difference in treatment applies to situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified 
by overriding reasons in the general interest (Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071, para 43, 
and Manninen, (n 529), paras 28 and 29). 
556
See, to this effect, the judgments in Futura, (n 543), para 26; Gebhard , (n 499), para 37; Case C-
19/ 92 Kraus [1993] ECR 1-1663, para32; and Case C-415/ 93 Bosman [1995] ECR 1-4921, para104. 
557 Cassis de Dijon, (n 35). 
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by the member states in defending their regulatory measures in both FoE and 
FMoC.
558
 The reluctance is generally due to the difficulty in proving strong and 
convincing justifications by the member states against the clear and precise aim of 
the European Union to achieve an internal market.  
 
a. Cohesiveness of National System/ Fiscal Supervision 
 
The ECJ has accepted the justification on the ground of maintaining the cohesiveness 
of national tax system in the case of Bachman. This defence is popularly known as 
the ‗Bachman defence‘ in EU literatures.  In Bachman, the court stated:  
 
‗…that the need to maintain the cohesion of the tax systems could, in 
certain circumstances, provide sufficient justification for maintaining 
rules restricting fundamental freedoms…‘559 
 
The court also mentioned in the case of Manninen that safeguarding the coherence of 
the tax system is compatible with the Treaty provisions but it must not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain the objective of the legislation.
560
 This defence is however 
accepted by the court if there is a direct link of the discriminatory measure to the 
justification of cohesion of the national tax system.  In the cases cited, there was a 
direct link between the deductibility of contributions from taxable income and the 
taxation of sums payable by insurers under old-age and life assurance policies, and 
that link had to be maintained in order to preserve the cohesion of the tax system in 
                                                 
558 Luca Cerioni, EU Corporate Law And EU Company Tax Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 38. 
559Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992]ECR I-249 and Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] 
ECR I-305). 
560Manninen, (n 529)  para 29; Verkooijen , (n 555) para 43. 
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question. In the case of Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) and Kenneth Hall 
Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes)
561
however, as there was no such direct 
link between the consortium relief granted for losses incurred by a resident 
subsidiary and the taxation of profits made by non-resident subsidiaries, the ECJ 
precluded the member state‘s legislation brought under this justification. The 
Bachman case was rather an exception than a rule. In the case of Bosal, over taxation 
cannot be justified to preserve the coherence of the tax system.
562
 
 
b. Avoidance of Taxation 
 
The court accepts avoidance of taxation as a justification if it can be proven that 
there are wholly artificial arrangements to circumvent the national tax provisions. In 
the case of Centros, while precluding the measure of the state which refused to 
register a branch of a company formed in another member state that have no actual 
business in that state, the court did not reject the possibility of considering this 
justification in the event of fraud. The court held:  
 
‗…That interpretation does not, however, prevent the authorities of the 
Member State concerned from adopting any appropriate measure for 
preventing or penalising fraud, either in relation to the company itself, if need 
be in cooperation with the Member State in which it was formed, or in 
relation to its members, where it has been established that they are in fact 
attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their 
                                                 
561Case C-264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I-0000, para 29. 
562Bosal, (n 93), para 34. Other cases which rejected cohesiveness as a justification were C-80/94 
G.H.E.J Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen [1998] ECR I-02493 paras 23-27 and 
Schumacker, (n 488).  
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obligations towards private or public creditors established in the territory of 
the Member State concerned.‘563 
 
 
Another condition that the court requires before invoking avoidance of taxation as a 
justification is that it must already occurred. In Lasteyrie, a French legislation 
provided lesser treatment to taxpayers who intended to transfer their residence for 
tax purposes outside France as compared to those who retained in France. The court 
held that the taxation on ‗immediate taxation on increases in value‘ on the first 
category of taxpayers was unjustified as they have not yet been realised ('latent 
increases in value').
564
  
 
c. Principle of Territoriality 
 
In terms of territoriality, the court accepted and recognised that resident companies 
are of ‗unlimited taxation‘ (taxed on their worldwide profits) while non –resident 
companies are of ‗limited taxation‘ (taxed on profits from the source in the taxing 
state). In the case of Marks & Spencer, the court acknowledged this principle as 
accepted by the EU law: 
 
‗In a situation such as that in the proceedings before the national court, it 
must be accepted that by taxing resident companies on their worldwide 
profits and non-resident companies solely on the profits from their activities 
in that State, the parent company's Member State is acting in accordance with 
                                                 
563Centros (n 522). 
564 Lasteyrie du Saillant, (n 491), paras 63-69. 
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the principle of territoriality enshrined in international tax law and recognised 
by Community law.‘565 
 
 
The court in the case of Manninen however did not extend justification under the 
ground of territoriality if the categories of dividends concerned by that difference in 
treatment share the same objective situation.
566
 
 
 
d. Capacity of the State 
 
The question which arose in the case of Truck Center was whether the retention of 
tax at source on interest paid by a company resident, which was in Belgium to a 
recipient company resident in another state, Luxembourg was discriminatory. The 
interest paid to a recipient company resident in the host state was however exempted 
from the retention. Despite the discriminatory surface of the treatment, the court 
accepted that the companies were objectively comparable. The reasoning was based 
on the different legal bases on which the legislation was based on. Among the 
justification was the capacity of the state in both circumstances. Belgium was in the 
capacity of State of residence when the company paying and receiving that interest is 
resident in Belgium, and holds the capacity of the State in which the interest 
originates when a company resident in Belgium pays interest to a non-resident 
company. When both the companies paying the interest and receiving that interest 
are resident in Belgium, the position of the Belgian State becomes different to (that 
                                                 
565Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of  Taxes) [2005] ECR I-
10837, para 39. 
566Manninen, (n 529), para 39. 
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in which it finds itself) when a company resident in Belgium pays interest to a non-
resident company. In the first case, the Belgian State acts in its capacity as the State 
of residence of the companies concerned, while, in the second case, it acts in its 
capacity as the State in which the interest originates. This is termed as the ‗source 
state capacity‘ and the ‗residence state capacity‘.567 
 
e. Reduction in Tax Revenue 
 
The EU law does not accept the reason of reduction in tax revenue as constituting 
overriding reasons in the public interest. In Manninen the court mentioned, 
 
‗…it has been consistently held in the case-law that reduction in tax revenue 
cannot be regarded as an overriding reason in the public interest which may 
be relied on to justify a measure which is in principle contrary to a 
fundamental freedom.‘568 
 
The court upheld similar decisions in the case of Verkooijen, Danner and X&Y.
569
 
 
f.  Public Interest 
 
The EU has provided exceptions for abolition of restrictions in the TFEU. As for 
public policy, the EU has adopted a strict guideline. In the case of Eglise de 
                                                 
567 Truck Center Case, (n 492), para 42. See also O‘Shea, ‗Truck Center: A Lesson in Source vs. 
Residence Obligations in the EU‘ (n 128); Werner, ‗Analysis of the ECJ‘s Recent Judgment in Case 
C282/07, Etat belge-SPF Finances v Truck Center‘ (n 524). 
568 Manninen, (n 529), para 49. 
569Verkooijen, (n 555) para 59, Case C-136/00 Danner [2002] ECR I-8147, para56 and Case C-436/00 
X and Y v Riksskatteverket, 2002 I-10829,  para 50. 
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Scientologie, the administrative declaration imposed by the French government, 
invoking ‗threat to public policy‘ was held to be incompatible with the EC Treaty for 
the reason of its generality and resulting to less clarity to the persons concerned. The 
measure must be proven that it is taken only when the objective cannot be achieved 
by a less restrictive measure. The public policy justification must also be detailed 
and must not result to the law being less clear, which will then be against the 
‗principle of legal certainty.‘570 A similar approach is adopted in the case of Alfredo 
Albore where the Italian law which imposed on nationals of other member states 
administrative authorisation for any purchase of real estate situated within an area of 
the national territory designated as being of military importance, was found 
incompatible with the EC Treaty. The court was not satisfied with the discriminatory 
measure introduced and insisted that it is necessary to show that ‗non-discriminatory 
treatment of the nationals of all the Member States would expose the military 
interests of the Member State concerned to real, specific and serious risks which 
could not be countered by less restrictive procedures.‘571 
 
g. Reciprocity 
 
 
The court looked at this justification unfavourably in the case of Avoir Fiscal.
572
 
According to France, only countries having Double Taxation Conventions (DTCs) 
with France could enjoy the Avoir fiscal. This means, companies of other member 
states would receive differential treatment. Similarly, the ECJ rejected this 
                                                 
570Case C-54/99 Association Église de Scientologie de Paris, Scientology International Reserves Trust 
and The Prime Minister [2002] ECR I-1335,  para 22. 
571 Case C-423/98 Alfredo Albore [2000] ECR I-05965, para 24. 
572 Avoir Fiscal Case, (n 464), para 26. 
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justification in the case of St. Gobain, emphasizing that in entering into DTCs, the 
member states are still subjected to the parameters of the Community law.
573
 
 
5.2 Analysis of the Justifications Brought by Member States 
 
5.2.1 The ECJ Strict Approach 
 
The justifications brought by the member states are mostly precluded despite the fact 
that some of them are accepted in principle.
574
 The thresholds in accepting the 
justifications are high. The member states in the EU have given away a huge scope 
of power to the EU, effectively giving the EU law the right to interpret matters in its 
own perspective, even if it is contrary to the domestic interpretation. The domestic 
interpretation in such cases would not be upheld if the EU decides that its own 
interpretation is necessary for the furtherance of internal market.
575
  It must be 
realised that the EU law carries at least three interests, the interest of the claimant, 
the member state that is challenged and the interest of the EU as a regional 
integration. In most of the decisions, the EU speaks for itself. This can be seen in the 
usage of certain phrases such as ‗less attractiveness‘ or ‗compatibility‘ which 
                                                 
573 Saint-Gobain, (n 546) paras 55-63. 
574Justifications which are in principle accepted by the court are evasion of tax, avoidance of abuse 
and coherence of tax. See discussion in 5.1 and cases e.g Manninen (n 529), Centros (n 522)  and  
Futura (n 543). 
575 For instance, in the Centros case, Denmark contended that the determination of the registration of 
branch should be within the domestic perusal considering that the there was no business held by the 
company at its incorporation place. However the ECJ ruled that the result of refusing registration of 
the branch which is otherwise allowed for non-nationals would lead to the denial of freedom of 
establishment. This indicates that the supremacy and the direct effect of the EU law in the member 
states‘ legal system are the factors that differ to the international investment legal regime. See 
Centros, (n 522), para 16, 21. 
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indicate the furtherance of its own objectives.
576
 This is why the principle of 
proportionality plays an important role in setting the right limits of the application of 
the freedoms or measures by the member states on the one hand and the EU on the 
other.
577
 
 
The justifications brought by the EU member states – coherence of the national 
system, avoidance of double taxation etc, would perhaps make a better way in the 
investment tribunals. This is where the effect of the EU deeper integration marks the 
demarcation line with that of the investment regime. This could be seen from the 
ECJ decisions which are reluctant to accept justifications, or to accept with heavy 
restrictions in order to prioritise the achievement of the internal market. The 
investment treaties on the other hand are negotiated limited to the extent of 
                                                 
576 In view of satisfying the aim of internal market, the ECJ has in many occasions out ruled the 
justifications of the member states on the ground that the regulation or restriction would make it ‗less 
attractive‘ for member states‘ residents for establishment in another member state.  While this may be 
a common remark made by the ECJ in assessing discrimination cases, it may not be suitable, fear of it 
being taken afar, in the context of investment treaties as restrictions may be justifiable even though 
they appear to cause less attractiveness in the enjoyment of investment treaties. The term ‗less 
attractiveness‘ may be appropriate if the investment treaties have similar ‗notion of freedom‘ as in the 
EU law. In the case of Tankereederei, the court held: 
‗In the present case, it must be held that a national provision such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings – which applies a less favourable tax regime to investments used in the territory 
of other Member States, in which the undertaking concerned is not established, than to 
investments that are used in national territory – is likely, if not to discourage national 
undertakings from providing, in other Member States, services that require the use of capital 
goods situated in those other Member States, at least to make that provision of cross-border 
services less attractive or more difficult than the provision of services in national territory by 
means of capital goods situated in that territory‘ (see, to that effect, Jobra, paragraph 24). 
As in the EU law, even though a measure is not discriminatory, it is precluded nevertheless if it 
‗hinders the exercise of the freedoms. While the EU law would  conclude that there is a restriction on 
the freedoms whenever a national measure prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of 
that freedom, the investment treaties confines itself (in the context of national treatment) only if the 
measure discriminates a foreign investor. Resorting to determine and depending solely whether a 
discriminatory measure would cause less attractiveness to the exercise of the benefits of the 
investment treaties would render excess of jurisdiction and unacceptable. See C-287/10 Tankereederei 
I SA v Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes, [2010] I-14233 para 19 and  the use of 
‗dissuaded‘ in Bosal (n 93), para 27 . As for compatibility see Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v 
Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of  Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837 paras 35 and 51, and Manninen, (n 
529), paras 28, 29. 
577 An elaboration on the principle of proportionality in the EU law will be discussed in the 
subsequent section.  
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investment protection from state sovereignty. Acknowledging this, host states still 
possess a considerable level of regulatory power in exercising its sovereignty.  
 
There are possibilities that justifications relating to cohesion of national tax system 
and national tax policy are brought in the investment cases. It is observed that all the 
justifications (in 5.1) brought by the member states have the potential to be accepted 
by the investment tribunals. The main reason is that the justifications as featured in 
EU cases are mostly involving sensitive domestic tax measures which override 
public interest. The lack of strong integration aim makes investment treaties not as 
encompassing as the EU law to overrule such measures. Nevertheless, they must be 
subjected to proportionality. In the case of Feldman v Mexico, there was in principle 
no objection on the justification of fiscal coherence but there must be reasonable 
nexus to the rational policy in which the host state intends to achieve.
578
 In that case, 
the tribunal accepted that the refusal to grant rebate on the ground of, inter alia, 
‗deprivation of government substantial amount of tax revenue‘, was an objective and 
rational basis for treating producers and re-sellers differently.
 579
 
 
It is also pertinent to note that the ECJ has in particular expressed its rejection of any 
justification purely on economic reason.  This is a general approach taken by the ECJ 
across the freedoms. If the measure is taken on purely economic grounds, it is not 
good enough to constitute a reason of public interest. In Federación de 
disribuidorescinematográficos the court held, 
 
                                                 
578 This test was developed in the case of Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada. See Pope & Talbot, Inc, v 
Canada, (n 20), para 78. 
579 This reason was brought along with other justifications. The justifications were to discourage 
smuggling, protect intellectual property rights and prohibit gray market sales. Feldman v Mexico, (n 
15) paras 115 and 171. 
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‗16 … It may also be seen from those judgments that objectives of an 
economic nature cannot constitute grounds of public policy within the 
meaning of that article. 
17. There is no doubt that the Decree-Law pursues such an economic 
objective since by seeking to guarantee the distribution of a large number of 
national films it succeeds in ensuring sufficient receipts for the producers of 
such films.  
… 
21. In those circumstances, the link between the grant of licences for dubbing 
films from third countries and the distribution of national films pursues an 
objective of a purely economic nature which does not constitute a ground of 
public policy within the meaning of Article 56 of the Treaty.‘ 580 
It remains unclear in the investment treaties in relation to transfer of fund whether 
the host states are allowed to introduce restrictive measures in situations of financial 
crisis. In the case of CMS v Argentina the tribunal held:  
 
‗The third issue the Tribunal must determine is whether Article XI of the 
Treaty can be interpreted in such a way as to provide that it includes 
economic emergency as an essential security interest.  While the text of the 
Article does not refer to economic crises or difficulties of that particular kind, 
as concluded above, there is nothing in the context of customary international 
                                                 
580Case 17/92 Federación de disribuidorescinematográficos [1993] ECR I-2239. Among other purely 
economic grounds which were rejected by the court were considerations of a ‗national budgetary 
nature‘. See Case C-109/04 Kraneman[2005] ECR I-2421 para 32. 
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law or the object and purpose of the Treaty that could on its own exclude 
major economic crises from the scope of Article XI.‘ 581 
 
The justification of economic crises may be acceptable in principle as in Enron
582
 
and LG&E
583
 cases, but the tribunals differed on whether to approach the issue in a 
restrictive manner
584
 and on the determination of the severity of an economic 
situation
585
 entitled to justification.   
 
It could be argued that since investment treaties are not as far reaching as the EU in 
the context of integration, the host states would have wider margin of appreciation in 
defending its national policies.
586
 Some commentators put forth that investment 
treaties do have a role in answering to the call for ‗international cooperation for 
economic development‘ in the ICSID preamble and similarly phrased objectives in 
many investment treaties
587
 and highlight development as an ‗international right‘ and 
                                                 
581In the case of CMS v Argentina, a claim on discrimination was brought up alleging that ‗other 
public services relying on dollar –based tariff such as telephone companies, water distribution 
enterprises, banks, waterway transportation companies and other businesses, and significantly, the gas 
producers, have all been treated in a more favourable manner.‘ The tribunal rejected the existence of 
discrimination as there was no intention to discriminate based on nationality and that similarity was 
not established either within the gas transportation and distribution industry or other utilities as well. 
The tribunal related it rather on the ground of fair and equitable treatment under the treaty. See CMS 
Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case No. ARB/01/8, Award 12 May, 2005, 
para 293, 359. 
582
Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, 
Award, May 22, 2007. 
583LG&E Energy Corp., L&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006. 
584 The tribunal in Enron applied restrictive interpretation. Enron Case, (n 582), para 331. 
585CMS v Argentina, (n 581), para 355. 
586 A different viewpoint on this matter could be made in respect of more integrated investment 
treaties such as the ACIA and CAFTA-DR. This matter will be discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs and partly in Ch.6. 
587Omar E García-Bolívar, ‗Economic Development at the Core of the International Investment Law 
Regime‘ (2010) 
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=omar_garcia_bolivar>, 
accessed on 29 January 2014. 
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that there is a trend of new regional investment treaties and provisions going towards 
it.
588
   
 
Generally, this issue may fall under deference given to host states. The investment 
tribunals have accorded deference in a number of cases, for instance El-Paso v 
Argentina, Paushok v Mongolia and Feldman v Mexico.  In El-Paso v Argentina, the 
government accepted the host state‘s justification to balance for each sector the 
advantages and disadvantages of the general economic situation. This justification in 
effect allowed favourable treatment regarding the pesification measure to the 
banking sector which was locally run as compared to the oil and gas sector 
measure.
589
 Similarly, in Paushok v Mongolia the tribunal accepted the justification 
of ‗avoiding tax evasion in the gold mining industry‘ while in the case of Feldman v 
Mexico the tribunal accepted among others ‗better control of tax revenues‘.590 
 
While wider scope of deference may suit well with general bilateral investment 
treaties, it may not be preferred in the interpretation of more integrated investment 
treaties. The ACIA and the AEC could, considering the wordings of the agreement, 
resort to the EU template of deciding cases. This means that deference will be 
reduced significantly as can be seen in EU cases. Similarly, in the context of 
CAFTA-DR and to some extent the NAFTA which are relatively more 
comprehensive trade and investment commercial network than general BITs, one 
could argue for narrower scope of deference. 
                                                 
588Diane Alferez Desierto, ‗Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-
Based IIAs‘ (2011) 3 Trade Law & Development 296. 
589 El Paso  v Argentina, (n 173), para 310. 
590 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 170; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company, CJSC 
Vostokneftegaz Company v The Government of Mongolia UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, 28 April 2011, para 316. See elaboration of the cases in respect of deference in Ch.6 on 
Margin of Appreciation.  
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This first scenario would also lead to possible discontentment by member states, as 
to the intrusiveness of regulatory space. This could be seen in particular from the EU 
member states reactions on the ECJ recent rulings on direct taxation matters. The 
ECJ has portrayed a more expansive view of non-discrimination.
591
 It would result to 
a back lash if the EU approach is adopted, it would render many national regulations 
violating the non-discrimination principle by restricting member states‘ flexibility 
over their own fiscal abilities.
592
 
 
It is potential that the EU jurisprudence will be invoked in an ACIA case. It is 
anticipated that cases may arise under ACIA.
593
 If the tribunals referred to the EU, 
there will obviously be more integration. The EU applies the effet utile principle to 
achieve the internal market and thus any form of discrimination may be barred. If 
this approach is preferred, the ECJ jurisprudence may be helpful.  
                                                 
591 Warren and Graetz, ‗Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of 
Europe‘ (n 521) 1194. On an interesting note, one would realise the different approach by the ECJ 
when commenting on justifications brought by third countries enjoying the FMoC. This follows the 
‗lack of aim‘ of internal market in the investment regime. See Hindelang, The Free Movement of 
Capital and Foreign Direct Investment (n  127) 24.  This line of argument seemed to find consistency 
with some other passing commentaries on this erga omnes aspect of capital movement. In taxation 
matters and when touching on comparability of residents of the EU member states and third countries, 
it is repeatedly mentioned that they are not comparable due to the non-existence of tax treaties and 
thus entails justifications for difference of treatment. This indicates that though free movement of 
capital is granted, the third countries capital may face restrictions or discriminations due to this 
incomparability. Reflecting this to investment treaties, which has a lesser level of integration than the 
EU law, it is thought that perhaps the ECJ would also construe comparability test in a more strict 
manner as compared to if the case was adjudicated between residents of member states. Hence, in 
construing the judgments of the ECJ this research is cautious in excerpting lessons bearing in mind 
the aim of internal market as the fundamental philosophy of each ECJ decisions. 
592 Warren and Graetz, ‗Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of 
Europe‘ (n 521) 1253. 
593 The trend can be seen from other regional investor-state disputes such as NAFTA and CAFTA. 
Since the inception of  NAFTA in 1994, there are 42 cases (up to 2005). See ‗NAFTA Chapter 11 
Investor-State Cases: Lessons for the Central America Free Trade Agreement‘ [2005] Public Citizen 
Global Trade Watch 11 <http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAReport_Final.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013, < http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAReport_Final.pdf>, accessed 20 
September 2013. As for CAFTA, there at least six cases filed according to the U.S Department of 
State Diplomacy in Action website. See CAFTA-DR Investor State Arbitrations, < 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c33165.htm>, accessed 20 September 2013. 
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However, this thesis takes the view that a holistic appreciation on the ASEAN 
political economy should be considered in determining the direction of interpretation 
in investment arbitrations. Learning from the impact of EU strict approach in 
interpreting discrimination cases, it is proposed that the ACIA adopts the general 
BIT approach. The effet utile principle can still benefit the investment regime if it is 
placed in the investment law perspective. Rather than eliminating all forms of 
restriction and discrimination, it is suggested that the national treatment provision 
under the purview of investment regime, only strikes down where purpose is 
apparently discriminatory. This seems to be the most appropriate approach which 
could reasonably be applied in the ACIA. It must be noted that ASEAN consists of 
member states with different economic positions. In the interpretation of justification 
for discrimination, this different level of development must be taken into account. 
This is an integral aspect of circumstances which could affect the ‗like 
circumstances‘ assessment. The recognition of this difference is manifested in the 
ACIA in the guiding principles in Article 2. The article states that the liberal, 
facilitative, transparent and competitive investment environment in ASEAN must 
adhere to certain principles, inter alia, to grant special and differential treatment and 
other flexibilities to Member States depending on their level of development and 
sectorial sensitivities.
594
 This reason, along with the differences in the legal systems, 
political ideology and the lack of support by institutions such the European Court of 
                                                 
594 Similar exemption is provided in Article 79 of the AEC that member states must provide special 
treatment to the least developed countries. See also discussions on the differences of the member 
states in both economic and non-economic positions that would impede integration. Muna Ndulo, 
‗Harmonisation of Trade Laws in the African Economic Community‘ (1993) 42 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly; Theophilus Fuseini Maranga, ‗Colonial Legacy and the African 
Common Market: Problems and Challenges Facing the African Economic Community, The‘ (1993) 
10 Harvard Blackletter Journal 105; Gino J Naldi and Konstantinos D Magliveras, ‗African Economic 
Community: Emancipation for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure, The‘ (1998) 24 North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 602. 
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Justice, the European Commission and the European Parliament, are said to be the 
challenges faced by the ACIA towards a full-fledged economic community.
595
 In 
fact, it could be argued that the lack of such harmonisation institutions in the ACIA 
area is evidence of the member states‘ unwillingness to integrate closer along the 
line of the EU. 
 
5.2.2 Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality prominently takes place in the ECJ decisions of 
freedom of establishment and free movement of capital. Its role is eminent to resolve 
the straddling of interests of the member states especially in the matter of direct 
taxation in FoE and FMoC against the interest of the EU which aims at ensuring the 
direct and full effect of the freedoms.
 596
 
 
The principle of proportionality works both sides, not only does it ensure that the 
restriction was necessary for achieving the aim of the EU law, it also ensures that 
any derogation must remain within the limits of the legitimate objectives in which it 
intends to pursue. 
597
  The first aspect of proportionality is by measuring the 
                                                 
595 To the contrary the AEC provides for the establishment of Court of Justice in Article 19 of the 
AEC. However, the challenges to it are obvious, due to the difference of legal systems, language, 
financing and independence of the system. Ndulo, ‗Harmonisation of Trade Laws in the African 
Economic Community‘ (n 594). Some literatures also share the same view in respect of ACIA‘s slow 
progress towards achieving an economic union, see Tan, ‗Will ASEAN Economic Integration 
Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?‘ (n 516); Lin Chun Hung, ‗ASEAN Charter: Deeper Regional 
Integration Under International Law?‘ (2010) 9 Chinese Journal of International Law 821. 
596
Direct taxation may constitute an obstacle to the EU by interfering with the efficient allocation of 
capital or incurrence of burden to residents of member states  wanting to benefit from the freedoms. 
See Arginelli, ‗The Discriminatory Taxation of Permanent Establishments by the Host State in the 
European Union: a Too Much Separate Entity Approach‘ (n  465) 86. 
597
Case C-423/98 Alfredo Albore, [2000] ECR I-05965 para 19. See also Case 222/84 Johnston v 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 38 
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proportionality of the member states measure so that it does not exceed its legitimate 
objective. In Gebhard, the court emphasised: 
 
‗…national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: 
they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified 
by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for 
securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not 
go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.‘ 598 
 
The EU law took into consideration the proper practice given in a particular matter in 
determining the justifiability of a discriminatory treatment.
599
 In tax matters, the 
court similarly took the effort to understand/deliberate on the philosophy and 
technicalities of the effect of such tax measures, for instance by balancing the 
cohesion of tax system and the discriminatory and restrictive impact it would cause 
to nationals of another member state. In Costa and Cifone, the protection of public 
authorities against possible non-performance by the concession holder, in the light of 
the high overall value of the contracts which have been awarded to it was considered 
as disproportionate and therefore unjustified restrictions on the freedoms laid down 
                                                 
598
 Gebhard, (n 499), para 37. See also Case C- 19/92 Kraus ν Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR 
I - 1663, para 32 and Case C-415/ 93 Bosman [1995] ECR 1-4921, para 104, Case C-100/01 
OteizaOlazabal[2002] ECR I-10981, paragraph 43; Case C-527/06 Renneberg[2008] ECR I-7735, 
paragraph 81; Joined Cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 X and Passenheim-van Schoot[2009] ECR I-
0000, paragraph 47; and Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consigliodei Ministri [2009] ECR I-0000, 
paragraph 42. 
599An example of this is ‗proper practice in a given profession‘ See Case C-96/85 Commission v 
France [1986] ECR 1485. 
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in Articles 43 EC and 49 EC.
600
 In addition, if there is any less restrictive method to 
achieve a legitimate objective, the court may render a measure disproportionate.
601
 
 
As for the other aspect of proportionality, it relates to the EU competency. In Article 
5 (4) TEU (ex Article 5 TEC), this function of the principle of proportionality is 
made clear: 
 
‗Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.‘ 
602
 
 
This provision disallows the interpretation of the ECJ that would overly emphasise 
on the aim of internal market when it was not necessary. For instance, if a measure is 
already in compliance with the EU law, it is not necessary to impose further 
requirements. In relation to this, the principle of proportionality controls the bona 
fide application of the freedoms. In Centros, the court held that if there is attempt to 
apply freedom of establishment by illicit arrangements or fraud ‗on the basis of 
objective evidence‘ and to the disadvantage of the member state, the court may deny 
the freedom.
603
 
 
                                                 
600 Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10 Marcello Costa  and Ugo Cifone [2012](Costa and Cifone), 
para 40. 
601 Futura, (n 543), paras 36-43. 
602Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union, signed 7 February 1992, Official Journal of 
the European Union C115/13 of  9.5.2008, < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF>, accessed 21 
September 2013. 
603 A mere option of a national to choose the least restrictive jurisdiction to set up a company or to 
perform business does not amount to fraud, but inherent in the exercise of the freedoms in a single 
market. See Centros, (n 522), paras 25, 27. 
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Proportionality is normally perused in the context of the legitimacy of the national 
measures in investment cases. Less is noticed on the second aspect of proportionality 
– on whether the interpretations proposed by the claimants or decided by the 
tribunals in its ratio decidendi are actually within the proportionate competence of an 
investment treaty or have actually exceed it. By highlighting the principle of 
proportionality in both of these aspects in investment arbitration, it could lead to a 
balanced interpretation of national treatment acceptable to both foreign investors and 
host states. 
7.0 Conclusion 
 
There are two major points that investment law could learn from the ECJ. Firstly is 
on how the ECJ focuses on the situations of comparators in its likeness analysis (see 
4.1) and secondly is by the application of the effet-utile principle. These two 
elements provide helpful insights to develop the interpretation of national treatment 
in investment treaties. They revive the meaning of ‗circumstances‘ or ‗situations‘ in 
the assessment of likeness and directs the interpretation towards achieving the 
functions of national treatment in the context of investment treaties.  The EU cases 
have also shown how analysing likeness is possible and practical without restricting 
to the three-prong method by examining justification at the comparability stage. This 
feature is similar to the observation on the International Human Rights 
jurisprudence, in particular the ECHR cases.  As will be explained in Chapters 5 and 
6, there would be instances that the tribunal should adopt this approach. As discussed 
in this chapter, the EU law could potentially be referred to by the new emerging free 
trade and investment agreements which provide for pre-establishment rights such as 
 196 
 
the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009, AEC and the CAFTA-DR. 
It is unable to predict the direction of these treaties due to the limited number of 
cases. In this regard, this thesis suggests that the arbitrators should take cognisance 
of the importance of deference that is more apparent in the investment tribunals and 
the differences in the level of development of member states as enshrined in the 
treaties. This is also a lesson learnt from the EU interpretations which has reflected 
the furtherance of the EU aims and objectives, while rendering less regard on the 
member states‘ interests. It is submitted that a balanced approach is needed that 
could cater both the member states‘ and foreign investors/investments‘ interest for 
the effectiveness and sustainability of international investment law.  
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Chapter 5 
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (IHR) ON 
PROPERTY TO NATIONAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The interaction between international human rights law and international investment 
law has generally been on several grounds. Among those which are discussed and 
adjudicated are the competing objectives of the jurisprudences, the substantive 
balancing of investors and human rights, the extent of a state‘s adherence to other 
international obligations
604
 and the shared general principles that could benefit 
interpretation. This chapter aims at expanding the last aspect mentioned, i.e the 
relevance of the methodology of interpretation in discrimination cases.
605
 The aim is 
                                                 
604 Conflicts often arise when public services are privatised and was later interfered by government 
measures (such as freezing water prices) leaving the investors facing human rights issues. A conflict 
between the objectives of the BIT and human rights can be seen in the case of  Azurix v Argentina. It 
was contended that the the government‘s action was for the consumers‘ public interest on water as an 
essential human right.  See Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Final 
Award, 14 July 2006, para 254. Other cases of this nature are Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona SA and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua SA v The Argentine Republic ICSID Case 
No ARB/03/17,Decison on Jurisdiction, 16 May 2006; Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia 
ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent‘s Objection to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005‘; 
SAUR International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4). See also various scholarly 
articles and commentaries on this interaction in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni and Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009). 
605 This kind of interaction would to some correspond to the harmonisation of the two regimes. See  
Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, ‗Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human 
Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology‘ in Christina Binder and others (eds), International 
Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP Oxford 2009); A 
Dias, ‗Investing in Human Rights Protection - The Soundest Investment of All?‘ (2013) 10 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1934>,  accessed on  24 January 2013.; Ursula Kriebaum and 
Christoph Schreuer, ‗The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International Investment 
Law‘ in Stephan Breitenmoser, Bernhard Ehrenzeller and Marco Sassoli (eds), Human Rights, 
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to compare the judicial approaches taken by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR or hereinafter ‗the Court‘) and to benefit them to the extent suitable to 
international investment law in the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle. 
This subject has received less attention in the light of comparison in the two 
jurisprudences albeit its potentials.
606
 The motivation for this exercise is the quest to 
search for guidance in the interpretation of national treatment in investment treaties. 
 
Protection of property as a component of international human rights is covered under 
various conventions. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) stipulates that everyone has the right to own property and shall not be 
arbitrarily deprived of it.
607
 Among the main human rights instruments which 
embody the right to property are the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR),
608
 the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR),
609
 the Protocol to 
the African Charter on the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights 
(ACHPR),
610
 the United Nations Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural 
                                                                                                                                          
Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Mul, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2007); Pierre-Marie Dupuy and others (eds), ‗Unification Rather Than 
Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights 
Law‘, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 
2009). 
606 For instance, in a recent article there seem to be a wide coverage on areas of convergence of 
international human rights and investment treaties including expropriation, full protection and security 
and fair and equitable treatment but did not include non-discrimination except in brief with the 
discussion of NAFTA and indigenous discrimination. See TG Nelson, ‗Human Rights Law and BIT 
Protection: Areas of Convergence‘ (2013) 10 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) 
<http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1936>, accessed on  24 January 
2013. A notable exception is an article by Freya Baetens, see Freya Baetens, ‗Discrimination on the 
Basis of Nationality: Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment Law‘ (n 97). 
607 This right maintains as a general recognition until when it was later included in other human rights 
instruments which have binding effect. 
608 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 4 November 
1959, entered into force 3 September 1953 
609 Article 21 (2) ACHR contains rights to property. 
610 The right of property is contained in Article 14 ACHPR. 
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Rights
611
 and on Civil and Political Rights
612
  and Fundamental Rights Charter 
(FRC).
613
  
 
The international human rights jurisprudence, similar to international investment law 
also holds the non-discrimination principle as an important element of the treaties. 
Equally, it also protects the right to property. These are the main commonalities 
between the two jurisprudences that lead to this study.  
 
The major focus of this chapter is the ECHR, in particular Article 1 Protocol 1 
(A1P1) on the right to property taken together with Article 14 which prohibits 
discrimination. Other applications of Article 14 ECHR will however be construed 
when necessary, especially the cases that contain important decisions or guidelines 
which are applied across the various rights.
614
  
                                                 
611 Article 2 ICESCR. 
612 Article 3 ICCPR. The ICCPR does not incorporate protection to property as a fundamental right 
but incorporates it with the prohibition of discrimination in Article 3. Although it is an important 
international human right instrument at the universal level it, if one is to talk about expropriation, it 
has ‗weak foundation‘ for such investment protection. See Christian Tomuschat, ‗The European Court 
of Human Rights and Investment Protection‘ in Christina Binder and others (eds), International 
Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP Oxford 2009) 
638. 
613 Article 21(1) FRC provides ‗Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited.‘ By the accession of European Union to European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU is obliged to respect the fundamental rights 
contained in the convention. These rights are incorporated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (2000/C 364/01). See also Article 6(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon on the accession of 
the EU. 
614 It is pertinent to note that the Article 14 is dependant and must be accompanied by a substantive 
claim. Thus, it could be invoked with other various rights in the ECHR, to name a few A1P1, Article 
6, Article 8 and Article 9. The general principles employed in the interpretation of the non-
discrimination principle across other jurisprudences could arguably be instructive as there is no 
indication that there should be any difference in determining likeness in relation to property or 
nationality namely the search for analogous situations, objectivity and reasonableness of the measure 
and the reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realised. See  Freya Baetens, ‗Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: Determining Likeness in 
Human Rights and Investment Law‘ (n 97); Thlimmenos v Greece (Application No. 34369/97) 
Decided on Merits, 6 April 2000‘; Case ―Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of 
Languages in Education in Belgium v. Belgium (Merits)(Application No 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 
1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64). Article 14 accompanied with Article 1 Protocol 1 are the closest match 
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This chapter is aimed at examining how a discrimination case is construed in the 
ECHR and other instruments of international human rights especially in the 
determination of likeness or similarity of the comparators.  The question related to 
this exercise is to find out whether there are characteristics or concepts applied in 
determining the proper comparator which could be benefitted by international 
investment law. This chapter will reveal that while there are a few noticeable traits in 
the determination of likeness, there are concepts that have even played a major role, 
namely the concept of margin of appreciation and proportionality which are applied 
by the court. The application of margin of appreciation and proportionality would 
create the legitimate expectation for states and private parties on how likeness is 
construed in discrimination cases.  
 
Comparison is made not without caution. The relevance of the characteristics or 
concepts will be discussed in the light of compatibility and appropriateness of the 
philosophy which will be perused in the subsequent section and will be re-
emphasised after the characteristics and concepts are put forth. 
 
2.0 Reasons for Reference to the ECHR 
 
It is observed that there is an emerging trend of reference to the ECHR jurisprudence 
in international investment arbitrations. This attempt has been highlighted in several 
                                                                                                                                          
to the national treatment provision in investment treaties. Cases which brought claims under these 
articles have questioned the legitimacy of discriminatory measures by member states which have 
allegedly infringed the enjoyment of property by individuals. This may also include investors. This 
will be explained in the subsequent subsection. 
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cases
615
 and scholarly writings,
616
 but not as yet advanced in the context of national 
treatment. On the surface, this may be primarily due to the non-existence of a direct 
reflection of the national treatment provision as one may find in Article III of 
GATT/WTO. The non-existence of such direct reflection should not however deter 
reference to international human rights law. The ECHR in its jurisprudence of non-
discrimination contained in Article 14, coupled with the protection of property in 
A1P1 provides similar concerns for adjudication, asks the same questions (i.e the 
search of comparator, discriminatory treatment and the rationale of the measure) and 
provide structurally similar opportunities for individuals (or investors) to bring direct 
claims against states‘ alleged discriminatory measures in front of the ECtHR.617 
Especially in respect of A1P1, it is increasingly being invoked by businesses, 
including investments to challenge regulatory measures which interfere with the 
enjoyment of their possessions.
618
 Such regulatory measures may give rise to actions 
both under investment treaties as expropriation claims or human rights 
instruments.
619
 Observed further, when A1P1 is taken together with Article 14 
                                                 
615 See for example cases which referred to the ECHR jurisprudence, for instance the cases of Mondev 
and Tecmed in determining civil rights in the interpretation of Article 6 (1) of the European 
Convention and the issue of proportionality. Mondev International Ltd v US, (n 64); Tecnicas 
Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 
Award, 29 May 2003. See also relevant articles such as Elyse M Freeman, ‗Regulatory Expropriation 
Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Some Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights‘ (2003) 42 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 177. 
616 See list of reference on this matter at (n 605) above. 
617The structurally similar characteristics of individual-state claim create a basis of analogy. The same 
view is made in the context of TRIPS. See Laurence R Helfer, ‗Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under 
the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy‘ (1998) 39 Harvard 
International Law Journal 357.; Tomuschat, ‗The European Court of Human Rights and Investment 
Protection‘ (n 612) 636. 
618 The provision has been taken as a ‗commercial character and been used extensively by business in 
the advancement of its interests‘. See Robin CA White and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on 
Human Rights (5th edn, OUP Oxford 2010) 477. Examples of cases brought by companies are, inter 
alia Segame SA v. France – (App. 4837/06), 7 June 2012, ECHR 2012 -V; Buffalo SRL in 
Liquidation v. Italy, (App. 38746/97), 3 July 2003, ECHR 2033-1; Eko-Elda AVEE v Greece, (App. 
10162/02), 9 March 2006, ECHR 2006-IV; see also Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of 
Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (OUP Oxford 2006).; Tomuschat, ‗The 
European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection‘ (n 612) 642. 
619 A similar measure or government policy has even given rise to possible claims under both 
investment treaties and international human rights instruments. For instance, the Zimbabwe land 
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ECHR which prohibits non-discrimination, it could result to the same effect as a 
national treatment provision in international investment law when it is invoked 
against a better treatment given to nationals of the host state.
620
  
 
Secondly, it is due to the immaturity of international investment regime relative to 
international human rights.
621
 The whole exercise is not to undermine the potential of 
international investment law to develop its own interpretation. It is submitted that 
while the interpretation in accordance to the ordinary meaning of the terms in their 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaties is a mandatory 
obligation that precedes other methods of interpretations,
622
 the minimalist nature of 
investment treaty provisions leaves the international investment tribunals in 
inadequate guidance.
623
 In the context of national treatment for instance, interpreting 
the ordinary meaning of the words ‗in like situation‘ or in ‗like circumstances‘ may 
end up meaningless as they are relative in nature, which rather needs the way to 
                                                                                                                                          
reform led to a case under ICSID and a case under SADC, invoking human rights protection. See  
Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, 
Award, 22 April 2009 and Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC 
Case No. 2/2007 (Nov. 28, 2008). See also Gino J Naldi, ‗Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et Al v The 
Republic of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe‘s Land Reform Programme Held in Breach of the SADC Treaty‘ 
(2009) 53 Journal of African Law 305; Ben Love, ‗Introductory Note to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: Funnekotter and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe‘ (2009) 48 
International Legal Materials 760. 
620 In the case of Darby v Sweden, the differential treatment between resident taxpayers and non-
resident taxpayers in the right to opt out of paying church tax violated Article 14 taken together with 
A1P1. See Darby v Sweden, (App.11581/85), 23 October 1990, Series A, No 187, (1991) 13 EHRR 
774. 
621 Roberts, ‗Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping  the Investment Treaty System‘ (n 
322); Walde, ‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3); Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: 
National Treatment in International Investment Law and the WTO‘ (n 102). 
622 Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provide the method of 
interpretation of international treaty which is also a reflection of customary international law. See 
Anena (Mexico v United States) 2004 ICJ, 37-28/83, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 645 (Dec. 17). The application of these treaty 
interpretation articles in investment arbitrations is capable of not only interpreting the treaties in line 
with the customary international notions, but can be used to ‗fill the open-ended language‘ by way of, 
inter alia reference to the ECHR jurisprudence. Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences 
and Examples‘ (n 539) 732. 
623 Roberts, ‗Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping  the Investment Treaty System‘ (n 
322). 
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construe likeness more than its literal meaning. Thus the tools needed in construing 
likeness are vital in this process. The vague provisions of national treatment in 
investment treaties need to be elaborated, and an effective and plausible way of 
achieving this is by referring to the established practice of other jurisprudences 
which address similar concerns. This could be learnt not only from the relevant 
investment treaty, but other investment treaties
624
 and even from other jurisprudence 
having analogous protection by way of adverse or negative interpretation.
625
 
Tendency would be to seek similar interpretations elsewhere in the international 
legal fraternity especially where it is well practised and established.
626
 It is observed 
that to the extent that an interpretation serves similar purpose and useful in the 
understanding of a concept, there is no reason that the interpretation in international 
investment law must be different merely because it belongs to another legal 
discipline. The equitable result may be the same.
627
 Thus analogous interpretations in 
other jurisprudence can be useful as an ‗interpretative aid‘, ‗instructive‘ or 
‗supplemental guidance‘ in forming the context of national treatment or how to 
construe a case of discrimination.
628
 Both ways, it is still in line with the VCLT 
                                                 
624 This is to acknowledge that since the investment treaties are not one and the same, they are 
strikingly similar to each other (except with small linguistic differences), so much that they form a 
regime as a result of cross-reference. See Schill, ‗Multilateralization through Interpretation: Producing 
and Reproducing Coherence in Investment Jurisprudence‘ (n 496). 
625 Gerald Fitzmaurice in the oral proceedings relating to Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations mentioned this negative interpretation as a useful methodology in 
interpretation, ‗It often happens that when a problem is difficult or novel, as I think the present one is, 
the best method of approach to it is the negative rather than the positive one. In order to ascertain 
what a thing is, it is sometimes very useful to begin by enquiring what it is not, and in order to decide 
what exactly is covered or involved by a certain question, it may be well to determine first what is not 
involved by that question.‘ See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Pleadings, ICJ, 9th March 1949, p.111. 
626 Anthea Roberts, ‗Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping  the Investment Treaty 
System‘ (n 322). 
627 Freeman, ‗Regulatory Expropriation under NAFTA Chapter 11‘ (n 615). 
628 The terms ‗interpretative aid‘, ‗instructive, and ‗supplemental guidance‘ has been used by Prof. 
David D. Caron concerning the interpretation of Article 11 (7) and (2) of the US-Ecuador BIT and 
analogous arbitral and scholarly interpretation of analogous language in other arbitral tribunals (for 
instance the US Model BIT, Article 10(2) of the ECT, the ECHR and ICJ. See Chevron Corporation 
and Texaco Petroleum Company v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL/ PCA Case No.2009-23, Expert 
Opinion of Prof. David.D. Caron as to Art. 11(7) of the Treaty, 3 September 2010, < 
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Article 31-33, that in the quest of interpretation it must be done according to its text 
and context, and that a comparative exercise could help in achieving it. 
 
Thirdly, the principles applied in the human rights jurisprudence can be regarded as 
general principles of international law. The development of jurisprudence in human 
rights instruments, in particular the ECHR has been influenced by the interaction and 
adoption of the common general principles or constitutional norms of national 
European legal orders.
629
 In this regard, the principles of non-discrimination and 
property rights are to a large extent common to both international human rights law 
and international investment treaties and thus, arguably could be considered as 
general principles of law under article 38 of the ICJ Statute. Following this line of 
argument, the international human rights jurisprudence becomes a relevant source of 
law in which investment arbitrations should take cognisance of.
630
 On a micro level 
observation of the construction of the non-discrimination principle in the 
international human rights law, the court applies similar tests in particular the search 
of analogous situations and the legitimacy of the aim pursued. These are potential 
aspects in which investment arbitration could learn from. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0241.pdf >, accessed on 10 October 
2013, paras 60, 80 and 138. 
629 The European legal orders include civil and common law legal systems, in particular of that of UK 
and France which has influenced other jurisdictions all over the world as a result of past colonisation.  
630 Walde has also emphasised the use of general principle of law under article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ 
Statute to extend the application of comparative administrative law principles such as deference 
(margin of appreciation) and proportionality. This chapter is also responding and addressing Walde‘s 
concern of this underdeveloped area by highlighting the principles of margin of appreciation and 
proportionality in the interpretation of national treatment as will be explained in the subsequent 
sections. Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‘ (n 539) 734. 
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3.0 Underlying Philosophies 
 
The commonality of the underlying philosophies of international human rights and 
investment treaties forms part of the reason for this comparison. The protection and 
promotion of investments in investment treaties can be regarded as the ‗human 
rights‘ (so as to use the term loosely) of foreign investors.631 In a similar vein, certain 
protections in the international human rights instruments such as the right to property 
and the principle of non-discrimination can appear as human rights of companies 
which may be owned by foreign investors.
632
  
 
Thus the two jurisprudences can be seen as complementing each other and to a large 
extent similar. By promoting the foreign investors‘ rights, it is actually also 
promoting human rights. On a practical note, the same discrimination could give rise 
to claims under human rights law and investments. For instance, if Czech Republic 
issues a discriminatory measure that affects the enjoyment of property of say, a 
Dutch investor, the Dutch investor could bring a claim under the ECHR or 
alternatively under the Netherlands-Czech Republic investment treaty. An actual 
example is as in the Zimbabwe land reform measure that led to a case under ICSID 
and a case under SADC, invoking human rights protection.
633
  
 
                                                 
631 The rights are accrued to the investors or shareholders of investments. The term human rights may 
not be the appropriate term to refer to the rights contained in investment treaties due to the 
fundamental nature of human rights as inherent to human beings. Nevertheless, the ECHR despite 
being an instrument of international human rights explicitly extend the application of Article 1 
Protocol 1 to natural and legal persons, which includes non-profitable or corporate entities. See also 
Charles Brower, ‗Corporations as Plaintiffs Under International Law: Three Narratives About 
Investment Treaties‘ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 179; Jose E Alvarez, ‗Critical 
Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement‘s Chapter Eleven‘ (1996) 28 University of 
Miami Inter-American Law Review 303. 
632 Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies (n 618). 
633 See  Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v. Zimbabwe, (n 619) and Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Ltd and Others v. Zimbabwe, (n 619). 
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While the underlying philosophy of granting national treatment provision and non-
discrimination principle in the GATT/WTO and EU are to facilitate liberalisation 
and to achieve an internal market respectively,
634
 the international human right‘s 
underpinning philosophy is on the basis of fundamental human rights. The ECHR 
provides clearly in its preamble that it aims at ‗securing the universal and effective 
recognition and observance‘ of the rights in the treaty for the ‗further realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms‘.635 The philosophy of the ECHR could be 
further understood from the history in which it was originated. The European states 
came into collaboration to ensure that European individual‘s rights are protected 
against the backdrop of the atrocities of World War II and the ideologies prevalent at 
that time i.e, fascism, communism and totalitarianism.
636
 Fear of going back to the 
violations of human rights as occurred in the past, the ECHR aims at granting the 
essential civil and political rights which was then extended to property rights. The 
ECHR‘s main objective is the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
including right to property contained therein.
637
   
  
Similarly, the history of investment treaties would reveal the fragility of aliens‘ 
position in customary international law which led to the insertion of various 
substantive protections in the investment treaties.
638
 The main motivation of the 
investment treaties is to protect investors or investment of nationals of the signing 
parties against unilateral takings and unfair treatment. This led to the signing of 
                                                 
634 Please refer to explanations of the underlying philosophy of GATT/WTO and the EU law in Ch.3 
and 4 respectively. 
635 Preamble, ECHR. Similarly in the ICCPR preamble it emphasizes the respect and the observation 
of human rights. 
636 White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (n 618) 5. 
637 Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies (n 618) 160. 
638 Details on the position of the aliens in customary international law is explained in Ch.2. 
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bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) in the 1820s and the 
conclusion of various investment treaties after World War II.
639
 
 
The underpinning philosophy to protect human rights, fulfilled by the enjoyment of 
possession and non-discrimination in A1P1 and A14 is reflected in the assessment of 
discrimination to property in the ECHR. The ECHR contained right to property in 
Article 1 Protocol 1 which reads: 
 
‗Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.‘640 
 
Similarly, the wording of Article 14 of the ECHR also suggests the protections 
covered in the convention as rights and freedoms, fortified with the guarantee of 
non-discrimination. The article provides: 
 
‗The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
                                                 
639 Vandevelde made a remark on the role of BITs that while they profess as instruments of liberal 
investment policy, they could only do so in a limited manner. He outlined three principles, namely 
investment neutrality, investment security and market facilitation which are necessary for the purpose. 
He concluded that the BITs are geared towards investment security (or protection) reflected in the 
various provisions including the expropriation clause, fair and equitable treatment (FET), national 
treatment, most favoured nation treatment (MFN) and full protection and security. Vandevelde, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (n 2) 109. 
640 Right to property is also established in case laws. In the case of Marckx v Belgium, the court held, 
‗By recognising that everyone has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, Article 1 
(P1-1) is in substance guaranteeing the right of property.‘ See Marckx v. Belgium, (App.6833/74), 13 
June 1979, ECHR 1979. 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.‖ 
 
The case laws adopt a straightforward test in determining whether a measure has 
illegitimately discriminated and infringed the right of the claimant on his property 
without further recourse to achieve a more complex aim such as liberalisation of 
trade or achieving an internal market.
641
  In the ECHR case Chassagnou and Others 
v France
642
 for instance, the tribunal has taken a direct assessment of whether there 
was discriminatory treatment (treatment between small and large land owners) and 
whether there was objective and reasonable justification (the need to promote the 
rational management of game stocks). The analytical perspective was whether the 
discriminatory treatment would infringe the property right (the right to use their 
lands in accordance to their conscience). On a more general note, it gears towards 
how to preserve fundamental human rights when they meet public interest. 
 
                                                 
641 The aims of GATT and EU are reflected strongly in the interpretation of its texts. This could be 
compared to the EU law for instance, which final aim is economic integration. It provides free 
establishment and free movement of capital to achieve the economic purpose.  The EU pursues 
economic integration in the interpretation of likeness by adopting the effet utile principle which is 
evidenced in the strict interpretation of any derogation. See Article 58 (1)(a) EC and Manninen (n 
529), para 28). The Court has also placed the attractiveness of the application of the freedoms 
guaranteed in its analysis of cases. For instance in Manninen, the Court construed whether it was less 
attractive to investors residing in Finland than shares in companies which have their seat in that 
member state. If a measure results to less attractive application of the treaty, the measure is likely to 
be incompatible with the EU law. See Verkooijen, (n 555), paragraph 35; Case C-334/02 Commission 
v France [2004] ECR I-2229, paragraph 24. Another strong principle in the EU law is ‗direct effect‘ 
which brought to the complete liberalisation (in respect to Directive 88/361) of capital movements 
and required Member States to abolish all restrictions on such movements. See Verkooijen, (n 555), 
para 33. Similarly, GATT/WTO has its own trade objectives to liberalize trade between WTO 
member states. The dimension of national treatment assessment has thus been on the competitive 
performance of the products by the consumers looking into factors such as physical similarities, tariff 
classifications and the end uses. See Border Tax Adjustments, 2 December 1970, GATT B.I.S.D (18th 
Supp).  Due to the competitive nature of the products (competing the same pool of consumers), there 
is a  tendency of assessing the aims of the measure in the angle of protectionism-  note ‗so as to afford 
protection‘ in Article III. Although protectionism is equally undesirable in international investment 
law and that the national treatment is capable to significantly curtail protectionism, this research 
submits that it could not be elevated to be the underlying philosophy of national treatment. See 
elaboration in Ch. 3. 
642 Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III. 
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There is a commonality in this aspect. Both jurisprudences aim at protecting the right 
to property and non-discrimination.
643
 The interpretation of national treatment has 
also been straight in cases, even in the deeper integrated treaties like the NAFTA. 
For instance in the case of SD Myers,
644
 the tribunal highlighted that the context of 
the interpretation of national treatment should include consideration that ‗states 
should be avoiding distortions to trade‘. The tribunal then concluded that likeness 
should be construed whether the investors were in the same sector.  This assessment, 
although motivated by the NAFTA‘s aim towards liberalisation, nevertheless 
provides a plausible criterion of likeness that would be delivered by any other 
tribunal based on any other treaty. Similarly, in the case of CPI  Inc. v Mexico,
645
 the 
tribunal underlined the objectives of NAFTA in construing likeness which includes 
‗to promote fair competition‘ and ‗to increase substantially investment 
opportunities‘. However the primacy of these objectives was not fully tested against 
a strong grounded regulatory measure. The government measure in this particular 
case was a countermeasure action which was held by the tribunal to be irrelevant to 
its national sugar crisis. From the cases, it could be seen that the focus of the 
tribunals was to protect the investment of the foreign investors against irrational 
government measures. 
 
                                                 
643 The IHR and IIL jurisprudence despite having similarities in protecting properties nevertheless 
evolve in isolation resulting to distinct approaches and usage of terminologies between them. Both 
jurisprudences protect immovable property and tangible assets. See  Kriebaum and Schreuer, ‗The 
Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International Investment Law‘ (n 605); Ursula 
Kriebaum, ‗Foreign Investments & Human Rights - The Actors and Their Different Roles‘ (2013) 10 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1925>,  accessed on  24 January 2013. 
644 S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 247. 
645 CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 113.  Thus, even with such explicit provision, the effect in the 
cases so as to depart NAFTA cases from the others is not explicit. Furthermore, deference to the host 
states are given in a number of NAFTA cases. 
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There is however one observation that is worth noting. While the international 
investment law is more geared towards providing a level playing field for the foreign 
investors to invest in the host state, the ECHR seems to be a level ahead. The non-
discrimination principle is often invoked and applied to support ‗equality‘ especially 
in strict scrutiny matters such as discrimination based on gender, race and 
nationality. However as the subsequent discussion will reveal, in matters which the 
member states receive wide margin of appreciation, this philosophy seems to dilute 
and especially where there is no mass number of comparators in which equality 
could be bench marked.
646
 
 
4.0 Restriction Clause in the ECHR – Scope of Application Compared 
 
The straddle between the member states regulatory measure and discrimination in 
the ECHR is however more apparent than in investment disputes. This is due to the 
explicit restriction clause in the ECHR which calls for a balance in the application of 
property rights. One may wonder that as the right to property is considered as a 
fundamental right in ECHR, the protection that entails would be near exhaustive.
647
 
On the contrary, the right to property granted in A1P1 is accompanied with a clear 
restriction clause which words: 
                                                 
646 There are some attempts  to bring equality as the underlying philosophy and thus criticised the 
ECHR approach in handling cases as not heading to that direction The criticism is that Article 14 
being narrow and ‗parasitic‘, the problematic application of the comparability test Rory O‘Connell, 
‗Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to Non-discrimination in the ECHR‘ (2009) 29 
Journal of Legal Studies 211. 
647As a fundamental right, it would curtail that its infringement would be more grievous than an 
ordinary infringement or violation. This was illustrated in Janneke H Gerards, ‗The Prism of 
Fundamental Rights‘ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 173. Dupuy 
emphasised on the origin of the rights to show the fundamental nature of human rights as compared to 
investment law.  While the rights in international investment are directly linked to the state from 
which the investors received, the human rights are inherent as human being. Dupuy, Francioni, 
Petersmann, and Dupuy, ‗Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of 
International Investment Law and Human Rights Law‘ (n 605) 45. 
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 ‘The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of 
a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties.‘ 
 
This means that the right to property is limited if the State sees it necessary for the 
general interest with a specific mention on ‗payment of taxes‘. Similar language is 
contained in the American Convention on Human Rights in Article 21 which grants 
individuals the right to use and enjoy property, but it also states that the law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. In Sporrong Lonnroth 
v Sweden, the Court emphasised the challenge to achieve the ‗fair balance which 
should be struck between the right to property and the requirement of general 
interest.‘648 
 
The absence of a restriction clause contrasting the rights of foreign investors rings 
the question of whether the extent of national treatment protection in investment 
treaties is wider than the ECHR.
649
 The question remains, is it all about property that 
such restriction is seen in the ECHR or is it related to the ECHR in particular? Could 
the wide margin of appreciation be applied in the international investment law 
because of the nature of property? 
  
                                                 
648 Case of Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden Judgment (Application No. 7151/75; 7152/75) 18 
December 1984, para 74. 
649 For example in the context of expropriation in Article 1110 NAFTA, there is a clear guarantee 
against deprivation of property without explicitly guaranteeing control of the use of property to the 
states as contained in the ECHR.  
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These questions influence the scope of national treatment. While it is true that 
property by itself contains social function, the wide margin of appreciation given to 
member states in the ECHR was also the result of the member states‘ compromises. 
Those compromises gave birth to the restriction or deprivation clause in A1P1 
despite its controversial beginning.
650
  It is submitted that although such negotiation 
is absent or not known in the promulgation of investment treaties neither in the texts, 
it does not negate the importance of deference to host states when there is legitimate 
public need. Assessing the justification of host states‘ regulatory measure is inherent 
in the finding of justifying a claim of discrimination. Deference is given to host 
states is several cases for instance Feldman v Mexico,
651
 Paushok v Mongolia
652
 and 
El-Paso v Argentina
653
 as will be explained in the subsequent sections on margin of 
appreciation. What is absent is the explicit recognition of the status of deference that 
may provide a significant difference in the way cases are construed.  
 
The ECtHR in this respect therefore has two important guides for the scope of 
discrimination, firstly the restriction clause (including payment of taxes which would 
be relevant in investment tax related cases) and the application of margin of 
appreciation. It follows that Strasbourg determines the rights to be protected (as 
contained in the ECHR) and it is the contracting parties that determine how to apply 
them, depending on the suitability of the domestic interests.
654
 
                                                 
650 This right was however controversial that it was not incorporated in the ICCPR (except in its 
discrimination clause) or the ICESCR, but instead incorporated in the regional instruments of IHR as 
that of ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR. The debate could be seen in the travaux preparatoire of the 
ECHR. See Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the First Protocol to The European Convention on 
Human Rights, CDH(76)36, Strasbourg, 13 August 1976. 
651 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15). 
652 Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company, CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The Government 
of Mongolia UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability 28 April 2011. 
653 El Paso v Argentina, (n 173). 
654 Aaron Baker, ‗Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK‘ (2008) 37 Industrial 
Law Journal 305. 
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5.0 Likeness 
 
In determining discrimination cases, the ECtHR generally takes into cognisance four 
prime elements; differential treatment, the comparability of the comparators, 
objectivity and reasonableness of the measure and proportionality. These elements of 
discrimination are not treaty based or explicitly required by the treaty in Article 14, 
but has rather evolved judicially in cases. The Belgian Lingusitics case in 1968 has 
laid a foundation of the concept of discrimination which was later referred to by 
subsequent cases. The court carefully explains the concept of discrimination in the 
following words: 
 
‗On this question the Court, following the principles which may be extracted 
from the legal practice of a large number of democratic States, holds that the 
principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective 
and reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be 
assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, 
regard being had to the principles which normally prevail in democratic 
societies. A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the 
Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 (art. 14) is 
likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised.‘655  
 
                                                 
655 Case "Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium" 
v. Belgium (Merits)(Application No 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64). 
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It inferred that not all discriminatory actions are prohibited. A discriminatory action 
is considered violating equality treatment if it is not objective and justifiable.  This 
case also established the use of proportionality in assessing discrimination. In 
Thlimmenos v Greece,
656
 the right not to be discriminated guaranteed in the 
Convention is only violated when states, 
 
‗…treated differently persons in analogous situations without providing an 
objective and reasonable justification, but also when States, without an 
objective and reasonable justification, failed to treat differently persons 
whose situations were different.‘  
 
The Thlimmenos case and almost all other discrimination cases reiterated the 
importance of comparability test in construing Article 14, in similar language or 
meaning. For instance, in the case of Efe v Austria,
657
 the court held that it must be 
established that ‗other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy 
preferential treatment‘.658  In Lithgow v United Kingdom the Court maintained that 
Article 14 safeguards persons (including legal persons) who are "placed in analogous 
situations" against discriminatory differences of treatment.
659
 
The general trend of assessing likeness can be seen from the words in Chabauty v 
France.
660
 
 
                                                 
656 Thlimmenos v Greece (Application No. 34369/97) Decided on Merits, 6 April 2000. 
657
 Case of  Efe v Austria Judgment (Application No. 9134/06) Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 January 
2013.  
658 Ibid., para 43, This principle is applied across A14 cases, see Case of Unal Tekeli v. Turkey 
Judgment (Application No. 29865/96)16 November 2004, para 49, Case of the National & Provincial 
Building Society, the Leeds Permanent Building Society and  the Yorkshire Building Society v. the 
United Kingdom Judgment (Application No 117/1996/736/933-935) 23 October 1997. 
659 Lithgow and Ors v UK Judgment, 8 July 1986, (Application No. 9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 
9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81) para 177. 
660 Case of Chabauty v France Judgment (Application No. 57412/08) 4 October 2012. 
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49.  The Court reiterates in this regard that a difference in treatment is 
discriminatory if it ―lacks objective and reasonable justification‖, that is, if it 
does not pursue a ―legitimate aim‖ or if there is not a ―reasonable relationship 
of proportionality‖ between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised. The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a difference in treatment. The scope of the margin of 
appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and 
its background (see, among many other authorities, Chassagnou and Others, 
cited above, § 91, and, for a recent reference, Konstantin Markin v. Russia 
[GC], no. 30078/06, §§ 125-26,22 March 2012). 
 
There are at least two observations in relation to the comparability test in the ECtHR. 
Firstly, the construction of likeness in discrimination cases is very brief. Secondly, in 
many cases the comparability test has not evolved independently, but merged into 
the justification test.
661
    These features are apparent in the ECtHR discrimination 
cases.
662
  
 
5.1 Brief Construction of Likeness 
 
The ECtHR is less rigorous in the construction of its comparability test despite the 
resonance of its importance in the cases.  If the length of analysis is measured 
                                                 
661 There are even instances that it has merged into the differential treatment test. See also Stephen 
Livingstone, ‗Article 14 and the Prevention of Discrimination in the European Convention on Human 
Rights‘ [1997] European Human Rights Law Review, where it maintains that there are three elements 
to A14 – differential treatment, legitimate aim and proportionality- and that the comparability test is 
subsumed in the differential treatment test.  
662 F Van Dijk, F Van Hoof and A Van Rijn (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights: Fourth Edition (4th edn, Intersentia 2006). 
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between the jurisprudences, it would be clear that investment and trade cases tend to 
deal more in the comparison analysis. A noticeable stand taken by the court is that if 
the substantive provision which Article 14 is dependant to is breached, the court will 
generally not analyse Article 14 for a separate ruling. An example of this is in the 
case of Herrmann v Germany,
663
 where there was already a breach of A1P1.
664
 Had 
the court construed likeness, it would be interesting to see how the court would 
construe the claimant against two comparators, firstly, against owners of real 
property that do not belong to a hunting district (the enclaves) and secondly the 
owners of small landholdings.
665
 Other examples of brief assessment of likeness are 
Fredin v Sweden,
666
 where the Court rejected the similarity between the claimant‘s 
gravel pit and at least two others without elaborating the reasons and the case of 
Vistinš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia where the Court similarly rejected the likeness of 
two acquired lands on the ground of one being ‗donated‘ and the other ‗purchased‘.  
 
Another observation that may lead to this is that in ECHR cases, the analogy is often 
made between repeated type of cases or because of the clear similar circumstances of 
the claimant and the rest of the comparators. Claims are often against a piece of 
legislation which affect a mass group of people or entities in matters such as 
pensions, benefits, allowances or personal taxes which would normally provide the 
court with obvious similarities among the comparators. It is unless if the similarity is 
unclear, then the court would adopt a more rigorous approach in construing 
                                                 
663 Herrmann v Germany Judgment (Application No. 9300/07) 26 June 2012. 
664 Ibid., para 94. The court held that the obligation to tolerate hunting has  interfered the enjoyment 
of peaceful possession of the claimants land. 
665 The Chamber earlier decided that there was no violation of A14 read together with A1P1 accepting 
the justification brought by the government in ensuring the effective management of game stocks and 
the existence of ‗specific situation‘ of the enclaves. The comparator analysis was not however 
elaborated. Ibid., para 96. 
666 Case of Fredin v Sweden Judgment (Application No. 12033/86) 18 February 1991.  
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comparability. This could be seen in the more rigorous approach in Posti and Rahko 
which involves comparability between coastal and open sea fishermen.
667
 The 
comparability test is often to disprove similarity of what is otherwise similar, or 
when the court is not convinced with the similarity. The situation is different in  
investment dispute cases as the tribunals sought similarity from the very start to 
prove prima facie case of similarity.  
 
5.2 Merging Assessment of Likeness in Justification Test  
 
A plausible logic of this approach is that at most of the time the comparability test 
links and relates to the objectivity of the regulatory measure which affects the 
comparability in question.
 668
 Some commentators view that by taking into account 
objective justifications as a factor of distinction, it as a way to enhance a meaningful 
assessment of likeness.
669
 Furthermore, since differential treatment can only be 
prohibited if it has no objective or reasonable justification, the measures have to be 
scrutinised under that direction.
670
 However, this could not hold true for every case. 
There is danger in the over-use of this approach. As some ECHR cases have 
indicated, merging the comparability test into justification may cause clear 
difference or clear similarity of the comparators ignored but the discrimination 
justified.  
                                                 
667 More cases which involve similar investment activities which could be found in investment 
disputes are normally brought under A1P1, for instance Marini v Albania (the court dropped the case 
under Article 14 for lack of evidence). Case of Marini v Albania Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) (Application No. 3738/02) 18 December 2007; Case of Posti and Rahko v. Finland 
Judgment (Application No. 27824/95) 24 September 2002. 
668 Dijk, Hoof, and Rijn, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (n 662) 
1036 
669Ibid. 
670 Case of Raviv v Austria Judgment (Application No. 26266/05) 13 March 2012, para 47. 
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The merging of comparability test into justification test would also result to 
decisions that two comparators are not alike because of the very ground upon which 
discrimination is alleged.
671
 In the case of Posti and Rahko v Finland,
672
 the aim of 
the measure was not disputed – that the measure was needed to ‗safeguard relevant 
fish stock, taking into consideration different fishing gear and different timing of 
spawning route‘. What was disputed was the discriminatory effect the measure 
causes to coastal fishermen as opposed to open sea fishermen. The court held that 
they were not alike for the exact same reason the measure was introduced. This may 
not be as controversial where cases which have obviously or deliberately resorted to 
the justification of the measure as a basis of distinction.
673
 
 
In the ECHR context, this inconsistency has been criticised for being politicised in 
what has led it to a restrictive application.
674
 Criticisms occur in both approaches, 
excessive merging of comparator test into justification test and the over reliance of 
the comparator test, especially when there is no objective justification to defend the 
measure.
675
  
 
 
                                                 
671 McColgan, ‗Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, Equal Treatment and the Role of 
Comparisons‘ (n  95). 
672 Posti and Rahko v. Finland, (n 667).  
673 Joory, ‗Arguments against the Politicized Role of Comparators in Article 14 Discrimination Cases‘ 
(n 95). 
674 Ibid.; Gerards, ‗The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights‘ (n 134). 
675 McColgan, ‗Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, Equal Treatment and the Role of 
Comparisons‘ (n 95). In particular  the Case of Carson and Others v. The United Kingdom Judgment 
(Application  No.42184/05) 16 March 2010. 
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5.3 Extracted Criteria of Likeness 
 
The most obvious methodology in assessing likeness in ECHR is the application of 
concepts of margin of appreciation and proportionality. These two concepts in the 
determination of likeness will be looked at extensively in the subsequent sections. In 
this section, certain other noticeable characteristics which may be intrinsic to the 
different set of facts of the cases are worth noting. These criteria which are extracted 
may be a useful guidance for international investment national treatment cases: 
 
1. The Detriment Factor: This approach may seem similar to the assessment of 
less favourable treatment, but it does not bring the same effect when applied 
under the examination of likeness. While less favourable treatment requires 
the proof of treatment below the level accorded to the locals, the detriment 
test requires the examination of discriminatory effect which could indicate 
the unlikeness of the situation of two investments facing a single regulatory 
measure. This approach is essentially important if a regulatory measure 
provides a general measure that by de facto cause detrimental and 
discriminatory impact to a particular investment. Here, the characteristics of 
the investment may not be enough to represent the unlikeness of the 
investments, but the situation caused by the detrimental impact could.  
 
In the case of Posti and Rahkov Finland,
676
 a fishing restriction which was 
imposed to both coastal and open-sea fishermen was challenged by the 
coastal fishermen as discriminatory.  The restriction was aimed to safeguard 
                                                 
676 Posti and Rahko v. Finland , (n 667). 
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the relevant fish stocks as seen in the restrictions of the different timings, 
different water areas and the different fishing gears taking into account the 
spawning routes of salmon. The court attempted to examine the detrimental 
impact as alleged by the applicant and found no differential of treatment in 
that regard. 
 
Such situations would occur more in the context of international human 
rights law as the doctrine of non-discrimination explicitly covers both 
treating likeness unlike and treating unlike alike. 
677
 In the international 
investment law, although most investment treaties specify the prohibition to 
treat like investments unlike, it does not mean to confine like investments to 
investments similar in characteristics or sector per se, but extended to the 
situation of the investments. Thus, in certain situations of de facto 
discrimination it may require the claimant to indicate the detriments caused 
by the measure to the investment as compared to the comparator. It may be 
even more relevant in treaties which do not clearly specify ‗like investments‘.  
 
This approach is also relevant when the underlying justification of the 
regulation is not disputed as in Posti and Rahko v Finland, but the overall 
policy which nevertheless at the end discriminates a particular group. At this 
particular point, discussions on the rational aim of the measure may no longer 
be necessary but other matters must also be scrutinised, including the 
                                                 
677 The ECHR is violated not only when States – without providing an objective and reasonable 
justification – treat differently persons in analogous situations but also when they fail to treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different (see Thlimmenos v. Greece (n 656)). 
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manner, the reasonable relationship of proportionality
678
 or even the 
detrimental impact which may cast further indication of the likeness of 
situation. Thus the justification sought should shift as to why equal treatment 
is given despite the discriminatory and detrimental impact. This also reflects 
the philosophy of equality, as equality does not necessarily mean equal 
treatment but a treatment that is fair taken into account the circumstances of 
those imposed upon. 
 
2. Identifiable Characteristics679: Two comparators which are generally alike 
must not be regarded unlike in the absence of any identifiable characteristic. 
In the case of B v UK,
680
 the government required the claimant to repay a sum 
of overpaid benefit upon a disclosure of fact. The claimant alleged that the 
government has discriminated unjustifiably between capable and incapable 
people who could understand the facts which they are required to report. The 
court accepted the dissimilarity between two situations of mental capacity. 
The court highlighted that in its case law, only differences in treatment based 
on an identifiable characteristics or status can be regarded as 
discrimination.
681
  
 
3. Correction of Factual Inequalities: The Court does not prohibit 
discrimination in order to correct factual inequalities. However such 
correction of factual inequalities must be with objective and reasonable 
                                                 
678 Case of Kuric and Others v Slovenia Judgment (Application No. 26828/06) 26 June 2012, para 
386. 
679 Raviv v Austria, (n 670), para 46; Case of Carson and Others v. The United Kingdom Judgment 
(Application  No.42184/05) 16 March 2010. 
680 Case of B v United Kingdom Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (Application No. 36571/06) 
14 February 2012. 
681 Ibid., para 54. 
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justification.
682
 The decision in El-Paso v Argentina has indirectly applied 
this concept. Due to the economic crisis, the government attempted to re-
balance the situation of banking sector as opposed to exporters including oil 
and gas companies which have benefited from the devaluation of peso. The 
tribunal stated: 
 
‗The Tribunal also takes note of a statement made by the Claimant 
itself, making the same analysis when saying that ―those who export 
their production … benefited from the devaluation of the Peso since 
the Peso equivalent value of their exports tripled.‖ It was thus 
reasonable for the Government to institute a tax on the unexpected 
profits made by the oil and gas companies to re-balance the situation 
of the banking sector.  Far from being discriminatory, this measure 
aimed at equalising the playground of the different economic actors, 
by distributing more equitably the burden of the country‘s economic 
crisis among all those affected.‘683   
 
This test would trigger many hypothetical situations in investment disputes 
which involves better treatment of less advantaged local groups. Presumably, 
if the state provides subsidies to smaller farms or industry, or to investments 
which have not yield investment returns as compared to foreign investment 
which already have repeatedly, it would be allowed under this test. Should 
this test be invoked and applied, the assessment of proportionality must 
follow with great scrutiny. 
                                                 
682 See Thlimmenos v Greece (n 656). 
683 El Paso v Argentina, (n 173), para 314. 
 223 
 
 
6.0 Principles Applied Throughout Determination of Likeness 
 
It is indicated earlier that there are concepts emphasised by the ECHR in 
discrimination assessments. These are the concepts of margin of appreciation and the 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised.
684
 This standard of review is emphasized throughout the 
jurisprudence.
685
 
6.1 Margin of Appreciation 
 
The introduction of margin of appreciation in Art 14 found its way in the case of 
Belgian Linguistics.
686
 The rationale of margin of appreciation is to acknowledge 
that the state is in the position to know better what is in the better interest of the 
public or the economic situation than the Court.
687
 It is a method to respect the 
legislature‘s assessment.688 The court has generally guided its application based on 
the grounds put forth in the cases.
689
 A narrow application of margin of appreciation 
                                                 
684 Case of  Andrle v. the Czech Republic Judgment (Application No. 6268/08), 17 February 2011 
para 48. 
685 Dirk Ehlers and Dr Ulrich Becker, European Fundamental Rights And Freedoms (Walter de 
Gruyter 2007) 93–94. 
686 Howard C Yourow, The Margin Appreciation Doctrine in the Dinamics of European Human 
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) 29. 
687Case of Lithgow v United Kingdom Judgment (Merits) (Application No. 9006/80; 9262/81; 
9263/81;  9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81) 8 July 1986, para 122, Andrle v. Czech  Republic, (n 
684),  para 50. 
688  National & Provincial Building Society, the Leeds Permanent Building Society and the Yorkshire 
Building Society v. The United Kingdom , (n 658)), para 80. 
689 The doctrine was developed on a case by case basis. See Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, International 
Studies in Human Rights, Equality and Non-Discrimination Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 63. 
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is given to states in discrimination relating to race, colour or ethnic diversity
690
 and 
in the sphere of family life.
691
 On the other hand, a wider margin of appreciation is 
given in matters of nation‘s security and military,692 the determination of social 
security system,
693
 the economic and social policy.
694
  
 
The margin of appreciation accorded to the states in the matter adjudged determines 
the scope of protection guaranteed under A1P1 and Article 14 ECHR.
695
 It plays a 
significant role in determining whether two comparators are alike. In the case of 
Stummer v Austria, the court mentioned: 
 
‗The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify 
a different treatment.‘696 
 
In the Case of the National & Provincial Building Society, the Leeds Permanent 
Building Society and  the Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 
697
 the 
                                                 
690 See, among many other cases Case of Oršuš and Others v. Croatia Judgment (Application No. 
15766/03) 16 March 2010 and Case of Kuric and Others v Slovenia Judgment (Application No. 
26828/06) 26 June 2012,  para 386. 
691 Case of Konstantin Markin v Russia Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction)(Application 
No.30078/06) 22 March 2012, para 100. 
692 Ibid., para 134. 
693 B v United Kingdom, (n 680), para 50. 
694Efe v Austria (n 657), para 36, Case of Stummer v Austria Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction)  
(Application No. 37452/02), 11 October 2007, para 89. This includes ‗general measures of economic 
and social strategy‘, see Andrle v. Czech Republic, (n 684) para 50; Case of  Zubczewski v Sweden 
Decision as to Admissibility (Application No. 16149/08) 12 January 2010 para 15; Case of Andrejeva 
v Latvia Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (Application No. 55707/00) 18 February 2009. 
695 See Case of Gaygusuz v Austria  Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction)(Application 
No.17371/90) 16 September 1996, Case of Rasmussen v Denmark Judgment (Merits) (Application 
No.8777/79) 28 November 1984, and Case of Inze v Austria Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) 
(Application No. 8695/79) 28 October 1987. 
696 Similar wordings are repeated in National & Provincial Building Society, the Leeds Permanent 
Building Society and the Yorkshire Building Society v. The United Kingdom (n 658), para88,  and 
Case of Stubbings and Others v The United Kingdom Judgment (Merits) (Application No. 22083/93; 
22095/93) 22 October 1996. 
697 Ibid. 
 225 
 
claimant attempted to recover sums paid in application of invalidated fiscal 
provisions alleging that it was in similar situation with another company called 
Woolwich. The court applied margin of appreciation in ruling that there was 
reasonable and objective justification by public interest to secure liability to tax and 
the intention of the Regulation to make it immune from any other exploitation on 
technical grounds. Woolwich has also mounted a legal charge which made it 
incomparable to the claimant. The court held: 
 
‗The decision to do so retrospectively has been found by the Court to be 
justified in the public interest (see paragraph 81 above). To exclude the 
Woolwich from the retroactive effect of section 53 could be considered on 
reasonable and objective grounds to be justified given that by the time of 
enactment of that section the Woolwich had secured a final judgment in its 
favour from the House of Lords and it was understandable that Parliament 
did not wish to interfere with a judicial decision which brought to an end 
litigation which had lasted over three years.‘698 
 
6.1.1 Wide Margin of Appreciation in Property Matters v Strict Scrutiny for Ground 
of Nationality 
 
It must be noted that although a wide margin of appreciation is given to member 
states in the matter of property, the ECHR construed stricter scrutiny of the state‘s 
actions if it involves discrimination based on nationality. Especially in suspect 
grounds category (which includes discrimination based on sex, race, nationality), the 
                                                 
698 Case of the National & Provincial Building Society, the Leeds Permanent Building Society and  
the Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, (n 658), para 90. 
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court would require for weighty reasons for any justification put forth by the 
states.
699
 In the case of Gaygusuz v Austria, a Turkish who worked in Austria applied 
for an advance on his pension in the form of emergency assistance but was rejected 
on the ground that he did not have Austrian nationality. The court applied a stricter 
scrutiny on the measure and found no objective and reasonable justification.
700
 It was 
therefore held that Mr. Gaygusuz was in like situation to Austrian nationals as 
regards to his entitlements.
701
   
 
Although the subsequent cases have upheld strict scrutiny test on cases based on 
nationality in cases of regular migrants,
702
 they could not hide the fact that the issue 
of discrimination based on nationality is complex and sensitive
703
.  Especially in 
addressing problems of non-nationals benefitting welfare programmes, questions of 
national interest and limited resources intended for nationals has arisen. This has also 
triggered the theoretical understanding of discrimination between ‗universalism and 
particularism‘ on whether equality should be enjoyed by all human beings or only by 
the people belonging to a constituted liberal polity.
704
 The latter would correspond to 
                                                 
699 The high scrutiny approach in certain matters (important personal liberties as opposed to 
legislations that regulate ordinary economic activity) is adopted from/ more popular in the US by 
Stone J in Carolene Product case. See United States v Carolene Products Co 304 US 144, 58 S Ct 778 
(1938). 
700 Gaygusuz v Austria, (n 695),  para 50. 
701 Ibid., para 48. 
702 Case of Koua Poirrez v France Judgment (Merits and Satisfaction) (Application No. 40892/98) 30 
September 2003; Andrejava v Latvia Application No 55707/00; Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18 
February 2009 ; Case of Luczak v Poland   Merits and Just Satisfaction (Application No 77782/01) 27 
November 2007. 
703 See dissenting opinion in Gaygusuz which reveals the sensitivity of the issue of immigration and 
the abuse of the welfare system. Judge Matscher remarked,  
‘The background to the whole case is a typical instance of abuse of the Welfare State, a very 
widespread trend in all our societies and one - I would point out - by no means limited to 
foreign workers.  It is regrettable that the Court, by awarding disproportionate amounts 
ofcompensation, should reinforce this trend.‘  
Gaygusuz v Austria, (n 695), Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Matscher.  
704 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, ‗Gaygusuz Revisited: The Limits of the European Court of Human 
Rights‘ Equality Agenda‘ [2012] Human Rights Law Review 3 
<http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/12/12/hrlr.ngs025> accessed 27 February 2013. 
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the power of the state to determine sensitive national concerns hence granting a 
wider margin of appreciation to the member states.
705
  
 
In a deeply rooted nationality based investment treaties (i.e the NT provision and the 
admissibility of investment cases which require the establishment of nationality), the 
adoption of the Gaygusuz approach would defy the meaning of its adjudication, 
rendering an easy superfluous approach towards the protection of foreign investors. 
It will also negate the mantra of both the ECHR and investment treaties – that not all 
discrimination is a violation, when there is a rational for the measure. This is the 
exact function of objective and reasonable justification test in the ECHR and the 
rational policy and legitimacy test in investment arbitrations. Nationality by itself 
should not be the one and definitive element to strike out any government action as 
shown in Gaygusuz.  It must also be noted that national based discrimination cases in 
the international human rights law are generally broader than investment law, 
including employment,
706
 elections,
707
 social securities and pensions. These are 
socio-economic aspects which are prone to apply the principle of non-discrimination 
to achieve ‗equality‘ in the society. 
 
Gaygusuz however, may be helpful in emphasizing the fragility of the status of non-
nationals in facing regulatory measures that may be nationally biased. The lesson 
                                                 
705 See Marc Bossuyt, ‗Should the Strasbourg Court Excercise More Self-Restraint? On the Extension 
of the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to Social Security Regulations‘ (2007) 28 
Human Rights Law Journal 321. This is also in line with the principle of non-discrimination under 
customary international law. Borzu Sabahi has discerned from the U.S Restatement 1987, section 712 
that the principle of non-discrimination sanctions unreasonable distinction but exempted nationality 
based classification for security or economic purposes. Borzu Sabahi, ‗National Treatment-Is 
Discriminatory Intent Relevant?‘ in Todd Weiler (ed), Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
International Law (JurisNet 2008) 270. 
706 Syndicat National des Professions du Tourisme v France (Complaint no. 6/1999) 10 October 2000 
ECSR. 
707 Case of Karakurt v Turkey Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) (Application No. 45718/99) 20 
September 2005. 
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learnt is perhaps the level of scrutiny that is required. It is to ensure that whilst the 
government can exercise its margin of appreciation, the measure is not aimed at 
‗singling out‘ foreign investors due to nationality by way of examining the design 
and structure of the measure. Thus the host state‘s measure must not only be 
objective and reasonable, it must also not be designed to discriminate foreign 
investors.  
 
6.1.3 Excessive Use of Margin of Appreciation and Its Effects on Comparability 
 
The ECHR standard of wide margin of appreciation means that the court can only 
intervene if it is ‗manifestly without reasonable foundation‘.708 It is counter-checked 
with the tests of ‗objective and reasonable justification‘ and proportionality. This 
methodology is plausible in determining discrimination. The problem in the ECHR 
cases is however, that the latter tests were not construed extensively (as one would 
expect) in matters which are given wide margin of appreciation despite theoretically 
and conceptually emphasized in cases. This results to an odd effect of margin of 
appreciation which is reflected in the narrow scope of application of discrimination 
in the ECHR. For instance, in the case of Zubczewski v Sweden, as Swedish national 
had his pension reduced approximately 50 Euro per month due to his marriage at the 
age of 63. The state‘s reason for this difference of treatment was that married 
couples who live together generally had lower costs for living per capita than single, 
unmarried persons.
709
 This principle constituted a general measure of the Swedish 
social and economic strategy. Despite reiterating the importance of objective and 
                                                 
708 Stummer v Austria,(n 694),  para 101. 
709 Case of Zubczewski v Sweden Decision as to Admissibility (Application No. 16149/08) 12 January 
2010, para 15. 
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reasonable justifications in its reasoning, the court seemed to disregard the economic 
dependency of the wife on the applicant that would have made him non-comparable 
to other married couples. Margin of appreciation was applied exclusively and 
excessively and has resulted to an absurd comparison of unlike situations which was 
so self-evident.    
 
Without proper utilisation of objective and reasonable justification test and 
proportionality, the following result could occur in investment cases (as have been 
criticised in the ECHR): 
 
a) In determining comparator, examination of likeness would reduce and would 
face the risk of being abandoned or ignored. If investment law is to apply the 
flexibility or wideness of margin of appreciation as given in matters of 
property, scrutiny of likeness would be at risk as it will be hard to be proven 
when margin of appreciation is given to the state.
710
  
 
b) Excessive application of margin of appreciation will expose to the investors 
to further degree of uncertainty.
711
  
 
6.1.4 Non-exclusiveness of Margin of Appreciation 
 
Any exercise of margin of appreciation must not be unlimited. The Court has made it 
clear that it will respect the States‘ policy unless it is ‗manifested without reasonable 
                                                 
710 Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, ‗Non-Discrimination Under Article 14 ECHR: The Burden of Proof‘ 
[1999] Scandinavian Studies in Law 14. 
711 This has been commented by Jakob Cornides in the context of ECJ cases. See Jakob Cornides, 
‗Three Case Studies on Anti-Discrimination‘ (2012) 23 Eur.J.Int‘L. 517. 
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foundation.‘712 Caution must be made to the powerful effect of margin of 
appreciation in discrimination assessment. In the context of ECHR, the rational of 
strict scrutiny on discrimination on minorities and non-nationals is the fear that the 
democratic application of margin of appreciation which is made by the majority 
would jeopardise the minorities and non-nationals under the name of democratically 
made legislation or measures.
713
 Although a measure may be economic in nature (in 
the realm of wide margin of appreciation), it would still render a narrow margin of 
appreciation if it is directed to a small group of people (foreign investors or non-
nationals). Analogically, in the context of foreign investors, the non-voting rights 
would expose them to the change of legislations or introduction of measures that are 
not in their favour. Thus, what could be learnt here is that a wide margin of 
appreciation is only appropriate when it affects the whole population generally.
714
 
This could reduce the risk of acknowledging states‘ measures which are disguised in 
a particular public purpose, in the complex realm of public choice theory. This 
assessment is potentially part of the ‗rationality‘ test in investment tribunals, that a 
measure is not targeted on the foreign investors. 
 
In the context of national treatment especially, deference to host states must be 
guided as it involves possible protection of domestic investors by way of regulatory 
measures. Allowing unguided application of margin of appreciation would 
undermine the purpose of national treatment provision realising the fact that the 
                                                 
712 Andrle v.  Czech  Republic, (n 684) para 50; National & Provincial Building Society, the Leeds 
Permanent Building Society and  the Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, (n 658), para 
80  
713 In the context of minorities, it is stated in Benvenisti that ‗Majorities often monopolize political 
power with little more than half of the votes and thus use the democratic processes as means to secure 
their interests at the expense of the minority‘ See Eyal Benvenisti, ‗Margin of Appreciation, 
Consensus and Universal Standards‘ 31 International Law and Politics 843, 848. 
714 Ibid., 847. 
 231 
 
regulatory measures could be used as tools for protectionism to the disadvantage of 
foreign investors. As compared to expropriation, the scrutiny of the objective and 
reasonableness of the measure in national treatment is paramount due to its potential 
alteration of the national treatment effect. Similarly in A1P1 of the ECHR, the 
application of margin of appreciation is not confined or restricted by the additional 
characteristic of nationality discrimination if it is not accompanied with Article 14 on 
the ground of nationality. Thus the objective and reasonable justification and the 
proportionality test in the latter works for both A1P1 and Article 14.  
 
The application of the margin of appreciation must not be unlimited. It must be 
subjected to certain conditions among which are: 
 
1. That it observes other principles primarily reasonableness, proportionality 
and good faith.
715
  
 
2. It must not lead to ‗denial of justice‘.716 The application of margin of 
appreciation must be balanced with the loss of bargaining power that foreign 
investors face once they have sunk their assets in the host state. Unguided 
application of margin of appreciation will render the protections in the 
investment treaties meaningless. It would deny the effective system of 
justice.  
 
 
                                                 
715 Yuval Shany, ‗Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?‘ (2005) 
16 European Journal of International Law 907. 
716 Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (n 344). See also Loewen. Final Award. Prof. 
Greenwood 2nd Opinion, para 129. 
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3. That there is no consensus on the matter elsewhere. In the context of ECHR, 
there must be no existing consensus in the ECHR in the matter of which the 
government wishes to apply its own judgment.
717
 In a joint partly dissenting 
opinion of the case of Stummer v Austria, it was opined that where a trend 
has emerged in how other states construe a matter, that would reduce the 
margin of appreciation that a state should enjoy in the area.
718
  
 
4. Whether it involves matters of sovereignty. Even though discrimination on 
nationality ground receives narrow margin of appreciation in the ECHR
719
, it 
is not expected that states would lose its discretionary power in immigration 
matters that involves sovereignty.
720
 Most property measures in ECHR cases 
are on claims on pensions
721, benefits and these involve ‗domestic 
variables‘722 and often a mix of ‗economic and social‘ consequences in which 
need a wide margin of appreciation for the member states. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
717 Benvenisti, ‗Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards‘ (n 713); Laurence R 
Helfer, ‗Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights‘ (1993) 26 Cornell 
International Law Journal 133. 
718Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Kovler, Gyulumyan, Spielmann, Popovic, 
Malinverni and Pardalos in  Stummer v Austria , (n 694), para 5. 
719 Gaygusuz, (n 695), para 42 and Koua Poirre v France (n 702). 
720Janneke H Gerards, ‗Intensity of Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases‘ (2004) 51 Netherlands 
International Law Review 135, 181. 
721 Andrle v. Czech Republic, (n 684). 
722Andrle v. Czech Republic, (n 684) para 56. 
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6.2 Reasonable Relation to Proportionality 
 
Proportionality test became the foundation of discrimination assessment of Article 
14 ECHR in the case of Belgian Linguistics.
723
 The proportionality test is to 
determine whether the state‘s use of objective justification to distinguish the 
comparators has outweighed its need.  A measure is regarded as not proportionate 
due to certain factors. The most common is when a measure is objective and 
justifiable but the method is not proportionate where a particular method is chosen 
even though less restrictive alternative measures exist. In the case of Andrle v The 
Czech Republic , the court held that the progressive and gradual measure taken by 
the Czech Republic to compensate the inequality between men and men since 
socialist Czechoslovakia was proportionate and related to the legitimate objective 
even though discrimination may remain in a group of people not yet affected by the 
change. In this case the male applicant complained of discrimination concerning the 
lowering of the pensionable age for women who took care of children but not for 
men in the same situation. The court mentioned: 
 
‗Therefore, the State cannot be criticised for progressively modifying its 
pension system to reflect these gradual changes (see also paragraph 51 
above) and for not having pushed for complete equalisation at a faster pace. 
Indeed, the respondent Government have to choose from among different 
methods of equalising the retirement age. This task is even more demanding 
and deserves well-thought-out solutions since the State has to place this 
                                                 
723 Case "Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium" 
v. Belgium (Merits)(Application No 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64), para 10, 
Part B. 
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reform in the wider context of other demographic shifts, such as the ageing of 
the population or migration, which also warrant adjustment of the welfare 
system, while preserving the foreseeability of this system for the persons 
concerned who are obliged to contribute to it.‘ 
 
ECHR cases have emphasised that a measure must be proportionate when it has to 
discriminate. This involves claiming why two comparators are not the same or 
comparable. What is not seen in the ECHR is the use of proportionality to limit 
comparability especially when it involves conflicts with other rights. In the case of 
Test Achats,
724
  Article 5(2) of the Directive 2004/113/ was declared invalid because 
it allowed the use of gender related factors in determining premiums and benefits 
under insurance schemes. While the Directive has to be examined whether it is 
reasonable and proportionate, it is almost neglected that the a test must also be made 
on whether it is proportionate to rule comparability between male and female in the 
insurance context, and the economic impact in the insurance industry and perhaps 
the right to enter into insurance contract based on risk assessment which may be 
contingent to gender. A more striking conflict with the right to contract can be seen 
in the case of Hall & Preddy v. Bull & Bull.
725
 By claiming the discrimination 
against a homosexual couple who were refrained from a B&B that restricts 
unmarried couples, the court has indirectly negated the freedom of contract of the 
B&B owner. In another case, B v UK, the court held that governments should be 
allowed to correct its mistakes in awarding benefits as depriving them from doing so 
                                                 
724 Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, Yann van Vugt, Charles 
Basselier v. Conseil des ministres ECJ (Grand Chamber) 1 March 2011. 
725 Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83 (10 February 2012). 
 235 
 
would result to benefits being enjoyed unjustly, contrary to the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment.
726
 
 
In the ECHR, this principle is more apparently applied on questions of 
discrimination on certain grounds where the margin of appreciation is narrow. In 
such cases, the Court imposes the burden to the states to provide ‗very weighty 
reasons‘ so as to the need of such distinction.727 On the other hand, it is less seen in 
matters of wide margin of appreciation which has played a more dominant role.  
 
It is submitted that matters which receive wider margin of appreciation needs similar 
attention with regards to the assessment of proportionality.  This would balance the 
deference given to the state and determine the broader societal impact
728
 and the 
suitability and reasonableness of the methods used by the states to achieve their 
legitimate aims within their wide margin of appreciation.   
 
6.3 Legitimate Expectation 
 
Legitimate expectation is used to protect substantive expectations about the 
treatments in investment treaties.
729
 However, it is normally applied in fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) and expropriation. This section explores whether this 
concept could be applied in the context of national treatment. It is argued that 
                                                 
726 B v UK, (n 680), para 60. 
727 Gerards, ‗Intensity of Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases‘ (n 720) 161. 
728 Belgian Linguistics,(n 723), para 283. 
729 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (n 65) 280. Among the ECHR 
cases which apply legitimate expectation are Case of Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v 
Ireland Judgment (Merits) (Application No. 12742/87) 29 November 1991, para 51 and Case of 
Maurice v France Judgment (Application No. 11810/03) 21 June 2006, para 69. 
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legitimate expectation could be a useful tool in providing stability and predictability 
in the assessment of likeness in national treatment.  
 
The first scenario is if the host states have provided certain guarantees for a specific 
economic sector ensuring that a certain investments are alike to other investments 
within the group, it is reasonable that the investors would rely on them. This is also 
in line with the ‗legal similarity test‘ in the EU law. For instance, if the host state 
includes oil pipelines under the same category of ‗common carriers‘ in respect of 
contract rate which includes ferrymen, canal boat owners and stagecoaches, the 
investors would have a basis to rely on this piece of legislation as a legitimate 
expectation.
730
 Thus if the host state later wishes to regulate or impose different 
contract rates on oil pipelines on the ground of capacity which would discriminate 
oil pipelines which has calculable capacity as compared to railroad capacity, it would 
likely be against the legitimate expectation of the investors unless if it can be proven 
that there is ‗overriding public interest‘ to deprive him from such interpretation. 
Similarly, if there is a domestic bill or legislation that includes hydroelectric projects 
as ‗clean energy‘ together with other traditional renewable projects like wind, 
biomass or photovoltaic, it would be a clear case of likeness in the absence of 
justifications of overriding public interest.
731
 
 
In such situations, it would be easier if there is no legal classification of sectors for 
the investors to rely on at the first place. The tribunal would only have to examine 
                                                 
730 Possible comparability issue that may arise from contract rates on shippers. See Christopher J Bar, 
‗Unfinished Business: FERC‘S Evolving Standard For Capacity Rights in Oil Pipelines‘ (2011) 32 
Energy Law Journal 563. 
731See David C.Coen, ‗Should Large Hydroelectric Projects Be Treated as Renewable Resources‘ 
(2011) 32 Energy Law Journal 541; Mary G Powell, ‗Treatment of Large Hydropower as a 
Renewable Resource‘ (2011) 32 Energy Law Journal 553. 
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comparability of the oil pipelines and railroad transportation based on their merits. 
This would also caution host states to be careful in guaranteeing certain advantages 
in grouped investments or economic sectors that would lure foreign investors unless 
such categorisation is to be adhered to. 
 
It must be noted that expectations are however not unconditional and everlasting.
732
 
If the measure is responding to a legitimate public interest, the investors could not 
hold on to the expectation. This is where the margin of appreciation comes in, but 
restricted to rationality and proportionality. Indeed in matters involving environment 
or health, it could be expected that new change of legislation may occur in response 
of new scientific discoveries.
733
 If the state has human rights obligation, it should be 
expected that the obligation will be fulfilled.
734
 
 
In the absence of legal representations or regulations that guarantee likeness, 
legitimate expectation on comparability can be ascertained by understanding what 
would fall under the state‘s margin of appreciation which are rational and justifiable. 
Presumably as previously mentioned, sensitive public matters like environment, 
health and safety would grant the state a wider margin of appreciation. Arguably, 
economic justifications could also be included under the category depending on the 
rational of the measure and its proportionality.  
 
                                                 
732 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican State, UNCITRAL, 
Separate Opinion of Prof. Thomas Wälde, 1 December 2005, para 30. 
733 Waelde and Kolo, ‗Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ―Regulatory Taking‖ in 
International Law‘ (n 39) 819. 
734 Dupuy, Francioni, and Petersmann, Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (n 604) 54. 
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It could be reasonably inferred that there is legitimate expectation in the foreign 
investors that they would not be treated less favourably than comparable domestic 
investors as arued by the claimant in Methanex v USA. The fact that both investors 
were producing oxygenates, fortified by the existence of competition, should qualify 
the test of likeness. However, the tribunal chose to adopt a restrictive approach in 
requiring the ‗most like circumstances‘ of situations which are already alike, and 
ignored the assessment of likeness in view of the claim at hand. If this was construed 
as legitimate expectation, the task then required from the tribunal is to assess 
whether there is any rational for the host states to consider the investors as not in like 
circumstances by applying the margin of appreciation. If there is none, then 
comparability is established and the assessment of the rational and justifiability of 
the measure will follow. Though potentially this would result to a more meaningful 
assessment of likeness, the discussion did not heed towards this direction. 
Confusingly, while the tribunal rejected the idea of ‗like products‘, ‗competitive‘ and 
‗substitutability‘ in GATT/WTO,735 by adopting the ‗most like circumstances‘ or 
‗identical‘ as there were identical operators, it has similarly brought the assessment 
to one which is micro and technical which may not be placing the assessment of the 
‗circumstances‘ of the comparator.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
 
This research suggests that the international human rights jurisprudence could 
provide an instructive guide by way of analogy.
736
 Investment tribunals should 
                                                 
735 Methanex v USA, (n 19), para 37. 
736 It is discussed elsewhere on the possibility of applying IHR principles in IIL by way of applicable 
law. It is triggered that general principles of law (Article 38 ICJ Statute) could include the jus cogen 
 239 
 
benefit from the similar questions asked in the structurally similar individual-states 
adjudication. The tribunal must have the ability to foresee the result of justice that 
would come from the decision when applying a particular approach of comparability. 
This is to avoid absurd result in the end justice. The ECJ approach for instance in the 
case of Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen was criticised 
for its failure to recognise the factual differences of same-sex life partners and 
married couple. By adopting solely the legal similarity, the ECJ has committed 
‗logical error‘ or ‘petitio principii’ and resulted to a judgement that ‗creates no 
equality but undeserved privileges‘. 737 Surely, this echoes the investment decision in 
OEPC v Ecuador where a construction of likeness from one point of view had failed 
to fit in the logical understanding of likeness which results to an exploration oil 
company to be in like circumstances with agriculture companies including flowers 
etc.  Although one may argue the role of ‗justice‘ in the decision making of 
investment tribunals, it is submitted that the whole system must not lead to the denial 
of justice by providing weak standards of interpretation of the protections.   
 
This chapter has explored the basis of reference to the ECHR jurisprudence by 
outlining ‗protection of rights‘ as the underlying principle between the two 
jurisprudences. It has also highlighted the role of important administrative principles 
in determining comparators in discrimination cases. The nature of international 
                                                                                                                                          
principle of non-discrimination via ‗(and) international law as may be applicable‘ in A42 ICSID and 
‗applicable rules of international law‘ in Article 1131 NAFTA and Article 26 (6) ECT. Dupuy, 
Francioni, and Petersmann, Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (n 604) 
57. The analysis of the word ‗and‘ was scrutinised to give effect to the above proposition. See 
Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, ‗The Meaning of ―and‖ in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, 
of the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process‘ 
(2003) 18 ICSID Review. 
737The criticism highlighted the factual differences including the difference in financial household 
burden, bearing of children and the social function arises from married couples which could cast a 
different view in the light of the granting of widowers pension sought for. See Cornides, ‗Three Case 
Studies on Anti-Discrimination‘ (n 711) 5. 
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investment law as one which involves interaction of the national and international 
obligations urge the adaptation of sustainable standards that could stand in the 
system, namely the application of margin of appreciation, reasonableness and 
proportionality. This, according to Petersman would address the problem of 
intergovernmental regulation that infringes ‗democratic legitimacy, rule of law or 
fundamental rights.‘738  
 
The biggest lesson learnt from the ECHR is that we are able to see the effects of 
certain interpretations which are adopted by the Court. This research submits that the 
application of margin of appreciation, although may provide assistance in the 
determination of comparator, must not be adopted by international investment law as 
how it features in the ECHR. While the concept is useful, the application in the 
ECHR is too extensive. It is essential that deference is recognised but applied 
reasonably and proportionately. Proportionality must be given due importance in 
achieving this balance.  
 
 
  
                                                 
738 Petersman article suggested complimentary approach including multilevel constitutions, global 
administrative law and legal and constitutional pluralism. See Dupuy, Francioni, and Petersmann, 
Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (n 604) 40. For the inter-relation 
between the democratic rights of the people and investment arbitration, see Schneiderman, 
Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization (n 344).  
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Chapter Six 
SYNTHESIS AND SUMMARY 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The whole essence of legal comparative study is to see what lessons that could be 
derived from the experiences of other jurisprudences in answering similar questions. 
As studies in Chapters 3-5 has shown, there are threads of commonalities and 
differences between international investment law and the jurisprudences under 
comparison, namely GATT/WTO, EU and international human rights law. These 
commonalities and differences are essential to guide this thesis to establish an 
informed comparative outcome on the suitability of certain concepts or principles 
that can be applied in the interpretation of national treatment in international 
investment law.
739
 
 
Although each chapter has tentatively indicated the useful apparatuses for likeness in 
the jurisprudences, this chapter will synthesise and operationalise them in the context 
of international investment law.  This chapter will conclude the findings against the 
research questions put forth in the proposal. The first research question calls for a 
study on the emerging principles in national treatment in determination of likeness 
and legitimate regulatory interests.
740
 This question is answered partly in Chapter 
Two which identifies the trend of the interpretation of national treatment across the 
                                                 
739The assessment of the philosophies and contexts of the EU, GATT/ WTO and International Human 
Rights jurisprudences in Ch. 3-5 was attempted to arrive at a sound and informed comparison, a 
matter which is commonly criticised to be overlooked in functional comparative law approach.  
Michaels, ‗The Functional Method of Comparative Law‘ (n 88); Whytock, ‗Legal Origins, 
Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law‘ (n 88). 
740 See 4.1, Ch.1. 
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cases. Chapter Six particularly develops this observation to analyse the underlying 
value of national treatment. The methodology applied in achieving this is by 
doctrinal assessment of the national treatment provision under investment 
agreements and by comparative study with the GATT/WTO, EU and international 
human rights law. Chapter Six answers the most difficult part of the research 
question in suggesting and illustrating how decided investment cases could 
correspond with the underlying values of national treatment.
741
  
 
The next important limb in the research question is to find out the relevance of 
GATT/WTO, EU and international human rights law in the interpretation of likeness 
and determination of legitimate regulatory measures.
742
 This chapter extracts the 
lessons learnt from the jurisprudences and analyses its suitability and relevance to 
the investment cases, by evaluating and criticising where necessary the respective 
tribunals‘ approach in addressing the issues. This thesis concludes that the said 
jurisprudences are relevant and instructive to the issues in question. 
 
At the end, this chapter provides a flowchart to suggest a systematic analysis of the 
criteria of likeness, the determination of legitimate regulatory measure and the 
interaction thereof, taking into account the lessons learnt from the relevant 
jurisprudences.  
 
This chapter is executed under five main headings, namely, the value underlying 
national treatment, operationalisation of useful principles and methods in 
ascertaining likeness, reflection of the analytical framework, coherence and 
                                                 
741 See 4.1.3, Ch.1. 
742 See 4.2, Ch.1. 
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legitimate expectation and proposed criteria of likeness for national treatment in 
international investment law. 
 
2.0 Lesson Learnt 1: The ‘Value’ Underlying National Treatment  
 
This section examines on how GATT/WTO, EU and the ECHR could assist national 
treatment in international investment law in understanding its own underlying 
values. The significance of this exercise is not only to identify the specific features 
of international investment law as compared to the other jurisprudences,
743
 but it is 
also essential to answer the research questions on the doctrinal content of national 
treatment and the interaction of investment decisions to this underlying philosophy. 
 
It is observed summarily that the non-discrimination principle in all the compared 
jurisprudences aim at prohibiting irrational government discriminatory measures. 
While this forms the commonality in this comparison, it must be acknowledged that 
this prohibition is also oriented to serve the jurisprudences‘ specified purposes. The 
GATT/WTO aims for competition for the access in the market and liberalisation of 
trade, the EU quests for non-discrimination in the freedom to exercise capital 
movement and establishment, while international human rights law aims for equality 
in the exercise of fundamental right of property. The study of these jurisprudences‘ 
linkage of its non-discrimination assessment to the philosophy of its treaties has 
provided the lenses to similarly measure the position of national treatment in 
investment treaties. This area has been an underdeveloped area in investment 
                                                 
743 Arguably, for a more acceptable functional comparative exercise. Michaels, ‗The Functional 
Method of Comparative Law‘ (n 88). 
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decisions and scholarship which could have otherwise developed a ‗principled‘ 
interpretation of national treatment.  
 
Putting alongside the national treatment provision with the non-discrimination 
principles in the GATT/WTO, EU and the international human rights law, it surfaces 
what national treatment aims to achieve in international investment law. It enables us 
to see what it ‗is‘ and ‗what it is not‘ in comparison to the others. The relevant 
questions to be asked in this respect are basically: What is the value or underlying 
philosophy of national treatment in investment treaties? How could the interpretation 
of national treatment reflect these philosophies? The determination of likeness will 
benefit from this finding by making it as the operational and observational 
standpoint to construe the situations of the comparators. This is thus the first lesson 
learnt, i.e the need to search for the philosophy or underlying value of national 
treatment in international investment law. 
 
In order to discern the philosophy of national treatment, one would have to 
understand its purpose and context. To put it simply, the national treatment provision 
is incorporated in the investment treaties to protect from discrimination. As opposed 
to general discrimination provisions, it is based on the nationality of the investment/ 
investors which is the most needed protection by foreign investors in facing potential 
threats from the regulatory functions of the host state.
 744
  Thus by incorporating 
national treatment, it would in turn enhance the effectiveness of investment treaties 
in providing protection and promotion of investments. The relationship between 
national treatment and investment treaties indicates that national treatment comes 
                                                 
744 Federico Ortino mentioned that there is a difference between national treatment and most favoured 
nation treatment with the broad principle of equality. Nationality is the regulatory criterion in the 
former. See Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade (n 100) 122. 
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with a purpose which should be reflected in its interpretation. This includes the 
interpretation of likeness which is the most problematic part of the provision.  
 
In attempting this issue, this thesis submits that the value of national treatment 
consists of two important values which are; ‗level playing field‘ and ‗nationality 
based‘ (or discrimination based on nationality). These values are potential to bring 
the operationalisation of the national treatment provision closer towards it objective 
and purpose.  
 
These values are explained in the following subsections: 
2.1 Level-Playing Field  
 
First and foremost, level –playing field corresponds with the purpose of national 
treatment. The very purpose of national treatment is to prohibit host states from 
treating less favourably foreign investors than that is accorded to local investors as 
part of the protection of investments. Investments will lose control of its profitability 
and economic efficiency with the interference of discriminatory measures by the 
government, the effect of which may push investments to inefficiency or inactivity. 
The interference of level playing field by government policies has triggered many 
investment cases. The US government via its Buy America measure in the ADF 
Group Inc v US case for instance has disrupted the level playing field between US 
and foreign (construction projects) and caused the claimant massive increase of cost 
to fabricate its steel at five different subcontracting facilities.
745
 Similarly, in SD 
Myers v Canada, the level playing field between foreign and domestic PCB waste 
                                                 
745 ADF Group Inc v USA, (n 173),  para 55.  
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remediation services was interfered by the ban on the export of PCBs to the 
detriment of the foreign investor including the loss of contracts and opportunities.
746
 
These interferences are considered as political risks, which are most worrying and 
often took investors by surprise outside the calculation of the ordinary course of 
business.
747
  
 
It in turn upsets the legitimate expectations of foreign investors. The insertion of the 
national treatment clause and the signing of investment treaties are supposed to 
create a legal certainty that foreign and local investments will be treated alike and in 
a level playing field. In CPI, Inc. v Mexico, the tribunal acknowledged the legitimate 
expectation of foreign investors to invoke national treatment when the level playing 
field between competing investments is distorted. The tribunal asserted, 
 
‗The fact that economic competitors have - and lobby for - different interests 
is not at all surprising. On the contrary, it is a fact of economic and political 
life which may be observed in any open society. Far from suggesting that 
they are not in like circumstances, it tends to suggest the opposite; it is 
precisely because they are in close competition that they lobby against each 
other - if they were not competing in the market for what are effectively 
interchangeable products, they would not trouble to maintain such lobbying 
activities. To accept Mexico's argument in all its breadth would be to neuter 
Article 1102, because it is precisely where the interests of foreign investors 
                                                 
746 S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 222. 
747 Discrimination by host states deprive investments from its value. See Noah Rubins and Stephan 
Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (n 
424). 
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and domestic investors are in conflict that the principle of non-discrimination 
becomes most important.‘748 
 
The case of Mesa Power Group LLC v Canada has featured an example of a last 
minute imposition of discriminatory measures by the government of Canada that was 
contrary to the initial set of expectations in the renewable energy sector. The 
claimant has brought up the issue of expectation, i.e Canada‘s failure to maintain a 
regulatory framework in conformity with its international obligations under 
NAFTA.
749
 It is natural that an investor in such a sector would expect level playing 
field in the fair evaluation of projects and electrical grid access with other domestic 
and foreign investors. 
 
In terms of interpretation of national treatment, the assessment of level playing field 
assists the tribunal to determine the angle of like situations between the comparators. 
This is possible by understanding what level playing field is the subject of the 
dispute which is affected by a regulatory measure. The correct approach is to 
construe level playing field in the competition of investment opportunities. By so 
doing, it raises ‗economic standard‘ as the tertium comparationis to the 
interpretation of likeness.
750
 This approach is sound to achieve a teleological and 
                                                 
748 CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 135. 
749 MESA Power Group, LLC v Government of Canada NAFTA, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim 
to Arbitration under Section B of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 6 July 
2011. See also Footer, ‗On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the Relationship between Foreign 
Investment and International Trade‘ (n 318) 131. 
750This standard has been applied in GATT/WTO and a number of investment cases (see the NAFTA 
cases mentioned above, in contrast to Methanex v USA and UPS v Canada which ignored the role of 
competition  which is an economic standard in the determining of likeness). Diebold has highlighted 
‗economic standard‘ as one of the main approach in the interpretation of likeness in international 
economic law. See Nicolas F Diebold, ‗Non-Discrimination and the Pillars of International Economic 
Law – Comparative Analysis and Building Coherency‘, IILJ Emerging Scholar Paper 18 (2010) . It is 
also interesting to relate the economic impact of discriminatory actions by states as highlighted by 
DiMascio and Pauwelyn that ‗discrimination creates inefficiency.‘ The effect is well similar in 
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prudent interpretation of treaty, in assessing what is truly relevant to the text and 
context and by not over emphasising on the contrary.
751
  This can at least reduce the 
dilemma in which tribunals face in considering whether the appropriate comparison 
is between like circumstanced investments (or investors), or like circumstanced 
treatment.
752
 It can also alternatively assist the tribunal to take into account both 
approaches. For instance, in the case of Methanex v USA, the application of level 
playing field could have highlighted the effect of the regulatory measure on the 
competing businesses of methanol and ethanol producers. It will also on the contrary 
show that there is no relevance of comparison with the other methanol producer 
despite being more identical to the claimant because of the absence of the 
competitive relationship that would warrant level playing field.
753
  
 
In the case of CPI, Inc. v Mexico, although the tribunal was persuaded to consider 
likeness of corn sweetener (HFCS) and sugar cane sweetener based on price 
regulation, the tribunal concluded that likeness in this case must be based on the 
subject of investments which are interchangeable and indistinguishable from the 
viewpoint of the end-users. The tribunal continued affirming that the regulation on 
                                                                                                                                          
investment terms. Although one may argue that the main role of investment treaties is not economic 
efficiency, it must also be noted that the protection of investors can only be meaningfully achieved if 
the investors could have full control of their investments‘ economic efficiency. DiMascio and 
Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties‘ (n 49). See cases, Methanex v USA, 
(n 19) and UPS v Canada, (n 21). 
751
 The tribunal in the case of MHS v Malaysia for instance has adopted a teleological approach in the 
interpretation of ‗investment‘ by taking into account the context of economic development as set in 
the preamble of the investment treaty. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v. Government of 
Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 17 May 2007. Similarly, in the 
context of national treatment, the purpose of prohibiting states from discriminating foreign 
investments /investors has been to create a level playing field for the protection and promotion of 
investments as warranted the preambles of investment treaties. It is therefore absurd if the 
interpretation of likeness is taken linguistically and secluded from the context it belongs. Take for 
example the case of UPS v Canada where the tribunal ignored the competitive relation and the level 
playing field of the comparators in the same postal industry but peruse into any possible differences 
that could render the comparators unlike.  See UPS v Canada, (n 21), paras 98-119. 
752 Bjorklund, ‗National Treatment‘ (n  104) 39. 
753 Methanex v USA, (n 19). 
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HFCS is discriminatory when intended to protect producers of sugar.
754
 This 
reasoning indicates implicitly that the tool ‗level playing field in the competition of 
investment opportunities‘ was used to determine the angle of whether to choose 
likeness from the point of view of investment (or investors), treatment or other 
factors. Apparently, the regulatory regime designed to affect the price was not 
relevant to the question of likeness and applying so would negate the effect of the 
non-discrimination clause.
755
  
 
In this aspect, the GATT/WTO provides guidance in what less favourable treatment 
means in understanding Article III.
756
 Similar to Article III, the term ‗less favourable 
treatment‘ in investment treaties is unqualified (except in like circumstances). It is 
also in line with the GATT Panel in the Section 337 case
757
 which calls for effective 
equality of opportunities in respect of its establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
758
 The 
aim towards level playing field is reflected under the requirement of ‗directly 
competitive or substitutable products‘ to establish likeness of products under the 
domain of Article III:2. In the Appellate Body Report Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, the essence of level playing field was deliberated implicitly: 
 
                                                 
754 CPI, Inc  v Mexico, (n 98), para 126. 
755 Ibid. 
756 One of the common cores of trade and investment is level economic playing field. See DiMascio 
and Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties‘ (n  49); Vandevelde, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (n 2) 337. 
757 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Panel Report adopted 7 November 
1989, BISD 36th Supp.345 (1990), para 5.11. This case was also quoted by the tribunal in the case of 
CPI, Inc. v Mexico, (n 98)  para 111. 
758 See for instance Chile-US FTA 2003, < http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/chile-fta/final-text>,  and Singapore-US FTA 2004, 
<http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.
pdf>, both accessed on 17 October 2013. 
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‗…Article III  protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but 
rather of the equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic 
products.‘759 
 
‗In this case, the Panel emphasized the need to look not only at such matters 
as physical characteristics, common end-uses, and tariff classifications, but 
also at the "market place". 53 This seems appropriate. The GATT 1994 is a 
commercial agreement, and the WTO is concerned, after all, with markets. It 
does not seem inappropriate to look at competition in the relevant markets as 
one among a number of means of identifying the broader category of 
products that might be described as "directly competitive or substitutable".
760
 
 
The identification of competitive relationship as the angle of comparison indicated 
the likeness of the products from the viewpoint of the level playing field that 
exported products entitled to enjoy. Similar to GATT/WTO, investment treaties are 
also entered into as commercial agreements, if not public-commercial hybrid 
agreement. It is therefore similarly appropriate to construe the national treatment 
provision from the level playing field of the investors‘ economic activities.  
 
Level playing field in the assessment of non-discrimination principle is however not 
apparent in the EU context. The EU law, despite heavily grounded in an economic 
liberalised setting, is inclined in using its non-discrimination principle more towards 
prohibiting any restriction (which is discriminatory in nature) that would hinder its 
                                                 
759
 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (n 387), p16. See also United 
States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, BISD 34S/136, para. 5.1.9.  
760 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (n 387), p 25. 
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subjects from the enjoyment of the freedoms guaranteed.
761
 The test in the EU 
jurisprudence is to ask whether the discriminatory treatment has resulted to 
restriction of freedom rather than the distortion of the level playing field with other 
investors. The EU law often invokes assessment of likeness under the purview of the 
Community principle of equal treatment.
762
 
 
Similarly, the ECHR uses the non-discrimination principle to secure the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms set forth in the convention (in particular right to property) 
and thus does not in its jurisprudence construe the level playing field of the 
comparators.
763
 The inclination in ECHR is to examine the situation of the 
comparators whether they are similar enough so as not to justify a differential 
treatment.  Similarity and analogous situations seems to be the focal factor to enable 
the Courts to see whether there was less favourable treatment that would deny the 
claimant from the enjoyment of right to property.
764
 Furthermore, in the ECHR 
jurisprudence, it promotes non-discrimination more towards ‗equality‘ to ensure the 
rights are enjoyed equally without discrimination. In both EU and ECHR, the 
principle of non-discrimination is used to secure another legal right (freedom of 
establishment, free movement of capital and right to property), whereas in 
international investment law and GATT/WTO it is embedded in the protection itself. 
In the latter, the principle of national treatment therefore embodies a richer content to 
                                                 
761 The non-discrimination principle in the EU law is a ‗tool to pursue the goals of the Treaty: a 
safeguard of the free market and free competition. See Marco Greggi, ‗Revisiting ―Schumacker‖: The 
Role of Limited Tax Liability in EU Law‘, Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union 
(Springer 2013) 45. 
762 See Schumacker, (n 488) and Case C-80/94, Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493. See also Tracy A. 
Kaye, ‗Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of US and EU Approaches‘ in Reuven S Avi-
Yonah, James R Hines and Michael Lang (eds), Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the 
European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence, vol 14 (Kluwer Law 
International 2007). 
763 Article 14 ECHR; see also Article 1 of Protocol 12 ECHR. 
764 Case of Fredin v Sweden, (n 666), para 60; Marckx v. Belgium, (n 640), para 32. 
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serve its own purpose and context which is to ensure level-playing field between 
nationals and non-nationals in the respective economic activities. 
 
Another justification of preferring the concept of level-playing field over others such 
as ‗equality‘ in the ECHR or ‗freedom‘ in the EU law is that it has a more flexible 
stretch to accommodate likeness in truly fair situations. This will reflect the practical 
and real business atmosphere between local and foreign investors and allow the 
tribunal to decide a situation that is fair to both local and foreign investors in setting 
the platform for investment. Thus, it is useful to ensure that the national treatment 
principle is not advantageously benefitted possibly by the foreign investors which 
are already having competitive advantage over the local investors, or possibly by the 
host states by creating a false disadvantage to local investors. In the case of El-Paso 
v Argentina, the tribunal has taken into consideration the general impact of 
pesification on the banking sector as compared to the oil and gas sector which have 
benefitted from the export and the devaluation of peso. It is thus reasonable for the 
government to tax the unexpected profits as a way to rebalance the situation.
765
 The 
measure may seem to be unequal but it is nevertheless fair and level. By applying the 
national treatment provision in the purview of what is level playing field enhances its 
role as supporting the rule of law in investment regime.
766
 Correcting factual 
inequalities should not be regarded as discriminatory as it promotes fairness and 
                                                 
765 El Paso v Argentina, (n 173),  para 314. 
766
 The same concern was raised in an article which questioned the way some ECJ cases allowed the 
exploitation of the principle of equality and discrimination  by claimants. The article highlighted in 
particular the cases of Maruko, Romer and Test Achats which took advantage of the difference of 
situations for particular gains. Cornides, ‗Three Case Studies on Anti-Discrimination‘ (n 711). See 
also  Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-
01757; Case C- 147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg ECJ (Grand Chamber) 10 
May 2011 and Test-Achats, (n 724). 
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reasonableness. In a similar vein, the UNCTAD report of national treatment noted 
that, 
 
‗However, where countries at different levels of development are parties to 
an IIA, such formal equality may disregard important differences in the 
actual situation and capabilities of the enterprises on each side. The formal 
―legal symmetry‖ of their legal situation may be accompanied by actual 
―economic asymmetry‖ (UNCTAD, 1999e). In such a context, application of 
the national treatment standard may require more than formal equality, so 
that the development needs of a developing country party to an IIA are taken 
into account in the definition and application of the standard.‘767 
 
The logic of level playing field allows reasonable justifications to take place if there 
is a need to correct the economic imbalance of the investment players. This would 
result to fair and sustainable application of national treatment both to the local and 
foreign investors.  
 
Level playing field is also consistent with the general aim of investment treaties in 
ensuring a favourable investment climate and economic cooperation.
768
 A favourable 
investment climate can only be achieved if there is competitive neutrality. The 
OECD, in noting the relevance of level playing field and competitive neutrality in 
achieving favourable investment conditions noted; 
 
                                                 
767 ‗National Treatment‘ (n 151) 61. 
768  For instance in Article II of the Egypt - United States BIT (1986), it obliges both parties to 
‗maintain a favourable environment for investments‘ and recognises the importance of ‗economic 
cooperation‘ in its preamble to foster bilateral trade and investment. Similarly, see Canada - Croatia 
BIT (1997) and Argentina - Germany BIT (1991). 
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‗The recommendation of level playing field is fully consistent with common 
definitions of competitive neutrality.‘  
 
This is due to the fact that once investments set in a host state, it has to abide by the 
local laws, including tax requirements which may be designed to disadvantageously 
affect foreign investors.
769
 The essence of competitive neutrality is that no business 
entity is advantaged or disadvantaged because of its ownership.
770
 A host state is 
considered to have violated competitive neutrality if its measures distort which 
nationality occupies particular investments. Competitive neutrality is especially 
needed to protect foreign investments against public sector business under 
government ownership (state owned enterprises).
771
 An example of distortion of 
level playing field between a public sector business and a private investor is in the 
case of UPS v Canada where there was a clear exemptions of certain obligations (for 
instance payment of penalties, cost recoveries, cost of transition of systems), 
monopoly of certain custom functions and deprival of advantages akin to brokerage 
service that was enjoyed by the Canada Post as a State enterprise.
772
  
 
 
 
                                                 
769 The role of competitive neutrality and level playing field will be even more needed in investment 
treaties that provide pre-establishment rights or freedom of establishment such the NAFTA, the 
German BITs the North American BITs and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. See 
Sandrock, ‗The Right of Foreign Investors to Access German Markets: The Meaning of Article 2(1) 
of the German Model Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments‘ (n 340). 
770 Antonio Capobianco, and Hans Christiansen, ‗Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned 
Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options‘ (OECD Publishing 2011) No. 1.; OECD, ‗The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment Commentary to the Consolidated Text‘ (n 188). 
771 This is the concern put forth by the OECD. Antonio Capobianco, and Hans Christiansen, 
‗Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options‘ (n 770) 
772 UPS v Canada , (n 21), para 97. 
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2.2 Nationality Based Discrimination 
 
This is a complex matter. The discussion of national treatment as a nationality based 
discrimination provision may not seem controversial at its surface, but its furtherance 
will involve the questions of intent, protectionist purpose and burden of proof. No 
matter how much the tribunal attempt to avoid or provide safe remarks on the 
relevance of (in particular) intent and protectionist purpose, they have to nevertheless 
deal with them in one way or another.   National treatment as a nationality based 
discrimination will also impact on the determination of likeness especially when it is 
construed from the legitimacy of the regulatory measures in generally three 
situations–in the obvious presence  of motivation to discriminate against a 
nationality, in the absence of such motivation and  in the situation where other 
legitimate justifications exists. 
 
This thesis submits that national treatment in investment treaties is nationality based 
and should be reflected in its interpretation. It suggests that, for a measure to breach 
national treatment there must be evidence that it was motivated by discrimination 
against foreign nationals than any other reason. This is based on a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the indication for a nationality based interpretation is explicitly and 
literally termed in the national treatment provision. The general construction of the 
provision obliges each party (a state) to an investment treaty to accord investors of 
another party (the national of another state) treatment no less favourable than it 
accords to investments of its own investors (the national of that state).
773
 Nationality 
is thus the crux of this provision.  
                                                 
773 Such literal construction of the national treatment provision can be seen for instance  in NAFTA 
Article 1102 (1) and (2). 
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Secondly, nationality-based assessment forms the contextual and purposive 
interpretation of national treatment. This does not only differentiate it to other 
applications of the non-discrimination principle in EU, ECHR or customary 
international law which are far more general in nature, it also confines its application 
to the correct beneficiaries of national treatment i.e  to the foreign investors which 
are subjected to discrimination based on nationality rather than mere 
discrimination.
774
 
 
Thirdly, nationality based assessment is inherent in many investment cases either 
directly or indirectly. The NAFTA cases for instance have considerably taken into 
account the nationality assessment in the alleged discriminatory measures. In CPI 
Inc. v Mexico, the tribunal asserted that: 
 
‗When the clear impact of that discrimination falls on the foreign investor, 
the result is a violation of Article 1102 of the NAFTA‘ 775   
 
In SD Myers, Inc v Canada, targeting foreign nationals can be assessed by both 
intent and practical effect (treatment). Intent must be accompanied with practical 
effect. 
776
 In GAMI, the fact that the measure was not motivated by nationality but 
financial stability was the reason that it did not violate national treatment.
777
  
                                                 
774
 This is particularly to note the approach taken by the tribunal in the case of OEPC v Ecuador 
which broadly expanded the scope of national treatment by subjecting a state to a breach of national 
treatment obligation even though it was done without the intent of discriminating foreign owned 
companies. See OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18), para 177. 
775 CPI, Inc v Mexico , (n 98),  para 126. 
776 SD Myers, Inc v Canada,  (n 24), para 252. 
777 This case was referred to by CPI Inc v Mexico to compare the nationality motivated measure and 
the reason to depart from the judgement. See CPI Inc v Mexico,(n 98),  para 131. 
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Fourth, the existence of another general form of non-discrimination principle in 
some investment treaties urges the national treatment principle to be more 
concentrated on cases of discrimination based on nationality. The Romania-US BIT 
for instance prohibits contracting parties from ‗arbitrary or discriminatory measures‘ 
in a separate provision from the national treatment provision.
778
 The same provision 
could be found in the US-Argentina BIT.
779
 It is observed that even in cases under 
these provisions, the tribunals were inclined to adopt the nationality based 
assessment. Two obvious examples under the abovementioned BITs are Noble 
Ventures, Inc v Romania and LG&E v Argentina.
780
 In Noble Ventures, Inc v. 
Romania, the tribunal indicated the possibility of a case to succeed under the clause 
if there is discriminatory intent. The tribunal held, 
 
‗But that in itself does not exclude the possibility that the proceedings 
constituted a discriminatory measure because it is possible for a single 
measure to be discriminatory if proof to that effect is given. As one cannot 
rely on objective criteria in such situations,  the Claimant has to demonstrate 
that a certain measure was directed specifically against a certain investor by 
reason of his, her or its nationality.‘ 
 
                                                 
778 Romania-US BIT 1994, Article II(2)(b) and Article III(3). 
779 Article II (b), 1994 US-Argentina BIT. 
780
 Both cases failed under this test. In LG&E v Argentina, the tribunal quoted ELSI Elettronica 
Sicula SpA case (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ Report 1989 RLA 56 and required 
discriminatory treatment to fulfil three requirements, which are: an intentional treatment (ii) in favour 
of a national (iii) against a foreign investor, and (iv) that is not taken under similar circumstances 
against another national. As a note of comparison to the national treatment provision based on the two 
cases, this clause is perhaps resorted to when the claimant feels that there is possible evidence of 
intentional treatment but  no clear comparator. See LG&E Energy Corp. v Argentine Republic ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para 146 and Noble Ventures Inc. v. 
Romania, (n 183), para 180. 
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In the case above, the tribunal did not find sufficient evidence that the measure was 
targeted on the claimant as a US company.
781
 Such explicit assessment of nationality 
should often be exhibited in national treatment decisions.  Cases such as OEPC v 
Ecuador, UPS v Canada and Methanex v USA have not incorporated the assessment 
of nationality motivated discrimination, indirectly conveying the messages that the 
national treatment provision could encompass a broad range of discrimination cases, 
and that the national treatment provision may not be able to prohibit measures 
motivated by discrimination against foreign national than any other reason despite 
being so apparent.  
 
There is thus a need to pay attention to national treatment as a nationality based 
provision. There are several issues often related to this which are worth mentioned. 
First is its possible association with national treatment as an anti-protectionism 
principle and the requirement of intent. Both concerns have so far received no 
consensus in the acceptability and the application in investment disputes. This 
concern is understandable as in the finding of whether a particular national is 
targeted, evidences of protectionist purposes will pour in.
782
 Secondly, it is argued by 
some commentators that by extending the interpretation as such, it will exceed its 
literal scope.
783
 This is not required by the treaty.
784
  Thirdly, it will cause 
difficulties/ hardship for the foreign investments to access government records.
785
 
Finally, it is also feared that it would equate the national treatment provision in 
                                                 
781 Noble Ventures Inc. v. Romania, (n 183), para 180. 
782 See SD Myers, Inc  v Canada, (n 24), paras 161-195 on the allegations of protectionist statements 
‗in Canada by Canadians‘. 
783 This is a general reluctance of investment tribunals to adopt a teleological approach, considering 
the new development of international investment law, the need to build the confidence therein and the 
manifest jurisdiction of arbitrators in the interpretation of the legal texts of the treaties. 
784 Marvin Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 181. 
785 In Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal mentioned; ‗[R]equiring a foreign investor to prove that 
discrimination is based on nationality could be an insurmountable burden to the Claimant, as thin 
formation may only be available to the government. […].‘ See ibid. para 183. 
 259 
 
investment treaties to that of GATT/WTO which has explicit purposive guide in 
Article III:1.  
 
This subsequent discussion will address the issues one by one.  
 
Nationality based discrimination inevitably encompasses the problem of 
protectionist intent. Tribunals have taken ambiguous views on this matter. In SD 
Myers v Canada, the tribunal states that,  
 
‗Intent is important, but protectionist intent is not necessarily decisive on its own. 
The existence of an intent to favour nationals over non-nationals would not give 
rise to a breach of Chapter 1102 of the NAFTA if the measure in question were 
to produce no adverse effect on the non-national complainant.‘786 
 
This statement is also cited in the case of Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine in 
emphasising the need of protectionist intent to be accompanied with more feasible 
evidence of discriminatory treatment.
787
 There were also tribunals that 
unconvincingly refused to adopt this approach because of the absence of explicit 
language in the text but nevertheless acknowledged that investment treaties are 
designed to prevent discrimination based on nationality.
788
 In line with this view, the 
tribunal in Bayindir upheld; 
 
                                                 
786 SD Myers v Canada, (n 24), para 254.  
787 Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award, 8 November 2010, 
para 427. 
788 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 181. 
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‗If the requirement of a similar situation is met, the Tribunal must further 
inquire whether Bayindir was granted less favourable treatment than other 
investors. This raises the question whether the test is subjective or objective, 
i.e. whether an intent to discriminate is required or whether a showing of 
discrimination of an investor who happens to be a foreigner is sufficient. The 
Tribunal considers that the second solution is the correct one.‘789 
 
There must be a more rigorous assessment of nationality based motivation of a 
regulatory measure.  This thesis submits however that the requirement is not the 
level of ‗intent‘ but is grounded to a more assessable standard of ‗aim and effect‘. 
While one would argue that an assessment of intent would be impossible and 
implausible, akin to that of an international criminal law assessment,
790
 the 
assessment of aim and effect of nationality preference can be more achievable taking 
into account the circumstantial evidence of the dispute.  If the tribunal is satisfied 
that the aim and effect of the regulatory measure is to discriminate against a 
particular nationality, the measure must be deemed illegitimate, unless if the host 
state could provide a legitimate justification. Protectionist purpose can be derived 
from the factual background of the case, its political drive (including lobbying), the 
design and the structure of the measure challenged. If there is such evidence, the host 
state will then has to provide reasonable justification for the legitimacy of the 
measure. This also addresses the third concern, in the sense that the burden of proof 
on the claimant is not as high as it would be to prove the requirement of intent. The 
                                                 
789 Bayindir v Pakistan, (n 290),  para 390. See also Thunderbird Case, (n 199),  para 177. 
790 Borzu Sabahi has pointed out the difference of assessing intent under objective responsibility of 
states in the International Law Commission‘s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts in particular on the Genocide Convention  that requires ‗intent to destroy‘ as part of 
the definition of the crime. In contrast to this, the national treatment provisions do not incorporate 
such requirement and thus according to ILC, ‗it is only the act of State that matters, indecently of any 
intention‘. See Sabahi, ‗National Treatment-Is Discriminatory Intent Relevant?‘ (n 705). 
 261 
 
claimant must show that the circumstances, the structure of the measure and the 
effects thereof is nationally motivated and affected.   
 
As far as the next argument is concerned, by taking into account the context of 
national treatment and the rigorous examination of the ‗circumstances‘ as in the like 
circumstances requirement, it does not render exceeding its literal scope. It is in line 
with the rule of interpretation in Articles 30-31 of the Vienna Convention. 
Methodologically, it is inappropriate to stick to the literal meaning of likeness and 
ignoring the interpretation of ‗circumstances‘. The assessment of circumstances 
allows the tribunal examine relevant facts and the national treatment contextually. 
Similarly, strictly adhering to the three prong test without taking into account the 
need to move beyond has proven inappropriate. It could  lead to either ‗false likeness 
of circumstances‘ which would cause host states a hard time to justify the measures, 
or ‗false failure of like circumstances‘ which would allow host states to escape from 
the burden of justifying the measure especially when the weakness of such 
justification is expected.  In OEPC v Ecuador for instance, there was no active 
assessment on whether the measure was targeting particular nationals, leading us to 
the understanding that a simple situation of less favourable treatment can be accepted 
by any national against any domestic investor.
791
 As there was no finding of 
‗targeting foreign investor or singling out foreign investor‘, the assessment of like 
circumstances evolved around a broad net that encompasses a foreign investment in 
the oil exploration sector against domestic investors of various sectors. This is a false 
likeness of circumstances. Consequently, the host state is unexpectedly left to justify 
                                                 
791 Similarly, it was upheld in the case of Bayindir v Pakistan that the showing of discrimination of an 
investor who happened to be a foreigner is sufficient. See  Bayindir. v. Pakistan, (n 290),  para 390. 
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the discriminatory allegation on broad grounds akin to ordinary discrimination cases. 
Ultimately, the interpretation of national treatment defeats its purpose.  
 
The GATT/WTO is instructive in this aspect, contrary to the fear of the trade and 
investment equation in the fourth argument above. Although the aims and effects test 
receives a mixed response in the realm of GATT/WTO, it could nevertheless 
potentially provide guidance to international investment law as it requires the search 
of protectionist purpose and the disproportionate discriminatory impact on foreign 
investors.
792
 The GATT/WTO is grounded on the basis of curbing protectionism. It 
is explicitly stated in Articles III that regulations should not be applied to imported 
or domestic products ‗so as to afford protection to domestic production‘. It is this 
explicit guide that led to the GATT panel decision in United States: Taxes on 
Automobiles to uphold the classifications of autos based on the gasoline 
consumptions as not like products because there was a bona fide aim of regulation 
and the effect was not inherently protective.
793
  
 
                                                 
792
 There was a shift of approach in GATT to adopt the aims and effects test in 1992-1995. It was put 
aside later but it seems that this principle has re-emerged in the year 2000 in the case of Chile – Taxes 
on Alcoholic Beverages. The Appellate Body stated that,  
‗we consider that a measure‘s purposes, objectively manifested in the design, architecture 
and structure of the measure, are intensely pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not 
that measure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production.‘  
See Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para. 71, WT/DS87/AB/R, (adopted Jan. 12, 2000), para 
71. 
793
 The test was contested in particular in the case of Japan-Alcoholic Beverages. The rejection of the 
aim and effect test according to Hudec was not conclusive. There is correctness in this approach to 
some certain extent, including ‗protective application‘ and ‗discriminatory purpose‘ that seemed to be 
applied, yet discreetly in subsequent cases such as Bananas Panel Report, Canadian Periodicals and 
Hormones Case. See  Hudec‘s article E. Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: 
Requiem for an ―Aim and Effects‖ Test‘ (n 123) See also Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities –Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 
adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591; Appellate Body Report, Canada –Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR1997:I, 449 and Panel Report, 
and EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, 
WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report  
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR1998:III, 699. 
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There is no comparable provision that form a purposive guide for national treatment 
in the international investment treaties. Nevertheless, it does not require a complex 
assessment to realise that investment treaties similarly prohibit protectionism as the 
basis of government regulatory measures. This can be deduced from the similar 
political economy of trade and investment and the use of the national treatment as a 
traditional international economic law cornerstone concept in most liberalising trade 
and investment treaties.
794
   
 
This thesis submits and acknowledges however that while protectionism is the 
subject of discipline under the national treatment provision, protectionism is not 
totally illegitimate. The tribunal in the case of SD Myers, Inc. v Canada seemed to 
support that protectionist purpose can be legitimate. In SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, the 
protectionist purpose was to ensure the economic strength of the Canadian industry 
to maintain the ability to process PCB within Canada in the future.
795
 The tribunal 
stated: 
 
‗The indirect motive was understandable but the method contravened 
Canada‘s commitment under NAFTA‘. 
 
There is logic behind excusing certain acts of protectionism if it is genuinely for the 
public need or national security. This is not an alarming reduction of application of 
national treatment, but would on the contrary be in line with the general principles of 
                                                 
794 This line of argument is in line with Kurtz‘s proposition that the quest for state purpose in a 
national treatment inquiry could enhance the role of the national treatment provision as a discipline to 
constrain protectionism. See Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in 
International Investment Law and the WTO‘ (n 102). 
795 SD Myers Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 255. 
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reasonableness, good faith and public interest.
796
 It must also be noted that the best 
approach to follow is whenever there is evidence of protectionism, the burden of 
proof will be higher on the host state to justify the rational and proportionality of the 
measure. As in the case of SD Myers v Canada, although its protectionist measure 
was somewhat approved by the tribunal, the host state has failed to defend it under 
the ground of proportionality. Thus protectionism is prohibited and should be curbed 
only if there is no reasonable justification that legitimises it. 
 
It is thus submitted that construing national treatment provision as a tool that is 
grounded on nationality and anti –protectionism (notwithstanding recognising the 
possible exceptions) has a role in interpreting the provision.  It does not only lead a 
way for a meaningful and effective provision (in protecting the ‗right thing‘ for the 
investors and not protecting just ‗anything‘), it also solves significantly the 
interpretative hurdle of the national treatment provision. 
 
An example of a lack of protectionist purpose enquiry can be seen in the case of 
OEPC v Ecuador. The tribunal applied a mere discrimination test and did not 
construe the relevance of protectionist enquiry. The result was that likeness was held 
across the economic sectors. There was no protectionist purpose, but there was still a 
breach of national treatment. This is an unfair construction of national treatment, 
because states, in particular, would be caught in surprise as the assessment of 
likeness by the tribunal could stretch anywhere, as in this case, from oil exploration 
to flowers and banana producers.  The correct disciplining on states‘ behaviour, if 
one were to use the word, must only be that the investment treaties could only  
                                                 
796 This is where margin of appreciation will play its role, together with the principle of 
proportionality. Please refer 3.3.1  for an analysis on margin of appreciation. 
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‗discipline‘ a state if it has crippled  a level playing field condition of foreign and 
domestic  investors  because of protectionism (protecting the latter), not coupled 
with legitimate reason.  This is what states understand, or rather what should derive 
from the incorporation of a national treatment provision in an international 
investment treaty.
797
 
 
Another example is the case of Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. 
United States of America. Had the purposive enquiry took place, it would have 
analysed the relevant facts of the case, inter alia; the growth of the claimant‘s market 
share with other NPMs share of the US market as a result of substantial reduction of 
PM sales and market share; and the regulatory response to that i.e the 
implementation of a complementary legislation in 2002 (known as the contraband 
law) that prohibited tax stamps on cigarettes for NPM and to eventually forfeit 
cigarettes without them. The involvement of the participating members and the state 
to the contraband law, the reasonableness of the measure allegedly motivated by 
public health and the discriminatory effect on the foreign investor may be indicative 
to the finding of protectionism with no concrete justification.
798
   
 
                                                 
797 This is in line with the ‗effect and purpose‘ method proposed by one scholarly writing claiming 
that the motivation to discriminate because of difference in nationality is essential for a breach of 
Article 1102. This could avoid a declaration of breach without protectionist intent. See Rojas, ‗The 
Notion of Discrimination in Article 1102 of NAFTA‘ (n 107), New York, < 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/05/050501.pdf> accessed on 29 July 2013. 
798 The arguments in this case did not go to the direction of discussing purposive protectionism either 
by the claimant or the respondent (except in a passing, see Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., 
et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award, 12 January 2011, para 171). The 
claimant was perhaps under the impression that it would be easier to proceed with the ‗broad and 
remedial fashion‘ argument as in OEPC v Ecuador (see (n 18), para 161). Unlike OEPC v Ecuador, 
one could argue that the facts in the Grand River case have stronger evidence of purposeful 
protectionism. This submits that if the aim and effect test is applied, as opposed to the strict 
requirement of intent, it would have made it possible for the claimant to challenge the reasonableness 
of the regulatory measure against the background of protectionist circumstances. This would also 
affect the plausibility of the ‗like legal circumstances‘ employed by the tribunal based on the exact 
chain of contested regulation. See Grand River Case, (n 798) paras 165-166.    
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Taking into consideration protectionist traits is important. States could otherwise 
hide behind self-serving legitimate objectives of health or environment while 
actually systematically advantage its domestic investments. Particularly when there 
is lobbying involved, it is hard to tell whether the public policy justification is a bona 
fide one and not one which is representing an interest group. 
 
Had the aims and effect test was applied in Methanex v USA, it could have also 
revealed the effect of the discriminatory measure on the methanol producer and a 
strong protectionist purpose of the measure. Although eventually the result of the 
case could be the same (by upholding the environment measure), in terms of burden 
of proof, the state would have to show a really strong reason why the environment 
measure is up and above the obvious protectionist effect.  
 
A lesson learnt in this aspect is to understand the position of protectionism, or 
operationally, the search of protectionist measures in international investment. This 
is an essential aspect of the interpretation of national treatment that must be given 
attention to. As seen in the above discussions, it plays a purposive role to ensure that 
the essence of the national treatment provision is met, as a provision that prohibits 
discrimination based on nationality.  
 
3.0 Lesson Learnt 2: Principles and Methodologies in Assessing Likeness 
 
Comparison with the GATT/WTO, EU law and International Human Rights has 
enabled the evaluation of methodological strengths and shortcomings in the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination.  This section will highlight the 
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important principles and methodologies observed from the GATT/WTO, EU law and 
International Human Rights Law and their relevance to the interpretation of likeness 
in international investment treaties.  
3.1Lessons from GATT/WTO 
 
As seen from the GATT/WTO jurisprudence, the main tests of likeness are the 
traditional characteristics test, aims and effects test and competitiveness and 
substitutability test. This part will attempt to apply the competition test as the most 
useful test of the three as a potential criterion of likeness in investment cases. As for 
the aims and effects test, it is more useful in forming the ground context of national 
treatment, hence, a significant part of its role  is taken as an instructive guide in 
enhancing or emphasising  national treatment as a  nationality based provision. 
Therefore, this section will highlight the importance of aim of effect test only to the 
extent that it may be useful in assessing likeness.  
3.1.1 Competition Test 
 
Competition is the most obvious indicator of likeness especially the market or 
service based investments. This is due to the dependency of the investments of this 
type on the proceeds from consumers based on the performance in the competitive 
market. This would determine the rates of returns and the financial viability of the 
investments. When there is a regulatory measure that provides competitive 
advantages to a particular investment to the deprivation of other investments which 
share the same consumers, the measure has arguably undermined the level playing 
field of investments in like situations.  
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One could not deny the inter-relatedness between trade and investment, that 
production of goods is one of the core activities of investments (apart from 
services).
799
 One could also argue that the purpose of product based investments is to 
produce in the very market place as an alternative to export. If the latter is chosen as 
the method of business, the relevant jurisprudence would otherwise be the 
GATT/WTO.  Thus an investment in this line could be affected by measures that 
affect the customers of a particular investment and the competition test should 
become helpful as how it is helpful in the GATT/WTO context. 
 
However, (as discussed in Chapter Three) when investment cases containing 
competing investments were brought to the tribunal under national treatment, there 
were mixed views on the acceptance of the competition test, or rather the acceptance 
of GATT/WTO in which competition test is an important evaluation. It was 
controversially ignored in earlier cases of Methanex v USA and UPS v Canada. 
Although it has eventually found its way in the decision of CPI Inc. v Mexico , the 
competition test was not articulated in many other investment decisions and remain a 
subject of debate.
800
 
 
The tribunal in the case of Methanex v USA has rejected the competition test in 
favour of the search of ‗most like circumstances‘. This led to a narrow reading of 
national treatment. The claimant alleged the MTBE ban was affecting the sale of 
methanol as every ethanol sale took away a sale of methanol. The claimant put forth 
                                                 
799 For the inter-relation between trade and investments, see e.g, Footer, ‗On the Laws of Attraction: 
Examining the Relationship between Foreign Investment and International Trade‘ (n 318); DiMascio 
and Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties‘ (n 49). 
800 In the same vein, Kurtz highlighted the deficiency of the tribunals in addressing the relevance of 
the competition test in the cases. See  Kurtz, ‗The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National 
Treatment in International Investment Law and the WTO‘ (n 102) 256. 
 269 
 
that Methanex and other methanol producers are in like circumstances with US 
domestic ethanol producers.  The difference of approach on the question of likeness 
arose where Methanex claimed that the competition test should be applied, while the 
US government insisted on the ‗most like circumstances approach‘ considering that 
there were other domestic methanol producers.
801
  The tribunal held that methanol 
and ethanol producers are not in like circumstances despite the fact that both were 
producing oxygenate and competing the same consumers. Although it may be 
challenging to decide such case in the presence of another most like investor 
producing methanol, the tribunal should gear likeness to the likeness of 
circumstances as warranted in investment treaties even if it may mean to conclude 
likeness to a lesser characteristically or physically like investment. The point is, in 
the given set of facts in the case, both oxygenate producers are similar enough 
without dwelling into the scientific differences which are not relevant in the context 
of invocation of the national treatment protection. In relation to this, it brings us to 
the realisation that there are situations where most like investors may not be in 
competition with the claimant as compared to a less like investor which is adequately 
alike enough in the absence of the former.  
 
As in the case of Methanex v USA, methanol and ethanol producers as oxygenate 
producers and competitors should be considered as alike despite its scientific 
differences. The tribunal rejected the relevance of GATT/WTO and upheld that 
Article 1102 should be read in its own terms.
802
 The tribunal did not however 
                                                 
801 Methanex v USA, (n 19) , para 16. 
802
 The tribunal asserted, 
‗International law directs this Tribunal, first and foremost, to the text; here, the text and the 
drafters‘ intentions, which it manifests, show that trade provisions were not to be transported 
to investment provisions. Accordingly, the Tribunal holds that Article 1102 is to be read on 
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elaborate what those own terms were. It seemed that the tribunal rejected the 
‗competitiveness approach‘ together with its rejection of the relevance of 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence. By indication, the ‗own terms‘ include an acceptance of 
detailed assessment of characteristics of the products (in this case the methanol and 
ethanol) exactly as one would expect in a comparison of likeness in GATT/WTO 
characteristic test. This is not only a backward/ traditional method even in the 
GATT/WTO as compared to the competition test, it is also not suitable to be applied 
in the investment context as it denies the situation of the investments which is the 
crucial aspect of determination of likeness. This effect may not come to the attention 
of the tribunal during the assessment, but a calculation of the result of the decision 
has revealed an awkward outcome. The outcome is that investments which are 
competing,  in the same economic sector are not in like circumstances to contrast 
with the case of OEPC v Ecuador that have allowed a broad range of investments as 
comparators. This case has contributed to the incoherence of national treatment.
803
 
With regards to comparison based on the physical attributes or characteristics (in the 
context of article III:2 GATT), is described by Hudec  as ‗sterile‘ and having ‗no 
purpose oriented‘ in the determination of important regulatory issues like national 
treatment.
804
  
                                                                                                                                          
its own terms and not as if the words ―any like,directly competitive or substitutable goods‖ 
appeared in it.‘  
See Methanex v USA, (n 19),  para 37. 
803 In relation to this, there are commentaries and critics on the future of NAFTA Chapter 11, one of it 
includes a prediction that it will ‗dampen the enthusiasm to launch future investment arbitrations‘. It 
further stated that ‗future claimants will have to prove that they are truly in ―like circumstances‖ to a 
domestic industry to qualify under Chapter 11. An investor that is indirectly affected but that is not in 
precisely the same competitive category will be out of luck. See Lawrence Herman, ‗Trade Law 
Memo-Volume 4 Issue 5- The Methanex Case and the Future of NAFTA Chapter 11‘ 
<http://www.casselsbrock.com/CBNewsletter/Trade_Law_Memo___Volume_4_Issue_5___The_Met
hanex_Case_And_The_Future_Of_NAFTA_Chapter_11> accessed 15 April 2013., at 
<http://www.casselsbrock.com/CBNewsletter/Trade_Law_Memo___Volume_4_Issue_5___The_Met
hanex_Case_And_The_Future_Of_NAFTA_Chapter_11>, accessed on 15th April 2013. 
804 E. Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ―Aim and Effects‖ 
Test‘ (n  123). 
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‗Most like circumstances‘ is not plausible an approach. The first reason is that it 
could lead the tribunals to construe likeness restrictively. As in the case of Methanex 
v USA, the tribunal has ignored the competitive situation that Methanex had to face 
with the ethanol producers, which are considered by the tribunal as less similar 
investments. Ethanol producers could have qualified as alike in the absence of the 
other methanol producers which are ‗in most like circumstances‘ as coined in the 
case.
805
 Secondly, this approach would result to governments hiding behind most 
similar situated domestic investments (possibly being created by the government) 
with exactly similar characteristics to potential foreign investments which are the 
targets of discriminatory action.  
 
The message is unclear. In the case where there is no identical comparator, will the 
ethanol competitor be still considered unlike to methanol producers? It is submitted 
that likeness could not be relatively construed based on the existence or absence of 
an identical or most like comparator. Likeness of a situation is alike when it is by its 
own merits alike.  If the investors in the Methanex case are compared with based on 
their own merits, i.e by way of its competitive situation, then perhaps it would not 
after all, as the terms used by the tribunal, be of ‗forced application‘ to ignore 
identical comparators. 
806
 
                                                 
805 Andrew Newcombe has also highlighted this possibility, ‗that the appropriate comparator group 
might not be the domestic investment in identical circumstances, but another competitor in like 
circumstances‘. See Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment (n 2) 169. 
806 The tribunal referred to the case of Pope & Talbot v Canada on like circumstances. The tribunal 
remarked, 
‗It would be a forced application  of Article 1102 if a tribunal were to ignore the identical 
comparator and to try to lever in an, at best, approximate (and arguably inappropriate) 
comparator.‘ 
 See Methanex v USA, (n 19), Part IV-Chapter B, para 19. See also Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada, (n 
20). 
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Similarly, in the case of UPS v Canada, the tribunal aimlessly construed the 
differences of two strikingly similar investments in the postal services whilst 
neglecting the importance of its competitive relationship. Cass criticised this 
approach saying: 
 
‗National treatment protection would be dramatically reduced under that 
approach, as it would eliminate any right to protection whenever there were 
differences between the complaining party and the compared investment or 
investor even if those differences were slight enough to affect the competitive 
relationship that Article 1102 was designed to protect‘.807 
 
The competitive relationship between UPS Canada and Canada Post including 
similar times for delivery, similar service features and similar customers, should be 
enough to show likeness. Any justification otherwise must be one that is substantial 
and relevant to the matters at issue. One needs only to look at the differences of 
treatment alleged by the claimant (which includes denial of brokerage service, 
exclusion of certain custom functions and the obligation to pay certain costs related 
to CADEX) to realise that the more it has shown the similarity of affairs UPS and 
Canada Post are involved in. The justifications brought forth in this case were on the 
exact reasons it brought for unlikeness, which could lead one to draw an inference 
that there was actually no legitimate justifications that the case could resort to if it 
fails under the likeness test. At this point, the differences accepted by the tribunal 
                                                 
807 UPS Inc. v Canada, (n 21), para 14. 
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(which are different objects, mandates and transports, deliver goods in different 
ways) seem superficial and irrelevant.
808
   
 
 It would be impossible to request for identical characteristics in investments. There 
must be differences in one way or another.
809
 Here, what is relevant is to measure 
likeness on the point of the level playing field the investors seek in the protection of 
national treatment, and there could be no better assessment than the competition of 
the investments in a given market when such evidence is available.  
 
Thus, the competition approach is the most instructive interpretation that 
international investment disputes could learn from the GATT/WTO jurisprudence. 
The GATT/WTO jurisprudence has adopted the competition test despite the 
availability of tangible characteristics of products that is relatively easier to be 
examined. This can be seen in Australia—Subsidy on Ammoniun Sulfate 810 and 
European Community—Measures on Animal Fee Proteins.811  It could provide the 
relevant range of ‗accordion of likeness‘, by broadening the narrow approach as in 
Methanex v USA, UPS v Canada and Feldman v Mexico (where strict characteristic 
assessment was employed) and narrowing a broader approach as in OEPC v 
Ecuador.  
                                                 
808 Taking identical twins as an analogy, it is inappropriate to give similar fitness test when one is 
physically weaker or medically inferior to another. Upon comparison, the physical strength of the 
twins should be taken into account to examine likeness for a level playing field rather than 
insignificant characteristic based factors such as the location of a mole, birthmark or hobby. 
809 In the case of CPI v Mexico the tribunal acknowledged that differences can be construed in many 
possible angles. The important criteria is one which is most relevant to the object and purpose of 
national treatment. The tribunal mentioned, ‗ Any other interpretation would negate the effect of the 
non-discrimination clauses, because it would always be possible to find differences between the way 
competing products are owned, managed, regulated or priced.‘ See CPI Inc. v Mexico, (n 98), para 
126. 
810 BISD, vol.2, 188 (1952). 
811 BISD, 25th Supp.49 (1979). Hudec described Australia—Subsidy on Ammoniun Sulfate811 and 
European Community—Measures on Animal Fee Proteins cases as containing meaningful discussions 
of ‗like product‘  as they considered the competitiveness of physically dissimilar products. See E. 
Hudec, ‗―Like Product‖: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III‘ (n 123). 
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The Methanex tribunal made this following remark when commenting on the 
relevance of GATT/WTO: 
 
‗Hence, the Tribunal begins with an inquiry into the plain and natural 
meaning of the text of Article 1102. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 1102 
enjoin each Party to accord to investors or investments of another Party 
―treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its 
investors [or investments]. . . ‖. These provisions do not use the term of art in 
international trade law, ―like products‖, which appears in and plays a critical 
role in the application of GATT Article III. Indeed, the term ―like products‖ 
appears nowhere in NAFTA Chapter11.‘812 
 
What the tribunal failed to understand is that the ‗product‘ in this case was the exact 
investment that suffered less favourable treatment. The tribunal also failed to 
understand that competition is a neutral test, which is not specific for GATT/WTO. 
It is able to cast similarity of situations which is relevant in trade and investment and 
would be highly relevant in the context of national treatment. 
 
The tribunal should acknowledge competitive relationship in fulfilling the essence of 
the claim of national treatment even though the breach of national treatment is 
upheld. There may be cases of tight business competition but no scientific 
differences to tell them apart. What is not addressed is the role of competition which 
could cast a different and sensible view of likeness of situations towards reasoned 
                                                 
812 Methanex v USA, (n 19), para 29. 
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awards in the international investment jurisprudence.   In this aspect of assessment, 
GATT/WTO could highly cast guidance in the interpretation of national treatment. 
 
3.1.2  Aims and Effect Test 
 
In the context of GATT/WTO, the aims and effect test was revolutionary when it 
was first introduced for deviating from the traditional characteristics test of like 
products. This may be understandable as products are traditionally defined by their 
tangible features, end uses and consumer preferences. Furthermore, there is Article 
XX GATT to take the hurdle of assessing the legitimacy of the challenged regulatory 
measures.  
 
The proponents of the aims and effects test argue that the traditional or literal way of 
construing likeness could in some cases result to a ‗no purpose-oriented criteria‘ and 
‗would fail to prohibit some product distinctions that should be prohibited and 
prohibit some product distinctions that should not be prohibited‘.813 The aims and 
effect test is applied to tell the adverse effects of the absence of a bona  fide purpose 
                                                 
813
 See for instance in the case of Malt Beverages, where the panel took into account the purpose of 
the provision. The panel noted:  
The purpose of Article III is thus not to prevent contracting parties from using their fiscal 
and regulatory powers for purposes other than to afford protection to domestic production.  
Specifically, the purpose of Article III is not to prevent contracting parties from 
differentiating between different product categories for policy purposes unrelated to the 
protection of domestic production.  The Panel considered that the limited purpose of Article 
III has to be taken into account in interpreting the term "like products" in this Article. 
Similarly in the Auto-Taxes case which applied the aim and effect test, the panel found that the 
product distinctions between automobiles were bona fide and that the effect was not protective. This 
decision was however not adopted. See United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D (DS23/R - 39S/206), para 5.25; United States: Taxes on 
Automobiles, 11 October 1994, WT/DS31/R (unadopted); Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , 12 
January 2000, WT/DS87/AB/R. See also  United E. Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO Constraints on National 
Regulation: Requiem for an ―Aim and Effects‖ Test‘ (n 54). 
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to differentiate products based on a certain criteria. Because criteria can be made, it 
is therefore plausible to examine the rational of those criteria.
814
  
 
The relevance of aims and effects test in the context of likeness is that it allows 
consideration of the legislative purpose.
815
 This is an instructive guide for investment 
cases. If a measure is introduced, say environment standards, and resulted to two 
otherwise similar investments unlike, the aims and effect test would then do the 
checking of whether the environment standards are not only reasonable or rational on 
its merits, but whether in the whole context has targeted a particular investment 
based on nationality. If there is no justification and if there is effects on a particular 
foreign investor, then it could be adversely concluded that the measure was of no 
grounds other than protecting the local investment. Therefore, the measure that is the 
determinant factor of the differences between the investments could not be valid.  
 
This test should be applied in the case of Methanex v USA to examine whether the 
environmental objective was the main aim of the measure which can be adversely 
indicated from the structure, effects and protective application of the measure 
weighing against proportionality and its least restrictive application on foreign 
                                                 
814 In Malt Beverages case, the US was unable to rationalize the different tax rates imposed on the 
type of grape which grows only in the south eastern of United State s and the Mediterranean region. 
The panel concluded that failure to be indicative of purposeful protectionism of local producers. The 
tax thus could not hold differences between what are otherwise like products. See United States-
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D (DS23/R - 
39S/206), para 5.23-5.26. 
815
 Aims and effect test has been discussed in GATT in generally a few aspects, likeness and less 
favourable treatment. The demarcation line is however unclear. Roughly, up to the point of 
determining the legitimacy of the regulatory measure and its application as a criteria that differentiate 
the investments of an otherwise similar situation, it is relevant to the assessment of likeness. Where 
the discussion expands on assessing the disproportionate effect on the foreign investors, it leans more 
towards answering the question of less favourable treatment. 
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investments.
816
  It was not so in this case. The tribunal was occupied in the 
examination of the differences of physical properties of ethanol and methanol and 
the relevance of the most like investor in the market. This is exactly a no purpose-
oriented criteria as described by Hudec and resulted to the failure to prohibit 
investment distinctions when it should be prohibited. The tribunal has ignored two 
important assessments which are the relevance of competition and the purpose of the 
regulation.
817
 The assessment of aims and effect test would have resulted to a 
different decision. 
 
Similarly in the case of Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United 
States of America, the claimant urged to be compared as a non-participating 
manufacturer (NPM) with no exemption to its escrow payment under the Allocable 
share amendment off-reservation sales to the Subsequent Participating 
Manufacturers (SPM). The SPMs do not make MSA payments with respect to their 
pre-MSA share.
818
 The tribunal refused to consider the competitive situation and 
protectionist threat faced by the claimant and preferred an identical / characteristic 
approach of likeness. According to the tribunal, the comparators should be other 
firms engaged in the wholesale distribution of cigarettes in the US and potentially 
subject to enforcement actions under the state‘s complementary legislation.  
 
                                                 
816 The claimant in the case of Methanex has forwarded that USA must satisfy whether the measure 
was necessary to fulfill the environmental objective, proportionate, least restrictive on foreign 
investments and do not constitute a disguised restriction on foreign investments. These factors were 
not construed by the tribunal in the likeness stage, and would presumably be dealt with after likeness 
is established as it adopted the three – pronged assessment of likeness. This observation is discussed 
in 3.3.2 below. See  Methanex v USA, (n 19), para 9 Part IV- Chapter B. 
817 The aims and effects test is appropriate rather as an alternative argument after the competition test. 
The competition should at first instance rules likeness between the methanol and ethanol producers. 
The assessment of the legitimacy of the measure would follow in the next step, applying the three 
prong test. Alternatively, the appropriateness of the regulatory measure must be taken into account for 
a sound examination of likeness. 
818 Master Settlement Agreements (MSA). 
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On the flipside of the same argument, the aim and effect test could save governments 
from accidental discriminatory effects on foreign investors which are not based on 
protectionism. In such circumstances, the unlikeness of a situation because of a bona 
fide non-protectionist measure will avoid host states from breach of national 
treatment because of random discriminatory effects.
819
  An obvious example of this 
is the case of OEPC v Ecuador which lacked the assessment of the protective aim 
and discriminatory impact of the challenged measure. The government of Ecuador 
nevertheless was held to have breached the national treatment obligation solely on 
the ground of discriminatory impact without due regards to the justifications and 
absence of protectionist aim. Here the justification of the states on the 
reasonableness of a regulatory measure is important. The tribunal may validate or 
invalidate a regulatory distinction based on its adverse inference on the 
reasonableness and proportionality of the measure.
820
 
 
One may argue that since national treatment in international investment treaties are 
mostly not accompanied with an explicit and restrictive exception clause as Article 
XX in GATT/WTO, the aims and effect test becomes more relevant.
821
 This is even 
more so especially when the merge justification approach of construing likeness is 
                                                 
819
 Hudec‘s view may be instructive in the quest for protectionist aim. He suggested the use of 
‗protective application‘ by reflecting the decision of the Appellate Body in Alcoholic Beverages 
which mentions that ‗…protective application can most often be discerned from the design, 
architecture and the revealing structures of a measure.‘ Appellate Body Report on Alcoholic 
Beverages WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WTDS11/R (July 11, 1996), at 18.E. Hudec, ‗GATT/WTO 
Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ―Aim and Effects‖ Test‘ (n 123). 
820 This issue is discussed under deference (under margin of appreciation below). This means that the 
aims and effects test provides more regulatory autonomy to the host states. In the context of 
GATT/WTO, see Michael Ming Du, ‗The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO 
Regime‘ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 639, 658.  
821 As exceptions to this, see the Article 24 (2)(b) of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, Article 17 of the 
2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation with Korea and China (AKIA and ACHIA). See 
discussions on Article XX GATT/WTO and international investment treaties in Legum and 
Petculescu, ‗GATT Article XX and International Investment Law‘ (n 319); Céline Lévesque, ‗The 
Inclusion of GATT Article XX Exceptions in IIAs – A Potentially Risky Policy‘ (n 450) . 
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adopted.
822
  The opened structure of the national treatment in investment treaties 
allows regulatory measures to be assessed in either stage of interpretation, either in 
the likeness stage or the justification stage. It also opens the tribunal to the flexibility 
of determining legitimacy of a measure of various grounds, considering that 
investments are of many forms and complexity.  
 
The absence of Article XX GATT/WTO resemblance in investment treaties is 
undoubtedly a reason for a more active and wider assessment of the justifications of 
a regulatory measure.
823
 The inclusion of Article XX GATT/WO resemblance on the 
other hand would open the risk of restricting the tribunals from determining 
justifications which are outside the exception list. Furthermore, it would result to a 
mere formalistic assessment of exception and would not allow the merge 
justification test to occur in the determination of likeness. It is submitted that 
whether or not the exceptions to the investment treaties are included, it should not 
cast a significant difference in the investment regime that should itself embody and 
recognise the public elements involving sovereigns, environment and the people.
824
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
822 In GATT/WTO, the finding of bona fide regulation will become redundant with Article XX which 
comes after the construction of likeness as it also requires the same finding. This research suggests 
that merge of justification test is to be adopted in certain situations. See ‗Practicality of the Three 
Prong Test of National Treatment in the Determination of Comparators‘ in 3.3.2 below.  
823 To the contrary, one may argue that the inclusion of the Article XX GATT/WTO provision in 
investment treaties is to provide flexibility in the exceptions. See discussion on the matter in Andrew 
Newcombe, ‗General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements‘ [2008] BIICL Eighth 
Annual WTO Conference <http://www.biicl.org/files/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf> accessed 15 July 
2013., < http://www.biicl.org/files/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf>, accessed on 13 July 2013. 
824 Ibid. 
 280 
 
3.2  Lessons from the EU Jurisprudence 
 
3.2.1 Emphasis on the ‘situation’ of the comparators 
 
The EU cases in respect of freedom of establishment and free movement of capital 
have highlighted the examination of situations of the comparators. In examining the 
situation of the comparators, both the factual and legal situations of the comparators 
are taken into consideration.  
 
The assessment of situation does not require a total similarity or a hundred per cent 
similarity. It is adequate if the comparators can show that they are similarly situated 
for the purpose of a discrimination claim. Hence in the cases of Schumacker, the 
court held likeness based on the overall tax situation of the taxpayer and the 
positions in both the home and host state, although as a rule, residents and non-
residents are non-comparable.
825
 The assessment of similarity can overrule even the 
most established principle, if it is within the court‘s view that it is unreasonable and 
discriminatory.
826
 Although this exercise was motivated by the search for equality in 
taxes and the right of freedom of establishment, it provides a useful apparatus in 
which investment tribunals should consider in assessing likeness.  
 
In the investment context, the situations of the investors should be examined based 
on its overall factual and legal situations. The overall factual situation will capture 
the discriminatory impact of measure, protectionism and competitive relationship 
that may exist between the comparators. This could provide the tribunal with useful 
                                                 
825 Schumacker, (n 488), para 37. 
826 In the case of Schumacker, the court looked at the overall tax situation of the taxpayer and the 
positions in both the home and host state. Ibid., para  31, 37. 
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assessment in the angle in which likeness should be construed. An illustration of this 
would be as in the case of Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United 
States of America where the tribunal construed likeness to confine investments under 
the same legal requirement. The tribunal asserted that the correct comparator should 
be other firms in the wholesale distribution business and subject to the same 
enforcement actions under the complementary regulation. The tribunal quoted 
various investment cases that supported this line of approach: 
 
‗While each case involved its own facts, tribunals have assigned important 
weight to "like legal requirements" in determining whether there were "like 
circumstances." The ADF tribunal thus emphasized that both the claimant 
and its U.S. competitors were subject to the same U.S. "Buy America" 
provisions. Pope & Talbot found that the relevant comparators were lumber 
exporters subject to the same restrictive legal regime as the claimant, so there 
was no denial of national treatment if exporters in other unregulated 
provinces were not so limited. Feldman v. Mexico found the relevant 
comparators for purposes of MFN analysis to be a limited group of cigarette 
exporters subject to the same legal requirements as the claimant. The 
Methanex tribunal (citing Pope & Talbot) emphasized the importance of 
assuring that purported comparators face similar regulatory requirements. 
Looking at the question from the other direction, UPS v. Canada found a key 
difference between the parties there to be that Canada Post was subject to 
legal requirements under national law and international postal agreements 
that did not affect UPS.‘ 
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The tribunal however did not construe the factual situation of the claimant which 
could have revealed the competitive situation of the claimant and the disparate 
disadvantage that the measure has caused to Grand River as compared to the 
Subsequent Participating Manufacturers (SPM) who were the US cigarette 
manufacturers. The SPM did not have to make MSA payments with respect to their 
pre-MSA market share. The difference in treatment has caused the cigarettes by 
Grand River to be deprived from tax stamp and consequently declared forfeited. The 
tribunal should have constructed a purposive reading of national treatment by 
looking at all relevant facts of the case, especially where there are protectionist 
purpose and competition involved. Even the cases quoted by the tribunal in the 
passage above have somewhat construed a narrow assessment of likeness, i.e by 
looking at the legal situation of the comparators.  
 
While legal requirements are possible to be ‗deliberately created legal situation‘, the 
factual circumstances is more realistic and could highlight the genuine situations of 
likeness. This could be the economic parameters of likeness that includes the 
competitive relationship between the investors. The tribunal must be able to mark the 
line of which situation  that should be correctly looked at in a particular situation.
827
  
 
This would also cast a difference in the judgment of the UPS v Canada case in 
investment arbitration. The situation that the investor was in – similar needs of 
certain treatments relating to the postal industry which were enjoyed by the local 
comparator – was ignored by the tribunal. Rather than construing the situation of the 
investor, the tribunal took a literal approach of comparing likeness based on 
                                                 
827 Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services (n 376). 
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characteristics of the investments which diverted the decision away from the 
meaning of national treatment.  
 
3.2.2 Effet Utile 
 
The EU approach in reminding the effet utile of the EU integration in discrimination 
cases is a useful guide. It provides a firm direction for the court to determine whether 
a measure is discriminatory and restrictive to its achievement of the enjoyment of 
fundamental freedoms. The benefits of the effet utile approach are inter alia, that it 
could lead an incomplete rule effective, curbs the attempt to limit protection by 
literal interpretations and focusses on the function of a concept.
828
  In the 
minimalistic nature of the national treatment provision, this principle could assist in 
finding and apply the essence of national treatment. 
 
Generally, the two components of the underlying philosophies as explained in 2.1 
and 2.2 above, namely ‗level playing field‘ and ‗nationality based‘ form the effet 
utile of national treatment. The aim of the treaties is to provide level playing field to 
foreign investors /investments against nationals.  
 
In application, it will avoid narrow interpretations of a particular limb in the 
provision in the seclusion of the context. The cases of Methanex v USA, ADF Group 
Inc v US and UPS v Canada are a few obvious examples of non-construction of the 
broader context of national treatment in the analysis. In the case of Methanex for 
instance, the tribunal may be carrying on (of what it perceived correct), an 
                                                 
828 Norbert Reich, Understanding EU Law: Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community Law 
(Intersentia nv 2005) 31. 
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assessment of likeness by requiring the most like investment, but an effet utile 
approach would instruct the tribunal to look beyond the material assessment of 
likeness to likeness of the circumstances in enjoying the economic level playing field 
between foreign and nationals as guaranteed by the investment treaties.  
 
Similarly in the ADF Group Inc v US, the nationality based regulation was not 
highlighted as an important criterion of assessment of the legitimacy of the 
regulatory measure that resulted to a non-level playing field of nationals and foreign 
investors.  
 
In the case of UPS v Canada, the legitimacy of the regulatory measure was not 
construed at all, as the national treatment decision halted at the narrow interpretation 
of likeness which did not take into account the obvious interference of level playing 
field between competing investments.  
 
The effet utile principle is different from the treaty object and purpose approach. One 
may argue that if the approach of interpretation is solely based on the aims of the 
investment treaties, it would result to a pro-investor interpretation.
829
 The preambles 
of the investment treaties are clearly favouring foreign investors and would 
significantly affect the regulatory space of the host states. This thesis suggests that 
the effet utile of national treatment must include the general principles of 
reasonableness and proportionality. These elements combined would form a holistic 
and balanced approach in national treatment. It is a step towards a teleological 
                                                 
829 J Romesh Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 
USA 2012). , Christoph Schreuer, ‗International Investment Law and General International Law – 
From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration?‘ 
<http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/comments_treaty_interpret.pdf>, accessed on 13 July 
2013. 
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interpretation of national treatment which enhances legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the treaty.
830
 This is in line with Article 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT) which requires observance of good faith, ordinary meaning and 
context. 
 
An interesting note to make when discussing effet utile is its possible application in 
investment agreements which have bigger economic integration objectives.
831
 The 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) for instance aims at 
achieving ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).
832
 Looking at the composition of 
the provisions, one would conclude that it resembles the EU economic integration 
(freedom of establishment etc.). The question is, is it possible that the interpretation 
of national treatment will also follow the approach by the EU? It must be noted that 
the economic integration in the EU forms a strong effet utile in the interpretation of 
the non-discrimination principle in the freedoms guaranteed. If that is the case, host 
states must then be ready to accept the significant reduction of regulatory space, both 
in the assessment of justification of the regulatory measure both at the comparability 
level or the justification level.  
 
On the other hand, there are specific features of the ACIA that could possibly turn 
the interpretation approach away from the EU law. The effect of a particular 
paragraph in the preamble that urges the member states to recognise ‗the different 
levels of development within ASEAN especially the least developed Member States 
which require some flexibility including special and differential treatment‘ is 
                                                 
830 Teleological methodology of interpretation would mark the maturity of the international 
investment law. See DiMascio and Pauwelyn, ‗Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties‘ 
(n 49). 
831 This discussion is first introduced in Ch.4 of this thesis. 
832 ACIA 2009, (n 471), Preamble. 
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untested. This is a unique feature of the ACIA and could be a strong pushing ground 
for member states to justify differential treatment or unlikeness of two otherwise 
similar investments. 
  
The effet utile must therefore be tailored to the aim of the treaty, and therefore, 
although it may be tempting to follow the EU approach in achieving economic 
integration, regards must be made to the intrinsic features of the treaty.
833
 In 
investment agreements such as ASEAN, it will be interesting to see how the national 
regulatory interest is balanced or tolerated in the furtherance of the economic 
integration. In this particular situation, the invocation of the principles of good faith, 
reasonableness and proportionality are of prime importance. Applying the effet utile 
approach, the tribunal is able to look both within and beyond a particular limb of the 
national treatment provision to capture interpretation according to the VCLT.
834
 
 
The advantage of the application of effet-utile is that it revives reference to the 
context of the jurisprudence in the examination of discrimination. Taking into 
account the effet-utile of the investment treaties purpose is a plausible approach as it 
strives to give meaning to the text. In the case of Noble Ventures v Romania, the 
tribunal noted that:  
                                                 
833 ASEAN integration has been criticised for its lack of political will as compared to the EU. See 
Tan, ‗Will ASEAN Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?‘ (n 516).  
834 In a similar vein, Schreuer has highlighted the connotations related to the restrictive and effective 
interpretation of investment treaties, the former being sided to the host state while the latter to the 
investors. He cited the case of Mondev International v United States which disregarded such 
approaches of interpretation, but promoting interpretation in accordance to the VCLT. The tribunal in 
Mondev held:  
43. In the Tribunal‘s view, there is no principle either of extensive or restrictive 
interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in treaties. In the end the question is what the 
relevant provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the applicable rules of 
interpretation of treaties. 
See Mondev International v. United States of America, (n 64); Schreuer, ‗International Investment 
Law and General International Law – From Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration?‘ (n 829). 
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‗Reference should also be made to the principle of effectiveness (effet utile), 
which too, plays an important role in interpreting treaties.‘835 
 
Walde linked the principle of effectiveness to ‗good faith‘ in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law Treaties, although having a tenuous relationship, it 
nevertheless gives due recognition to the ‗sacred text‘ – in that every element has to 
have some sense.
836
 In the case of Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao 
Biskaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic the tribunal stated, 
 
‗When considering the purpose either of the BIT as a whole or of a particular 
provision, the Tribunal has to give such purpose an understanding that 
comports with the equally important principle of effectiveness (or principle 
of effet utile). Any treaty rule is to be interpreted in respect of its purpose as a 
rule with an effective meaning rather than as a rule having no meaning and 
effect. This principle is one of the main features of the law of treaties and has 
been applied by many ICSID Tribunals. It is given effect within Article 31(1) 
of the Vienna Convention by virtue of the requirement to interpret in good 
faith. Effectiveness of a treaty rule denotes the need to avoid an interpretation 
which leads to either an impossibility or absurdity or empties the provision of 
any legal effects.‘837  
                                                 
835 Noble Ventures Inc. v. Romania, (n 183), para 50. 
836 Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‘ (n 539) 739. Lauterpacht 
marked a stronger relationship between the principle of effectiveness and good faith. He contended 
that ‗the principle of effectiveness constitutes a general principle of law and a cogent requirement of 
good faith‘. H Lauterpacht, ‗Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties‘ (1949) 26 British Year Book of International Law 48, 83.  
837 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Biskaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Jurisdiction, 19 December 2012, para 50, 107. 
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It is also related to the ‗purposive‘ approach in the context of Article 31 (1) 
VCLT.
838
 The purpose is not only referred to the purpose or function of the treaty, it 
could also be referred to the purpose and function of a particular concept or principle 
in the treaty.
839
 This is an important tool needed in the interpretation of national 
treatment which has its own purpose and function (as a nationality – based 
discrimination provision), the application of which would add a meaningful 
substance to the interpretation of national treatment. 
 
The effet-utile of international investment law, i.e ‗promotion and protection of 
investments‘ is under-developed and less linked to national treatment.840 Based on 
the existing development of the jurisprudence, it is unclear on the extent of 
protection intended in the investment treaties. It is deemed that protection would be 
delivered by way of the separate substantive provisions of expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment (FET), national treatment, most favoured nation treatment 
(MFN) and full protection and security but the notion of investment protection by 
itself is not adequately articulated across the provisions. Thus, it is not surprising that 
in the national treatment interpretation, it is sometimes seen that the scrutiny of 
likeness was taken too far that the context or aim of national treatment and the effet- 
utile of the investment treaty is neglected. An illustration of this is the case of UPS 
Inc. v Canada where the scrutiny of the comparability of UPS and Canada Post was 
                                                 
838 Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‘ (n 539) 739,758–765. For 
concise discussion on effet utile and the non-codified rules of interpretation in the context of 
investment treaties, refer Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (n 829) 143–
194. 
839 Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‘ (n 539) 764. 
840 The importance of investment protection as catalyst in the assessment of national treatment is the 
reason why it is chosen as the analytical framework of this research, together with the concept of 
reasonableness. These two concepts are introduced in Ch.1 and explained further in the context of 
national treatment in investment law in Ch.2.  
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too deep into its characteristics that it out shadowed other considerations of 
circumstances reflecting the need of protection by the investor. In UPS v Canada, 
the tribunal noted that ‗that the importation of goods by courier required different 
customs treatments because of their different characteristics‘.841 This approach was 
criticised in the Separate Statement that by placing the orientation of finding likeness 
by asking ‗are the circumstances unlike?‘ It is an advantage to the host state and will 
not lead the tribunal to the justification of the treatment no matter how 
discriminatory it is.
842
 The context of national treatment in providing protection for 
foreign investors against discriminatory actions from the host state will be defeated. 
By placing the effet utile importantly,
843
 it will at least bring about three emphases in 
the investment treaty interpretation, firstly, that attention will not divert to small 
scrutiny of characteristics of likeness, secondly, that priority will be given to the 
circumstances of the investors as the prime factor for comparison and thirdly, that it 
will enhance the application of proportionality and reasonableness of a measure in 
the light of the effet-utile of the investment treaties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
841 UPS v Canada, (n 21),  para 99. 
842UPS v Canada, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass, 24 May 2007 (n 206), page 19. 
843 The effet utile of the national treatment will be explained in Ch.6. It is generally a holistic principle 
which should incorporate the values that national treatment provisions are nationality based 
discrimination provisions and that they function to provide level playing field for the protection and 
promotion of investment and recognise the public role of the state as long as they are executed 
reasonably, proportionately and in good faith. 
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3.3 Lessons from the International Human Rights Law 
 
3.3.1Margin of Appreciation 
 
Investment cases have not been explicit in the application of margin of appreciation 
in approving comparability of investors. It has nevertheless been considered 
implicitly. For instance in the case of El-Paso v Argentina, the issue was whether the 
banking sector which are mainly Argentinians and the oil and gas sector companies 
which are mainly foreign-owned are in like circumstances in facing the pesification 
measure. The tribunal accepted the government‘s measure as reasonable; i.e to 
balance for each sector the advantages and disadvantages of the general economic 
situation.
844
 In the case of Feldman for instance, when the claimant alleged 
discrimination for the denial of rebate which was given to other investors in the 
tobacco industry, the tribunal upheld the domestic rationales of treating producers 
and resellers differently. The tribunal held: 
 
‗As discussed in the Article 1110 section (supra, paras.115, 129), there are at 
least some rational bases for treating producers and re-sellers differently, e.g., 
better control over tax revenues, discourage smuggling, protect intellectual 
property rights, and prohibit gray market sales, even if some of these may be 
anti-competitive. Thus, as discussed in the expropriation section, the Tribunal 
does not believe that such producer – reseller discrimination is a violation of 
international law.‘845 
 
                                                 
844 El Paso v Argentina (n 173), para 310. 
845 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 170. 
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In another case of Paushok v Mongolia, the tribunal accepted the host states 
justification of the difference of tax law imposed on gold and copper as against the 
other industries such as the petroleum sector, and between gold and copper itself 
mainly to avoid tax evasion in the gold mining industry and to use the proceeds of 
copper exports for the advancement of copper production.
846
 The tribunal has been 
explicit in not interfering in the wisdom of the justification made by the host state in 
the absence of a strong claim of discrimination by the claimant of the measure being 
‗abusive‘ and ‗irrational‘.847  
 
However, in the case of OEPC v Ecuador, margin of appreciation was not given to 
the host state. Despite the host state‘s argument that the VAT refund policy was to 
ensure that the competition condition is not changed within an economic sector, the 
tribunal ruled that the claimant which was in the oil sector to be in like 
circumstances with other exporters of flowers, mining and seafood. Likeness was 
construed based on the criteria of ‗exporters‘ rather than producers, manufacturers or 
exporters based on the economic sectors which would serve the purpose of the VAT. 
 
Thus, as can be seen in OEPC v Ecuador  it is observed that without giving 
deference or margin of appreciation to the host states, the interest of the host state 
(which includes the interest of the people) would not receive the attention it deserves 
especially if the tribunal do not rigorously assess the objectivity and reasonableness 
of the measure. The recognition of the state‘s interest in property is less emphasised 
in investment cases as a principle. If the state‘s interest is recognised by way of 
                                                 
846 Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company, CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The Government 
of Mongolia UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, para 316. 
847 Ibid. 
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margin of appreciation, it would potentially yield a more practical outcome which 
takes into account democratic legitimacy
848
 and evolutive interpretation.
849
  
 
The practical on-going of state administration must be taken into account.  While it 
is expected that the states should grant full application of the protection of properties 
under the treaties, the administration of states could not have intended to give away 
legislative autonomy in all aspects especially when there is legitimate public need.  
 
There are at least a number of reasons why margin of appreciation should be applied 
in the interpretation of national treatment: 
 
1. Sustainable Jurisprudence: The application of margin of appreciation helps 
the development of a sustainable jurisprudence. It allows the states to comply 
and meet the standards of the international treaties and in line with the 
changing needs, norms or ‗shift of value‘ of the society.850 It tolerates the 
states‘ need to regulate and help to create the legitimate expectation of the 
foreign investors in matters within the margin of appreciation of the states, 
particularly relating to likeness of circumstances.  
 
2. Reducing Clashes and Enhance Legitimate Expectation: Especially in the 
view that international treaties are becoming closer and connected to each 
                                                 
848 Yourow, The Margin Appreciation Doctrine in the Dinamics of European Human Rights (n 686) 
75 
849 Ibid.,108. 
850 In the context of ECHR, such flexibility is needed in borderline cases in which it is hard to 
determine discriminatory treatment when there is certain shift of values in the society. Ellie Palmer, 
Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing 2009) 287. 
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other,
851
 the doctrine of margin of appreciation could help in reducing 
clashes and enhance the legitimate expectation of the standard of protection 
in investor/ individual- states claims. The incoherence would leave one to 
expect a different award or compensation arising out from a single regulatory 
measure brought under two different regimes, which would at the end makes 
the whole international regime a world of speculation.
852
 The margin of 
appreciation is described a ‗teleological and dynamic interpretative 
techniques‘ that contributes to the effectiveness of the system.853  
 
3. Wide Coverage of Investment and Absence of Exhaustive List of Exceptions: 
The wide coverage of investment may be affected by the states regulation. 
Regulations can affect from almost all aspect of investments. Especially in 
sensitive areas of investments which involve public amenities which are 
privatised such as water sewage and electricity, government measures may 
be largely felt by foreign investors. This nature makes the doctrine of margin 
                                                 
851 States within a region may have or will enter into regional international human rights treaties and 
at the same time having commitments under various investment treaties. For instance the European 
countries having the ECHR commitments, BITs and the EU law as well as the (upcoming) American 
FTAA which may be colliding with the ACHR. Schill made a remark on the ability of states to 
comply with investment obligations by way of deference: 
‗At the same time, it is important that States do not feel unduly prejudiced by the system of 
international investment protection and continue to be able to both accept arbitration as a 
legitimate way for settling investment disputes and remain able to implement legitimate 
domestic public policies.‘ 
See Stephan Schill, ‗Rethinking the Substantive Standards of Protection Under Investment Treaties – 
How Much Deference Should Investment Treaty Tribunals Pay to the Regulatory or Judicial Acts of 
Host States?‘ in The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), Flaws and 
Presumptions: Rethinking Arbitration Law and Practice in a new Arbitral Seat: Mauritius 
International Arbitration Conference 2010 (Mauritius Government Printing Office 2012) 365. 
852 As hypothetically speculated of the outcome of Metalclad, due to the ECHR probable invocation 
of ‗control of use of property‘, there would be no compensation if it was to be brought under ECHR. 
See Freeman, ‗Regulatory Expropriation under NAFTA Chapter 11‘ (n 615). On a real speculation, it 
could be seen from the case of Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v.  Zimbabwe, (n 619) 
under ICSID and Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v. Zimbabwe ,(n 619) invoking human rights 
protection under SADC. See discussion on the overlapping of human rights and investment claims in 
Ch.5. See Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, 30 
August 2000. 
853 Rhona KM Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press 
2007) 90. 
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of appreciation necessary, similar to the ECHR which has wide coverage of 
claims.
854
 Furthermore, international investment treaties does not have 
explicit list of exceptions as one would find in Article XX GATT/WTO 
which is due to the nature of trade.
855
 Thus the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation could soften the effects of the investment treaties on the states, 
which could be otherwise too harsh on the exercise of regulatory function. 
 
4. Practical Tool of Administrative Law: Margin of appreciation is the tradition 
of European countries to balance conflicting rights in public law. For the 
purpose of administration, as states have ‗direct and continuous contact with 
the vital forces of their countries‘, they are seen apt to assess the local 
needs.
856
 It reflects a democratic standard (together with reasonableness and 
proportionality) that can harmonise and reconcile the interest of the investors 
and the people. As proposed by Walde, this judicial importation of 
democratic standards could be elevated as one of ‗comparative administrative 
law‘ as general principles of law under Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ Statute or 
as a principle of interpretation deriving from ‗restrictive interpretation‘ in the 
past.
857
  
 
5. Consistency with General International Law Practice: Margin of 
appreciation is not only applied in domestic laws. While it is renowned in the 
                                                 
854 This observation is also made by Freya Baeten in drawing the similarities between international 
human rights and international investment law. This research provides how this observation could be 
advanced, i.e by the application of margin of appreciation in assessing likeness. See Freya Baetens, 
‗Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment 
Law‘ (n 97). 
855 There are exceptions is some investment treaties. See discussion on Aims and Effect Test in 3.1.2 
above.  
856 UK v Connors, para 82. See also Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human 
Rights Act (n 850) 182. 
857 Walde, ‗Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‘ (n 539). 
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ECHR, it is also considered as a norm of interpretation in the form of 
deference in ECJ, WTO and ICJ.
858
  
 
6. State Concerns in Investor-State Disputes: Eventually, the existence of 
proper guideline on how to construe likeness will not be left under the risk of 
‗who arbitrates‘.859 This stems from the concern that many arbitrators are 
from the commercial field or the industry who would have the tendency to 
construe the government and investors in a level playing field, thus 
construing the cases from a commercial point of view and disregard, neglect 
or overlook governments as a sovereign power which decisions would 
impact the people of the government. The doctrine of margin of appreciation 
would place proper regards to the societal needs and values which are state 
concerns.  
 
The application of margin of appreciation must however be guided primarily by 
other principles of reasonableness, proportionality and good faith. The downside of 
the ECHR jurisprudence in this aspect is the lack of these elements portrayed in its 
case law despite its resonances as fundamental principles.
860
 The investment 
jurisprudence must take cognisance this experience in the ECHR and the impacts 
that lack of proportionality would bring to the legitimacy of investment decisions.
861
 
                                                 
858 Shany, ‗Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?‘ (n 715). 
859 Another problem that may arise from this is the tendency of commercial arbitrators to ignore 
general public international law which is more rooted on the nature of states as sovereigns and public 
interest.  
860 For explanation and illustration on this matter, please refer to Ch.5.  
861 The legitimacy of investment treaties are subject to comments by observers, among which 
concerns are the imbalance of states obligations against the absence of explicit countervailing duties 
by the investors and the fast track investor-state dispute arbitration. See Luke Eric Peterson, 
‗Evaluating Canada‘s 2004 Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement in Light of Civil Society 
Concerns‘ [2006] Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC). < 
http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/trade_2006-06_foreign_investment_memo_e.pdf>, 
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The importance of proportionality is recognised in cases. In the case of Parkering v 
Lithuania, the tribunal held, that a discriminatory measure can only violate 
international law if it is ‗unreasonable or lacking proportionality, for instance, it must 
be inapposite or excessive to achieve an otherwise legitimate objective of the 
State‘.862 In that case, the tribunal accorded to the public interest justification brought 
by the host state in justifying the difference of treatment between the comparators.  
 
3.3.2 Practicality of the Three Prong Test of National Treatment in the 
Determination of Comparators 
 
In investment arbitration cases, there are at least two factors of why likeness is 
construed from the viewpoint of the regulatory measure or justification. Firstly, it is 
due to the scarcity of like comparators (ranging from identical to most like to like 
comparators in terms of the nature of investment) and secondly due to the 
vulnerability of investments as they are prone to be effected by government 
regulations from every aspect of investment (not confined to pricing as in most 
GATT/WTO cases) including employment, compliance with environment, health 
and safety regulations and economic implications.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
accessed on 20 July 2013.  Other  concerns are, in the context of NAFTA  the ‗democratic deficit‘ of  
law making and investment arbitrations as a ‗private for a for public issues‘. Jeffery Atik, ‗Repenser 
NAFTA Chapter 11: A Catalogue of Legitimacy Critiques‘ (2003) 29 Loyola-LA Public Law 
Research Paper. 
862
 Parkerings v Lithuania, (n 257), para. 368. 
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The factors mentioned have somehow supported the practicality of this approach. 
When there are other investors which are in the same economic sector or in 
competition but not discriminated by the measure, the tribunal would put its attention 
to them. When there is none, then there would be a tendency that the comparator is 
sought from other investors that share similar circumstances in view of the 
legislation imposed. Andrew Newcombe has put forth a hypothesis in this aspect, 
that the relevant comparator in response to a legislative measure on pollution would 
appropriately be an investor in the same area although the investor may be in a 
different economic sector as compared to an investor in the same economic sector 
but located in another area in which is not affected by the legislation.
863
  
 
The Balance 
 
As the ECHR jurisprudence has indicated, over-construing likeness from the 
regulatory measure may not lead to appropriate results. An example of a case that 
over-construed likeness from the regulatory measure in investment arbitration is the 
OEPC v Ecuador,
864
 which resulted in the ignorance of clear dissimilarity of 
economic sector and the absence of competitiveness between the comparators. On 
the other hand, an example of case that has over-construed likeness without looking 
at the situation of investment as a result of the government measure is the case of 
UPS v Canada.
865
 In that case, the tribunal scrutinised the minute details of the 
characters of the investment, such as the manner in which mails and goods arrive so 
as to differentiate between postal traffic and courier shipments. The tribunal however 
                                                 
863 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (n 65) 
165. 
864 OEPC v Ecuador, (n 18).  
865 UPS, Inc v Canada, (n 21), para 99.  
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did not construe the relevance of the detailed scrutiny of likeness (despite that those 
characteristics have been endorsed by international custom experts) to the measure 
and how would such measure effect the situation of the claimant.
866
  
 
The dilemma is there. By not merging the justification test, the tribunal will be 
missing an important aspect of assessment if it limits the assessment of likeness at 
the comparability test.
867
 However, by merging, it would be odd to ask the state to 
justify itself in a case where comparability is not established. It is suggested here, as 
the cases of OEPC v Ecuador and UPS v Canada have portrayed, that the oddness 
will only surface in two situations; firstly if there is clear comparability but ignored, 
giving way to justification and secondly when there is clear relevance of the 
justification to the likeness of the investors but ignored, scrutinising the 
characteristics of the investment. 
 
The balance is ‗relevance‘. In the case of CPI Inc. v Mexico, the tribunal has 
correctly assessed likeness independent of justification because the latter brought by 
the host state was irrelevant to the likeness of the comparators. On the other hand, in 
the case of UPS v Canada, the tribunal should have brought the justification test into 
likeness to assess the reasonableness of the measure which regarded the comparators 
as unlike. This would detect the strategies taken by the host states to pursue the 
                                                 
866
 The tribunal in UPS v Canada held that there was no breach of national treatment as the 
comparators were not in like circumstances. The tribunal analysed the question of likeness between 
courier and postal traffic in detail in terms of their object, mandate, transport and method of delivery. 
The claimant alleged less favourable treatment which included denial of brokerage service, exclusion 
of certain functions, obligation to pay certain costs related to CADEX, payment of penalties and non-
enforceability of Customs Law in the postal stream. It appeared that the tribunal has attempted in 
assessing the likeness of the investments by scrutinising into the differences in detail of an otherwise 
similar comparators. 
867 In the case of Methanex v USA, the tribunal‘s assessment did not go beyond likeness test in this 
case. It has almost abruptly concluded that there was no discrimination after a short consideration of 
likeness. The discussion evolved mainly around the relevance of GATT/WTO jurisprudence of ‗like 
product‘. Methanex v USA, (n 19). 
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likeness test into detail, independent of the justification test if there is little prospect 
of defending the latter. 
 
The ECHR jurisprudence allows the examination of the justification of a measure 
when assessing the comparability of the applicants and their comparators. This, as a 
result provides no clear demarcation of the steps that comparators should be 
determined before the justification is perused. Thus the instruments used in assessing 
likeness rest on the overall situation of the comparators and how likeness of situation 
of the comparators is affected by the alleged discriminatory measure, and the 
justification thereof.  
 
3.3.3 Proportionality 
 
Generally, the proportionality principle is increasingly accepted in investment 
decisions.
868
 It is seen as an important tool to balance the interpretation of investors‘ 
rights in the treaties.
869
 While it seems to appear in other substantive principles of the 
investment treaties, it has not been invoked explicitly in national treatment. 
Nevertheless, the logic of assessing the execution of legitimate aims proportionately 
can be seen in several cases. In the case of CPI Inc. v Mexico for instance, the 
tribunal rendered the HFCS Tax was not relevant to the justification brought. The 
fact that they were being excluded from the US market access which rendered 
Mexican sugar cane producers not in like situation with HFCS producers (who were 
                                                 
868 Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 
2010; Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, (n 251); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. 
The United Mexican States, (n 615). 
869 SB Leinhardt, ‗Some Thoughts on Foreign Investors‘ Responsibilities to Respect Human Rights‘ 
(2013) 10 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) <http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1927>, accessed on 25 January 2013. 
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not barred from the Mexican market) was irrelevant to the decision to impose the 
HFCS Tax.
870
 Although the court would have accepted the crisis of the Mexican 
sugar industry, the nature of the measure to address the crisis was not reasonably 
related and was therefore rejected by the tribunal. This was a proportionality 
approach taken by the tribunal, without which would render all legitimate 
justifications acceptable without perusing into the manner in which they are 
executed.  
 
However, the proportionality principle, being not explicit in its cases, is assumed 
attended to in its assessment of reasonableness. In SD Myers v Canada, the tribunal 
mentioned: 
 
A finding of ‗likeness‘ does not dispose of the case. It may set the stage for 
an inquiry into whether the different treatment of situations found to be ‗like‘ 
is justified by legitimate public policy measures that are pursued in a 
reasonable manner. 
 
The reasonableness of the manner in which a legitimate aim is pursued would 
normally be an assessment of proportionality. Thus in the case of Feldman,
871
 it is 
hard to demarcate whether proportionality is assessed or neglected. In Feldman, the 
tribunal accepted the rational bases for treating producers and resellers differently, 
holding that only trading companies are alike, but proportionality was not assessed. 
In such facts of the case where the investors and the comparator are clearly in the 
                                                 
870 CPI, Inc.  v Mexico, (n 98), para 129. 
871 Feldman v Mexico, (n 15), para 170. 
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tobacco business suggesting likeness to the naked eye, the proportionality test would 
be extremely vital in determining whether the ruling of unlikeness was proportionate.  
 
Another problem due to the lack of attention towards the principle of proportionality 
is the vagueness of the standard in investment decisions. In the case of GAMI v 
Mexico, the tribunal was not only lenient (rather, brief or unclear) on what 
constituted ‗rational‘ of the measure, it also seem to suggest ‗ineffectiveness‘ as 
proportionately acceptable. Although the national treatment claim may have failed 
on lack of evidence or other grounds, the line of decision rings a different and 
misleading message on the standard of reasonableness and proportionality.
872
 
 
It is suggested that proportionality should be explicitly assessed in national treatment 
cases. It will not only result to a more systematic judicial interpretation, it could also 
enhance the legitimacy of the assessment of likeness.  
 
4.0 Analysis of Findings against Analytical Framework 
 
The analytical framework throughout this research is investment security and 
reasonableness. The connection between the findings of this research to the 
analytical framework as laid in the proposal chapter will be explained in this section.  
 
 
                                                 
872 GAMI Investments, Inc. v The Government of the United Mexican States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 
Final Award, 15 November 2004,  paras 111-115. 
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4.1 Investment Security:  
 
This research has taken into account investment security as the observational 
standpoint in building the criteria for likeness. It acknowledges that investment 
security is the overall reason of investment treaties which seek to promote and 
protect investments by reducing the political risks exposed to foreign investments, 
mid-sized and multinational companies alike.
873
 The hierarchical relation of state and 
investors grants that host states an advantageous position by the exercise of 
regulatory powers which could affect foreign investments.   
 
This research promotes investment security by firstly acknowledging it as the 
underlying philosophy of the investment treaties. The preambles of investment 
treaties to ‗promote and protect‘ investments coupled with its substantives provisions 
and dispute resolution clauses recognises investment security as the context of 
interpretation of its clauses. National treatment has to also carry this context in its 
interpretation.
 874
 
 
It is thus important to understand the linkage of investment security and ways to 
incorporate it in the functioning of the non-discrimination principle. This thesis 
suggests that the values of national treatment must be made clear; firstly that it 
promotes level playing field between nationals and non-nationals and secondly, that 
                                                 
873 Vandevelde, ‗Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, The‘ (n 337); Thomas . Walde, 
‗Investment Arbitration as a Discipline for Good Governance: Overview and Epilogue‘ (2004) 2 Oil, 
Gas & Energy Law Journal (OGEL) <http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1180> accessed 29 April 
2013. 
874 The explanation of ‗investment security‘ as the analytical framework of this research is explained 
in Ch.1.  
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it prohibits nationality based discrimination.
875
 These values are the first step 
towards achieving investment security.  
 
The next important contribution towards investment security is the use of ‗effet 
utile’.876 It drives the attention of the tribunal on the objects, purpose, values, 
effective and reasonable interpretation of national treatment. This would avoid the 
tribunals from being distracted by specific issues, in particular the determination of 
likeness, which would lead to a narrow construction of national treatment.   
 
 This thesis also recognises the economic situations of investors as a factor of 
likeness. This is by way of assuming likeness of investments in the existence of 
competitive relationship. Thus if there is obvious evidence of competitive 
relationship between the investors, the host states will have to assert stronger 
evidence that the regulatory measure was necessary to either disprove likeness or 
justify exceptions.
877
 
 
The situation of investors is the prime area of research in the assessment of likeness. 
It is thus forwarded in this thesis that, firstly, the tribunal should not confine itself to 
the narrow characteristic based assessment.
878
 Secondly, it must take into 
consideration both factual and legal circumstances of the investments.
879
 Thirdly, it 
allows the flexibility of independently or merging the assessment of likeness with 
the regulatory justification, depending on which could serve the most meaningful 
                                                 
875 See ‗Lesson Learnt 1: The Values of National Treatment‘ in 2.0 above.   
876 See ‗Effet Utile’ in 3.2.2 above.  
877 See ‗Competition Test‘ in 3.1.1 above.  
878 See ‗Emphasis on the ‗Situation‘ of the Comparators‘ in 3.2.1 above.  
879 Ibid. 
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assessment.
880
 All of these factors are supporting investment securities in the 
interpretation of national treatment contributed by this research.  
 
4.2 Reasonableness:  
 
This thesis has observed how the GATT/WTO, EU and international human rights 
jurisprudence consider reasonableness in the jurisprudences. The EU law for 
instance requires that the challenged measure must be ‗objectively comparable‘ or be 
justified by ‗overriding reasons in the general interest‘.881  GATT/WTO promulgates 
reasonableness by the requirement that measures must not constitute ―means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination‖882 while the international human rights 
jurisprudence highlights measure to have ‗objective and reasonable justification‘883.  
 
Similarly, investment treaties do not prohibit states from exercising its policy space 
to create regulations. They must however be done in conformity to the international 
obligations and genuinely representing public issues that the states face as 
sovereigns. International investment arbitration thus could not be treated as any other 
commercial arbitration.
884
 Due to the broadness of investment treaties (in particular 
                                                 
880 See ‗Practicality of the Three Prong Test of National Treatment in the Determination of 
Comparators‘ in 3.3.2 above.  
881
 Manninen,(n 529) para 28 and 20, Case C-35/98, Verkooijen,(n 555) para 43 and Case C-512/03, 
J.E.J. Blanckaert v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/ Particulieren/ Ondernemingenbuitenlandte 
Heerlen,  para 42. 
882 GATT, Article XX. 
883 Darby v Sweden, (App.11581/85), 23 October 1990, Series A, No 187, (1991) 13 EHRR 774, para 
31; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III, 
para 91; Spadea and Scalabrino v Italy (App. 12868/87), 28 September 1995, para 46. 
884 William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‗The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in 
Investor- State Arbitrations‘ in Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (OUP Oxford 2010). See also Schill, ‗Rethinking the Substantive Standards of Protection 
under Investment Treaties – How Much Deference Should Investment Treaty Tribunals Pay to the 
Regulatory or Judicial Acts of Host States?‘ (n 851). 
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the national treatment provision) and the absence of defined exceptions in most 
investment treaties that could assist interpretation,
885
 there is more need for public 
law concepts that could enhance good governance.
886
 The application of 
reasonableness should therefore be regarded as a norm. On this note, the framework 
of this analysis is to ensure that the interpretation of national treatment must be 
grounded on this concept.  
 
Operationally, reasonableness is taken into account in the assessment of likeness in 
this thesis in at least two functions, as a tool and as an end, sometimes 
interchangeably.  It is as a tool to balance the complex conflicts of interests between 
the investors and host states. It is particularly a core tool to assess the legitimacy of 
the regulatory measure. What is deemed reasonable must be considered by the 
tribunal as to its legitimacy. Here, the tribunal must acknowledge that there are 
reasonable grounds that the host states should be allowed to put forth to discriminate 
local and foreign investors considering its public role in representing the people. 
This can be done by the conferment of margin of appreciation to the host states.
887
 
As Chapter Five has extensively discussed, the conferment of margin of appreciation 
to the host state could ensure that matters of public interest within the state‘s specific 
socio-economic interest are addressed.  
 
                                                 
885 Such as Article XX in GATT/WTO. 
886 This is considering that investment law is not mere commercial disputes. See Benedict Kingsbury 
and Stephan Schill, ‗Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors‘ Rights with State Regulatory Actions 
in the Public Interest—the Concept of Proportionality‘ in Stephan Schill (ed), International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010). 
887 See ‗Margin of Appreciation‘ in 3.3.1 above. Deference is essential to investment arbitrations due 
its public nature. See Schill, ‗Rethinking the Substantive Standards of Protection under Investment 
Treaties – How Much Deference Should Investment Treaty Tribunals Pay to the Regulatory or 
Judicial Acts of Host States?‘ (n 851); Anthea Roberts, ‗The Next Battleground: Standards of Review 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration‘ (2011) 16 International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
Congress Series 170–180. 
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Reasonableness again steps in to determine the relevance and appropriateness of the 
execution of the measure to the issue at question. This thesis suggests that the 
principle of proportionality could fortify this function of reasonableness.
888
 The 
principle of proportionality has not been taken as a clear requirement in the 
investment disputes. There are thus risks that it may be overlooked by the tribunals. 
It is suggested in this thesis that it should be the final filter that the tribunal must 
ascertain before a measure is considered legitimate.
889
 
 
It functions as an end to allow the tribunal to analyse the plausibility of the outcome 
of the adoption of a particular methodology or interpretation. It is submitted that the 
outcome of an investment decision must be perceived as just. One way to do this is 
for the tribunal to adopt the ‗relevance‘ test in deciding whether to adopt the 
independent three prong likeness test or the merging of justification approach in 
determining likeness.
890
 It is also important for the tribunals to understand the 
dynamics of the assessment likeness if the facts are near or moving away from the 
factors such as similar economic sector, competition and protectionism.
891
  
 
4.0 Coherence and Legitimate Expectation 
 
The significance of this research is that it promotes coherence in the interpretation of 
national treatment.
892
 This research could be a significant guideline in understanding 
the application of the national treatment provision.   The coherence of criteria to 
                                                 
888 See ‗Proportionality‘ in 3.3.3. above.  
889 See ‗Criteria of Likeness in International Investment Law: A Suggested Approach‘ in 6.0 below.  
890 See ‗Practicality of the Three Prong Test of National Treatment in the Determination of 
Comparators‘ in 3.3.2 above.  
891 See ‗Criteria of Likeness in International Investment Law: A Suggested Approach‘ in 6.0 below.  
892 See 6.1 in Ch.1. 
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assess likeness will in turn create legitimate expectation for both the state and the 
investors. This thesis pushes this by arguing that the decisions of the investment 
tribunals are able to develop a coherent jurisprudence on national treatment and 
could then result to a set of legitimate expectation in which host states should act in 
accordance to.   
 
Legitimate expectation is formed on two bases: Firstly, by signing investment 
treaties which provides national treatment, it creates legitimate expectation that 
foreign investors shall be treated in an unbiased manner. Thus where the host state 
has provided a particular regulatory atmosphere in which investors expectedly rely 
on, it will be against legitimate expectation if it is modified or interfered by 
providing less favourable treatment to foreign investors.
893
 Secondly, building from 
the first argument, it is submitted that the doctrinal embodiment and the underlying 
philosophies of national treatment which influences its interpretation should 
constitute legitimate expectation as a part of coherence and legitimacy. 
 
This section primarily explains the second basis of legitimate expectation by 
accumulating the findings of this thesis.  
 
Firstly, the national treatment principle is intended to discipline states only if states 
introduce unjustified protectionist measures. Protectionism without justification will 
be an indicator an irrational measure and thus a state could not use the same 
justification to conclude that the investors are not in like circumstances. Whenever 
there is evidence of protectionism, the burden of proof will shift to the state to show 
                                                 
893 Mesa Power v Canada, (n 749). See also Footer, ‗On the Laws of Attraction: Examining the 
Relationship between Foreign Investment and International Trade‘ (n  318) 131. 
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that there is legitimate reason for such measure. The existence of discrimination 
against nationality can be deduced from the structure of the measure and the 
disparate impact on the foreign investors. 
 
Secondly, investments in the same economic sector and in competition with each 
other will likely be assumed as in like circumstances. Any justification brought by 
the state must be of overriding public interest, reasonable and proportionate to be 
able to negate likeness or to justify discrimination. 
 
Thirdly, it must be acknowledged that host states have a wide margin of appreciation 
if the measure involved issues of genuine public interest, for instance health, 
environment, economic necessity and safety. This margin of appreciation can 
conclude that investments are not in like circumstances. The margin of appreciation 
given to the states must be restricted based on the principle of reasonableness and 
proportionality. 
 
By having such coherence, investors could predict the outcome of a case if they wish 
to challenge a discriminatory measure under national treatment. Similarly host states 
could also regulate within its legitimate sphere based on the same legitimate 
expectation. This will avoid cases being brought for arbitration on meritless grounds 
that would save the consumption of time and money. 
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6.0 Criteria of Likeness in International Investment Law: A Suggested 
Approach 
 
As a summary of the discussions, this research provides a flowchart in which 
national treatment cases should be construed to determine likeness. This chart will 
incorporate the legitimate expectations in the previous section and suggests the 
situations in which the three prong test or the merged justification test could 
appropriately be applied. This chart assumes that less favourable treatment is already 
accorded to the foreign investors (as in the first step of the three prong test) and 
proceeds at examining the question of likeness and justification. The explanation of 
the chart will indicate the lessons learnt taken from GATT/WTO, EU and the 
international human rights jurisprudence and reaffirms plausible methodologies 
already applied in investment tribunals.  
 
The flowchart is as the following: 
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Assessment of Likeness: A Suggested Approach
Same Economic Sector
Yes / No
Competition
Other Factors
(e.g Legal 
procedures)
Yes / No
Assumption of 
Likeness
 Market Based
Justification 
relevant to 
likeness
Competition
Yes / No
Yes / No
Justified?
Justification 
irrelevant to 
likeness. 
Justified?
Yes / No
Proportionality
Yes / No
In like circumstances but 
failed on ground of 
justification
Not in like 
circumstances
Not in like 
circumstances
Justification failed 
on the ground 
proportionality
Yes / No?
In like circumstances 
and justification upheld
Three Prong Test 
(Independent Approach)
Merge Justification 
Approach
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The first enquiry is whether the comparators are in the same economic sector. 
Similarity in the economic sector is the most plausible starting point for assumption 
of likeness. This is due to the high possibility that investors in the same economic 
sector are likely to be in competition or face similar regulatory measures and 
business situations. The NAFTA cases of Pope & Talbot v Canada and SD Myer, 
Incs v Canada are in line with this approach. This is a unique approach in 
international investment law. In Pope & Talbot the tribunal upheld, 
 
‗In evaluating the implications of the legal context, the Tribunal believes that, 
as a first step, the treatment accorded [to] a foreign owned investment 
protected by Article 1102(2) should be compared with that accorded 
domestic investments in the same business or economic sector.‘894 
 
The same question is not asked in GATT/WTO, EU nor the international human 
rights jurisprudences. In GATT/WTO for instance, the enquiries are whether the 
products are similar. Taking into account the economic nature of investment treaties, 
it is therefore plausible to construe likeness within the same economic sector as the 
first enquiry. 
 
Next is the issue of competition. Investments in the same economic sector may or 
may not be in competition with each other. The test applied here is whether the 
comparators are in competition of investment opportunity.
895
 In order to encompass 
the wide range of investment activities, it is submitted that investment opportunities 
                                                 
894 Pope & Talbot v Canada, (n 20), para 78. See also SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 24), para 250.  
895 See ‗Level Playing Field‘ in 2.1 above. 
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can be further categorised into market-based competition and non-market based 
competition. The first category involves similar economic activities, often the same 
products as the subject of investments as trade. This often involves investments in 
the manufacturing sector. This is exactly the overlapping area that may invoke cases 
under both regimes.
896
 A single policy may affect both trade and investments. 
897
 If 
the comparators are competing in the same market and the same consumers, it is 
submitted that this must result in assumption of likeness.
898
  
 
The reality of competition of investment opportunities is not confined to the 
proceeds of sales in the market. Other factors that may impede competitiveness of 
investments are, for instance, exemptions of certain procedural requirements, grant 
or retraction of permits and imposition of certain taxes that may cause less 
favourable situations for foreign investors in the same economic sector. There are 
many types of foreign direct investments that may not involve direct competition in 
sales or services especially those in the extractive industries or infrastructure.
899
 A 
case to illustrate a situation of investments in the same economic sector but not 
competing in a market-based competition is Bayindir v Pakistan. The investment 
opportunities competed was the more favourable construction schedule and similar 
(lenient) treatment in the PMC-JV‘s unsatisfactory performance.900 Similarly, in the 
                                                 
896 ADM v Mexico, (n 355); CPI, Inc v Mexico, (n 98) and Methanex v USA (n 19). See also Tania C 
Voon and Andrew D Mitchell, ‗Time to Quit? Assessing International Investment Claims Against 
Plain Tobacco Packaging in Australia‘ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic Law., for 
possible trade and investment claims against plain tobacco packaging. 
897 Debra P Steger, ‗International Trade and Investment: Towards a Common Regime?‘ in Roberto 
Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade 
Forum (2013) 159. 
898 See further discussion on competition as a criterion of likeness and relevant cases in ‗Competition 
Test‘ in 3.1.1 above. 
899 Theodore H. Moran, ‗Foreign Direct Investment and Development: Novel Challenges‘ in Roberto 
Echandi and Pierre Sauv  (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade 
Forum (Cambridge University Press 2013) 42. 
900 Bayindir v Pakistan, (n 290), para 393. 
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case Parkerings v Lithuania, both of the investments compete the bid to construct 
the two multi-storey car park system (the ‗MSCP‘) in the City of Vilnius.901  The 
claimant purported that, 
 
‗In the Claimant‘s view, the Companies Pinus Proprius and BP were facing 
similar circumstances. The refusal of the City of Vilnius to sign a JAA or a 
Cooperation Agreement prevented BP from the construction of any MSCP in 
Vilnius and thus deprived it of the opportunity to carry out its investment as 
it was entitled to do under the Agreement.‘ 
 
This was the subject of the competition. In situations or clear competition like this, 
the tribunal should assume likeness if there is no justification brought by the host 
state that could negate it.
902
 
 
Once the tribunal has arrived at this stage, the tribunal should assess whether there 
are justifications of the regulatory measure brought by the host state that are relevant 
to the assessment of likeness. If the justification is relevant to the assessment of 
likeness, the tribunal should adopt the merge justification test and determine the 
legality of the regulatory distinction. In this case, the assumption of likeness is 
withheld until the legitimacy of the distinctive regulatory is ascertained. At this 
point, the burden of proof on the host states is higher so as to be convincing enough 
                                                 
901 This claim was brought under most favoured nation principle, but it could nevertheless shed some 
light in the interpretation of national treatment.  
‘Most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses are by essence very similar to ―National Treatment‖ 
clauses. They have similar conditions of application and basically afford indirect advantages 
to their beneficiaries, namely a treatment no less favourable than the one granted to third 
parties.  Tribunals‘ analyses of the National Treatment standard will therefore also be useful 
to discuss the alleged violation of the MFN standard.’ 
See Parkerings v Lithuania, (n 257), para 366. 
902 The host state in both Bayindir v Pakistan and Parkerings v Lithuania brought justifications to 
negate likeness which was accepted by the tribunal. This will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
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against the assumption of likeness of investments in the same economic sector. 
Taking the same case of Bayindir v Pakistan, the tribunal took into consideration the 
difference in experience and expertise of the foreign investor and local competitor so 
as to render the investments not in like circumstances.  
 
‗The expertise and experience of the contractors constitutes another 
difference. Bayindir benefited from considerable experience in handling large 
projects, while PMCJV did not. This difference which was reflected in the 
higher rates charged by Bayindir, played a role in the expectations that NHA 
formed with respect to each contractor.‘903 
 
This justification was relevant to the assessment of likeness and therefore the 
tribunal has correctly adopted the merge justification test. The investors are deemed 
alike only if the differences of the regulatory measure are unjustified. In  a similar 
vein, the tribunal in Parkering v Lithuania asserted: 
 
‗However, the situation of the two investors will not be in like circumstances 
if a justification of the different treatment is established.‘904 
 
 The tribunal in Bayindir has considered the reasonableness of the distinctions, 
judging from the considerations of lack of expertise, experience, foreign currency 
component, mobilization advance and the old equipment, machinery and plant,
905
 but 
had not regarded the proportionality of the measure. The decision may probably be 
the same had proportionality be evaluated, but a clearer and systematic assessment 
                                                 
903 Bayindir v Pakistan , (n 290), para 410. 
904 Parkerings v Lithuania (n 257), para 375. 
905 Bayindir v Pakistan, (n 290), paras 403-411. 
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on the reasonableness and proportionality of the measure even if the case fails on the 
account of likeness test would contribute to a more reasoned award.   
 
The case of Parkerings v Lithuania has probably shown an extent of systematic 
analysis in merge of justification case.
906
 It explicitly highlighted the importance of 
reasonableness and proportionality in discrimination cases: 
 
‗However, to violate international law, discrimination must be unreasonable 
or lacking proportionality, for instance, it must be inapposite or excessive to 
achieve an otherwise legitimate objective of the State.  An objective 
justification may justify differentiated treatments of similar cases.  It would 
be necessary, in each case, to evaluate the exact circumstances and the 
context.‘ 
 
In the assessment of the reasonableness of a regulatory distinction, the tribunal must 
take due regards to the probability of protectionist purpose which is not backed by 
reasonable justifications.
907
 If the measure is legitimate, the comparators are declared 
not in like circumstances because of the distinctive regulation.  
 
If the justification is independent from the assessment of likeness (such as in the case 
of CPI Inc. v Mexico), the tribunal could then pursue to determine the legitimacy of 
the regulatory measure once likeness is declared. This is generally the model taken 
from Article XX GATT/WTO which examines the legitimacy of the regulatory 
                                                 
906 Parkerings v Lithuania (n 257), paras 375-396. 
907 See discussion on protectionism in ‗Nationality Based Discrimination‘ in 2.2 above.  
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measure at a later stage.
908
 This is also the three-prong test approach suggested in the 
case of Pope v Talbot, Inc v Canada
909
.  The process of determining whether the 
merge of justification approach or the three-prong test approach is important, firstly 
to declare likeness at its right stage and secondly, to avoid tribunals from being 
allured to the politicising of this grey area by the parties.
910
 
 
If the justification in the three prong test is not accepted by the tribunal, the tribunal 
can then conclude that the comparators were ‗in like circumstances but failed on the 
ground of justification‘. In cases where justifications of the host states are accepted, 
the tribunal must countercheck its proportionality.  If the justification passes the 
proportionality test, then there is no breach of national treatment. If it does not, the 
tribunal will conclude that the justification failed on the ground of proportionality. 
The latter is not construed well in investment arbitrations. It is assumed that the 
tribunal will consider proportionality in the justification test. There is a risk that the 
tribunal may overlook it.
911
 This is also an important tool to balance the margin of 
appreciation applied by the host state. This is also an important lesson learnt from 
the international human rights jurisprudence, in particular the ECHR, which 
explicitly asserts the role of proportionality in its discrimination assessment but 
nevertheless seems to neglect it in providing margin of appreciation to the states.
912
   
 
                                                 
908 Legum and Petculescu, ‗GATT Article XX and International Investment Law‘ (n 319) 
909 Pope v Talbot, Inc v Canada (n 20). 
910 The international human rights law in particular has shed some light in the plausibility of the 
merge of justification approach in some cases to derive at a more meaningful interpretation of 
likeness. It has also in some scholarly articles highlighted the threat of such a method being 
politicised to favour a certain argument. See Cornides, ‗Three Case Studies on Anti-Discrimination‘ 
(n 711). 
911 See the case of GAMI v Mexico discussed in ‗Proportionality‘ in 3.3.3 above. 
912 The problems with excessive use of margin of appreciation if not counterchecked by the principle 
of proportionality is explained in Ch.5. 
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Moving to the right hand side of the graph, this thesis does not limit the possibility of 
likeness to investments which are in the same economic sector.  Investments which 
are not in the same economic sector may still compete the same investment 
opportunities.
913
 A few examples are; regulatory measures that affect a broader 
group of economic sectors  such as labor requirements which affect garments or 
footwear investments, measures for a particular geographical catchment  or  
environmental regulations that may affect infrastructure investments and power 
projects alike.  
 
It must be cautioned that the assessment of likeness in these cases will involve heavy 
scrutiny. It is particularly in these types of cases that the claimant must show that 
there is discrimination based on nationality based on the overall structure and effect 
of the regulatory measure. The tribunal must be careful of the possibility of declaring 
likeness in broad range of comparators unless there is reasoned analysis that leads to 
that conclusion.  
 
Cases that have attempted to invoke this are El-Paso v Argentina and OEPC v 
Ecuador. In El-Paso v Argentina, the claimant asserted that their investment in the 
energy sector was in like circumstances with investments in the banking sector.  
There was strict scrutiny in determining whether the comparators were in like 
circumstances. The tribunal took into consideration the factual disadvantaged 
position of the banking sector as a result of asymmetrical pesification and the 
government‘s effort to correct the situation. This is a respectable approach taken. 
                                                 
913 In a similar vein, Walde has highlighted the possibility of legitimate comparison across borders, 
depending on the design of the measure that aims for lesser treatment of foreign investors. See Walde, 
‗Comments on the Discipline of  ‘National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and Intruding into 
Domestic Regulatory Space?‘ (n 3).  
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However, it is submitted that the tribunal‘s less meticulous attention to the relevance 
of the nationality based discrimination is both undesirable and confusing. It is hard 
to draw a balance in the tribunal‘s approach that on the one hand it did not accept 
that there must be a finding of discriminatory intent, but on the other unconvinced 
that the measure which affected the energy sector was part of a specific policy to 
discriminate.
914
 The tribunal seemed to take into account the former for the finding 
of the latter. Had the tribunal construed its analysis on the structure and factual 
circumstances of the measure in light of nationality based discrimination (as 
suggested by this thesis), it would have released the tribunal from the apprehension 
that discriminatory intent was necessary that should be avoided.    
 
The case of OEPC v Ecuador has received vast criticism in this aspect. The tribunal 
did not pay attention to the absence of discriminatory motive based on nationality 
but rather gave the benefit of likeness to the claimants despite being in different 
economic sectors. Decisions such as this require reasoned justifications as it is more 
the exception than the rule.   
 
Generally , from the discussion above it can be concluded that it is harder to prove 
likeness when it involves comparators of different economic sectors. The merge of 
justification test is more likely to be applied when the facts of the cases move away 
from the same economic sector. Relatively, cases falling under the three prong test 
are straightforward and easier. Where the merge of justification test is applied, there 
will be more room for margin of appreciation for the host states and in turn, the 
proportionality assessment will be more rigorous. 
                                                 
914 El-Paso v Argentina, (n 173), paras 305-308. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
 
The study reveals that there is more to the interpretation of likeness in national 
treatment provisions than it seems. It is a fascinating subject, alive and involves 
important stakes, a fertile ground for private and public interests to interact. It can 
also be regarded as both the strength and the Achilles of the national treatment 
provision, depending on how the interpretation is directed to. It is under this 
realisation that this thesis aims to bring the interpretation of national treatment to 
what is just in terms of the obligation to foreign investors and what is right in the 
function of the sovereigns and the people. 
 
This thesis has responded to this complexity by understanding most importantly 
what obligation the host states have in the national treatment provision. This is 
translated into the underlying values of national treatment as described in this 
chapter.    It has firstly identified two important underlying values of national 
treatment which are, firstly to ensure level playing field and secondly, to protect 
foreign investors against unreasonable nationality based measures. These findings 
are deduced from the doctrinal evaluation of the objectives and purposes of the 
investment treaties, the tribunals‘ construction of investment cases and the reflection 
from the notion of national treatment under the jurisprudences under comparison, 
namely   GATT/WTO, EU and international human rights law.  This chapter 
summarised the essence of the national treatment provision in investment 
agreements. It captured the lessons learnt from the jurisprudences under comparison 
and operationalises them in the assessment of likeness in national treatment under 
international investment law. 
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Putting the underlying values of national treatment in place, it is then apt to 
determine the role of likeness in the provision. The analysis comprises lessons learnt 
from GATT/WTO, EU and International Human Rights Law in particular the role of 
‗competition‘, ‗protectionist purpose‘, ‗aims and effect test‘, ‗situation‘ of the 
comparators, the ‗effet utile’ of the jurisprudence, the importance and limits of 
‗margin of appreciation‘ and the consequences of adopting the ‗independent or 
merge of justification test‘ in assessing likeness. This chapter has assimilated the 
lessons learnt into the context of investment law by way of revisiting investment 
cases and suggesting its way forward.  
 
This thesis has considerably portrayed the complicated position of the international 
investment regime in responding to public concerns in national treatment cases. It 
has promoted the adaption of administrative public law principles such as the 
principles of ‗reasonableness‘ and ‗proportionality‘ and supported the relevance of 
‗margin of appreciation‘ in the interpretation of likeness. This is the most sustainable 
way in which investment law could move forward, enhancing its legitimacy and 
acceptance.
915
 
 
In conclusion, this thesis develops a body of knowledge on the interpretation of 
likeness and its relevant counterpart -the determination of legitimate regulatory 
measures- in national treatment. It provides the criteria and guidelines in which 
likeness should be interpreted, highlighting the ‗circumstances‘ or ‗situations‘ of the 
                                                 
915 Kingsbury and Schill, ‗Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors‘ Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest—the Concept of Proportionality‘ (n 886); Stephan W. Schill, ‗The 
Public Law Challenge: Killing or Rethinking International Investment Law?‘ [2012] Columbia FDI 
Perspectives. 
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investments and the economic context of the investment treaties. It has provided the 
methodologies in which situation the determination of legitimate regulatory 
measures becomes relevant to the interpretation of likeness. In the determination of 
legitimate regulatory measure itself, it has posed the importance of deference, 
balanced with the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The comparative 
study involving the GATT/WTO, EU and international human rights law has proven 
fruitful in providing insights for the direction of interpretation of likeness.  It is 
concluded that these jurisprudences are relevant to the interpretation of likeness. This 
comparative study is an academic effort for the development of the doctrinal 
embodiment of national treatment and is hoped to be influential in the practical 
arena. 
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